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PREFACE 
This book is an attempt to  present under one cover the current state of 
knowledge concerning the potential lightning effects on aircraft and the means 
that are available to  designers and operators to  protect against these effects. The 
impetus for writing this book springs from two sources--the increased use of 
nonmetallic materials in the structure of  aircraft and the constant trend toward 
using electronic equipment to handle flight-critical control and navigation 
functions. Nonmetallic structures are inherently more likely t o  be damaged by  a 
lightning strike than are metallic structures. Nonmetallic structures also provide 
less shielding against the intense electromagnetic fields of  lightning than d o  
metallic structures. These fields have demonstrated an ability to  damage or cause 
upset of electronic equipment. 
Such concerns, when added to the continuing apprehension regarding 
the vulnerability of fuel systems to lightning, have led in the past decade to 
increased research into lightning effects o n  aircraft. The results of this research 
are contained in the technical reports and literature published by ourselves and 
by researchers in other laboratories who are also working on  these problems. 
Conferences and symposiums have been held so that researchers could exchange 
ideas and information; there is a high degree of cooperation among all of those 
working towards the goal of complete safety-of-flight in the lightning environ- 
men t. 
The persons who can best use information on aircraft protection from 
lightning are the aircraft designers and operators, but generally they are not 
among those who produced this information. Moreover, they are often unaware 
of its existence, and they seldom have the background to distill from it the 
important facts that can and should be applied to  achieve safer designs. The 
purpose of  this book is to present the most important parts of this body of 
knowledge in a manner most useful to the designer and the operator. 
This book is organized into seventeen chapters. In the first of these we 
review what lightning is and how it originates. The second chapter describes how 
the aircraft becomes involved with the lightning Slash and why it is that aircraft 
d o  not produce their own lightning flashes, but  may, we think, sometimes trigger 
natural ones. Chapter 3 considers how often and under what conditions aircraft 
have been struck, reviews avoidance procedures now in use by operators, and 
reviews their degree of success. We also take up  the question of whether or not 
strikes could be totally avoided. The fourth chapter summarizes the various 
effects which have occurred when lightning has struck aircraft, giving the 
operator an idea of  the direct and indirect effects which he may expect when his 
aircraft is "zapped ." 
Since our main purpose is t o  help the designer protect against those effects 
that may be hazardous, the remainder of  the book is devoted t o  this purpose. 
Chapters 5, 6 ,  and 7 deal with protection against the direct physical damage 
effects. Chapter 5 sets forth three philosopl~ical steps which guide us in the 
design work that follows. Attention is also called to  government standards or 
certification regulations which deal with aircraft lightning protection. 
Chapter 6 reviews in some depth what is known about lightning effects on 
aircraft fuel systems and tells how to design protection against these effects. We 
give considerable attention t o  this subject and urge the designer to d o  likewise 
because of the serious consequences in the past of lightning effects on  these 
systems. Chapter 7 deals with the protection of the aircraft from structural 
damage resulting from lightning, with emphasis on the nonmetallic materials-- 
materials that may be more vulnerable than the metal structures they are 
beginning to replace. 
The remainder of the book deals with indirect effects. Chapter 8 
introduces the reader t o  the basic mechanisms by which induced voltages occur 
in aircraft electrical circuits, and Chapters 9 through 14 treat these mechanisms 
in greater detail. Chapters 15 and 16 then consider the impact of induced 
voltages upon solid state electronic devices and tell how these devices may be 
protected. Here, concepts such as the transient control level philosophy are 
presented. Concepts of this kind may form the basis for future specifications 
that define the roles to  be played by both the aircraft designer and the 
electronics equipment designer. Finally, in Chapter 17 we show how aircraft can 
be tested t o  determine their actual susceptibility t o  indirect effects and how 
equipment can be tested t o  determine its vulnerability or prove that protection 
design goals have been met. 
To some extent,  each chapter stands by itself and can be utilized without 
knowledge of the others. Dependencies often exist, however, among the 
lightning effects on structural, electrical, and fuel systems; for the most 
thorough understanding of lightning effects on  any one of these systems, the 
reader is urged t o  read the entire book. 
Part of  the research upon which this book is based was conducted by  
ourselves, but a significant amount was conducted by  researchers at other 
laboratories. We have referred to or incorporated that work frequently. Without 
it our present understanding of lightning effects--as well as this book--would 
not have been possible. Not all of the work conducted in this field could be 
referenced, of course, but we have carefully studied most of it. The work we 
reference is that which we consider to  be definitive, and we have taken care to  
provide complete source details so that the reader can refer to  them for 
additional information. 
Even though much has now been learned about lightning effects on 
aircraft and how t o  design protection, there are still some lightning effects which 
are not fully understood. Examples of  these are (1) the mechanisms by which 
lightning currents diffuse into interior structural members and conducting parts 
together with the extent t o  which this happens and (2) the effects of 
electromagnetic radiation from the lightning arc upon aircraft electrical and 
electronic systems. We have tried to identify these areas as they are encountered, 
and we caution the reader to  remain alert for developments in these areas in the 
future. 
While much of this book may appear oriented t o  the designer, there is 
much here of benefit to the operator as well. Familiarity with its contents will 
enable him to  know what to expect, what not t o  expect, and why particular 
th ing  happen when lightning strikes his aircraft. The book will show him where 
to look for damage after a strike, and, we hope, help him to  better identify 
potential problem areas and to communicate them to researchers and designers 
in time to avert future problems. 
The preparation of this material was supported by the Aerospace Safety 
Research and Data Institute, Lewis Research Center, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration under Contract NAS3-19080. We wish to  acknowledge the 
support of that organization. We also wish to  acknowledge the support of H. V. 
Bankaitis, Solomon Weiss and, in particular, of Paul T. Hacker of that 
organization. It was Mr. Hacker who first suggested that a book of this nature be 
written. 
Also, we deeply appreciate the help of Beryl I. Hourihan in digging 
through our fiIes for materials and in preparing the rough draft; and the 
diligence, skill, and long hours applied by Catharine L. Fisher, who edited this 
book, bringing order and clarity to a sometimes confusing array of facts and 
figures. 
F. A. Fisher 
J. A. Plumer 
April 1977 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE LIGHTNING ENVIRONMENT 
1.1 Introduction 
The lightning flash originates with the formation of electrical charge in the 
air or,  more commonly, clouds. The most common producer of lightning is the 
cumulonimbus thundercloud. Lightning, however, can also occur during sand- 
storms, snowstorms, and in the clouds over erupting volcanos. Lightning has 
even been reported to occur in clear air, though this phenomenon is rare and is 
possibly a result of  lightning originating in conventional clouds beyond the 
observer's field of vision. Lightning originating in sandstorms and volcanic 
eruptions is not o f  serious concern to  aircraft, but lightning associated with 
snowstorms occurs sufficiently often as to  present a problem, not because its 
nature is different from lightning associated with thunderstorms but because it is 
apt t o  occur when it is unexpected. 
The most common types of  lightning are those involving the cloud and 
ground, called cloud-to-grou~zd lightning, and lightning between charge centers 
within a cloud, called intracloud lightning. This latter is sonletimes erroneously 
called intercloud or cloud-ro-cloud lightning. True cloud-to-cloud I~glltning 
between isolated cloud centers is possible; however, what appears t o  be cloud-to- 
cloud lightning is often a spectacular manifestation of intracloud discharges. 
Most research on lightning has centered on cloud-to-ground l~ghtning; 
despite its importance t o  aircraft operation, much less information on the 
characteristics of intracloud lightning than on those of cloud-to-ground lightning 
exists, for a variefy of reasons. The first is simply that intracloud lightning, 
unlike cloud-to-ground lightning, is largely hidden from direct observation. The 
second is that conducting research on the characteristics of lightning is often a 
labor of love requiring both extensive apparatus and extreme patience. Observing 
lightning from a fixed ground station is rnuch easier and cheaper than observing 
lightning from a moving aircraft. The third is that most of the funding for re- 
search on  lightning has come, directly or indirectly, from those who are con- 
cerned with the effects of  lightning on electric power transmission and distribu- 
tion lines, which are affected only by cloud-to-ground strokes. 
The characteristics of lightning are discussed in the sections which follow. 
However, much of the material relative to  the physics of lightning will be dis- 
cussed primarily in terms of cloud-to-ground strokes for the reasons cited 
above and because frequently it is difficult to say for any given flash which type 
was involved. While aircraft may be involved with any of the three types of 
lightning, cloud-to-ground and intracloud lightning flashes are the most common 
types. But where aircraft design and operation are of  concern, the type of flash 
makes little difference. 
Figure 1.1 shows a generalized waveshape for the current flowing t o  
ground from a typical negative cloud-to-ground flash and presents terms for the 
five main regions shown: the leader, the initial return stroke, an intermediate 
current, a continuing current, and one or more restrikes. Each of  these aspects 
will be discussed. 
INTERMEDIATE RESTRIKE 
Figure 1.1 Generalized waveshape of current in negative cloud-to-ground 
lightning. (Note that the drawing is not t o  scale.) 
1.2 Generation o f  the Lightning Flash 
1.2.1 Generation of  the Charge 
The energy that produces lightning is assumed t o  be provided by warm air 
rising upwards into a developing cloud. As the air rises it becomes cooler, and at 
the dew point, the excess water vapor condenses into water droplets, forming a 
cloud. When the air has risen high enough for the temperature to  drop t o  -40 O C ,  
the water vapor will have frozen t o  ice. At lower elevations there will be many 
supercooled water drops that are not frozen, even though the temperature is 
lower than the freezing point. In this supercooled region, ice crystals and 
hailstones form. 
According t o  one theory, the cloud becomes electrically charged by the 
following process (Reference 1.1). Some of the ice crystals which have formed 
coalesce into hailstones. These hailstones fall through the cloud gathering 
additional supercooled water droplets. As droplets freeze on to  a hallstone, small 
splinters of ice chip off. Apparently, these splinters carry away a positive 
electrical charge, leaving the hailstone with a net negative charge. The vertical 
wind currents in the cloud carry the ice splinters into the upper part of the 
cloud, while the hailstone, being heavier, falls until it reaches warmer air, where 
some portion of it melts and the remainder continues t o  earth. Thus, the upper 
part of  the cloud takes on a positive charge while the lower region takes on a 
negative charge. In some other manner, another smaller pocket of positive charge 
may be formed near the front of  the base of the cloud and below the main body 
of  negative charge. 
Other theories have been proposed t o  account for the electrification of the 
cloud (References 1.2 t o  1.7). All of  them are based on experimentally observed 
evidence that the charge in the top of the cloud is positive. There may also be a 
body of positive charge near the front of the base of the cloud. The charge in the 
rest of the cloud is negative. Figure 1.2 shows a typical cloud with the charge 
distributed as previously described. The cloud is moving t o  the left. The 
unbroken lines represent stream lines of air. 
NEGATIVE RAIN 
Figure 1.2 Generalized diagram showing distribution of air currents and 
electrical charge distribution in a typical cumulonimbus cloud. 
The air currents and the electrical charges tend t o  be contained in localized 
cells and the cloud as a whole t o  be composed of a number of cells. A typical 
cloud might have the cell structure shown in Figure 1.3 (Reference 1.8). The 
electrical charge contained within a cell might appear as shown in Figure 1.4 
(Reference 1.9). The temperature at the main negative-charge center will be 
about -5 OC and at the auxiliary pocket of positive charge below it, about 0 "C. 
The main positive-charge center in the upper cloud will be about 15 "C colder 
than its negative counterpart. 
The lifetime of a typical cell is about 30 minutes. At its mature stage the 
cell as a whole will have a potential, with respect t o  the earth, of 10' t o  lo9  
volts (V). It  will have a total stored charge of several hundred coulombs (C) with 
potential differences between positive- and negative-charge pockets again on the 
order of lo8  t o  lo9  V. The cell as a whole will have a negative charge. 
1.2.2 Conditions o n  the Ground 
As the cloud passes over a point on the ground, an electrical charge is 
attracted into the ground under the cloud. The average electric field at  the 
surface of the ground will change from its fair-weather value of  about 300 volts 
per meter (V/m) positive (air positive with respect t o  the earth) t o  as high as 
several thousand volts per meter. Generally, when a cloud is overhead, the field 
from cloud to earth will be negative, but when a localized positive region is 
overhead, the field may be positive. The potential gradient will be concentrated 
around sharp protruding points on the ground and can exceed the breakdown 
strength of the air, which has a nominal value of 3 0  0 0 0  V/cm. When the 
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Figure 1.3 An idealized cross section through a thunderstorm cell in its mature 
stage. Key: 0, rain; *, snow; +, ice crystals. 
breakdown strength of the air is exceeded, current into the air increases sharply 
and a bluish electrical discharge called corona forms around a point. This 
discharge is the St. Elmo's fire that appears on such places as masts of ships, 
aircraft wing and tail tips, and from trees and grass on high ground. The 
magnitude of  the  current from a single discharge point may range from 1 or 2 
microamperes (PA) to  as high as 400 PA. 
0 1 I 
Figure 1.4 Estimated charge distribution in a mature thundercloud (after 
Phillips). 
1.2.3 Development of the Leader 
At some state in the electrification of the cloud, a discharge towards the 
earth takes place. I t  starts as  a slow-moving column of ionized air called the pilot 
streamer. After the pilot streamer has moved perhaps 30 to  50 m, a more intense 
discharge called the stepleader takes place. This discharge lowers additional 
negative charge into the region around the pilot streamer, recharges it, so t o  
speak, and allows it t o  continue for another 30 t o  50 m,  after which the cycle 
repeats. 
A discharge propagating in this manner is called a streamer discharge; its 
development is illustrated in Figure 1.5. The streamer is initiated when a free 
electron is accelerated in a sufficiently high electrical field (a). An electron (b) so 
accelerated collides with neutral molecules of air (c), ionizes them, leaving them 
with a positive charge, and creates new electrons at a rate of a per unit length. 
The electrons, being much less massive than the positive ions, move under the 
influence of  the electric field, leaving the positive ions behind. If the discharge 
continues t o  develop over the length a,  there will be a t  the head of  the discharge 
(d) a number of electrons given by 
N = exp (J: (a-n)) dx 
where a is the Townsend ionization coefficient and g is the attachment 
coefficient. In air at atnlospheric pressure, electron multipIication can exist only 
where the field is higher than 25 kV/cm because only in this case is a greater 
than 7. 
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Figure 1.5 Stages in the development of a leader. 
Left in the wake of these electrons will be positively charged ions (e). If 
the electric field is high enough, the initial avalanche will reach a critical size 
(approximately lo8 electrons) for another avalanche of electrons (f) to  be 
initiated by photoionization (g) from the initial discharge. The electric field that 
accelerates this secondary discharge is the sum of the initial electl-ic field and 
that produced by the positive space charge left behind by the initial avalanche. 
Under the action of the total field, these successive avalanches reach the positive 
space charge (h), neutralize it, and leave a new positive charge a little farther on. 
With such a mechanism a positive charge moves step by step into the un-ionized 
air leaving behind it a partially ionized filament (i). This filament is a conductor, 
though at  this stage o f  its development perhaps only a poor conductor. 
The processes just described relate t o  a positive electric field. In a negative 
electric field a similar, though more complicated, phenonienon occurs. The 
initial avalanches seem t o  develop in the air farther ahead of the leader and to 
propagate both ways: into virgin air and back toward the more fully developed 
leader. The end result is much the same; behind the advancing head of  the leader 
is an ionized column in this ease with a predominance of negative charge and 
' having at its center a more heavily conducting filament. 
If the initial development of the leader takes place in the charged cloud, 
the developing streamer branches and begins to  collect charge from its 
surroundings. Because it collecrs charge in this way, the streamer may be viewed 
as connected to  the cloud and at the same potential as the cloud. As the head of 
the leader moves farther into the un-ionized air, charge flows down from the 
charged regions of the cloud, along the partially conducting filament and toward 
the head of the leader, thus tending to keep all parts of the leader at a very high 
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potential. The amount of  charge, qo, lowered into the leader will be  on the order 
of 2 t o  20  x loe4 C/m of length. A leader 5 km long would then have stored 
within it a charge of  1 to  1 0  C. 
Since the potential of the leader is very high, there will be a high radial 
electric field along the leader. This field will be high enough t o  exceed the 
breakdown strength of the air, and secondary streamers will branch out  radially 
away from the central filament. The filaments will branch out radially until the 
field strength at the edge of the ionized region falls to about 30 kV/cm. 
It can be shown that the electric field strength at the edge of  a cylinder 
containing a charge, qo, per unit length is 
Froni this and the above breakdown strength of air, it can be deduced 
that the radius of the leader will be 1.2 to  12 m. At higher elevations the 
breakdown strength o f  air is less; hence the leader radius may be  more. 
Figure 1.6 The lightning leader as postulated by Wagner 
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As postulated by Wagner (Figure 1.6 [Reference 1.101 ), the head of the 
leader may have a larger diameter than that of the rest of the leader, though this 
is difficult to prove by photographs. The head of  the leader, nevertheless, is 
generally visible because of  the optical radiation associated with the extension of 
the electron avalanches, But once the growth ceases, the radiation stops; 
consequently, the corona sheath surrounding the central conducting filament is 
not visible. 
The process can be  studied in the laboratory, albeit on a smaller scale than 
that of  natural lightning. Figure 1.7 shows typical phenomena observed during 
the breakdown of  the air between electrodes about 10 m apart. The sketch is 
based on a series of short-duration (about 1 microsecond [ps]) photographs 
taken at intervals of  about 25 ps with an image-converter camera. As the 
electrons are attracted out of  the initially ionized region at the head of  the 
leader, the conducting filament lengthens and the corona discharge at the head 
of the leader occurs farther on in previously un-ionized air. 
Figure 1.7 The development of a leader in the laboratory. 
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Photographs of  actual lightning leaders may be taken with a Boys camera, 
a camera in which the film moves relative to  the camera lens. An example of 
such a photograph is shown in Figure 1.8 (Reference 1.1 1 ). The leader is seen 
originating at the top  left-hand corner of the picture and lengthening as time 
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increases. The bright line at the right of the picture is called the return stroke 
and will be  discussed shortly. 
Figure 1.8 Boys camera photograph of a lightning leader. 
From such hotographs it has been learned that the leader advances at tF about 1 t o  2 x 10 m/s, or 0.03 t o  0.06% of the speed of light (Reference 1.12). 
In order that a charge of 2 to  2 0  x 1 o - ~  C be deposited by a leader advancing at 
the rate o f  1 x lo5 m/s requires the average current in the leader, ip, t o  be 20 to 
200 A. A current of  this magnitude could be carried only in a highly conducting 
arc discharge, the assumed central conducting filament of the leader. Such an arc 
would have a diameter on the order of a few millimeters and an axial voltage 
gradient, gp, of about 5 x lo3  V/m. A leader 4 km long would then have a 
voltage drop along its length of 2 x l o 7  V. The longitudinal resistance, RQ, of 
the conducting filament gy/iQ would then be in the range of 4 0  t o  4 0 0  ohms per 
meter (Rim). 
While of less importance as regards aircraft, it might be noted that leaders 
sometimes start at the ground and work their way toward the sky. This happens 
most frequently from tall buildings or towers, o r  from buildings or  towers 
located atop hills. Generally, one can tell from the direction of the lightning 
flash branching whether the leader started at  the cloud or at the ground: if the 
branching is downward (Figure 1.9), the leader originated at  the cloud; if the 
branching is upward, the leader originated at the ground. 
1.2.4 The Return Stroke 
As the negatively charged step-leader approaches the ground, positive 
charge accumulates in the ground underneath it or,  more accurately, negative 
charge is repelled away from the region under the leader. At some point the 
electric field strength around objects on the ground becomes sufficiently high 
that a streamer starts a t  the ground and works its way toward the downward- 
approaching leader. When the streamers meet, the conducting filament in the 
center of each streamer provides a low-impedance path so that the charge stored 
in the head of the leader can flow easily t o  ground. As the current in the central 
CLOUD 
Figure 1.9 Leader direction as determined from direction of branching. 
(a) Downward-branching leader starts at cloud. 
(b) Upward-branching leader starts at ground. 
filament rises from its initial current of  a few tens of amperes t o  higher values, it 
gets hotter,  its diameter expands, its longitudinal gradient decreases, and it 
becomes an even better conductor, which in turn allows even more current t o  
flow in the arc. As the charge in the lower part of  the leader is neutralized, the 
heavily conducting arc reaches higher into the charged leader channel. The head 
of the region in which this neutralization takes place moves upwards at a rate of 
roughly 100 0 0 0  km/s (or one-third the velocity of light) until it reaches the 
cloud. This heavily conducting region, called the return stroke, produces the 
intense flash normally associated with the lightning stroke. Some stages in the 
development of the return stroke are shown in Figure I .  1 0  (Reference 1.13). 
The velocity with which this return stroke propagates, together with the 
amount of charge deposited in the leader channel, determines the amount of 
current developed in the return stroke. Let v be the velocity of  the return stroke 
and q be the amount of charge deposited per unit length, dQ, along the leader 
channel. Since 
and 
then 
As a numerical example let 
The velocity of  the return stroke is not constant from one stroke t o  the 
next. It seems t o  vary with the magnitude of  current that is ultimately 
developed. The relationship between current and velocity may be deduced either 
from theoretical concepts or experimentally. The relationship derived by  Wagner 
(Reference 1.14) is shown in Figure 1 . 1  I .  Considerations of the return stroke 
velocity are primarily of importance in studying the time history of the electric 
field produced by the lightning flash. The velocity, however, may affect the 
surge impedance of  the lightning stroke, and thus the way that the stroke 
interacts with a metallic conductor like an aircraft. 
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Figure 1.10 Stages in the development of the return stroke. 
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Figure 1.11 Relation between stroke current and velocity of return stroke. 
The velocity of propagation of the return stroke is less than that of the 
speed of light for two basic reasons. The first reason involves the longitudinal 
resistance of the return stroke channel. 
Some of the factors associated with this longitudinal resistance are shown 
in Figure 1.12. Central t o  the phenomenon is the fact that the current in the 
lightning channel must increase fairly rapidly from the 200 A (approximately) 
(4 
Figure 1.12 Phenomena associated with passage of the return stroke. 
(a) Current 
(b) Longitudinal voltage 
(c) Longitudinal resistance 
current associated with the initial development of the leader to a current of 
perhaps 100 kA as the return stroke becomes fully developed. It is a 
characteristic of an arc channel discharge that if the current through the arc is 
increased, the arc channel expands in diameter, keeping a fairly constant current 
density across the channel. This channel cannot expand instantaneously, since 
energy must be put into the channel to cause the channel to heat up sufficiently 
to force it to expand. Accordingly, if the current through the arc channel is 
increased suddenly by a large magnitude, as in Figure 1.12(a), the longitudinal 
voltage gradient of the channel must suddenly increase. Since the rate at which 
energy is injected into the channel is the product of the current and the 
longitudinal voltage gradient, the increased longitudinal voltage gradient may be 
taken as the mechanism forcing the arc channel to get hot enough to expand to 
the diameter required to carry the high currents. It is not known what the 
maximum longitudinal voltage gradient would be in a lightning channel, but it is 
known from studies of arcs in laboratories that the gradient will fall to values on 
the order of 100 kV/m in a fraction of a microsecond. Presumably in a few 
microseconds, the channel dianreter will have expanded to its final value, and the 
longitudinal voltage gradient will have decayed back toward values on the order 
of 5 to 10 kV/m. The longitudinal resistance, then, would fall from values on the 
order of 40 n / m  to values on the order of a small fraction of an ohm per meter, 
in times on the order of a few microseconds. 
This collapse of longitudinal resistance, however, is far from instantaneous. 
The initial resistance of the leader is sufficiently high to retard the development 
of the upward-going return stroke and hence reduce its velocity of propagation 
below that of the speed of light. Presumably, leaders which lead to the 
formation of high-amplitude lightning currents either have a sufficiently low 
longitudinal resistance to begin with or the longitudinal resistance is reduced to 
low values sufficiently fast by the high-amplitude return strokes that the 
longitudinal resistance presents less of an obstacle for the upward-going return 
stroke than it does for the flashes which involve lower peak currents, 
An additional factor that affects the velocity of the return stroke and is 
the second reason that the velocity is less than the speed of light is shown in 
Figure 1.13. As explained earlier, the leader deposits in its wake a column of 
electrical charge with diameters on the order of several meters. At the center is a 
highly conducting core, which has a diameter of a few millimeters for the leader 
and which expands to a few centimeters during the passage of the return stroke. 
The inductance of this return stroke is determined by the diameter of the highly 
conductive central core, and the capacitance by the diameter of the column of 
electrical charge. The lightning stroke may then be modeled as shown in Figure 
1.13(b), in which a highly conductive central conductor is fastened onto a series 
of projecting splines, much like the backbone of a fish. A better analogy might 
be to view the lightning flash as a piece of tinsel rope for decorating a Christmas 
tree: a central piece of string is surrounded by a tube of fine filaments projecting 
radially away from the central core. In either case, the radial filaments can carry 
a radial current, i,, but cannot carry an axial ~ u r r e n t ,  ia. Accordingly, the 
lightning return stroke has both a high capacitance and a high inductance per 
unit of  length. In this respect it differs from a solid conductor of large diameter 
which, while possessing a high capacitance per unit length, simultaneously 
possesses a low inductance per unit length. It follows that the surge impedance, 
governed by the ratio of  inductance to  capacitance, is high while the velocity of 
propagation, governed by the product of inductance and capacitance, is less than 
that of the speed of light. 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 1.13 Effect of corona cloud on velocity of propagation. 
(a) Distributed charge surrounding a highly conductive central 
core 
( b )  Highly conductive central conductor fastened o n t o  a series 
of projecting splines 
Wagner (Reference 1.15) concludes that the surge impedance of  the 
lightning flash is of the order of 3 000  52 for return strokes of  large amplitude, 
1 0 0  kA. This value is large compared to the surge impedance ( ~ 5 0 0  a) o f  a 
simple conductor in air and remote from a ground plane or other current return 
path. 
The waveshapes of  lightning-flash currents measured at  ground level are 
reasonably well known, principally from the work of Berger (Reference 1.16). 
Typical waveshapes detailing the front of the initial return stroke are shown in 
Figures 1.14 and 1.1 5 (References 1.17 and 1 .I 8). In all cases, the current is 
seen t o  have a concave front,  the current initially rising slowly but then 
increasing t o  a maximum current rate of  change just before crest amplitude is 
reached. It may be speculated that the initial slowly changing portion of these 
current oscillograms (which, of  course, were measured at ground level) 
represents the growth of an upward-going leader from the lightning tower 
reaching upwards t o  contact the downward-approaching lightning leader. I t  can 
also be speculated that the maximum rate of change of  current, which occurs 
just before crest, is most representative of the rate at which the current can 
increase in the lightning channel as the return stroke passes one particular point 
in space. This is supported by the observation that subsequent strokes in a 
- lightning flash, even measured at ground level, exhibit front times considerably 
faster than the rise time of  the initial stroke in the flash. 
The true front time of the leading edge of the return stroke as it passes a 
point remote from ground has probably never been measured. I t ,  however, seems 
appropriate t o  assume that it will be faster than the leading edge of currents 
measured at  ground level. 
Figure 1. 14 Front waveshapes of lightning currents as measured by Berger. 
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Figure I. I5 Current oscillograms from single strokes or first downward strokes. 
1) Fast time-scale t 1 ; 2) Slow time-scale t2. In osc. No. 6 1 19 TI, 
chopping may be caused by a flashover in the measuring equipment. 
1.3 Further Development of the Lightning Flash 
After the charge has been drained from the leader by the upwardly moving 
return stroke, the current measured at the ground decays, though at a rate 
slower than that a t  which the current rose to  its peak. Oscillograms showing 
typical decay times are shown in Figure 1.15 (Reference 1.18). The figure 
displays the current on two different time scales, emphasizing the front and the 
tail. Some of  the oscillograms showing the front are the same as those shown in 
Figure 1.14 (Reference 1.17). 
As the return stroke approaches the cloud, it may encounter other 
branches of  the leader, as shown in Figure 1.16. As i t  passes these branches, the 
charge stored in them will feed into the developing lightning stroke and 
momentarily increase the current. Eventually, the return stroke will reach the 
cloud. Our understanding of  the phenomena occurring within the cloud is 
hindered by our not being able t o  see the phenomena, but we can infer some of 
the phenomena from measurements of the electrical radiation produced by  the 
developing flash and from the usual behavior of the flash after the initial return 
stroke has passed. As the return stroke reaches into the cloud, it appears t o  
encounter a much more heavily branched leader than it did in the air below the 
cloud. The return stroke can thus tap the charge diffused through a large volume 
of the cloud, rather than only the charge in the more localized leader. It would 
CHARGE ON BRANCHES 
UPWARD-MOVING RETURN STROKE 
Figure 1.16 Further development o f  the flash. 
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appear t o  be during this period that the intermediate current (Component D of  
Figure 1.1) is developed. As the discharge continues t o  spread through the cloud, 
for times on the order of  fractions of a second, currents on the order of  a few 
hundred amperes continue t o  flow in the lightning flash. These are referred t o  as 
continuing currents (Component E of Figure 1.1). As one may expect, there is 
no clear-cut demarcation between the tail of the return stroke and the 
intermediate current, or between the end of the intermediate current and the 
start of the continuing current. 
Eventually, and usually, the developing discharge within the cloud reaches 
into a different cell o f  the cloud or, at any rate, into a region where there is 
another localized body of  electrical charge. At this stage there occurs what is 
called a restrike (Component F of  Figure 1 .I). The restrike starts with additional 
charge being lowered from the cloud to form a new leader, or, more properly, to  
recharge the central portion of  the old leader. Presumably, because of  the 
residual ionization in the channel, this charging process occurs smoothly, not in 
the step-by-step process by which the initial leader penetrates into the virgin air. 
Accordingly, this is called a dart leader instead o f  a step-leader. Unlike the initial 
step-leader, the dart leader is seldom branched. When the dart leader reaches 
ground level, a return stroke again occurs. The amplitude of this return stroke is 
again high, since the current comes from an intensely ionized region close to  the 
ground. While the amplitude is usually not as high as that of the first return 
stroke, the current rises to crest more rapidly than does that of the initial return 
stroke, presumably because the upward leader from the ground does not have to 
propagate into virgin air. 
1.4 Lightning Polarity and Direction 
Most Iightning flashes originate in the cloud and lower negative charge to  
earth. The question of direction of the lightning flash is sometimes confusing. 
With the intent of clarifying matters, the statement is sometimes made that 
lightning strikes upward and not downward. This is at least partially true; the 
return stroke that produces the high peak currents, thunder, and the highest 
intensity light, in fact does start near the ground and grow upward into the 
ionized channel previously established by the step-leader, thus tapping the 
charge in the step-leader. The step-leader, nevertheless, originated at the cloud. 
The source of energy is in the cloud, and the lower amplitude and longer 
duration currents have their origin in the charge stored in the cloud. Thus, in 
terms of the engineering definition of current, these flashes result in the 
direction of current flow from the earth to the cloud. This type is commonly 
called a negative polarity flash. 
When tall buildings or mountain tops are involved, the lightning flash often 
does originate at the ground; the step-leader starts a t  ground level and propagates 
upwards into the cloud. Such flashes seem to be triggered by the high electric 
field concentrated around the top of the building or mountain. They may be 
recognized by  the upward direction of branching, as mentioned earlier and 
shown in Figure 1.9(b). This type of  flash therefore results in current flow from 
the cloud to the ground and is called a positive polarity flash. Positive polarity 
flashes usually have lower peak currents than d o  flashes that originate at the 
cloud. 
About 10% of all flashes are positive polarity flashes, and a fraction of 
these involve the highest peak currents and charge found associated with 
lightning. Examples of  some of these strong positive flashes are shown in Figure 
1.17 (Reference 1.19). The positive flashes typically have only one high current 
stroke; they lack the restrike phase generally noted on flashes of negative 
polarity. 
Figure 1.1 7 Examples of strong positive strokes. Currents are recorded on  time- 
scales t 1 and t2; Qs electric charge (coulombs) within 2 p s  from 
the origin; Qk electric charge (coulombs) in the continuing 
current after 2 ps. 
1.5 Intracloud Flashes 
Intracloud flashes occur between charge centers in the cloud. A distin- 
guishing characteristic o f  intracloud flashes is that they seem t o  lack the intense 
return stroke phase typical of  flashes to  the ground, o r  at least that the electrical 
radiation associated with true intracloud discharges lacks the characteristics 
associated with the return stroke of  cloud-to-ground flashes. Discharges between 
charge centers take place during cloud-to-ground flashes as well, and, to  an 
observer within the cloud, it may be difficult to  tell whether or not a flash to  
ground occurred. 
With regard t o  aircraft the matter may be academic. Aircraft are struck 
underneath clouds by  clear-cut cloud-to-ground flashes and by flashes within 
clouds. Based on  the damage observed, the peak current sometimes is very high. 
Whether the high current was associated with the upper end of a cloud-to-ground 
flash or  with a true intracloud flash makes little difference. 
In temperate regions about two-thirds of  all flashes are intracloud flashes. 
In tropical regions, where there is more lightning activity, the ratio is higher. 
1.6 Measured Characteristics of the Lightning Flash 
Lightning flashes are quite variable from one to another. Peak currents, 
total duration, waveshapes, number of strokes in the flash, charge transferred, 
etc., may all vary over wide limits, and only in general terms can one find a 
correlation between different parameters. Data on  the characteristics of lightning 
are best presented in statistical terms, the mode that will be used in the 
following sections. 
One item that needs to  be emphasized is that virtually all the data on  
lightning comes from measurements made at  ground level, and these measure- 
ments may be influenced by  the growth of  an upward leader. Very few 
measurements have been made of the amplitude and waveshape of lightning 
currents passing through aircraft. Most of the measurements that have been 
made were of strokes with lower peak currents and longer times t o  crest than 
those often observed at  ground level. In part this may be explained by  chance 
and in part by the fact that many of  the flashes intercepted may have been 
intracloud flashes and not cloud-to-ground flashes. As noted earlier, intracloud 
flashes often lack the well-defined high-amplitude return stroke of cloud-to- 
ground flashes. 
The best summary of the statistical characteristics of lightning is that 
compiled by Cianos and Pierce (Reference 1.20). They observed that many of 
these characteristics were nearly linear when plotted as a log-normal distribution. 
They then made a judgment as t o  the linear distribution that was the best fit to  
the experimentally observed data. The figures that follow are reproduced from 
their report. 
Figure 1 . I  8 (Reference 1.2 I )  shows data on the peak current amplitude in 
lightning strokes. Regarding the damage that may be caused by  lightning, this is 
one o f  the most important parameters. There are two curves shown, one for the 
first return stroke in a flash and one for subsequent return strokes. The first 
return stroke is generally of  the highest amplitude. For engineering analysis, 
Cianos and Pierce have determined that subsequent return strokes may be 
represented as half the amplitude of the first return stroke. Marked on the curves 
are the amplitudes corresponding to the 2, 10, 50,90, and 98% probabilities. 
The peak value of the current is related to  the explosive, or blasting, effect 
of  lightning. It is also relative to the maximum voltage developed across ground 
resistance and hence to  the risk o f  side flashes occurring in the vicinity of  objects 
struck (or, related to  the maximum voltage developed across loading resistors 
struck (or, related t o  the maximum voltage developed across bonding resistance 
and hence t o  the possibility of  sparking at  structural interfaces). 
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Figure 1.18 Distribution of peak currents for first return stroke and sub- 
sequent strokes. 
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Figure 1.19 Distribution of time to peak current. 
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Figure 1.19 (Reference 1.22) gives a distribution of the time for the 
current to reach its peak amplitude. This time is subject to  considerable 
interpretation for any particular lightning stroke, since there is seldom a clearly 
definable time at which the stroke starts. Lightning strokes typically have a 
concave front, starting out slowly and then rising faster as the current gets 
higher. Thus, the effective rate of rise of  the lightning current is not directly 
obtained by dividing the peak current by the front time. The best summary of 
the effective rates of  rise is given on  Figure 1.20 (Reference 1.13). The rate of 
rise o f  a lightning current is an in~portant  factor in determining how much 
voltage is induced into electrical equipment, and in determining how many 
lightning conductors are needed and how they sliould be placed. 
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Figure 1.20 Distribution of rates of rise. 
The duration of  the stroke current affects the distance across which side 
flashes may develop, and affects how severely metal structures may be deformed 
by magnetic forces or the explosive libelation of energy. This distribution 1s 
shown in Figure 1.2 1 (Reference 1.24). The duration of the stroke, which is 
measured in tens o f  microseconds, should not be confused with the total 
duration of  the lightning flash. The total duration, shown in Figure 1.27 
(Reference 1.25), is frequently on the order of  a second. The duration of the 
total flash is influenced b y  the number of  return strokes in the flash (Figure 1.23 
[Reference 1.261) and the time interval between strokes (Figure 1.24 
[Reference 1.271 ). 
Figure 1.25 (Reference 1.28) gives information on  the total charge 
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Figure 1.21 Distribution of time to current half value. 
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Figure 1.22 Distribution of duration of flashes t o  earth. 
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Figure 1.23 Distribution of  the number of return strokes/flash. 
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Figure 1.24 Distribution of  time interval between strokes. 
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Figure 1.25 Distribution of chargelflash. 
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Figure 1.26 Distribution of charge in continuing current. 
Figure 1.27 Distribution o f  duration o f  continuing currents. 
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Figure 1.28 Distribution o f  amplitude of continuing current.  
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transferred in the flash. Little of the charge is transferred by any one stroke. 
Instead, most of it is transferred by the continuing currents. The total charge 
transfer and the amplitude and duration of the continuing currents largely 
govern the thermal effects of lightning. Data on the characteristics of these 
continuing currents are shown in Figures 1.26, 1.27, and 1.28 (References 1.29, 
1.30, and 1.3 1).  
1.7 Thunderstorm Frequency and Lightning-Flash Density 
One of  the major factors to consider in determining the probability of  
lightning damage is the number of lightning flashes t o  earth in a given area and 
for a given time. Since precise quantitative data d o  not exist (except at a few 
specifically instrumented structures), a secondary measure, the frequency of 
thunderstorms, is used. 
For many years, weather bureau stations have recorded thunderstorm days 
(the number of  days per year on which thunder is heard). This index, called the 
isokeraunic level, is shown for the continental United States in Figure 1.29' 
(Reference 1.32). It should be noted that the information so collected is of 
limited value for several reasons. First of all, no distinction is made between 
cloud-to-cloud discharges and cloud-to-ground flashes. Also, there is no 
allowance for the duration of a storm. A storm lasting an hour would be counted 
as heavily as one lasting several hours. A better indicator of  lightning frequency 
would be thunderstorm hours per year. Some weather bureau records are now 
being made of thunderstorm hours, but not much data has yet been 
Figure 1.29 Thunderstorm days (isokeraunic level) within the continental 
United States as reported by U.S. Weather Bureau. 
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accumulated. Despite its limitation, the isokeraunic level is broadly useful and 
can be correlated at least partially with lightning strokes t o  earth-based objects. 
Pierce has summarized some of  the available data, shown in Figure 1.30 
(Reference 1.33). 
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Figure 1.30 Relationship between annual thunderstorm day (Ty) and flash 
density (ay )  values. 
This flash density includes both flashes between clouds and flashes to 
ground. There is some evidence that the proportion of  flashes that go to  ground 
is related t o  the  geographical latitude of the point under study. This relation 
would exist because the proportion of  flashes to  ground depends partly on the 
average height of  clouds, and this, in turn, depends on the type of storm 
formation. Plerce (Reference 1.34) has proposed the relat~on shown in Figure 
I .3 I ) .  
The number of lightning flashes to  any particulal object depends strongly 
on the terrain upon which the object is situated. Objects on the crests of hills are 
more prone to be struck than are objects in valleys. All othel things considered, 
however, the probability that a given object will be struck depends upon the area 
covered by that object. For objects flat upon the ground- -for example, a long 
group of  cables laid on the ground surface--the strike interception area can be 
taken as directly equal to the area covered. Figure 1.37 shows such a group of 
cables. Equating the stroke interception area to the actual area covered implies 
that the stroke interception probability is unity for stroke 1 and zero for stroke 
7 falling somewhat to  the side. This may not be strictly true, since the ultimate 
contact point of a lightning flash seems to depend upon the junction of  the 
downcoming lightning leader and induced leaders which are drawn from the 
ground when the electric field strength at the ground surface becomes high 
enough. Such induced leaders could well appear somewhat earlier from a group 
of cables lying on  the ground than from the undisturbed ground surface. 
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Figure 1.31 Relationship between geographicaI Iatitude and proportion of 
flashes to  ground. 
If  there is a protruding object o n  the ground, the stroke interception area 
depends upon the height o f  the object. While there is no uniformity of judgment 
on  the effective stroke interception area of a protruding object, one can at least 
glean some information from the observed pattern of damage t o  objects near a 
tall building or on  a building protected by lightning rods. It has long been 
observed that lightning very seldom strikes within a one-to-one cone of 
protection o f  a protruding object. The significance of this fact is shown on 
Figure 1.33. A lightning flash that would ordinarily continue directly t o  the 
ground a t  point r will instead be  diverted t o  the protruding object. This implies 
that if the distance to  point r is less than h, the probability o f  the protruding 
object being struck at  a distance less than h is very little less than unity. It  stands 
to  reason also that the probability of striking the ground falls off from unity 
, 
.......... 
/ / / I / / / / / / / /  
(a) GEOMETRY 
(b) PROBABILITY 
Figure 1.32 Probability of striking a flat area 
only gradually as one moves farther and farther away from the protruding 
object. For purposes of calculations of  lightning-stroke incidence rate, i t  can 
then be assumed that a structure of  height h will intercept all flashes that would 
ordinarily strike the ground over a circle o f  radius 2h. 
It is not as easy t o  determine analytically how often aircraft in flight will 
be struck. Field experience seems to be the only reliable guide. Commercial 
aircraft in regularly scheduled service in the United States are struck about once 
per year, frequently while in takeoff, landing, or holding patterns, and usually 
while flying at less than 15 000 ft altitude. Transport aircraft are seldom struck 
while at cruising altitudes and speeds, partly of course as a result of  the fact that 
storms usually can be, and are, avoided. Aircraft constrained t o  operate at lower 
altitudes and along fixed corridors tend to be struck more often. 
LIGHTNING FLASH 
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DISTANCE 
(b) PROBABILITY 
Figure 1.33 Probability of striking a protruding object. 
Military aircraft tend to be struck less often than commercial aircraft, 
since they are flown in training flights, which are usually scheduled during good 
weather, much more often than in combat. 
1.8 Engineering Models of Lightning Flashes 
For purposes of  analysis it is helpful t o  have models of the current flowing 
in both typical and severe lightning flashes. Pierce (Reference 1.35) gives several 
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Figure 1.34 Time history of  typical (basic) lightning models. 
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Figure 1.35 Time history of severe (basic) lightning model. 
models, shown in Figures 1.34 and 1.35 (References 1.36 and 1.37). Other 
models may be devised. One that has received wide prominence in the aerospace 
field is the Space Shuttle Lightning Protection Criteria waveform (Figure 1.36 
[Reference 1.381). These, of course, are models for design purposes. As such 
they duplicate the effects (usually worst case effects) of lightning, but the 
chances of any real lightning flash producing currents of this exact shape is 
virtually zero. 
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Figure 1.36 Diagrammatic representation of lightning model. 
(Note that the diagram is not t o  scale.) 
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CHAPTER 2 
AIRCRAFT LIGHTNING ATTACHMENT PHENOMENA 
2.1 Introduction 
Statistics on lightning strikes reported by aircraft pilots seem to indicate 
that no aircraft is likely t o  receive more than one or two lightning strikes in a 
year bu t  that some types of aircraft receive more strikes than others. Compared 
with exposure to  other hazards, such as hail, birds, and turbulence, which are 
also encountered during flight, the exposure of aircraft t o  lightning strikes seems 
relatively infrequent. Because of  this relatively low incidence, inclusion of 
lightning protective measures in the designs of  some aircraft has been considered 
unnecessary. The question also arises: If lightning strikes d o  in fact occur 
infrequently, can they be avoided altogether? Because some types of aircraft 
seem t o  experience more than their "fair share" of lightning strikes, a related 
question also arises: Why are some aircraft more vulnerable than others? T o  
answer these questions a considerable amount of research on the effects of such 
factors as aircraft size, engine exhaust, and microwave radar emissions on 
lightning-strike formation has been undertaken during the past few years. Much 
of this research has been aimed at answering the question of whether or not an 
aircraft can in fact produce its own lightning strike, or static discharge, or if it 
can trigger an impending flash from a nearby cloud. While some of the findings 
are as yet inconclusive, others have provided definite answers t o  some of these 
questions. In  this chapter we summarize what has been learned about the 
aircraft's influence on  lightning-strike occurrence and dispel some other 
misconceptions about this phenomenon. In succeeding chapters we examine how 
other factors, such as flight and weather conditions, affect lightning strikes and 
conclude why it is important that lightning protection be incorporated into all 
new aircraft designs. 
2.2 Aircraft Influence on Flash Formation 
At the beginning of  lightning-flash formation, when a stepped-leader 
propagates outward from a cloud charge center, the ultimate destination of the 
flash at  an opposite charge center in another cloud or on the ground has not yet 
been determined. The difference of  potential which exists between the 
stepped-leader and the opposite charge center(s) establishes an electrostatic force 
field between them, represented by imaginary equipotential surfaces. They are 
shown as lines in the two-dimensional drawing of  Figure 2.1. The field intensity, 
commonly expressed in kilovolts per meter, is greatest where equipotential 
surfaces are closest together. It  is this field that is available t o  ionize air and form 
the conductive spark which is the leader. Because the direction o f  electrostatic 
force is normal to  the equipotentials and strongest where they are closest 
together, the leader is most likely to  progress toward the most intense field 
regions. 
If an aircraft happens to  be in the neighborhood, it will assume the 
\ 
Figure 2.1 Aircraft influence on stepped-leader direction. 
electrical potential o f  its location. Since the aircraft is a thick conductor and all 
of it is at this same potential, it will divert and compress adjacent equipotentials, 
thus increasing the electric field intensity in the vicinity of the aircraft, and 
especially between it and other charged objects, such as the leader. If the aircraft 
is far away from the leader, its effect on the field near the leader is negligible; 
however, if the aircraft is within several tens or hundreds of meters from the 
leader, the increased field intensity in between may be sufficient t o  attract 
subsequent leader propagation toward the aircraft. As this happens, the 
intervening field will become even more intense, and the leader will advance 
more directly toward the aircraft. 
The highest electric fields about the aircraft will occur around extremities, 
where the equipotential lines are compressed closest together, as shown in Figure 
2.2. Typically, these are the nose and wing and empennage tips, and also smaller 
protrusions, such as antennas or pitot probes. When the leader advances t o  the 
point where the field adjacent t o  an aircraft extremity is increased to about 30 
kV/cm, the air will ionize and electrical sparks will form at  the aircraft 
extremities, extending in the direction of  the oncoming leader. Several of these 
sparks, called streamers, usually occur simultaneously from several extremities of  
the aircraft. These streamers will c o n t ~ n u e  t o  propagate outward as long as the 
field remains above about 7 kV/crn (Reference 2.1). One of  these streamers will 
meet the nearest branch of  the advancing leader and form a continuous spark 
from the cloud charge center to  the aircraft. Thus, when the aircraft is close 
enougii to  influence the direction of the leader propagation, it will very likely 
become attached to a branch of  the leader system. 
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Figure 2.2 Compression of electric field around an aircraft. 
When the aircraft is attached to the leader, some charge (free electrons) 
will flow onto the aircraft, but the amount of charge which can be taken on is 
limited by the aircraft size. The measure of  the aircraft's ability to  store charge is 
its capacitance. The capacitance of a con~plex object, such as an aircraft, is 
impractical t o  calculate but may be estimated by comparing it with the easily 
calculated capacitance of  a sphere of equivalent surface area in an infinite field 
in which no other charge centers are present. The capacitance of  such a sphere is 
given by  
where 
C = capacitance (farads [F] ) 
a = radius (meters) 
S = surface area (meters2) 
eV = absolute dielectric constant (=10-~/36n  for vacuum) 
e r  = relative dielectric constant with respect to  vacuum 
(= 1 for air) 
For a typical transport aircraft with a total surface area of 3000 rn2, C is, 
from Equation 2.1 
= I .7 17 X 1 o - ~  = 17 17 picofarads (pF) 
A similar calculation has been made by Schaeffer and Weinstock 
(Reference 2.2) for smaller fighter aircraft, o f  4 2 0  pF,  and by Moore (Reference 
1.3) for helicopters, of  6 0 0  pF. 
The amount o f  charge which can be stored by an object having a known 
capacitance is 
where 
Q = charge (coulombs) 
C = capacitance (farads) 
V = object potential (volts) 
Thus, before the amount of charge which can be stored on an aircraft can 
be found, it is necessary to  determine the potential, V, which the aircraft can 
assume. For this purpose, i t  will be assumed that the potential of the entire 
aircraft is the same as that of  a small sphere whose radius is similar t o  that of the 
sharp aircraft extremities from which streamers develop and from which charge 
begins to  leave the aircraft. Assuming, for example, that this radius is 2 cm, the 
capacitance of a sphere of this radius is first determined directly from Equation 
2.1. 
The electric field at  the surface of  this charged sphere (Reference 2.4) is given by 
E = Q 
7 
(2.5) 
4 7 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~  
If E IS  assumed to be equal t o  30 kVIcm, which is the ionization stress of air in a 
uniform field, and if Equation 3.3 is substituted in Equation 1.5 for Q, then 
The values o f  C and a o f  Equation 2.4 are then substituted into Equation 
2.6 and the equation solved for V, as follows: 
= (30x 1 0 5 j  [(O. 1 1 x 1 o - ~ )  (0 .02)~]  (2.7) 
2 . 2 2 ~  10-12 
- 0 . 0 0 1 3 2 ~  = 0~000594x108 
2.22x 10-11- 
= 59.4 k V  
Since the cloud and ground charge centers already establish an ambient field, 
59.4 k V  is the potential at which the aircraft must be relative t o  the ambient 
field for streamering t o  occur. If the capacitance o f  even a large aircraft is no 
more than about 2000  pF, as given by  Equation 2.2, then the maximum amount 
of  charge which the aircraft can retain is 
Q = 1 1 8 . 8 ~ 1 0 - ~  coulombs (C) 
Q = 100 microcoulombs (PC) 
This can be  considered the amount of charge which a leader can deliver to  
the aircraft before streamers occur from opposite extremities. If additional 
charge flows o n t o  the aircraft, more profuse streaming will occur, and from 
extremities of  larger radii of  curvature. In fact, the maximum charge which can 
be on the aircraft probably exceeds by  up t o  100 times the streamer initiation 
value. However, statistics on natural lightning characteristics show that a typical 
leader contains about 1 t o  1 0  C (Reference 2.S), so there is still no room for any 
significant portion o f  this t o  accumulate on an aircraft. Thus, the aircraft merely 
becomes an extension of  the path being taken by the leader on its way t o  an 
ultimate destination at a reservoir of opposite polarity charge. Streamers may 
propagate onward from two or more extremities of the aircraft at the same time. 
If so, the incoming leader will have split, and the two (or more) branches will 
continue from the aircraft independently of  each other until one or both of 
them reach their destination. This process of attachment and propagation 
onward from an aircraft is shown in Figure 2.3. 
When the leader has reached its destination and a continuous ionized 
channel between charge centers has been formed, recombination of electrons 
and positive ions occurs back up the channel, and this forms the high-amplitude 
return stroke current. This stroke current and any subsequent stroke or 
continuing current components must flow through the aircraft, which is now 
part of  the conducting path between charge centers, as shown in Figure 2.4(a). 
If another branch of  the original leader reaches the ground before the 
branch which has involved the aircraft, the return stroke will follow the former, 
and all other branches will die ou t ,  as shown in Figure 2.4(b). No substantial 
Figure 2.3 Stepped-leader attachment t o  an aircraft. 
(a) Stepped-leader approaching aircraft 
(b) Stepped-leader attachment and continued 
propagation from an aircraft 
currents will flow through the aircraft in such a case, and any damage to the 
aircraft will be slight. A still photograph of  a downward-branching flash after 
completion of  the main channel is shown in Figure 2.5. Several dying branches 
are evident in the photograph. 
2.2.1 Precipitation Static 
The foregoing analysis began with the assumption that the aircraft is at the 
potential of its position in an electric field established by  the cloud and ground 
charge centers. In dry air this is correct, but if the aircraft is flying through dry 
I2igure 2.4 Return stroke paths. 
(a) Return stroke through the aircraft 
(b) No return stroke through the aircraft 
precipitation in the form of sleet, hail, or snow, the impact of these particles on 
the aircraft will cause a charge t o  separate from the particle and join the aircraft, 
leaving the aircraft with a preponderance of positive or negative charge 
(depending on the form o f  precipitation), thereby changing its potential with 
respect t o  its surroundings. This phenomenon is known as triboelectric charging 
and has been extensively studied by Tanner and Nanevicz, and others (Reference 
2.6). It is commonly referred t o  asprecipitatiorz static, or P-static. 
The P-static charging process is easily capable of raising the aircraft t o  a 
potential of  50 kV, or more, with respect t o  its surroundings, a charge sufficient 
to  cause ionization at sharp extremities. This ionization radiates broadband 
Figure 2.5 Downward-branching flash. 
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) throughout the low- and high-frequency 
spectrum. This EMR is often received as interference, or static, by the aircraft 
communications or low-frequency automatic direction finding (LF-ADF) 
receivers. The radiated EMR spectrum from P-static discharging at a typical 
trailing edge is shown in Figure 2.6 (Reference 2.7). 
The EMR results from a continuous series o f  minute streamer-like 
discharges o f  ionized air in the immediate (i.e., 10 cm) vicinity of sharp 
extremities. These discharges also produce a continuous ultraviolet glow visible 
at night and called St. Elmo 's Fire or corona. 
P-static discharging (corona) will occur initially from the sharpest 
extremities, where the surrounding field first reaches the ionization potential for 
air. If more P-static charge enters the aircraft than is bled off by the discharges at 
these extremities, the aircraft potential will increase until the field surrounding 
extremities of  large radii also becomes intense enough to ionize air. Thus, as the 
aircraft potential increases, the radiated EMR from static discharging becomes 
more intense, and so does the associated static in communications receivers. 
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Figure 2.6 Normalized noise spectrum from trailing edge. 
T o  reduce the level of P-static interference, it is therefore appropriate t o  
reduce the amount of charge which can be stored on  the aircraft, and thus its 
potential relative to its surroundings. This has been done (Reference 2.8) by 
attaching devices called sratic dischargers t o  the aircraft. These are brushes or 
sharp needles with very small radii of  curvature and thus of low corona inception 
potential. They are most effective in draining charge from the aircraft when 
located at regions where the surrounding field stress is already high and where 
the airflow may readily carry away discharged electrons or ions. Thus, they are 
usualIy found on  trailing edges o f  wing tips, empennage tips, and tail cones, as 
shown in Figure 2.7. While these dischargers are sometimes struck by lightning, 
they are not capable of either attracting or preventing lightning flashes, or of 
diverting them from other attachment points on the aircraft. 
P-static persists for as long as the aircraft is being charged by impact with 
dry precipitation, such as sleet or snow. It is rarely reported in rain. It is thus a 
continuous phenomenon lasting from several seconds to  many minutes. Once the 
aircraft has left such a region, the static in communications receivers quickly 
clears up, and the aircraft potential reverts t o  that of its surroundings-- - 
established again by its location in the ambient cloud-ground electric field. 
Because of its low capacitance, an aircraft cannot retain enough P-static charge 
to  produce a startling flash o f  several meters (or more) in length or a loud report, 
such as  is often heard when lightning strikes the aircraft. Nevertheless, pilots 
often report a "static discharge" from the aircraft, and proceed t o  describe the 
Figure 2.7 Precipitation static discharger on an aircraft. 
symptoms of  a lightning strike: i.e., a long, bright flash or spark extending 
outward from the aircraft, usually accompanied by a loud report, such as that 
which would be  produced by  a shotgun going off outside the cockpit. 
Thus, the P-static process cannot contribute much t o  the formation of a 
lightning leader o r  t o  the process of leader attachment t o  an aircraft. It is true 
that an approaching streamer 1s most likely to  attach t o  a point from w h ~ c h  an 
opposing streamer has developed, but the intense field produced by  an advancing 
leader would overcome that produced by the P-static process and draw streamers 
of its own from most locations where P-static discharges were occurring. 
The P-static discharging process may be intensified when the aircraft is in a 
region where the amblent electric field is relatively intense, as is the case when a 
lightning flash is imminent. When the flash occurs (whether or not it Intercepts 
the aircraft), the main charge centers are neutralized and the field collapses, 
thereby reducing the intensity of P-static discharging. This is the reason that 
pilots frequently report that P-static interference gradually intensifies until a 
lightning flash occurs and then diminishes instantaneously. This experience 
reinforces the pilot's impression that the flash is a sudden static discharge from 
the aircraft alone. For this reason P-statc interference should be  looked upon by 
pilots as an indicator that a lightning strike may be  imminent (i.e., withln a few 
seconds to a few minutes). P-static interference is, in fact, reported prlor t o  the 
lightning strike in about half of the Iightning-strike incidents described in recent 
airline 11ghtning-strike reports (Reference 2.9). 
2.2.2 Can an Aircraft Trigger a Lightning Strike? 
A question often asked is If an aircraft cannot produce its own lightning 
flash, can it trigger a natural one'? Stated another way the question might be 
Would the lightning flash have occurred if the aircraft were not present? 
While there is insufficient scientific data upon which to base a conclusive 
answer t o  these questions, the following factors suggest that the aircraft does not 
often trigger a flash. 
I .  Aircraft often fly through electrified regions without being struck, 
while lightning flashes are occurring nearby. 
2. The stepped-leader must begin from a charge source capable of 
furnishing it with several coulonibs of charge. Thus, the potential 
(voltage) of this center, and the surrounding field intensity, would 
seem to be much greater than that about an aircraft, leaving the 
implication that, unless the aircraft is very close t o  the charge center, 
it can have little influence on the surrounding field or on the process 
of leader initiation. 
3 .  Laboratory breakdown tests o f  long high-voltage air gaps, thought to  
be similar to  lightning leader formation, show that initial ionization 
always begins at one of the electrodes and not from an object 
suspended in the gap (Reference 2.10). Such an object significantly 
influences the voltage level at which breakdown begins only if it is 
close enough t o  one electrode to  influence the field about this 
electrode. 
It is more probable that the aircraft does not become involved until after 
leader propagation has begun. If the leader happens to  approach the aircraft, the 
field intensification produced by the presence of the aircraft becomes much 
more significant, and the leader may now be attracted to  the aircraft. 
There is some evidence (Reference 2.1 1) that jumbo jet (wide-body) 
aircraft d o  trigger their own flashes, but this is not yet conclusive, since 
accumuIated flight hours are not yet nearly as great as those for conventional 
aircraft. If large-body aircraft are in fact triggering flashes, it is probably because 
their larger sizes make a more noticeable perturbation on the electric field near 
the cloud charge centers from which leaders begin. 
The aircraft motion has little influence on the propagating leader because 
the aircraft is moving much slower, about lo2 mls, than the leader, which is 
advancing at  1 o5 t o  1 oh mls. Thus, the aircraft appears stationary t o  the leader 
during the leader formation process. 
Several other stimuli have been mentioned as possible causes of  aircraft 
lightning strikes. These include engine exhaust and radiated electromagnetic 
energy (i.e., radar transmission). 
2.2.2.1 Effect of Jet Engine Exhaust 
There has been speculation that the hot jet-engine exhaust gases may 
contain a sufficient number of  ionized particles t o  attract or trigger a lightning 
flash to  the aircraft. This speculation has been heightened by the widely 
publicized launch of Apollo 12, which apparently triggered a lightning flash that 
struck the top  of the vehicle when it had reached 1950 m and again at 4270 m. 
The flash exited from the vehicle exhaust plume. Subsequent studies by 
Nanevicz, Pierce, and Whitson (Reference 2.12) of this and other incidents in 
which a rocket was rapidly introduced into an intense electric field indicate that 
the exhaust plume does appear electrically conductive, making the rocket appear 
longer than its own physical length. An empirical study by Pierce (Reference 
2.1 3) of documented strikes t o  tall grounded and airborne conductors concludes 
that there must also be a potential discontinuity between the conductor and the 
adjacent atmosphere of up to l o h  V if the lightning leader is initiated from the 
conductor, and that the rapid discharge of  hot ionized gas from the rocket 
engine may cause sufficient charge separation from the vehicle t o  increase its 
potential t o  lo6  V or more with respect to  its surroundings. 
Shaeffer and Weinstock (Reference 2.14) have studied the conductivity of 
an aircraft jet-engine exhaust. In this case, ionized particles and free electrons in 
a jet exhaust originate in the combustion chamber as a result of chemical 
reactions taking place between the intake air and jet fuel. The ion concentration 
in a jet-engine exhaust has been measured by Fowler (Reference 2.15) t o  be 
between 5 x 1 0 ~  and 3 x 1 0 ~  particles per cubic centimeter ( /cm3) and the free P electron density deduced from this t o  be between 5 x 10 t o  3 x l o 5  p/cm3. 
The electron density in luminous rocket exhaust has been calculated by Pierce 
(Reference 2.1 6) t o  be 1 o1 p/cm3, as has that in the tip of an advancing leader. 
Conversely, the free electron density in ambient air ranges from l o 0  t o  lo3  
p/cm3. Evidently, then, the jet-engine exhaust is only slightly more ionized than 
the ambient air and much less so than the rocket exhaust, with the result that 
the jet exhaust would not be expected t o  have sufficient conductivity t o  initiate 
or attract a lightning leader. This conclusion is supported by  aircraft lightning- 
strike incident reports, which indicate that engine tail pipes are not often 
lightning attachment points unless they are already located at an aircraft 
extremity, where the electric field would be intense from geometrical conditions 
alone. 
There is also no evidence t o  suggest that jet aircraft are struck more often 
than piston-engined aircraft. Overall, the ability of the jet aircraft t o  operate at 
higher altitudes and spend less time climbing and descending t o  airports has 
probably rendered the jet less susceptible than its piston-engined predecessor to  
lightning strikes, which occur predominantly at low or intermediate altitudes. 
Recorded strikes which have hit jet engines almost always have terminated on 
the tail pipes of the aft- (tail-) mounted engines of conventional jet transport 
aircraft. However, a few recent reports of strikes t o  wide-body aircraft show 
evidence of strikes t o  the tail pipes of wing-mounted engines (Reference 2.1 7). 
The evidence t o  date is indirect, since no tell-tale burn marks have been found 
on  the tail pipes themselves. Instead, electronic engine instruments with sensors 
mounted on the engine have experienced damage, and no attachment points 
have been found other than the flash entry point at a nose or wing tip. Lightning 
attachment points on jet tail pipes may be masked b y  exhaust deposits or simply 
be indiscernible because of  the high melting temperature of  tail pipe metals. If 
this is true, the increased volume and temperature of the jumbo jet exhaust may 
have become a region o f  sufficient ionization or weakened dielectric strength t o  
divert a propagating leader into the exhaust channel or t o  enable the formation 
of  outward-propagating streamers from the tail pipe, once the aircraft has been 
struck elsewhere by  a leader. While this engine exhaust may divert an existing 
leader, it seems improbable that it  could trigger a flash by itself. 
Viewed another way, if the jet engine were leaving behind an ionized 
exhaust, it seems probable that an imbalance of charge on  the aircraft would 
eventually result, even when flying in clear weather. As with P-static charging, 
this would raise (or lower) the aircraft potential with respect t o  its surroundings 
and cause static discharging and corona from sharp extremities, causing 
interference in radio equipment. It  is well established that this does not happen. 
2.2.2.2 Effects of  Electromagnetic Radiation 
Another suggestion has been made that an aircraft's radar may trigger or 
divert lightning strikes. This possibility was also investigated by Schaeffer and 
Weinstock (Reference 2.18), who show that the transmitted power level of  
microwave radiation necessary t o  produce an electric field capable of ionizing air 
is about 6.7 x lo6 watts (W), which is far greater than that available from 
aircraft radars. They also point out that a radar would not be designed t o  ionize 
air because the energy required would reduce transmitted beam energy and 
because ionized air would cause an undesired radar return signal. 
Aircraft lightning-strike incident reports also show no evidence of  radar or 
other EMR having been involved in the lightning-strike formation. There are 
cases in which radomes are punctured, but clearly these are simple cases of 
dielectric breakdown of the plastic radome material, with flash termination on 
some airframe-grounded object inside the radome or on the radar antenna itself. 
The punctures have occurred whether or not the radar set was turned on. The 
addition of conductive diverter strips t o  the outside of the radome usually 
prevents these punctures by  enabling lightning flashes t o  attach directly t o  a 
diverter. 
2.3 Swept Strokes 
After the aircraft has become part of  a completed flash channel, the 
ensuing stroke and continuing currents which flow through the channel may 
persist for u p  t o  a second or more. Essentially, the channel remains in its original 
location, but the aircraft will move forward a significant distance during the life 
of  the flash. Thus, whereas the initial entry and exit points are determined by 
the mechanisms previously described, there may be other, subsequent, attach- 
ment points that are determined by the motion o f  the aircraft through the 
relatively stationary flash channel. In the case of  a fighter aircraft, for example, 
when a forward extremity such as the pitot boom becomes an initial attachment 
point, its surface moves through the lightning channel, and thus the channel 
appears t o  sweep back over the surface, as illustrated in Figure 2.8. This 
occurrence is known as the swept-stroke phenomenon. As the sweeping action 
occurs, the type o f  surface can cause the lightning channel t o  attach and dwell at 
various surface locations for different periods of time. If part of  the surface, 
such as the radome, is nonmetallic, the flash may continue to  dwell a t  the last 
metallic attachment point (aft end of the pitot boom) until another exposed 
metallic surface (the fuselage) has reached it; or the channel may puncture the 
nonmetallic surface and reattach to a metallic object beneath it (the radar dish). 
Whether puncture or surface flashover occurs depends on the amplitude and rate 
of rise of the voltage stress created along the channel, as well as  the 
voltage-withstand strength of the nonmetallic surface and any air gap separating 
it from enclosed metallic objects. When the lightning arc has been swept back t o  
one of  the trailing edges, it may remain attached a t  that point for the remaining 
duration of the lighting flash. An initial attachment point at a trailing edge, of 
course, would not be subjected t o  any swept-stroke action. 
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Figure 2.8 Typical path of swept-stroke attachment points. 
The aircraft cannot f ly  out of, or away from, the channel. This is because 
the potential difference between charge centers (cloud and earth or another 
cloud) is sufficient t o  maintain a very long channel until the charges have 
neutralized each other and the flash dies. The aircraft is a very small (and highly 
conductive) part o f  the channel and cannot move sufficiently far away from the 
vicinity of the channel t o  become detached from it during the brief lifetime o f  a 
lightning flash. 
2.4 Aircraft Lightning Attachment Zones 
Since there are some regions on  the aircraft where lightning will not 
attach, and others which will be exposed to attachment for only a small portion 
of the total flash duration, it is appropriate to  define the zones on the aircraft 
surface which will be exposed t o  different components of the flash and therefore 
receive different types and degrees of  effects. For purposes of aircraft fuel 
system protection, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has defined in its 
advisory circular AC 20-53 (Reference 2.1 9) the following zones: 
Zone I. 
(a) All surfaces of the wing tips located within I8 inches o f  the tip 
measured parallel to  the lateral axis of the aircraft, and surfaces 
within 18 inches of the leading edge on wings having leading edge 
sweep angles of more than 4 5  degrees 
(b) Projections such as engine nacelles, external fuel tanks, propeller 
disc, and fuselage nose 
(c) Tail group: within 18 inches of the tips of horizontal and vertical 
stabilizer, trailing edge of horizontal stabilizer, tail cone, and any 
other protuberances 
(d) Any other projecting part that might constitute a point of direct 
stroke attachment 
Zone 2. Surfaces for which there is a probability of strokes being swept 
rearward from a Zone I point of direct stroke attachment. This zone 
includes surfaces which extend I 8  inches laterally t o  each side of 
fore-and-aft lines passing through the Zone 1 forward projection points of 
stroke attachment. All fuselage and nacelle surfaces, including 18 inches of 
adjacent surfaces not defined as Zone I ,  are included in Zone 2. 
Zone 3. Surfaces other than those covered by Zones I and 2. Ignition 
sources in these areas would exist only in the event of strearnering. 
These definitions confine zone boundaries t o  the 18-inch distances 
described above. Even though they have proved adequate for protection of 
present-day transport category aircraft, it has been recognized that the lightning 
attachment zones of new aircraft designs in fact may not fit these rigid 
definitions. Therefore, an industry committee, designated special Task F of the 
Society of Auton~otive Engineers (SAE) Committee AE-4 on Electromagnetic 
Compatibility, has recently clarified the definition of these zones and broadened 
their application by removal of the arbitrary 1Sinch description. The Task F 
recommended definitions are as follows (Reference 2.20): 
Zone 1. Surfaces of the vehicle for which there is a high probability of 
direct iightning-flash attachment or exit 
Zone 2. Surfaces of the vehicle across which there is a high probability of 
a lightning flash being swept by the airflow from a Zone 1 point of direct 
flash attachment 
Zone 3. Zone 3 includes all of the vehicle areas other than those covered 
by  Zone 1 and Zone 2 regions. In Zone 3 there is a low probability of any 
direct attachment of the lightning-flash arc, but Zone 3 areas may carry 
substantial amounts of electrical current by  direct conduction between 
some pairs of direct or swept-stroke attachment points in other zones. 
The Task F definitions further divide Zones I and 2 into A and B regions 
depending on the probability of the flash hanging on for any protracted period 
of time. An A-type region is one in which there is low probability that the arc 
will remain attached, and a B-type region is one in which there is a high 
probability that the arc will remain attached. Some examples of  zones are as 
follows: 
Zone 1.4. Initial attachment point with low probability of flash hang-on, 
such as a nose 
Zone IB. Initial attachment point with high probability of flash hang-on, 
such as a tail cone 
Zone ZA. A swept-stroke zone with low probability of flash hang-on, such 
as a wing mid-span 
Zone 2B. A swept-stroke zone with high probability of flash hang-on, 
such as  a wing trailing edge. 
The Task F definitions are not in conflict with the FAA criteria but,  
rather, are broader in scope and consider the complete aircraft in addition to  
those areas of importance t o  the fuel system, which is the system primarily 
addressed by FAA AC 20-53. 
In accord with the Task F criteria, typical lightning effects and test criteria 
(described in subsequent chapters of this book) have been categorized according 
to each of these zones. The actual boundaries of each of  these zones on  a 
particular aircraft can never be exactly determined, but they can be established 
with sufficient accuracy t o  enable adequate lightning protection t o  be designed 
for the aircraft. 
Initial lightning attachment points (Zone IA) can usually be established by 
inspection and comparison with other aircraft in-flight experience. Locations of 
the other zones can then be deduced from the locations of Zone lA,  in 
accordance with the definitions. Alternately, simulated lightning flashes can be 
fired in a laboratory t o  a model of the aircraft, and the Zone 1 (A and B) 
attachment points determined photographically; however, the validity of  such 
scale model testing is somewhat questionable because of  the nonlinear behavior 
of air breakdown phenomena. Model test results have shown good comparison 
with aircraft of conventional wing and empennage configuration but may be less 
capable of accurately predicting the attachment points of more modern designs 
of blended wing-fuselage construction or high wing sweep-back angles. An 
example of lightning-strike attachment zones determined from a model test of 
the Lockheed S-3A aircraft is shown on Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9 Lightning-strike attachment zones predicted from model test results. 
REFERENCES 
2.1 C. T. Phelps, "Field Enhanced Propagation of  Corona Streamers," Journal 
o f  Geophysical Research 76,  24  (August 20,  1971): 5799-5806. 
2.2 J. F. Shaeffer and G .  L. Weinstock, Aircraft Related Lightning Mecha- 
nisms, Technical Report AFAL-TR-386, prepared by the McDonnell 
Aircraft Company, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, for the Air Force 
Avionics Laboratory, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Ohio (January 1973), p. 2 1. 
2.3 K. A. Moore, "Precipitation Static Noise Problems o n  Operational 
Aircraft," Lightning and Static Electricity Conference, 3-5 December 
1968, Part I[: Conference Papers, AFAL-TR-68-290, Air Force Avionics 
Laboratory, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base, Ohio (May 1969), pp. 168-78. 
2.4 M. A. Uman, Lightning (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 75-81. 
2.5 R. Plonsey and R. E. Collin, Principles and Applications o f  Electromag- 
netic Fields (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 50. 
2.6 R. L. Tanner and J. E. Nanevicz, "An Analysis of CoronaCenerated 
Interference in Aircraft," Proceedings o f  the IEEE 52, 1, Institute of 
Electronic and Electrical Engineers, New York, New York (January 1964): 
44-52. 
2.7 Tanner and Nanevicz, "CoronaCenerated Interference," p. 47. 
2.8 Cumulonimbus with cyclonic circulation at low levels to its southwest, 
photographed from U.S. Weather Bureau DC-6B at 20,000 f t .  near 
Topeka, Kansas, 1750 CST, 2 1 April 1961. 
2.9 B. I. Hourihan, Data from the Airlines Lightning Strike Reporting Project, 
June 1971 t o  November 1974, Summary Report GPR-75-004, High 
Voltage Laboratory, Environmental Electromagnetics Unit, Corporate 
Research and Development, General Electric Company, Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts (March 1975), p. 5. 
2.10 R. H. Golde, I,lghtning Protection (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 25. 
2.1 1 E. T. Pierce, "Triggered Lightning and Some Unsuspected Lightning 
Hazards," American Association for the Advancement o f  Science, 138th 
Annual Meeting, 1971, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California 
(January 1972), pp. 14-28. 
2.12 J. E. Nanevicz, E. T. Pierce, and A. L. Whitson, Atmospheric Electricity 
and the Apollo Series, Note 18, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, 
California (June 1972). 
2.1 3 Pierce, "Triggered Lightning." 
2.14 Shaeffer and Weinstock, Aircraft Related Lightning Mechanisms, pp. 
33-45. 
2.15 R. T. Fowler, Ion Collection b y  Electrostatic Probe in a Jet Exhaust, 
graduate thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Ohio (June 1970). 
2.16 E. T. Pierce, Atmospheric Electric and MeteorologicaI Environment o f  
Aircraft Incidents Involving 1,ighttting Strikes, Special Interim Report I, 
Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California (October 1970). 
2.1 7 Hourihan, Data /rum the Airlines, pp. 40-4 I .  
2.18 Shaeffer and Weinstock, Aircraft Related 1,ighttzing Mechanisms, pp. 
65-66. 
2.19 Protection of Aircraft Fuel Sys tems Against Lightning, Federal Aviation 
Agency Advisory Circular AC 10-53, Federal Aviation Administration, 
Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. (Octoher 6, 1967), pp. 
2-3. 
2.20 Lighfnij~g Test Wave forms and TecAniqltes for Aerospace Vehicles atld 
IJard\vare, Society of Automotive Engineers, Warrendale, Pennsylvania (5 
May 1976). 

CHAPTER 3 
LIGHTNING STRIKE EXPERIENCE 
The atmospheric and flight conditions under which aircraft have been 
struck by lightning have been of  interest since the beginning of powered flight 
because lightning and other thunderstorm effects, such as turbulence and icing, 
are to  be avoided if possible. T o  learn about these conditions, various 
lightning-strike incident reporting projects have been implemented. Beginning in 
1938, the Subcommittee on Meteorological Problems of  the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) prepared and distributed a sixteen-page 
questionnaire to  airlines and the Armed Forces (Reference 3.1). Pilots filled out  
one of  these questionnaires after each lightning-strike incident and forwarded it 
to the NACA subcommittee for analysis. This questionnaire was evidently too  
long for widespread use, however, and, although it could have been shortened, 
was discontinued b y  1950. Nevertheless, the program provided important data 
for the first time on the meteorological conditions prevailing when strikes 
occurred and the resulting effects on the  aircraft. For  one thing, the data 
obtained from the NACA program showed that some lightning-strike conditions 
arc common t o  many incidents. 
Subsequent programs were conducted by the Lightning and Transients 
Research Institute (LTRI) (Reference 3.2) and the FAA (Reference 3.3). 
Projects currently in operation are being conducted by Plumer and Hourihan of 
General Electric (Reference 3.4), Anderson and Kriininger of South Africa 
(Reference 3.5), Perry of the British Civil Aviation Authority (Reference 3.6), 
and Trunov of the USSR National Research Institute for Civil Aviation 
(Reference 3.7). Strike incidence data, based largely on turbojet or turboprop 
aircraft, is usually summarized according t o  the following categories: 
Altitude 
Flight path (i.e., climb, level flight, descend, etc.) 
Meteorological conditions 
Outside air temperature 
Lightning-strike effects on the aircraft 
Altitude, flight path, meteorological conditions, and air temperature are 
topics discussed in this chapter. Lightning-strike effects on aircraft will be 
discussed in the succeeding chapter. 
3.2 Altitude and Flight Path 
Figure 3.1 shows the altitudes at  which these reporting projects show 
aircraft are being struck, as compared with a typical cumulonimbus (thunder) 
cloud. The turbojet and turboprop data from the four summaries are in close 
agreement. For comparison, the data from the earlier piston aircraft survey of  
Newman (Reference 3.8) are also presented. Cruise altitude for jet aircraft is 
considerably higher (10 km) than that of  earlier piston aircraft, which flew at 
about 4 t o  5 km; yet Figure 3.1 shows the altitude distribution of 
lightning-strike incidents t o  be nearly the same. This fact indicates ( I )  that there 
are more lightning flashes t o  be intercepted below about 6 km than above this 
altitude, and (2) that very likely jet aircraft are being struck at  lower than cruise 
altitudes: that is, during climb, descent, or hold operations. Flight regime data 
obtained from the jet projects shown in Figure 3.2 (Reference 3.9) confirm this. 
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Figure 3.1 Aircraft lightning-strike incidents vs altitude. 
If the strike altitudes shown in Figure 3.1 are compared with the electrical 
charge distribution in the typical thundercloud shown in the figure, it is evident 
that strikes which occur above about 3 km result from intracloud flashes 
between positive and negative charge centers in the cloud (or between adjacent 
clouds), whereas strikes below about 3 km probably result from cloud-to-ground 
flashes. Strike incidents occurring above 6 km are rare because of the absence of 
concentrated charge centers at  the higher altitudes and because aircraft at these 
altitudes can more easily divert around thunderclouds than can aircraft at lower 
altitudes. 
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Figure 3.2 Flight conditions when struck. 
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Data discussed thus far might imply that an aircraft must be  within or  
beneath a cloud to receive a strike and, since electrical charge separation is 
brought about by precipitation, that most strikes would occur when the aircraft 
is within a cloud in regions of precipitation. Strike incident reports show that 
these conditions often d o  exist, but other lightning strikes occur t o  aircraft in a 
cloud when there is no evidence of precipitation nearby, or even t o  aircraft 
flying in clear air a supposedly safe distance from a thundercloud. F A A  and 
airline advisory procedures instruct pilots t o  circumvent thunderclouds or 
regions of  precipitation evident either visibly or on radar, but strikes t o  aircraft 
flying 25 miles from the nearest radar returns of precipitation have been 
reported. Occasionally a report of a "bolt from the blue," with no clouds 
anywhere around, is received. It is highly improbable, however, that these 
reports are correct because it does not seem possible for electrical charge 
separation of the magnitude necessary t o  form a lightning flash to  occur in clear 
air. In most well-documented incidents, a cloud is present' somewhere (i.e., 
within 25 miles) when the incident occurs. 
Perhaps of most interest t o  aircraft operators are the area weather 
conditions which prevailed at the time of reported strikes. There is no universal 
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data bank for this type of data, but a summary has been made by  H. T. Harrison 
(Reference 3.10) of the synoptic meteorological conditions prevailing for 99 
United Air Lines lightning-strike incidents occurring between July 1963 and 
June 1964. Table 3.1 lists the synoptic type and the percentage of incidents (z 
number of cases) occurring in each type. Examples of the most predominant 
synoptic conditions are presented in Figure 3.3  (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) 
(Reference 3.1 1). 
Table 3.1 SYNOPTIC TYPES INVOLVED WITH 
99 ELECTRICAL DISCHARGES 
JULY 1963 TO JUNE 1964 
Harrison has summarized this data by saying that any conditions which 
will cause precipitation may also be expected t o  cause electrical discharges 
(lightning), although he adds that no strikes were reported in the middle of 
warm front winter snowstorms. Data from the projects of  Plumer and Perry 
(Reference 3.1 2) presented in Figure 3.4 (Reference 3.13) show that lightning 
strikes t o  aircraft in the United States and Europe occur most often during the 
spring and summer months, when thunderstorms are most prevalent. 
It is also important to  note that many strike incidents have been reported 
where no bona fide thunderstorms have been visually observed or reported. L.P. 
Harrison (Reference 3.14), for example, rcports that in 1946 active thunder- 
storms were manifested in less than half of the 150 strike incidents which he 
studicd. Later, from July 1963 to June 1964, United Air Lines flight crews 
reported 99 cases of  static discharges or lightning strikes in flight (Reference 
3.1 5). Correlation of thesc incidents with weathcr conditions prevailing in the 
- 
Synoptic type 
Airmass instability 
Stationary front 
Cold front 
Warm front 
Squall line or instability line 
Orographic 
Cold LOW or filling LOW 
Warm sector apex 
Complex or intense LOW 
Occluded front 
Pacific surge 
Percentage 
2 7 
18 
17 
9 
9 
6 
5 
3 
3 
1 
1 
vicinity and in the general area at the time of strike gave the results shown in 
Table 3.2. 
LBF 
FL 350 (9%) 
WARMFRONT 0-720 
Figure 3.3 Examples of most frequent synoptic meteorological conditions when 
aircraft have been struck. Tip of arrow indicates position of 
aircraft when struck (continued). 
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Figure 3.3 (Continued). 
Table 3.2 PERCENTAGES OF STRIKE INCIDENTS VS 
REPORTED THUNDERSTORMS 
Thunderstorms Reported in Vicinity 33% 
Thunderstorms Reported in General Area 14% 
No Thunderstorms Reported 4 274 
3.4 Immediate Environment at Time of Strike 
Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 show the immediate environment of the aircraft 
at the times of the 214 strikes reported in the project of Plumer and Hourihan 
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(Reference 3.16). In over of the strikes reported, each aircraft was within a 
cloud and was experiencing precipitation and some turbulence. With precipita- 
tion present, turbulence is to be expected, since vertical air currents acting 
against precipitation are thought to be the cause of electrical charge separation. 
Incident reports also show that most aircraft strikes occur when an aircraft 
is in the freezing level of 0 "C. Figure 3.8 (Reference 3.17) from Newman's 
project (Reference 3.18), for example, shows the distribution of lightning strikes 
to aircraft as a function of  outside air temperature. Freezing temperatures (and 
below) are thought to be required for the electrical charge separation process to 
function. Of course, strikes to aircraft at temperatures higher than + I 0  "C have 
occurred when the aircraft was close t o  (or on) the ground, where the ambient 
air temperature may be as high as about +25 "C. 
Figure 3.4 Occurrence of lightning strikes relative to months, in Europe and 
the United States. 
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Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3 . 7  Environmental conditions at  time of strike. 
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Figure 3.8 Lightning strikes t o  aircraft as a function o f  temperature. 
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3.5 Thunderstorm Avoidance 
Clearly, whenever it is possible t o  avoid the severe environments which 
thunderstorms present, it is desirable to  d o  so. For, even if the aircraft is 
adequately protected against lightning effects, the turmoil caused b y  wind and 
precipitation in or near thunderstorms presents a serious hazard t o  safe flight. 
Consequently, the operating procedures of commercial airlines and those of 
other air carriers strongly advise against penetration of thunderstorms. 
In attempts t o  avoid thunderstorm regions, pilots use three indicators: 
Visual sighting of thunderclouds (cumulonimbus) in daytime and of 
lightning at night 
Airborne radar patterns of precipitation areas 
Ground-base radar patterns, if available, relayed by Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) t o  aircrews as instructions for thunderstorm 
avoidance. 
Methods of thunderstorn avoidance in common use are, in order of 
preference 
Circumvention of thunderclouds, ideally by 25 miles or more 
Flying over the tops of thunderclouds 
Flying beneath the bases (bottoms) of thunderclouds. 
Obviously, when other conditions are equal, the degree t o  which any of 
these measures is successful depends on the accuracy of the information received 
by the pilots. 
Aside from visual observation (which has obvious limitations), the most 
common method of detecting thunderstorms is using airborne weather radar. 
Radar, however, cannot detect clouds themselves; it can detect only the 
associated precipitation (if any), which is capable of  producing an echo; only the 
rain that may be present in the cloud will produce a radar echo. 
A typical C-band airborne weather radar presentation of a thunderstorm 
(cumulonimbus cloud) with active precipitation ar?d frequent lightning is shown 
in Figure 3 , 9  (Reference 3.19). The pictures were taken during a research project 
carried out b y  Beckwith of United Air Lines t o  determine the weather detection 
capability of  airborne radar. The photographs shown were taken during a United 
Air Lines flight from Chicago t o  Denver on August 3, 1960. 
Figure 3.9 (Reference 3.19) shows the northern end of a line of severe 
thunderstorms, developed from a cold front, in Illinois. A detour t o  the north 
was planned and successfully executed with the aid of this radar presentation. 
The flight remained in clear and generally smooth air while making the detour. 
The strong echos were easily detected with a slight upward tilt of the radar 
antenna t o  eliminate ground clutter. 
It is possible t o  obtain more information regarding the intensity of a storm 
by  use of the contour circuit provided on most radars. This circuit provides a 
means of eliminating any reflected signal the intensity of which is above a 
certain level. Figure 3.10 (Reference 3.20) shows the same radar return as that in 
Figure 3.9 (Reference 3.19) one minute later with the contour circuit employed. 
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The thin, distinct outlines which now appear in place of  the original echo 
indicate a narrow boundary across which the intensity of rain varies from no rain 
(outside the white outline) t o  intense rain (inside the white outline). This change 
in return intensity is called the rain gradient; and the narrower the white outline 
of the return, the more abrupt, or steeper, is the gradient. 
TIME: 00262 TIME: 00282 
ALTITUDE: 28 000 FT. ALTITUDE: 28 000 FT. 
RANGE MARKS: 10-MILE SOUTH OF DUBUQUE, IOWA, LOOKING SE 
ANT.: 1 'hO UP TO S AND W EDGE OF THUNDERSTORM LINE. 
HEADING: 255O TRUE THIS CUMULONIMBUS WAS BUILT TO AN ESTI- 
STRONG ECHOES HERE ARE THE N END OF MATED ALTITUDE OF 45 000 FEET. ECHO ON 
, A LINE OF THUNDERSTORMS WHICH WERE PRO- PHOTO 17-R2 CORRESPONDS TO THIS VISUAL. 
DUCING SEVERE WIND AND LIGHTNING DAM- 
AGE BELOW. LESS THAN ONE HOUR EARLIER. 
HAILSTONES OF GOLF BALL SIZE WERE RE- 
PORTED IN THE AREA OF THE NEAREST LARGE 
ECHO. STORM PICTURED ON PHOTO 17-C2. 
Figure 3.9 Radar presentation and subsequent photograph of a thunderstorm. 
The amount of electric charge separation and lightning activity is known 
to be directIy related t o  the degree of interaction between precipitation and 
vertical air currents (turbulence). Further, the severity of turbulence is also 
related t o  the amount of temperature difference that exists between different 
masses of air. Thus, turbulence and electrical activity are likely t o  exist at 
well-defined boundaries, such as those indicated by steep rain gradients on 
contoured radar. These boundaries derived from contour radar are often used in 
planning a detour. 
Considering the variable nature of thunderstorms and the limited 
information as t o  their whereabouts and severity available t o  pilots, it is not 
surprising that there are varying opinions as t o  what detour distance is adequate 
t o  avoid turbulence and lightning. Primarily, a pilot is advised t o  use distances 
commensurate with his radar's specific capability. 
The specifications and policies of one of  the major airlines (Reference 
3.2 1) follow. 
TIME: 00272 
ALTITUDE: 28 000 FT. 
RANGE MARKS: 10-MILE 
ANT.: 1 " UP 
HEADING: 255" TRUE 
CONTOUR: ON 
Figure 3.10 Same as Figure 3.9 but  with contour t o  show very steep rain 
gradient of each cell. 
Specifications: 
Wavelength: 3.2 cm (X-Band) through 5.6 cm (C-Band) 
Antenna Size: 12-inch or larger (X-Band); 25-inch or larger (C-Band) 
Power (Peak): 10 kW (X-Band) or higher; 75 kW (C-Band) or higher 
Policies: 
1. When the temperature at flight level is 0 "C or higher, avoid all 
echoes exhibiting sharp gradients by 5 nautical miles. 
2. When the temperature at flight level is less than O ° C ,  avoid all 
echoes exhibiting sharp gradients by 10 nautical miles. 
3, When flying above 23 000 feet avoid all echoes, even though no 
sharp gradients are indicated, by  20  nautical miles. 
Weather radar, however, is not a foolproof means of  detecting and 
avoiding thunderstorms because situations exist in which radar is not capable of 
distinguishing a thunderstorm return from ground or other precipitation returns 
in the same vicinity. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 3.1 1 (Reference 3.22). 
TIME: 01532 TIME: 01552 
ALTITUDE: 29 MX) FT. ALTITUDE: 29 000 FT. 
RANGE MARKS: 25-MILE DECAYING THUNDERSTORM BUILT TO 
ANT.: O0 ABOVE FLIGHT ALTITUDE FOR WHICH NO 
HEADING: 060° TRUE. OVER ST. GEORGE, MATCHING ECHO WAS VISIBLE IN SCOPE PIC- 
UTAH. TURE 11 -R-3. 
A THUNDERSTORM ECHO IS NOT DISTIN- 
GUISHABLE FROM TERRAIN AT THIS OR OTHER 
ANTENNA SETTINGS TO MATCH THE VISUAL 
SIGHTING AT 9:30 BEARING IN PHOTO 11 -C2. 
Figure 3. I I Thunderstorms not distinguishable on radar scope. 
In this case, returns froin the ground (ground clutter) obscured the return 
from the storm. However, if ground clutter does not obscure a storm return and 
an aircraft is successful in avoiding all thunderstorms by the recommended 
distances of u p  t o  25 miles, the severe turbulence associated with thunderstorms 
is usually also avoided. Nevertheless, lightning flashes may extend farther 
outward from the storm center than does turbulence and for this reason are not 
as easily avoided. Indeed, there are several reports each year of  aircraft receiving 
strikes "in the clear" 25 or  more miles from the nearest storm. That lightning 
flashes can propagate this distance is evident from ground photographs of very 
long, horizontal flashes. 
A decaying thunderstorm, moreover, may not present a distinctive radar 
echo. Sometimes this type of storm becomes embedded in expanding anvils or 
cirrus clouds in such a way that it is not visible. In-flight measurements 
conducted by  the Air Force and the Federal Aviation Administration, and 
reported by Fitzgerald (Reference 3.23) ,  indicate that thunderstorms in their 
early stages of  dissipation have sufficient charge t o  cause a few lightning 
discharges if a means of streamer initiation becomes available; an aircraft 
entering such a region may initiate, or trigger, such a flash. Thus, in normal IFR 
operations in regions where an active thundercloud is merged with decaying 
thunderclouds and other cloudy areas, those diversions from the normal course 
that are taken to avoid the active cloud may redirect flight through a decaying 
area, where a lightning strike is possible. 
Attempts have been made from time t o  time t o  develop an airborne 
instrument capable of warning pilots of an impending lightning strike and 
providing information t o  the pilot for use in avoidance. Most such instruments 
are based on the principle of detecting the ambient electric field which would 
exist when a lightning flash is imminent (Reference 3.24). None of  these 
instruments have been successfully tested in an aircraft, and because of the 
apparent wide variation of  electric field magnitudes and directions which may 
exist at the aircraft surface just before a strike occurs, the prospects for success 
seem remote. The situation is further complicated by the problems of field 
interpretation and translation into advisory information t o  aid the pilot in 
deciding on an avoidance maneuver. 
Perhaps the most effective warning of imminent strikes available t o  flight 
crews is that which is readily available-the buildup of static discharging and (at 
night) St. Elmo's Fire (corona). Static discharging causes interference (insta- 
bility) in Low Frequency Automatic Direction Finding (LF-ADF) indicators, or 
audible "hash" in most communications receivers. St.  Elmo's Fire is visible at 
night as a bluish glow at  aircraft extremities where the discharging is occurring. 
Pilot responses t o  Lightning strikes (which may also be called static discharges or  
electrical discharges) vary. Typical answers by  pilots of  one airline (Reference 
3.25) t o  the question "Do you have any recommendations for avoiding electrical 
discharges?" were as follows: 
"From cruise speed, a reduction of 25% to 30% in airspeed will 
often allow the static buildup to stabilize at a lower maximum and 
dissipate rather than discharge. These buildups are generally 
accompanied by a buzz-type static on VHF [very high frequency] 
and ADF {automatic direction finding] and a random swinging of 
the ADF needles though I have observed the ADF needles to hold a 
steady error of up to 90O as the static level stabilized at or near its 
peak, generally just prior to the discharge or beginning of dissipa- 
tion. " 
"Climb and descend through the freezing level as quickly as 
possible. " 
"Avoid all precipitation. I know o f  no way to predict accurately 
where a discharge wiN occur." 
"Slow down to minimum safe speed, change altitude to avoid 
temperature of 20 OF ro 35 OF." 
'Not without excessive detour, both route and altitude." 
"The static discharges I have encountered have built up at a rate 
which would preclude any avoidance tactics (3 to  15 seconds)." 
"No, I have never known when to expect this until just prior to the 
discharge. " 
"No, not in the modern jets. Once the static begins the discharge 
follows very quickly. " 
'Y11 information received at the . . . training center applicable to 
static discharges and their avoidance has been completely accurate 
and helpful. " 
"No, hang on!" 
"Lead a clean life. '" 
Thus, there is a wide divergence of pilot opinion regarding the best way t o  
avoid lightning strikes. However, from this and many other sources, it is possible 
t o  list the symptoms most often present just prior t o  experiencing a lightning 
strike, and the actions (if any) which most pilots take t o  reduce the possibility 
of  receiving a strike. 
A lightning strike is imminent when a combination of  some of  the 
symptoms which follow is present. 
Symptoms: 
1. Flight through or in the vicinity of the following: 
Unstable air 
Stationary front 
Cold front 
Warm front 
Squall line 
2. Within a cloud 
3. Icy types of precipitation 
4. Air temperature near 0 "C 
5. Progressive buildup of  radio static 
6. St. Elmo's fire (when dark) 
7. Experiencing turbulence 
8. Flying at altitudes between 1.5 and 4.5 km (5000 and 15 000 f t ) ;  
most prevalent: 3.35 km (1  1 0 0 0  ft) 
9. Climbing or descending in the vicinity of  airports 
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Actions: 
1. Circumvent areas of heavy precipitation. 
2. Reduce speed (or rpm with piston-engine aircraft). 
3. Change altitude to  avoid temperature near 0 "C. 
4. Turn u p  cockpit lights. 
5. Have one pilot keep eyes downward. 
Since air traffic congestion often precludes circumvention of precipitation 
and since diversion often poses hazards, avoidance, while desirable, is neither a 
dependable nor an adequate means of  protecting the aircraft against lightning 
strikes. The aircraft, therefore, must be designed t o  safely withstand lightning 
strike effects. 
3.6 Frequency of Occurrence 
The number of lightning strikes which actually occur as compared with 
flight hours for piston, turboprop, and pure jet aircraft is tabulated in Table 3.3 
based on the data of  Newman (Reference 3.26) and Perry (Reference 3.27). 
From this data it follows that an average of one strike can be expected for each 
3000  hours of flight for any type of commercial transport aircraft, with slightly 
greater exposure expected for piston aircraft only. The probable reason for this 
difference is that piston aircraft are limited to  lower cruise altitudes, where 
lightning flashes are more prevalent. 
Unlike commercial airlines, military and general aviation aircraft need not 
adhere t o  strict flight schedules or c ~ n g e s t e d  traffic patterns around metro- 
politan airports. The result is that these aircraft d o  not experience as many 
strikes as d o  corrimercial aircraft, as is evident from Table 3.4, which shows U.S. 
Air Force experience for the years 1965 t o  1969. 
Comparison of the experience reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 indicates that 
the probability of commercial aircraft being struck is anywhere from 1 0  t o  200 
times greater than for U.S. Air Force aircraft for the same number of flight 
hours. The discrepancy is most certainly a result of variations in flight 
operations, rather than a result of physical differences in the types of aircraft 
flown. Whereas the Air Force may curtail flight operations in adverse weather, 
commercial air lines usually continue operations, and their aircrafts' exposure t o  
lightning is further increased in bad weather by traffic congestion and holding 
requirements near airports. 
Statistics such as these, which apply t o  a broad category of aircraft and 
include data from a variety of different operators in varying geographic 
locations, may be misleading, however. For example, whereas Table 3.4 shows 
that there is an average of 99 0 0 0  flying hours between lightning strikes t o  U.S. 
Air Force fighter-type aircraft, the strike experience in Europe is known to be 
about 10 times more frequent than strike experience in the U.S. and in most 
other parts of the world. Weinstock and Shaeffer (Reference 3.28) report 10.5 
strikes per 1 0  0 0 0  hours for certain F-4 models flying in Europe, which rate is 
about 5 times greater than the world-wide exposure rate for these aircraft. A 
similar situation pertains t o  commercial aircraft operating in Europe, as 
indicated by Perry's summary of United Kingdom and European strike data 
(Reference 3.29), for example. This unusually high lightning-strike exposure 
seems Lo result both from the high level of lightning activity in Europe as 
compared with that in many other regions and fronl the political constraints 
placed on flight paths in this multinational region. 
There are several trends in  commercial and general aviation which are 
likely t o  cause even greater exposure of aircraft everywhere to  lightning strikes 
in the future: 
More time in holding patterns as a result of increased traffic: at major 
airports 
Increases in the number of intermediate stops along former nonstop 
routes, resulting in more time in descent-hold-climb patterns at 
lower altitudes 
Increasing use of radar and other navigation aids in general aviation 
aircraft, permitting IFR flight under adverse weather conditions. 
These factors warrant continued diligence in the design and operation of aircraft 
with respect t o  the possible hazards which lightning may present. 
Table 3.3 INCIDENCE OF REPORTED LIGHTNING STRIKES 
TO COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT 
b 
Newrnan Perry 
(1950 - 1961) (1959 - 1974) TOTALS 
No. hours 
Strikes Hours Strikes Hours Strikes Hours per strike 
Piston 808 2 000000 - - 808 2000000 2475 
Turboprop 109 415 000 280 876 000 389 1 291 000 3320 
Pure Jct 4 1 
-
427000 480 1314000 521 1741000 3340 
- --  
ALL 958 2 842000 760 2 190000 1718 5 032000 2930 
Table 3.4 INCIDENCE OF LIGHTNING STRIKES TO 
U.S. AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT 
68 000 140 000 1 I 2  000 124 006 76 000 104 000 
ighter 141 000 105 000 1 1  2 000 65 000 73 000 99 100 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIGHTNING EFFECTS ON AIRCRAFT 
4.1 Introduction 
"We had just taken off from Presque Isle, Maine, and had been 
in cruise power for 50 minutes, when a large thunderhead cumulus 
was observed directly on course. Lightning could be seen around the 
edges and inside the thunderhead. All cockpit lights were on and the 
instrument spotlight was full on, with the door open. I had just 
finished setting the power and fuel flows for each engine. As the ship 
approached the thunderhead, there was a noticeable drop in 
horsepower arzd the airplane lost from 180 MPH airspeed to I68 
MPH, and continued to lose airspeed due to power loss as we 
approached the thunderhead. . . . A few seconds before the 
lightning bolt hit the airplane all four engines were silent and the 
propellers were windmilling. Simultaneous with the f ish of lighr- 
?zing, the engines surged with the original power. The lightning flash 
blinded the Captain and me so severely that we were unable to see 
for approximately eight minutes. I tried several times during this 
interval to read cockpit instruments and it was impossible. lie First 
Officer was called fiom the rear to watch the cockpit. Of course, 
turbulent air currents inside the cumulus tossed the ship around to 
such an extent that, had the airplane not been on auto-pilot when 
the flash occurred and during the interval of  blindness by the 
cockpit occupants, the ship could have easily gone completely out of 
control The Captain and I discussed the reason for all four engines 
cutting simultaneously prior to the lightning &sh and could not 
explain it, except for the possibility of a magnetic potentialaround 
the cumulus affecting the primary or secondary circuit of all eight 
magnetos at the same time. " First Officer N.A. Pierson's experience 
on a flight from Presque Isle, Maine, t o  the Santa Maria Islands on 
July 9, 1945 (Reference 4. I) .  
I t  wasn't long after the beginning of powered flight that aircraft began 
being struck b y  lightning--sometimes with catastrophic results. The early 
wooden aircraft with metal control cables and guy wires were not capable of 
conducting lightning-stroke currents of  several thousand amperes or more. 
Wooden members and even the control cables exploded or caught fire. Even if 
severe structural damage did not occur, pilots were frequently shocked or  
burned by  lightning currents entering their hands or feet via control pedals or 
the stick. Sometimes fuel tanks caught fire o r  exploded. These effects, coupled 
with the air turbulence and precipi-tation also associated with thunderstorms, 
quickly taught pilots t o  stay clear of  stormy weather. 
With the advent o f  all-metal aircraft, most of the catastrophic effects were 
eliminated, but  thunderstorms continued t o  be treated with respect. Nonethe- 
less, because a few bad accidents attributed t o  lightning strikes continued t o  
happen, in 1938 the Subcommittee of Aircraft Safety, Weather and Lightning 
Experts was formed b y  the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(NACA) to study lightning effects on aircraft and determine what additional 
protective measures were needed. Dr. Karl B. McEachron, Director of Research 
at the General Electric High Voltage Laboratory, was a key member of  this 
committee, and during its twleve-year existence he performed the first 
man-made-lightning tests on  aircraft parts. During and subsequent t o  this period, 
other organizations, such as the U.S. National Bureau of Standards, the 
University o f  Minnesota, and the Lightning and Transients Research Institute, 
also began t o  conduct research into lightning effects on aircraft. 
For a long time the physical damage effects at the point of flash 
attachment t o  the aircraft were o f  primary concern. These included holes burned 
in metallic skins, puncturing or splintering of nonmetallic structures, and 
welding o r  roughening of  movable hinges and bearings. If the attachment point 
was a wing tip light o r  an antenna, the possibility of conducting some of the 
lightning current directly into the aircraft's electrical circuits was also of 
concern. Today, these and other physical damage effects are called the direct 
effects Since present-day military and commercial aircraft fly IFR (Instrument 
Flight Rules) in many kinds o f  weather, protective measures against direct 
effects have been designed and incorporated into these aircraft so that hazardous 
consequences o f  lightning strikes are rare. 
In recent years it has become apparent that lightning strikes to  aircraft 
may cause other effects, or indirect effects, t o  equipment located elsewhere in 
the aircraft. For example, the operation of  instruments and navigation 
equipment has been interfered with, and circuit breakers have popped in electric 
power distribution systems when the aircraft has been struck by lightning. The 
cause of these indirect effects are the electromagnetic fields associated with light- 
ning currents flowing through the aircraft. Even though metallic skins provide a 
high degree of electromagnetic shielding, some of these fields may penetrate 
through windows or seams and induce transient voltage surges in the aircraft'b 
electrical wiring; these surges in turn may damage electrical or electronic 
equipment. 
To date, few aircraft accidents can be attributed positively to  the indirect 
effects o f  lightning, but there are two trends in aircraft design which threaten t o  
aggravate the problem unless new protective measures are developed and 
utilized. The first of  these trends is the increasing use of miniaturized, solid state 
components in aircraft electronics and electric power systems. These devices are 
more efficient, lighter in weight, and far more functionally powerful than their 
vacuum tube or electromechanical predecessors, and they operate at much lower 
voltage and power levels. Thus, they are inherently more ~ n s i t i v e  to  overvoltage 
transients, such as  those produced b y  the indirect effects of ;ightn~ng. 
The second trend is the increasing use of reinforced plastics and other 
nonconducting materials in place of  aluminum skins, a practice that reduces the 
electromagnetic shielding previously furnished by the conductive skin. This 
reduced shielding may greatly increase the level of surges induced in wiring not 
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protected by other means. Because electronic systems were being increasingly 
depended upon for safety of flight, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Department of Defense 
initiated research programs, beginning in 1967, to learn how to measure or 
predict the levels of  lightning-induced voltages and how t o  protect against them. 
A considerable amount o f  research has followed these initial programs 
Since the indirect effects originate in the aircraft's electrical wiring, their 
consequences may show up  anywhere within the aircraft, such as at equipment 
locations remote from the lightning-flash attachments. The direct effects, on the 
other hand, occur primarily at the points of arc attachment. This comparison is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
INDIRECT 
Figure 4.1 Areas of direct and indirect effects. 
Before discussing the techniques for protecting aircraft against either type 
of lightning effect, it is worthwhile to  review some of  the common examples of 
each which occur on today's aircraft. The purpose of this review is t o  remind the 
aircraft designer of  areas needing particular attention and t o  alert pilots to  what 
t o  expect when lightning strikes occur in flight. Detailed discussion of the causes 
of each effect, including the lightning-flash characteristic most responsible and 
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its quantitative relationship t o  damage severity, is deferred until protective 
measures are discussed, beginning with Chapter 5. 
4.2 Direct Effects on Metal Structures 
Metal structures include the outer skins of the aircraft together with 
internal metallic framework, such as spars, ribs, and bulkheads. Because lightning 
currents must flow between lightning entry and exit points on an aircraft and 
because these currents tend to  spread out as they flow between attachment 
points, using the entire airframe as a conductor, the aluminum with which most 
of these structures are fabricated provides excellent electrical conductivity. As a 
result, the current density at  any single point in the airframe is rarely sufficient 
t o  cause physical damage between entry and exit points. Only if there is a poor 
electrical bond (contact) between structural elements in the current flow path is 
there Iikely to be physical damage. On the other hand, where the currents 
converge to the immediate vicinity of an entry or exit point, there may be a 
sufficient concentration of magnetic force and resistive heating to cause damage. 
Damage a t  these points is further compounded by the lightning arc, from which 
intense heat and blast forces emanate. Discussion of individual effects follows. 
4.2.1 Melting and Burnthrough 
If a lightning arc touches a metal surface for a sufficient time, melting of 
the metal will occur at the point of attachment. Common evidences of this are 
the successive pit marks often seen along a fuselage or empennage, as shown in 
Figure 4.2 (Reference 4.2) or the holes burned in the trailing edges of wings or 
empennage tips, as shown in Figure 4.3 (Reference 4.3). Most holes are melted 
in skins of 1 rnrn (0.040") thick, or less, except at trailing edges, where the 
lighting arc may hang on for a longer time and enable holes to be burned 
through much thicker pieces. Since a relatively large amount of time is needed 
for melting to occur, the continuing currents are the Iightning-flash components 
most conducive to melting and burnthrough. Melting or burnthrough of skins is 
usually not a safety-of-flight problem unless this occurs in an integral fueI tank 
skin. 
4.2.2 Magnetic Force 
Metal skins or structures may also be deformed as a result of the intense 
magnetic fields which accompany concentrated lightning currents near attach- 
ment points. It is well known that parallel wires with current traveling in the 
same direction are mutually attracted to each other. If the structure near an 
attachment point is viewed electrically as being made up of a large number of 
parallel conductors converging to this attachment point, then as lightning 
current flows from the point, forces occur which tend to  draw these conductors 
closer together. If a structure is not sufficiently rigid, pinching or crimping may 
occur, as shown in Figure 4.4 (Reference 4.4). The amount of damage created is 
Figure 4.2 Successive pit marks extending backward from leading edge of 
vertical stabilizer. 
proportional t o  the square of the lightning-stroke current amplitudes and is 
directly proportional to the length of time during which this stroke current 
flows. Thus the high amplitudes of return stroke and intermediate stroke are the 
lightning-flash components most responsible for magnetic force damage. 
Besides the main airframe, other parts which may be damaged by magnetic 
forces include bonding or diverter straps, pitot probes, or any other object which 
may conduct lightning-stroke currents. Magnetic force damage is usually not, by 
itself, significant enough t o  require abortion of a flight, and may not even be 
detected until the aircraft is on the ground. However, since overstress or severe 
bending of metals is involved, aircraft parts damaged by this phenomenon are 
not often repairable. 
4.2.3 Pitting at Structural Interfaces 
Wherever poor electrical contact exists between two mating surfaces, such 
as a control surface hinge or bearing across which lightning currents may flow, 
melting and pitting of these surfaces may occur. In a recent incident, for 
example, the jackscrew of an inboard trailing edge flap of a jet transport was so 
Figure 4.3 Hole burned in trailing edge corner of ventral fin. 
damaged by a lightning flash that the flap could not be extended past 1 So. Since 
this jackscrew is located on the inboard side of the flap, the flash must have 
reached it after sweeping along the fuselage from an earlier attachment point 
near the nose, as shown on Figure 4.5. Instead of continuing to sweep aft along 
the fuselage, the flash apparently hung on t o  the jackscrew long enough t o  melt 
a spot on it. The event did not cause difficulties in landing the aircraft, and the 
damage. in fact, was not discovered until after the aircraft was on the ground. 
The damage, however, was extensive enough that the jackscrew had to be 
replaced. 
It should be noted that the jackscrew in this instance was not an initial, or 
Zone 1, attachment point (See Figure 2.9). It subsequently became an 
attachment point only by  being in the path of  a swept stroke and is therefore in 
Zone 3B, a swept-stroke zone with high probability of  hang-on. 
A second illustration of  pitting is the damage caused t o  the seals of the 
hydraulic jack operating the tail control surfaces of another jet transport 
aircraft. In this case the jack was shunted by a jumper of  adequate cross section 
t o  carry lightning-stroke currents but of excessive length, which caused most of 
the current t o  flow through the lower inductance path directly through the jack 
body and across the seals, resulting in leakage of hydraulic fluid. 
Earlier aircraft, especially those with nonmetallic skins, experienced more 
troublesome consequences from lightning currents, nearly all of which had to 
flow through the control cables. In these cases, lightning currents entering a 
Figure 4.4 Example of magnetic pinch effect a t  lightning attachment points. 
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Figure 4.5 Swept-stroke attachment and inboard flap jackscrew attachment. 
control surface have been conducted all the way through the aircraft via the 
control cables, sometimes with very damaging results. There is a t  least one case 
on  record (Reference 4.5) of  a wooden glider lost as  a result of  lightning current 
which entered the aircraft a t  the left aileron pulley support and then flowed via 
the aileron cables t o  the right pulley, from which point it exited the aircraft. The 
cables were disintegrated, and the wreckage indicated that extensive damage to 
the wooden airframe had occurred before impact, probably as a result of  the 
cables exploding inside. There are n o  records of  loss of a powered aircraft from 
this effect, since these aircraft have nearly always been of  metallic construction. 
The high-amplitude stroke currents are primarily responsible for pitting, 
but continuing currents may also contribute to  this damage, as illustrated by the 
jackscrew incident. 
4.2.4 Resistive Heating 
The glider accident mentioned above is also an example of  another direct 
effect: resistive heating of conductors. When the resistivity of  a conductor is too  
high or its cross-sectional area too  low for adequate current conductance, 
lightning currents flowing in it may deposit appreciable energy in the conductor 
and cause an appreciable temperature rise. Since the resistivity of most metals 
increases with temperature rise, a given current in a heated conductor will 
deposit more energy than it would in an unheated, less resistant conductor; this 
process in turn increases the conductor temperature still further. 
Resistive energy deposition is proportional t o  the lightning current action 
integral ( l i 2 d t ) ,  and for any conductor there is an action integral value at 
which the metal will melt and vaporize, as shown in Figure 4.6. The result is the 
1 o2 1 o3 1 0' loa 
(AMPERE' - SECONDS) 
Figure 4.6 1 i2dt vs temperature rise in a conductor. 
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exploding conductor apparent in the glider incident described in Section 4.2.3. 
Other consequences of resistive heating and explosive vaporization of 
conductors are shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 (References 4.6 and 4.7). The 
damage is usually most severe when the exploding conductor is within an 
enclosure, which contains the explosion until the pressure has built up to a level 
sufficient t o  rupture the container. 
Figure 4.7 Lightning damage to  radome-probably as a result of exploding 
pitot tube ground wire. 
4.2.5 Shock Wave and Overpressure 
When a lightning-stroke current flows in an ionized leader channel (as 
when the first return stroke occurs), a large amount of  energy is delivered to the 
channel in 5 to 10 /IS, causing the channel t o  expand with supersonic speed. Its 
temperature has been measured by spectroscope techniques to be 30 000 O K  and 
the channel pressure (before expansion) about 10 atmospheres (Reference 4.8). 
When the supersonic expansion is complete, the channel diameter is several 
centimeters and the channel pressure is in equilibrium with the surrounding air. 
Later, the channel continues t o  expand more slowly t o  the equilibrium situation 
of a stable arc. The cylindrical shock wave propagates radially outward from the 
center of the arc, and, if a hard surface is intercepted, the kinetic energy in the 
shock wave is transformed into a pressure rise over and above that in the shock 
wave itself. This results in a total overpressure of several times that in the free 
Figure 4.8 Resistive heating and explosive vaporization of conductors. 
shock wave at the surface. Depending on the distance of the arc from the 
surface, overpressures can range up  to several hundred atmospheres at the 
surface, resulting in implosion-type damage, such as that shown in Figure 4.9 
(Reference 4.9). The arc does not have t o  contact the damaged surface but may 
simply be swept alongside it, as was evident in the case shown in Figure 4.9. 
Apparently a return stroke or restrike occurred as the tip of  the propeller passed 
just below the leading edge of  the wing, positioning a cylindrical shock wave 
horizontally beneath the wing, as in Figure 4.10. This hypothesis by Hacker 
(Reference 4.1 0) is supported by  scorching of the paint on the imploded panels, 
an indication o f  a nearby heat source. 
I f  an arc is contained inside a structure, such as would occur when a 
nonmetallic assembly is punctured, its overpressure may cause additional damage 
to the structure. This may have been responsible for some of the damage t o  the 
radome shown in Figure 4.7. 
Other examples of  shock wave implosion damage include cracked or  
shattered windshields and navigation light globes. Modern windshields, especially 
those aboard transport aircraft, are of laminated construction and evidently of 
sufficient strength t o  have avoided being completely broken by arc blast and 
overpressures. Broken windshields resulting from a lightning strike, however, are 
considered a possible cause of the crash of at least one propeller-driven aircraft. 
(Reference 4.1 I ) .  
8 4  
Figure 4.9 Implosion damage from lightning-flash overpressure. Flash swept aft 
beneath wing from propeller. 
4.3 Nonmetallic Structures 
Early aircraft of wood and fabric construction would probably have 
suffered more catastrophic damage from lightning strikes had it not been for the 
fact that these aircraft were rarely flown in weather conducive t o  lightning. The 
all-aluminum aircraft which followed were able t o  fly in or near adverse weather 
and receive strikes, but because aluminum is an excellent electrical conductor, 
severe or catastrophic damage from lightning was rare. There is a trend again, 
however, toward use of  nonmetallic materials in aircraft construction. These 
include fiber-reinforced plastics and polycarbonate resins, which offer improve- 
ments in cost and performance. However, some of these materials have begun t o  
appear at  aircraft extremities, such as nose, wing and empennage tips, and access 
door covers, where structural loads are moderate but  where lightning strikes 
frequently attach. Often the nonmetallic material is used to cover a metallic 
structure. If this material is nonconducting, such as is the case with fiberglass, 
electric fields may penetrate it and initiate streamers from metallic objects 
inside. These streamers may puncture the nonmetallic material as they propagate 
outward to meet an oncoming lightning leader. This puncture begins as a 
pinhole, but,  as soon as stroke currents and accompanying blast and shock waves 
follow, much more damage occurs. An example of  a puncture of a fiberglass- 
honeycomb radome is shown on Figure 4.1 1 (Reference 4.12). In this case a 
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Figure 4.1 0 Orientation of lightning path and shock wave with respect to lower 
side of aircraft wing shown in Figure 4.9. 
(a) Chordwise plane 
(b) Fore-aft plane: perpendicular to lightning path a t  point P of part (a). 
streamer evidently propagated from the radar dish or some other conductive 
object inside the radome, puncturing the fiberglasshoneycomb wall and rubber 
erosion protection boot on its way to meet an oncoming lightning leader. Most 
of the visible damage was done by the ensuing stroke current. 
Other materials, such as boron- and graphite-reinforced composites, do 
have some electrical conductivity, and, because of this, their behavior with 
respect to lightning is considerably different from that of nonconductive 
Figure 4.1 I Puncture o f  a fiberglass-honeycomb radome. 
materials. At the present time, boron and graphite composites are only beginning 
to see in-flight service in Zone 1 and Zone 2 regions (Figure 4.9, where lightning 
attachments may occur; because of widespread concern regarding possible 
lightning vulnerability, these zones have been conservatively protected with 
conductive strips or coatings. No reports exist as yet of composite parts damaged 
by  natural lightning. Simulated lightning tests which have been performed on 
composites in the laboratory, however, have shown (Reference 4.13) that 
unprotected composites are likely t o  be vulnerable. The reason is that there is 
sufficient conductivity in the reinforcing fibers or filaments t o  prevent electric 
field penetration and puncture of the composite but not enough conductivity to  
safely carry away the lightning flash currents, which in this case tend t o  flow 
into the fibers or filaments themselves. When carrying even minute portions of 
the total flash current, these poor conductors overheat, and damage t o  
themselves or t o  the surrounding resin matrix results. An example of what 
happens to  the filaments in a boron-reinforced composite is shown in Figure 
4.1 2. The lightning current entered the composite at  the damaged areas shown 
and flowed t o  a conducting plate at  one end of  the panel. There is little or no 
damage t o  the resin matrix, but the damage to the reinforcing filaments results 
in loss o f  overall material strength (Reference 4.14). 
Because of their greater electrical conductivity and other differences, 
87 
TYPICAL INDIVIDUAL 
FILAMENT TRANSVERSE 
AXIAL FAILURE PLANES 
\-FRONT OF PANEL 
TYPICAL PANEL CROSS SECTION 
SHOWING FILAMENT DAMAGE 
Figure 4.12 Fifty-six kiloampere simulated lightning current damage to boron 
composite laminate panel. Seventeen-ply, 0 ~ - 9 0 ~ - 0 ~  orientation. 
graphite fibers can withstand more lightning current than can boron fibers. At 
higher current levels the graphite fibers remain intact but become hot enough to 
boil and ignite the plastic resin. Figure 4.13 (Reference 4.1 5) shows a small 
"popsicle stick" graphite composite laminate through which 10 kA of lightning 
current have been passed. Nearly all of the resin has burned away, and the 
graphite fibers are left in disarray. As a whole, however, graphite-reinforced 
composites are able to  withstand higher amounts of  lightning current without 
damage than can boron-reinforced composites. Often some damage to either 
material can be accepted or repaired, but sometimes a lightning-damaged 
composite part will need replacement. 
Transparent acrylics or polycarbonate resins are often u t i l i~ed  for canopies 
and windshields. These materials are usually found in Zone 1 or Zcne 2 
locations, where either direct or swept-lightning flashes may occur. Most of the 
polycarbonates are very good insulators, however, and so will successfully resist 
punctures by lightning or streamers. The electric field will penetrate them and 
induce streamers from conducting objects inside, but these streamers are not 
usually able to  puncture a polycarbonate. Thus, fighter pilots beneath poly- 
carbonate canopies have often reported electric shocks indicative of strealnering 
off their helmets, but the current levels involved have not been harmful because 
the streamers have not come in direct contact with the lightning flash. Leaders 
approaching the outside of a canopy travel along its surface t o  reach a metallic 
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Figure 4.13 Unidirectional graphite composite sample before and after conduct- 
. 
ing 10 kA of lightning current end-to-end. 
skin, or those initially attached to a forward metal frame may be swept aft over 
a canopy until they reattach t o  an aft metallic point. Sometimes this occurrence 
will leave a scorched path across the canopy, as shown in Figure 4.14 (Reference 
4.16). Scorches like this can usually be polished away. 
While harmless t o  a canopy itself, flashes passing just outside frequently 
cause electrical shock or flash blindness to  the pilot. In at least one case shock or 
blindness t o  the pilot caused him t o  lose control of the aircraft at low altitude 
and resulted in a fatal accident. 
In addition to  the direct effects described in the preceding paragraphs, 
replacement of metallic skins with nonmetallic materials removes the inherent 
protection against electromagnetic field penetration that is an important 
by-product of aluminum skins. Electrical wiring and electronics components 
enclosed inside nonmetallic skins are therefore likely to be much more 
susceptible t o  the indirect effects of lightning than those inside metallic skins 
unless specific measures are taken t o  reduce this susceptibility. 
4.4 Fuel Systems 
Potentially, aircraft fuel systems represent the most critical lightning 
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Figure 4.14 Evidence of lightning attachment to  canopy fastener and scorching 
of canopy. 
hazard t o  flight safety. An electric spark produced by only 0.2 millijoule (mJ) of 
energy is sufficient t o  ignite a propagating flame in a near stoichiometric mixture 
of hydrocarbon fuel and air (Reference 4.17); yet lightning-flash currents may 
deposit several thousand joules of  energy in an aircraft. 
There are several jet and turbojet transport accidents on record which have 
been attributed t o  lightning ignition of fuel. Although the exact location of  
ignition in each case remains obscure, the most prevalent opinion is that 
lightning ignited fuel vapor at the wing tip vent outlets of these aircraft 
(References 4.1 8 and 4.19). It  is also possible that sparking occurred somewhere 
inside a fuel tank as lightning currents flowed through the aircraft. The inflight 
loss of  at least two military aircraft also has been attributed to lightning ignition 
o f  fuel, and there is a report o f  a lightning strike igniting fuel in another military 
aircraft parked on the ground (Reference 4.20). 
In addition to  the direct effects described above, there are several instances 
in which indirect effects have evidently accounted for ignition of fuel. Lightning- 
induced voltages in aircraft electrical wiring are believed t o  have resulted in 
sparks, for example, across a capacitance-type fuel probe or some other electrical 
object inside fuel tanks of several military aircraft, resulting in loss of external 
tanks in some cases and the entire aircraft in others. Capacitance-type fuel 
probes are designed t o  preclude such occurrences, and laboratory tests 
(Reference 4.21) have shown that the voltage required t o  spark a typical 
capacitance-type probe is many times greater than that induced in fuel gauge 
circuits by  lightning. However, other situations involving unenclosed circuits, 
such as externally mounted fuel tanks, exist wherein induced voltages may be 
much higher than those found in circuits completely enclosed by  an airframe. 
The accidents mentioned above prompted extensive research into the 
lightning effects on and protection of aircraft fuel systems. Tmproved bonding, 
lightning-protected filler caps and access doors, active and passive vent flame 
suppression devices, flame-retardant foams, and safer (i.e., less flammable) fuels 
are examples of developments which have resulted from this research. In 
addition, government airworthiness requirements now include lightning protec- 
tion for aircraft fuel systems and specify requirements and tests that must be 
passed t o  demonstrate compliance prior t o  aircraft certification. As a result of 
these safety measures, lightning strikes present fewer hazards t o  the fuel systems 
aboard modern transport aircraft than t o  those of older aircraft, and properly 
certificated aircraft may expect to  experience lightning strikes with no adverse 
effects on fuel systems. Continued changes in airframe designs and materials, 
however, make it mandatory that care and diligence in fuel system lightning 
protection not be relaxed in the future. 
4.5 Electrical Sys terns 
If an externally mounted electrical apparatus, such as a navigation lamp or 
antenna, happens to  be a t  a lightning attachment point, protective globes or 
fairings may shatter and permit some of  the lightning current t o  enter associated 
electrical wiring directly. 
In the case of a wing tip navigation light, for example, lightning may 
shatter the protective globe and light bulb. This may in turn allow the lightning 
arc t o  contact the bulb filament so  that lightning currents may flow into the 
electrical wires running from the bulb t o  the power supply bus. Even if only a 
fraction of the total lightning current enters the wires, they may be too small t o  
conduct the thousands of amperes involved and thus be melted or vaporized. 
The accompanying voltage surge may cause breakdown of insulation or damage 
t o  other electrical equipment powered from the same bus. At best, the initial 
component affected is disabled, and, at worst, enough other electrical apparatus 
is disabled along with it t o  require evacuation of the crew and loss of  the 
aircraft. There are many examples of  this effect, involving both military and civil 
aircraft. Externally mounted hardware most frequently involved includes 
navigation lights, antennas, windshield heaters, pitot probe heaters, and, in 
earlier days, the trailing long-wire antennas that were deployed in flight for 
high-frequency radio communications. The latter were quite susceptible t o  
lightning strikes, and, since these wires were too thin t o  conduct the ensuing 
currents, they were frequently burned away. The high-frequency radio sets 
feeding these antennas were also frequently damaged, and cockpit fires were not 
uncommon. 
Damage may be increased when an electrical assembly is mounted on 
nonmetallic portions of the airframe because some lightning current may have to 
use the assembly ground wire as a path t o  the main airframe. That the resulting 
damage can be extensive was exemplified b y  a recent strike to  a small 
single-engine aircraft with fiberglass wing tips which included fuel tanks, the 
type pictured in Figure 4.1 5. The details of this incident will illustrate several of 
the strike effects described in this section. 
NAVIGATION LIGHT 
Figure 4.15 General avaiation aircraft with plastic wing tips. 
This aircraft, flying at about 900 m (3 000 ft), was experiencing light rain 
and moderate turbulence when it was struck by lightning. The pilots had seen 
other lightning flashes in the vicinity before their aircraft was struck, and 
embedded thunderstorms had been forecast enroute, but there had been no cells 
visible on the air traffic control (ATC) radar being used t o  vector the aircraft, 
which, of  course, had n o  weather radar of its own. 
The strike entered one wing tip and exited from the other. It sounded t o  
the pilot reporting like a rifle going off in the cabin, and the cabin immediately 
filled with smoke. Other effects follow. 
The No. 1 VHF communication set burned out. 
Seventy-five percent of the circuit breakers were popped, of w h ~ c h  
only SO? could be rebet later. 
The left wing tip fuel tank quantity indicator was disabled. 
The right main fuel tank quantity indicator was badly damaged. 
Several instrument lights were burned out. 
The navigation light switch and all lights were burned out. 
The aircraft, nevertheless, was able t o  land at a nearby airport. Subsequent 
inspection showed extensive damage t o  the right and left wing tips and t o  their 
electrical wiring. The attachment points and direct effects are pictured in Figure 
4.16 (A-F) (Reference 4.22) and are represented by a diagram in Figure 4.17. 
The evidence suggests that the flash included two or more strokes separated b y  a 
few milliseconds of  continuing current. Assuming, for purposes of  explanation, 
that the original lightning flash approached the right wing tip, the probable 
sequence of events was as follows: the initial point of  attachment was the right 
wing tip navigation light housing (Figure 4.16 [A]). Current from this stroke 
entered the housing ground wire and exploded both sections of it on the way t o  
the right outboard metallic rib, as evidenced by  the absence of  these wires and 
the blackened interior shown in Figure 4.16(B). Current continued through the 
airframe to the left outboard rib and out the sender unit ground wire t o  the 
sender unit, the base o f  which is shown in Figure 4.16(C). From there, the 
current followed the filler cap ground braid and exited the aircraft a t  the filler 
cap (Figure 4.16[D]). The current exploded the sender unit ground wire but not 
the heavier filler cap ground braid, which was only frayed. Sparksundoubtedly 
occurred inside the fuel tank along the ground braid and between the f i ler  cap 
and its receptacle, but the fuel-air mixture in the ullage of  these half-full tanks 
was probably too  rich t o  support ignition. 
Blast forces from stroke No. 1 at the right navigation light housing also 
shattered the lamp globe and bulb, as shown in Figure 4.16(A). This shattering 
allowed a portion of the first stroke current t o  enter the right navigation light 
power wire, exploding it between the lamp and the outer rib, where the current 
jumped t o  the rib and continued through the rest of the airframe t o  the left 
sender unit ground wire. 
Lightning current flowing in the navigation lamp power wire elevated its 
voltage to  several thousand volts with respect t o  the airframe, a voltage high 
enough t o  break down the insulation at the outer rib feed-through point, as 
shown in Figure 4.17. Until breakdown occurred here (a few microseconds after 
the first stroke began), the wire was at sufficiently high voltage t o  break down 
the insulation t o  the neighboring sender wire. This breakdown occurred all along 
the wire inside the right wing. The portion of current arcing into the sender wire 
caused a large voltage t o  build u p  across the right wing tip tank fuel gauge 
magnet inductance, t o  which this wire connects. This voltage in turn sparked 
over the gap between the gauge terminal and the nearest grounded housing wall, 
the arcing badly damaging the gauge unit. While the left navigation light power 
wire was also exploded, it is probable that this did not occur until the second 
stroke. 
Since the aircraft was moving forward, the entry and exit points of the 
second stroke were farther aft on both wing tips than the points of the first 
stroke. Since n o  other metallic components were present aft of the first stroke 
entry point on the right wing tip, the second stroke punctured a hole in the 
fiberglass trailing edge and contacted the metallic outboard rib, as shown in 
Figure 4.16(E). As shown in Figure 4.17, current from this stroke proceeded 
Figure 4.1 6 Attachment points and direct effects on plastic wing tips. 
through the airframe to the left wing tip, where by this time the stroke had 
swept aft adjacent t o  the navigation lamp (shown in Figure 4.16 [F] ) ,  from 
which point the stroke current exited. Current from stroke No. 2 thus probably 
arced between the left outer rib to  the navigation lamp power wire (the ground 
wire having been vaporized by  the first stroke), which it followed t o  the lamp 
housing. The power wire was vaporized by the second stroke current 
flowing in it. 
Both left and right navigation lamp power wires were connected together 
in the cabin and t o  both the 12 V d c  bus and the tail light. The voltage and 
current surges which entered the lamp power wires inboard of the outer rib 
feedthroughs were also conducted to the tail light, burning it out ,  and t o  the 12 
V do bus. The surge on the bus, of course, was immediately imposed on all of 
the other electrical equipment powered from this bus, or all of the electrical 
equipment in this aircraft. Arcing undoubtedly occurred in a number of 
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Figure 4.1 7 Plastic wing tips and associated electric circuits and locations of 
lightning effects. 
components, causing circuit breakers t o  pop. Because circuit breakers, however, 
react much too  slowly t o  prevent passage of a lightning surge, at least one piece 
of equipment (the No. 1 VHF communication set) and several instrument lamps 
were burned out. 
There have been several similar incidents (References 4.23 and 4.24), and 
together these have stimulated the design and verification of  protective measures 
(Reference 4.25) for general aviation aircraft with fiberglass components such as 
these wing tip fuel tanks, Many of  these aircraft, however, are still flying without 
adequate protection. 
The foregoing incident is an example of how a change in materials can 
increase the vulnerability not only of  the airframe but also of other systems 
which previously had the inherent protection of conventional aluminum skins. 
The lightweight lamp and sender unit electrical wires were quite adequate for an 
installation in which a metal skin was available to  carry away lightning currents, 
but they are woefully inadequate when used unmodified inside a plastic wing 
tip, where they become the only conducting path available to lightning currents 
trying to enter the main airframe. 
4.6 Engines 
With the exception of  a few incidents of temporary malfunction similar t o  
the incident reported in the introduction t o  this chapter, there have been no 
reports of  adverse lightning effects on reciprocating engines. Metal propellers and 
spinners have been struck frequently, of course, but effects have been limited t o  
pitting of  blades or burning of  small holes in spinners, as shown in Figures 4.18 
and 4.19 (References 4.26 and 4.27). Lightning currents must flow through 
Figure 4. I 8  Lightning-strike damage t o  a propeller. 
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propeller blade and engine shaft bearings, but these are massive enough to carry 
these currents with no harmful effects. Wooden propellers, especially ones 
without metal leading edges, could probably undergo more damage, but these 
are seldom used on aircraft which fly in weather conditions where lightning 
strikes occur. 
Figure 4.19 Lightning-strike damage to a spinner. 
Reported lightning effects on turbojet engines show that these effects also 
are limited to temporary interference with engine operation. Flameouts, 
compressor stalls, and roll-backs (reduction in turbine rpm) have been reported 
after lightning strikes to aircraft with fuselage-mounted engines. This type 
includes military aircraft with internally mounted engines and fuselage air 
intakes, or other military and civil aircraft with engines externally mounted on 
the fuselage. There have been no attempts to duplicate these events with 
simulated lightning in a laboratory, and there has been no other qualitative 
analysis of the interference mechanism; however, it is generally believed that 
these events result from disruption of the inlet air by the shock wave associated 
with the lightning arc channel sweeping aft along a fuselage. This channel may 
indeed pass close in front of an engine intake, and if a restrike occurs, the 
accompanying shock wave is considered sufficient to disrupt engine operation. 
The steep temperature gradient may also be important. These effects have been 
reported as occurring more often on smaller military or business jet aircraft than 
on larger transport aircraft. Thus, smaller engines are probably more susceptible 
to disrupted inlet air than are their larger counterparts. 
In some cases a complete flameout of the engine results, while in others 
there is only a stall or roll-back. There is no case on record, however, in which a 
successful restart or recovery of the engine to full power was not made while still 
in flight. Perhaps because of this, together with the impracticality of a 
laboratory simulation, there has been little research into the problem. 
Nevertheless, operators of aircraft with engines or inlets close to the fuselage 
should anticipate possible loss of power in the event of a lightning strike and be 
prepared to take quick corrective action. 
There are no reports of lightning effects on wing-mounted turbojet 
engines, since lightning strikes do not often occur near the inlets of these 
engines, and there are no reports of power loss of turboprop engines as a result 
of lightning strikes. 
4.7 Indirect Effects 
Even if the lightning flash does not directly contact the aircraft's electrical 
wiring, strikes to the airframe are capable of causing voltage and current surges 
in this wiring which may be damaging to aircraft electronics. 
The mechanism whereby lightning currents induce voltages in aircraft 
electrical circuits is illustrated in Figure 4.20. As lightning current flows through 
an aircraft, strong magnetic fields which surround the conducting aircraft and 
change rapidly in accordance with the fast-changing lightning-stroke currents are 
produced. Some of this magnetic flux may leak inside the aircraft through 
apertures such as windows, radomes, canopies, seams, and joints. Other fields 
may arise inside the aircraft when lightning current diffuses to the inside surfaces 
of skins. In either case these internal fields pass through aircraft electrical 
circuits and induce voltages in them proportional to the rate of change of the 
magnetic field. These magnetically induced voltages may appear between both 
wires of a two-wire circuit, or between either wire and the airframe. The former 
are often referred to as line-to-line col€ages and the latter as common-mode 
voltages 
In addition to these induced voltages, there may be resistive voltage drops 
along the airframe as lightning current flows through it. If any part of an aircraft 
circuit is connected anywhere to  the airframe, these voltage drops may appear 
between circuit wires and the airframe, as shown in Figure 4.20. For metallic 
aircraft made of highly conductive aluminum, these voltages are seldom 
significant except when the lightning current must flow through resistive joints 
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Figure 4.20 Magnetic flux penetration and induced voltages in electrical wiring. 
or hinges. However, the resistance of titanium is 10 times that of aluminum, and 
that of composite materials many hundred times that of aluminum, so the 
resistive voltages in future aircraft employing these materials may be much 
higher. 
Upset or damage of electrical equipment by these induced voltages is 
defined as an indirect effect. It is apparent that indirect effects must be 
considered along with direct effects in assessing the vulnerability of aircraft 
electrical and electronics systems. In situations like that of the light aircraft 
described in Section 4.5, the direct effects are clearly the most severe. Other 
aircraft exist, however, whose electrical systems are well protected against direct 
effects but not so well against indirect effects. 
Until the advent of solid state electronics in aircraft, indirect effects from 
external environments, such as lightning and precipitation static, were not much 
of a problem and received relatively little attention. No airworthiness criteria are 
available for this environment. There is increasing evidence, however, of 
troublesome indirect effects. Incidents of  upset or damage to  avionic or 
electrical systems, for example, without evidence of any direct attachment of 
the lightning flash to an electrical component are showing up in airline 
lightning-strike reports. Table 4.1 summarizes the reports of interference or 
outage of avionic or electrical equipment reported by a group of U.S. airlines for 
the period June 1971 to  November 1974 (Reference 4.28). 
Table 4.1 EVIDENCE OF INDIRECT EFFECTS IN 
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT 
(2 14 strikes) 
Interference Outage 
HF communication set - 5 
VHF communication set 2 7 3 
VOR receiver 5 2 
Compass (all types) 22 9 
Marker beacon - 2 
Weather radar 3 2 
Instrument landing system 6 - 
Automatic direction finder 6 7 
Radar altimeter 6 - 
Fuel flow gauge 2 - 
Fuel quantity gauge - 1 
Engine rpm gauges - 4 
Engine exhaust gas temperature - 2 
Static air temperature gauge 1 - 
Windshield heater - 2 
Flight director computer 1 - 
Navigation light - 1 
ac generator tripoff (6 instances 
of tripoff) 
Autopilot 1 - 
The incidents reported in Table 4.1 occurred in 20% of the total of 214 
lightning-strike incidents reported during the period. U.S. military aircraft have 
had similar experience. This experience is probably a result of the increasing 
sensitivity of miniaturized solid state electronics to transient voltages, a trend 
which necessarily would not have posed a problem in older, less sophisticated 
equipment. In any one incident, only a few electronic components are affected; 
others are not. Yet laboratory tests (Reference 4.29) have shown that 
lightning-induced voltages appear in all aircraft electric wiring at once. Thus it is 
evident that surges reach higher values in some circuits than in others or that 
some electronics are Iess tolerant of such surges than others. 
Indirect effects were evident in about 2W/r of all the incidents reported, 
while outages were reported in only about 10% of all incidents. Since severe 
strokes also occur in only about 10 to 20% of all flashes, it is probable that a 
severe stroke may be required to cause noticeable effects. 
While the indirect effects are not presently a major safety hazard, there are 
four trends in aircraft design and operations which could increase the potential 
problem. These include the following: 
Increasing use of plastic or composite skin 
Further miniaturization of solid state electronics 
Greater dependence on electronics to perform flight-critical 
functions 
Greater congestion in terminal airways, requiring more frequent 
flight through adverse weather conditions at altitudes where light- 
ning strikes frequently occur. 
Design of protective measures against direct effects is the subject of the 
next three chapters. Design of protective measures against indirect effects is 
treated in the remainder of this book. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DIRECT EFFECTS PROTECTION 
Successful protection of an aircraft against the direct effects of  lightning 
depends upon protection of each of its various systems or  coniponents that may 
be susceptible either to  direct lightning attachment or t o  current flow between 
lightning attachment (entry and exit) points. Components located in different 
sections of  the aircraft are likely to  experience different degrees o f  susceptibility 
t o  lightning, and they may be vulnerable to  different components of the 
lightning flash. In this chapter we present the basic steps which should be 
followed in eslablishing lightning protection by discussing the varieties of 
lightning susceptibility and the designing o f  suitable protective measures against 
arc entry and current flow-through damage. We explain how the lightning-strike 
zones and lightning current environments are established, since environmental 
conditions in the zones are those under which specific protective measures must 
perform. We then call attention to those airworthiness regulations which apply 
to  lightning protection. In subsequent chapters we present specific protection 
techniques for aircraft fuel and structural systems exposed to the direct effects 
of lightning strikes. 
5.2 Basic Steps in Protectio~i Design 
5.2.1 Establishment of the Ligh tnilig Susceptibility 
Design of successfill protection usually involves taking the following basic 
steps. As described in Chapter I ,  lightning strikes co~nmonly attach to an aircraft 
nose, wing tips, vertical fin tip, horizontal stabilizer tips, and to other 
appendages, such as propellers, pitot booms, antennas, or pylon-mounted 
external stores. These are the places where the hot lightning arc attaches directly 
t o  the aircraft and thus the places of  initial concern as far as direct effects are 
concerned. However, lightning currents must flow through the aircraft skin and 
structural members between these arc entry and exit points, and it is possible for 
these currents to  damage components along the way if safe conduction paths are 
not provided. Thus, the lightning protection designer's job is not completed 
when he has adequately treated only the attachment points. Instead, he must 
also look throughout the aircraft at other components that might be  vulnerable 
in one way or another t o  direct effects from current flow through the aircraft. 
The susceptibility (degree of exposure to  lightning effects) of  components 
depends greatly on their location on or within the aircraft. Thus it is helpful to 
utilize the lightning-strike zone definitions of Chapter 2 t o  establish the lightning 
environment which each particular component experiences. Once this has been 
established, the  vulnerability (if any) of the component t o  its own environment 
can be determined, and protective measures designed if necessary. 
The lightning attachment zone definitions proposed by SAE Special Task 
F (Reference 5.1) are repeated below: 
Zone I A :  An initial attachment point with a low probability of  flash 
hang-on, such as a leading edge 
Zone IB: An initial attachment point with a high probability of  flash 
hang-on, such as a trailing edge 
Zone 2A: A swept-stroke zone with a low probability of flash hang-on, 
such as a wing mid-span 
Zone2B: A swept-stroke zone with high probability o f  flash hang-on, 
such as a wing inboard trailing edge 
Locations of these zones can be determined either from comparison with 
actual lightning attachment points on existing aircraft or by laboratory tests in 
which a scale model of the aircraft is subjected t o  simulated lightning strikes. 
Perry (Reference 5.2) has shown the locations of actual lightning attachment 
points on several types of propeller and turbojet aircraft in use in the United 
Kingdom and Europe. His strike patterns for three aircraft are shown on Figures 
5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 (Reference 5.3). From these figures it is evident that initial 
attachment points (Zone IA and 1B) are at or very near the extremities, such as 
nose, wing tips, or empennage tips. if an initial attachment point is at a trailing 
edge, the arc must hang on there until the flash dies naturally; thus more damage 
may occur. On the other hand, if the initial attachment point is a forward 
extremity, such as the nose, the aircraft can fly through the flash channel, 
allowing the arc t o  reattach at subsequent points along the line of  flight, as 
evident from the lines of  successive burn marks d o n g  the fuselage in the three 
figures. Thus, forward initial attachment points are commonly in Zone 1A and 
the subsequent burn marks in Zone 3A. Once in a while, the flash may remain 
attached to a forward-most extremity or to  a small protrusion, such as an 
antenna or  even a rivet head along the fuselage. In such cases the attachment 
point becomes a B-Zone point with high probabiIity of hang-on. Since most 
lightning flashes persist for one-fourth of  a second or more (up t o  about 1 
second), the aircraft may move forward its entire length, or more, in this period 
of time, and its entire length may be exposed to swept-lightning flashes. Its 
entire length must therefore be considered to be in Zone 2. 
If a new aircraft design is of the same general configuration (that is, 
relative position and size of fuselage, wings, empennage, etc.) the general 
location o f  its lightning attachment zones can be determined by comparison 
with known attachment points on similar aircraft. Knowledge of the exact 
boundaries between one zone and another is important, however, and these 
boundaries must often be determined by a laboratory test in w h ~ c h  a full-size 
replica of the aircraft assembly in question (such as a wing tip or nose radome) is 
subjected to simulated lightning flashes from various directions. Knowledge of 
these zone boundaries is particularly important in designing protection for wing 
fuel tanks, for example. Recogni7ing that laboratory tests may not be practical, 
the Federal Aviation Administration in its advisory circular on protection of  
aircraft fuel systems against lightning defined Zone 1 as including "[a] ll surfaces 
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Figure 5.1 Position of lightning strikes on  Viscount aircraft - March 1959 t o  
June 1964. 
of the wing tips located within 18  inches of  the tip measured parallel t o  the 
Lateral axis o f  the aircraft, and surfaces within 18  inches of the leading edge on  
wings having leading edge sweep angles of more than 4 5  degrees." Also included 
are " [p] rojections such as engine nacelles, external fuel tanks, propeller disc, 
and fuselage nose"; in the tail group all surfaces "within 18 inches of the tips of 
horizontal and vertical stabilizer, trailing edge of horizontal stabilizer, tail cone, 
and any other protuberances," as well as "[a] ny other projecting part which 
might constitute a point of  direct stroke attachment." 
FAA defines Zone 2 as including "[s]urfaces for which there is a 
probability of strokes being swept rearward from a Zone 1 point of  direct stroke 
attachment. This zone includes surfaces which extend 18 inches laterally t o  each 
side of fore-and-aft lines passing through the Zone I forward projection points 
of stroke attachment. Ail fuselage and nacelle surfaces, including 18  inches of  
adjacent surfaces, not defined as Zone I are included in Zone 2" (Reference 
5.4). (FAA does not subdivide Zone 1 or Zone 2 into A and B zones as 
recommended by SAE Task F.) 
Thus, the establishment of the lightning attachment zones for aircraft of  
conventional configuration is relatively straightforward and can be done with 
reasonable accuracy. Prediction of the lightning attachment zones for new 
aircraft of unconventional design is not as easily accomplished by  reference t o  
inflight data or t o  the FAA 18-inch criteria. Such an aircraft might look like the 
one in Figure 5.4 (Reference 5.5). The gradual blending o f  fuselage and wing 
lines makes identification of the regions of maximum electric field stress (and 
lightning attachment) less easy t o  distinguish. With the exception of the pointed 
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Figure 5.2 Position of lightning strikes on Boeing 707 aircraft January 1962 
to December 1967. 
nose and vertical wing tips, the regions of  highest electric field stress are less 
evident on this aircraft than on the conventional aircraft of Figures 5.1 through 
5.3. Thus, in this case strike attachment tests on  a scale model in a laboratory 
are desirable. The SAE Task F report (Reference 5.1) describes how this test 
should be performed. 
5.2.2 Protection of Exposed Systems or Components in Zones 1 
and 2 Against Arc Entry Damage 
The most obvious protection task is to protect systems or components 
located in Zone 1 or Zone 2 from damage that results from direct arc 
attachment. In some cases, complete protection against burning and erosion is 
impractical, since the consequences of  permitting some o f  this damage t o  occur 
are of a maintenance nature only. In other cases, such as those involving integral 
fuel tank skins, it is very important that complete protection be designed and 
applied. 
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Figure 5.3 Position of  lightning strikes on Trident aircraft -- May 1964 
Figure 5.4 Possible aircraft configuration o f  the future. 
5.2.3 Provision of  a Safe, Controlled Path for Lightning Currents 
Since the aircraft is part of the lightning current path between two 
external charge centers, lightning currents must flow through the airframe 
between attachment points. In most cases aluminum skins and structural 
elements provide an excellent conductive path without the need of additional 
provisions for lightning currents. Nonmetallic materials, however, such as 
fiber-reinforced plastics are finding increased use in newer aircraft. At present, 
use of these materials has been limited to outer wing tips or radomes, for 
example; therefore, in these cases additional conductive paths need only be 
added across or through the nonmetallic section. However, an aircraft made 
entirely of  fiberglass has been fabricated. In this case positive steps must be 
taken to provide the necessary conducting path(s) for lightning currents to flow 
through the entire aircraft. 
5.3 The Lightning Environment as Related to Attachment Zones 
For guidance in the lightning protection design and qualification testing of 
aerospace vehicles and hardware, the Society of Automotive Engineers Com- 
mittee AE4, Special Task F ,  has formulated an idealized representation of  the 
current components of a severe lightning flash. This representation incorporates 
the important aspects of both positive and negative flashes. Four current 
components, A, B, C, and D, represent the four current characteristics found in 
most lightning flashes. These are shown together on Figure 5.5 (Reference 5.6). 
This model represents a very severe flash wherein intensities are exceeded less 
than 1% of the time. It may be used t o  define the environment that aircraft 
systems and components must withstand or against which they must be 
protected. At the  present time, this model is not included in any government 
specification or standard dealing with lightning protection; however, the model 
is expected to  be incorporated into forthcoming revisions of  most of  these 
requirements. The lightning environment described in Figure 5.5 is equal in 
severity to  the lightning currents which are described in present specifications, or . 
greater than such currents. The model is also in general agreement with new 
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Figure 5.5 Current test waveform components for  evaluation of direct effects. 
lightning protection requirements being formulated in the United Kingdom and 
Europe (Reference 5.7). 
In order to  design protection for a particular system or piece of hardware, 
its susceptibility to the various lightning current characteristics must be known. 
For this purpose SAE Task F has also defined the lightning current com- 
ponent(~) likely to strike the aircraft in each of the four lightning attachment 
zones. The results are shown on Table 5.1. Further references will be made to 
these Task F criteria during discussion of protection techniques in succeeding 
chapters of this book. 
Table 5.1 LIGHTNING CURRENT COMPONENTS 
EXPERIENCED IN EACH ZONE 
A B C D 
Current Component First Return Intermediate Continuing 
Zone Stroke Stroke Current Restrike 
1A: initial attachment X X 
point with low 
probability of 
flash hang-on 
1B: initial attachment 
point with high 
probability of 
flash hang-on 
2A: swept-stroke 
zone with low 
probability of 
flash hang-on 
2B: swept-stroke 
zone with high 
probability of 
flash hang-on 
3 :  low probability X 
of direct attach- 
ment 
*Only if flash hang-on time is greater than 5 ms 
5.4 Applicable Airworthiness Regulations 
There are a number of government airworthiness regulations that apply 
specifically to aircraft lightning protection. These are applicable in the United 
States and other countries and generally must be complied with as part of the 
aircraft certification requirements. Table 5.2  lists the regulations presently in 
effect. These are concerned primarily with fuel system protection, since this 
system has presented the most serious hazard in the past. Other areas such as 
nonmetallic structures and aircraft electronics systems are of increasing concern, 
however, and are beginning to appear in updated requirements. Applicable 
portions of the regulations in Table 5.2 will be referred to and discussed in 
succeeding chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FUEL SYSTEM PROTECTION 
6.1 Introduction 
Because of the hazardous nature of most fuels and the potential for 
catastrophe if ignition should occur, the design of adequate lightning protection 
for the aircraft fuel system is probably the most important lightning protection 
job t o  be  accomplished. This is the system that government airworthiness 
certification requirements stress most heavily, for the cause of the most tragic of 
lightning-related aircraft accidents has been attributed to  the vulnerability of 
fuel systems. 
Elements of  the fuel system are typically spread throughout much of a n  
aircraft and occupy much of its volume. They include the fuel tanks themselves, 
as well as associated vent and transfer plumbing, and electrical controls and 
instrumentation. Careful attention must be paid to  all of these elements if 
adequate protection is t o  b e  obtained. 
The main objective o f  fuel system protection is of course to  prevent any 
direct or indirect source of  ignition of  the fuel b y  lightning. Accomplishment of 
this goal is quite challenging when it is remembered that thousands of joules of 
energy must be  conducted through the airframe when the aircraft is struck b y  
lightning, that every metallic structural element in and on the aircraft is involved 
t o  some degree in this conduction process, and that a tiny spark of - 2 x lo4 
joule may be  all o f  the energy that need be released inside a fuel tank t o  ignite a 
fire o r  initiate an explosion. 
Prevention of fuel ignition from lightning must be accomplished b y  at  least 
one of the following approaches: 
(a) removing one or  more o f  the requirements for combustion 
(b) eliminating all sources o f  ignition. 
In this chapter we review typical aircraft fuel flammability characteristics 
and possible ways t o  control fuel flammability and ignition. Research in the field 
of fuel system protection distinguishes the areas of adequate knowledge and 
practice from areas of inadequate knowledge and practice. Because current 
guidelines for controlling lightning-related ignition derive in part from this 
research, we refer in some detail t o  several important studies, by  way of 
background, before presenting guidelines for effective protection o f  fuel 
systems. 
6.2 Fuel Flammability 
Ignition of fuel cannot occur until some of the fuel has become vaporized 
and mixed in a compatible proportion with oxygen or air. Thus, the ability of 
fuels t o  vaporize and mix with air in typical aircraft fuel tanks is of  primary 
concern. 
The flammability of the vapor space in a fuel tank varies according to the 
concentration of evaporated fuel in the available air. Reducing the fuel-to-air 
ratio below a definite minimum value produces a vapor and air mixture that is 
too lean in fuel to  burn. Likewise, there is a maximum fuellair ratio which, when 
exceeded, results in a vapor space mixture too  rich in fuel to be flammable. In 
between these extremes there is a range of mixtures that will burn. When only 
equilibrium conditions are considered, the particular fuellair ratio that can exist 
is determined by the temperature and altitude of the fuel system. The 
temperature determines the quantity o f  the fuel b y  controlling its vapor 
pressure, and the  altitude determines the quantity of  air. Therefore, b y  a suitable 
combination of temperature and altitude, under equilibrium conditions, the 
ullage of a fuel tank can be  made either flammable or nonflammable b y  varying 
combinations of temperature.and altitude. 
Much research into the fuel vapor and flammability characteristics that 
exist within aircraft fuel systems has been accomplished by  many organizations 
concerned with aircraft propulsion and the resulting need to safely transport 
large quantities of fuel aloft in a vehicle with severe space and weight limitations. 
This research has included laboratory investigations of  the flammability 
characteristics of the fuel vapors that exist within laboratory-type containers as 
well as those that exist during flight. Perhaps the most comprehensive laboratory 
work is that of  Nestor (Reference 6.1), who has paid particular attention t o  the 
behavior of fuels in aircraft tanks and flight environments. Nestor shows that,  as 
a result of the wide variety of temperatures, pressures, and motions that can 
exist in flight, there are correspondingly wide variations in the amount of  fuel 
that can exist in the vaporized state. One reason for this variation is that, in 
addition t o  fuel already present as a vapor, the aircraft motion and vibration also 
cause the liquid to  be dispersed in the vapor space in the form of mists and 
spray. An ignition source may preheat these droplets of  fuel to a point where 
sufficient vapors are evolved to support a flame, even if insufficient vapor has 
been released from the bulk fuel surface itself. The heat from the developing 
flame then causes more fuel to  vaporize and continue to feed and enlarge the 
flame. Temperature and altitude, however, are the primary characteristics that 
relate to  flammability. 
The relationship of  temperature and altitude to  tank vapor flammability is 
illustrated by  the flammability envelope. A typical flammability envelope is 
shown in Figure 6.1 (Reference 6.2). 
Turbine engine fuels are placed in two broad categories based on their 
distillation temperature ranges: wide-cut turbine engine fuels and aviation 
kerosenes. Aircraft with reciprocating engines are commonly fueled with 100 
octane gasoline. Turbine- Cjet-) powered aircraft fueled in the United States and 
in some foreign countries utilize aviation kerosenes. These include Jet A and Jet 
A-1 fuels. U.S. military aircraft and commercial transports in some other foreign 
countries are fueled with wide-cut fuels, such as Jet B or JP-4, which are 
kerosene-type fuels with a higher percentage of  volatile components. The 
flammability limits for the turbine fuels as determined in the laboratory by  
Nestor are presented in Figure 6.2 (Reference 6.3). 
The flammability envelopes are defined as lines beyond which no 
flammable points were observed in the laboratory tests. In Figure 6.2 these lines 
TEMPERATURE 
 
Figure 6.1 Typical flammability envelope of an aircraft fuel. 
have been drawn to enclose those data points at which ignition and flame 
propagation occurred but  exclude some of  the data points where only ignition 
occurred with n o  flame propagation. This results in a random scatter of ignition 
points about the lines, as shown by Nestor in Figure 6.2. The flammability 
envelopes of  the aviation kerosene-type fuels (Jet A and Jet A- I )  differ from the 
wide-cut fuels (JP-4 and Jet B) primarily in their temperature ranges. The 
aviation kerosenes have an average lean limit at sea level of about 3 8  "C and a 
rich limit o f  approximately 8 0  OC. For the wide-cut fuels, the lean and rich 
limits at sea level are about -20 "C and I0  "C,  respectively. 
Figure 6.3, taken from 3 Lockheed study on flammability of advanced 
flight vehicles (Reference 6.4) shows the flammability envelopes of aviation 
gasolines (AVGAS) along with a number of turbine fuels. The Reid vapor 
pressure of  each of  these fuels is also presented, and here the relationship 
between this parameter and volatility becomes apparent. Fuels with higher vapor 
pressures will release sufficient vapor at lower temperatures t o  reach a flammable 
mixture, thus lowering the flammability envelope as compared with the envelope 
of a fuel with a lower vapor pressure, which must be at a higher temperature to  
release sufficient vapor t o  form an ignitable mixture. 
The temperature vs altitude profiles for standard and tropical atmospheres 
are also presented in Figure 6.3 to show the mean air temperature at various 
flight altitudes. 
There are important factors which may alter the flammability limits of the 
vapor inside an aircraft fuel tank from those shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.3, 
however. One of these is the mixing of  one type o f  fuel with a small amount of 
TEMPERATURE, OC 
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Figure 6.2 Flammability limits for typical aircraft turbine fuels as a function of 
altitude and temperature. 
another. Figure 6.4 (Reference 6.5) shows, for example, the flammability limits 
determined by  Nestor of  a mixture proportionately comprised of 85% Jet A and 
15% Jet B fuels. Such a mixture might have occurred if the aircraft had 
originally been fueled with Jet B and later refueled with Jet A. The flammability 
envelope of the resulting mixture has been lowered such that it encompasses the 
altitudes and temperatures where most lightning strikes to  aircraft have 
occurred. 
Agitation is another way that the flammability envelopes might be  altered 
from those shown in Figure 6.2, for the latter are valid only when the mixture is 
stabilized. Agitation of  a fuel or spray from a pump or  pressurized fuel line can 
result in extending the lower temperature flammability limit below the curves 
shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.4. Thus, even though Figures 6.2 and 6.4 indicate 
that the vapor-air mixture in the tanks of  an aircraft fueled with Jet A would be 
too lean to support combustion, there can be  no assurance that this is always so, 
since agitation of the fuel may occur in flight. 
A number of methods have been developed to provide more positive 
TEMPERATURE, OC 
Figure 6.3 Flammability envelopes of fuels of different volatility. 
TEMPERATURE, 'C 
Figure 6.4 Flammability envelope of the fuel blend 85% Jet A/15% Jet  B, and 
altitudeltemperature envelope enclosing most lightning strikes. 
inerting of  the ullage in aircraft fuel tanks--inerting sufficient t o  inhibit the 
enlargement and propagation of flames away from a point of  ignition, so that an 
ignition source could occur yet  not result in a catastrophic fire o r  explosion. 
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These methods include inerting of the fuel tank ullage with gases, such as 
nitrogen or carbon dioxide, and mechanicaI subdivision of the tank volume with 
reticulated foams. Nitrogen-inerting systems have been developed and flight 
tested on  the USAF C-141 and C-135 (Reference 6.6) among others, but they 
have not been used extensively on any fleet of commercial aircraft because of 
excessive cost and weight penalties. Inerting systems have been used on several 
military aircraft for protection against fuel ignition resulting from enemy 
gunfire. 
Even if inerting systems were to come into common use, it would be 
advisable t o  take positive steps to assure that no ignition source could occur in 
the event of a lightning strike because there may never be complete assurance 
that a flammable mixture did not exist somewhere in the fuel system. Therefore, 
while the use of low-volatility fuels such as Jet A or while the inclusion of 
inerting systems t o  reduce the flammability of the atmosphere in a fuel tank will 
undoubtedly increase flight safety in the event of a lightning strike, these 
measures should not be relied upon to  prevent all in-flight fires or explosions 
resulting from lightning. Positive steps must still be taken to prohibit ignition 
sources within the fuel system. 
6.3 Sources of Ignition 
While there have been a number of in-flight fuel tank explosions 
undoubtedly caused by lightning strikes, the exact location or source of ignition 
has not been positively identified in any of these accidents. This failure is 
perhaps a result of the fact that so small an amount of energy in an electrical 
spark is required to  cause ignition that such a spark would leave little or no other 
evidence of itself (like pitting of a metal surface). It may be possible that 
ignition has begun outside of the fuel system itself--for example, at a fuel vent 
outlet--and then propagated inside, although there has been no proof of this. 
Laboratory studies involving simulated lightning strikes to fuel tanks or 
portions of an airframe containing fuel tanks have demonstrated several possible 
ignition mechanisms, and investigations of the accidents involving fuel tank fires 
and explosion have raised other possibilities. Possible ignition sources can be 
divided into the following two broad categories. 
Thermal Ignition Source 
1. Direct contact of the lightning arc with the fuel-air mixture, as at a 
vent outlet 
2 .  Hot spot formation or complete meltthrough of a metallic tank skin 
by lightning arc attachment 
Electrical Ignition Sources 
1 .  Electrical sparking between two pieces of metal conducting lightning 
current, such as poorly bonded sections of a fuel line or vent tube 
2 .  Sparking from an access door or filler cap (which has been struck) to 
its adapter assembly 
3. Sparking among elements of a capacitive-type fuel quantity probe, 
caused b y  lightning-induced voltages in the electrical wires leading t o  
such a probe 
The balance o f  this chapter considers each of the above ignition sources 
and methods of  their elimination. 
6.4 Vent Outlets 
The temperature of a lightning arc far exceeds that required t o  ignite a 
flammable fuel-air mixture; therefore, any direct contact of the lightning flash 
with such a mixture must be  considered an ignition source. Since fuel tank vents 
are the primary means by which a flammable fuel vapor can be exposed to the 
outside o f  an aircraft, a considerable amount of  research has been undertaken to 
evaluate the possibilities of  lightning ignition of fuel vent vapors. One of the first 
studies of  this possibility is that of  the Lockheed-California Company and the 
kghtning and Transients Research Institute in 1963 for the National Aero- 
nautics and Space Administration (Reference 6.7). In this program, fuel-air 
concentrations in the vicinity of aircraft vent outlets o f  several configurations 
were measured and mapped under various conditions of  tank vapor fuellair ratio 
and effluent velocity. The tests were run in a wind tunnel producing an airflow 
of up  to 100 knots. Mast vents discharging into wakes and free air streams were 
tested, as well as flush vents discharging into boundary layers, as shown in 
Figure 6.5 (Reference 6.8). The study showed that a vent discharging into a free 
stream exhibits the greatest dilution and thus the smallest flammable region, but 
that  flammable mixtures can exist in the immediate vicinity of each type of  vent 
outlet. 
A typical mixture concentration profile aft of  a flush vent outlet is shown 
in Figure 6.6 (Reference 6.9). Depending upon the richness of  the original 
effluent, dilution of  it b y  the addition of air to  3096, or more, might well lean it 
out of the  flammability envelope. Thus, dilution t o  a nonflammable mixture 
probably occurs farther than about one outlet diameter away from the outlet. 
This finding suggests that a lightning strike o r  associated streamer must occur 
very near to the edge of a vent outlet for an ignition to  occur. 
The above prediction was confirmed in the second part of  the 1963 
Lockheed-LTRI study, which included application of simulated lightning strikes 
to  a flush vent outlet with flammable fuel-air mixtures exiting from it into an 
airstream moving at 100 knots, both with and without flame arresters installed. 
These flame arresters, which were being evaluated as possible protective devices, 
consist of a parallel bundle of small-diameter metal tubes inserted into the vent 
line near the vent outlet, as pictured in Figure 6.7(a) (Reference 6.10). An 
alternate construction utilized a series of  baffles extending into the fuel vapor 
flow, as shown in Figure 6.7(b). The object in either case is to  quench 
(extinguish) the flame by  cooling it, and the small tubes, or baffles, are intended 
to accomplish this b y  providing additional surface area t o  conduct heat away 
from the flame. The test results showed that it was possible t o  get ignition of the 
vent effluent in the 100-knot airflow only when the lightning arc was delivered 
AIRFLOW WAKE RESULTING FROM 
- 
NOTE: THIS CONFIGURATION MAY HAVE FLAP, 
AILERON, OR BOTH, ADJACENT TO THE 
VENT MAST TO DISTURB FLOW PATTERN. 
Figure 6.5 Three general classes of fuel vent exits. 
directly to  the lip o f  the vent outlet. Arcs delivered t o  spots as little as 2.5 cm 
away did not ignite the effluent. The results also showed that flames ignited b y  
the strikes to  the outlet could propagate inward through the flame arresters 
when these were instaIled near the vent outlet. While the flame arresters did 
extinguish some flames ignited at the outlet, they did not stop all such flames. 
Evidently the intense heat and blast pressures o f  the lightning arc act to  heat the 
arrester and force the flame through. 
As a result of the crash of a Boeing 707 aircraft near Elkton, Maryland, on 
December 8, 1963, after being struck by  lightning (Reference 6.1 I ) ,  another 
BOUNDARY LAYER THICKNESS 0.50 VENT DIAMETERS 
VENT EXIT VELOCITY 0.10 X FREE STREAM VELOCITY 
LONGITUDINAL DISTANCE - VENT DIAMETERS 
6 8 10 
I I I I I 
-10- 
VERTICAL DIAMETERS 2- 
1 - PERCENTAGE INITIAL CONCENTRATION 
Figure 6.6 Typical profile of vent effluent in air stream aft of a flush vent 
outlet. (Profiles vary according to boundary layer thickness, effluent 
and air stream velocities, etc.) 
investigation of the possibility of lightning-initiated fuel tank vent fires was 
undertaken by Bolta and others of the Atlantic Research Corporation with the 
support of Newman and others of the Lightning and Transients Research 
Institute (Reference 6.12). This work was sponsored by the FAA and focused on 
the Boeing 707 wing tank and vent system, with the objective of determining the 
conditions under which ignition of fuel vent effluent allows flames to propagate 
back through the vent duct and surge tank and from there into the reserve tank. 
Another objective was the evaluation of various protective measures, including 
flame arresters and flame-extinguishing systems. 
Unlike the earlier Lockheed program, the vent was tested in still air, the 
rationale being that, if an ignitable effluent is assumed to be at the outlet, 
attachment of the lightning arc to the lip of the vent outlet is the governing 
factor in obtaining ignition. The ignitable mixture was a 1.15 stoichiometric 
mixture of propane and air. 
Thermocouples were installed along the vent line to determine the time at 
which a flame passed by, thus enabling calculation of flame front velocities. The 
latter information was important because an automatic extinguishing system 
under consideration depended for its operation on sufficient time elapsing 
between the initial sensing of a flame at a vent outlet and the activation of an 
extinguisher in the surge tank located about 1 m down the vent line. The 
simulated lightning tests confirmed the earlier result--that a strike must occur 
very close to the vent outlet for ignition to occur. Average flame velocities of up 
to 45 m/s were recorded between the vent outlet and the surge tank when 
simulated lightning strokes of 175 kA and 1.5 x lo6  ampere2-seconds ( A ~ - s )  
were applied. These strokes simulated a severe return stroke such as that which 
might be experienced if the vent outlet were located in Zone 1A or 1B. Other 
tests were run with the high current delivered through a 10 cm aluminum foil 
tape which would explode as the current passed through it. The resulting flames 
reached higher velocities (up to 126 m/s), but the exploding tape may have 
caused the higher flame speeds, creating conditions more severe than those in a 
natural case, where an arc alone is the ignition source. 
When lower amplitude currents of 4 4  kA and only 0.001 x lo6 A ~ - S  were 
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Figure 6.7 Flame arrester configurations. 
(a) Tubular construction 
(b) Baffle construction 
applied, ignitions still occurred, but  the highest average flame velocity was 17.4 
m/s, which indicates that the intensity of  the lightning discharge is one of the 
factors that affect the flame velocity. The 44 kA current is described b y  Bolta as 
a "high-voltage" discharge (Reference 6.13) because it was applied with a 
Marx-type, high-voltage generator, but the ignitions must have occurred from the 
ensuing 44 kA current discharge, since the 13 cm or 30 cm air gap between 
discharge electrode and vent outlet was too short to simulate the in-flight 
environment of the aircraft in a high electric field and allow formation of 
significant prebreakdown streamers at the vent outlet. 
Various flame arresters fabricated from corrugated aluminum and stainless 
steel, a ceramic material, and various copper screens were tested. None of these 
arresters was capable of stopping a flame ignited by a simulated stroke current 
when the arrester was installed near the outlet of the vent line, but arresters 
wound from corrugated stainless steel 1.27 cm or 2.54 cm deep did stop the 
flames when these arresters were installed about 1 m upstream from the vent 
outlet near the surge tank (as shown in Figure 6.8 [Reference 6.14]), even when 
these flames traveled in the vent tube at an average speed as high as 122 m/s (the 
highest measured). Other arresters made of screens and ceramics did not stop 
flames ignited by  the simulated strokes. 
LIGHTNING 
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CONSTRUCTION 
TYPICAL CELL 
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Figure 6.8 Successful flame arrester installation in simulated B-707 vent tube. 
A flame-suppression system developed by  Fenwal, Inc. (Reference 6.15) 
for industrial applications was also tested in this program. This system consisted 
of  a fast-acting sensor for detecting the presence of  a flame and a set of canisters 
containing a quantity of  liquid suppressing agent for release into the surge tank 
b y  an electric detonator. When the detector sees the light of  the flame, it sends a 
pulse to  the detonator, which disperses the extinguishant into the tank within a 
few milliseconds of flame sensing, before the flame itself has reached the tank. 
This system effectively suppressed those flames which traveled slowly enough 
(30 mls or less) t o  give the system time (18 ms) to  react, but did not stop those, 
o f  course, which had gone past the surge tank b y  the time the extinguishant was 
released. In the latter case the extinguishant might still extinguish the fire in the 
surge tank, but the flame front o n  its way through interconnecting vent lines to 
the fuel tanks would have passed out o f  the reach of  the extinguishant. 
The Atlantic Research-LTRI program also included an investigation of arc 
plasma propagation into the vent line, which was inconclusive because of 
instrumentation difficulties. The question of icing of  the successful flame 
arrester was also considered (Reference 6.16), resulting in the conclusion that 
unacceptable icing would occur only when the worst combination of atmos- 
pheric and flight conditions existed. This conclusion, however, is based on 
analysis only and should b e  verified b y  flight tests if this arrester or any other is 
to be incorporated into an aircraft fuel system. 
6.4.1 Airflow Velocity Effects 
Lightning attachment to  the lip of  a vent outlet was assumed to be 
possible in  the Atlantic Research-LTRI and Lockheed programs reviewed in the 
preceding paragraphs. No attempt, however, was made in these programs t o  
establish whether or not this phenomenon could in fact occur t o  a n  aircraft in 
flight or ,  if it could, how often. Yet neither the Elkton airplane nor any other 
airplane known t o  have been struck by  lightning has shown evidence of lightning 
attachment to  a vent outlet, and the outlet in the B-707, while located near the 
wing tip, is not located at the very tip of the wing, where lightning is known to 
attach. It is therefore improbable that flush-mounted vents, such as those o n  the 
B 7 0 7 ,  will receive direct strikes. These questions then arise: Could a n  arc sweep 
across the outlet from another point and ignite the effluent?; if so, How close to  
the outlet must such an arc pass to  cause ignition?; and Is it possible for 
streamering to be induced at the vent outlet and ignite an effluent? Answers t o  
these questions were sought by  Newman and others, who undertook an 
experimental program (Reference 6.17) during 1966 and 1967. Simulated 
lightning strikes were delivered t o  a B-707 wing tip and vent assembly to learn 
more about these possibilities, as well as the degree t o  which air flowing past at 
realistic flight speeds would make ignition unlikely even if an arc did in fact 
become attached to the outlet. 
Whereas in earlier programs ignitions were obtained nearly 100% of  the 
time when the vent outlets were in still air, Newman found that ignition of  a 1.5 
stoichiometric propane-air mixture by a 48 kA, 0.009 x lo6 A ~ - S  simulated 
direct stroke occurred only once in 34 shots with a 90-knot (46 m/s) airflow 
over the outlet and not at all after 200 shots in a 200-knot (100 m/s) airflow. 
When strokes of longer duration were swept across the vent outlet by the 
90-knot windstream, the effluent was ignited 11 times out of 15 runs, but when 
the airflow was increased to 200 knots, only 2 ignitions occurred in 46  runs. 
Nearly all of Newman's tests were performed under the most vulnerable 
effluent condition, which was found to be a 1.5 mls flow out of the vent outlet, 
such as might exist when an aircraft is climbing. Since more than half of all 
reported lightning strikes occur when the aircraft is either in level flight or 
descending and since most aircraft climb at well over 90 knots, the probability 
of an in-flight ignition from a direct stroke to a vent outlet must be remote. 
Newman's investigation, however, showed that a flash sweeping across the vent 
outlet might have a greater (2 in 46) chance of igniting an effluent, even under 
climb conditions at the more realistic speed of 250 knots. This result 
demonstrates the importance of locating vent outlets away from both direct and 
swept-stroke zones on the aircraft. 
6.4.2 Explosive Ignitions 
In the program just described, Newman and his colleagues conducted a test 
(Reference 6.18) in which a stroke to the vent outlet produced indications of 
unusually high flame velocities and severe deformation of the vent outlet, 
indicating much higher pressures than normal. They cite a similar case in another 
program in which flames traveling in excess of 300 m/s (1000 ftls) were actually 
measured. The implication of these findings is serious because an arrester or 
surge tank protection system capable of extinguishing the Iower velocity flames 
may not be able to stop flames traveling as fast as 300 mls. 
Kester and others (Reference 6.19) attempted to reproduce such speeds in 
a 14 cm simulated vent line, shown in Figure 6.9, but did not measure flame 
velocities higher than 20 mls (65 ftls) in this system, even when severe, 180 kA, 
1.0 x lo6 A ~ - S  strokes were applied. These velocities were, in fact, comparable 
to those measured in the Atlantic Research-LTRI program of 1964. Kester and 
his colleagues also reported one explosive ignition, when a stroke of 195 kA was 
delivered to the vent outlet. It was found that the 195 kA stroke current had 
induced a voltage in instrument wiring sufficiently high to spark over the 
insulation around several pressure probes inside the vent line. The vent outlet 
and parts of the surge tank were badly deformed, even though these parts were 
made of 0.64 cm (0.25 in) steel. Again, much higher than usual pressures were 
indicated. The explosion in the Kester program serves as a warning that a similar 
consequence might conceivably result from inductive voltages in an actual fuel 
system unless, by means of design, care is taken to eliminate such situations. 
The question of whether or not these explosive ignitions could occur in 
actual fuel tank vent systems was of such importance that the Federal Aviation 
Administration undertook yet another study of flame propagation in vent 
PHOTO DIODES 
TOTAL LENGTH FROM 
OUTLET TO SURGE TANK 
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1 w 
FUEL AND AIR ENTRANCE 
Figure 6.9. Simulated vent system--flames up to 20 m/s. 
systems. The work, conducted b y  Gillis (Reference 6.20), expanded upon earlier 
research by  including the  study of flame behavior in the long vent Iines leading 
inboard from the  surge tanks to  the fuel tanks, which comprise a typical, 
complete, vent system (Figure 6.10) (Reference 6.21). Gillis did not use 
simulated lightning arcs for an ignition source but, instead, discharged 100 J of 
electrical energy into a spark plug at the vent outlet. This is much less energy 
than would be  released by  a lightning arc of the same length. Nevertheless, Gillis 
recorded flames (Reference 6.22) that had accelerated t o  300  mls  (1000 ftls) far 
inboard (shown in Figure 6.10) when the aircraft was in a climb condition. 
When fresh air was made to flow into the vent outlet, as in a descent 
condition, supersonic velocities like this also occurred as near t o  the surge tank 
as probes PI  and P2 in Figure 6.10. These supersonic flames expanded some of 
the vent lines from a rectangular to  an elliptical cross section, a result similar to 
those occurring in the earlier programs of  Newman and Kester. 
The total number of authentic tests run by Gillis was 13,  of  which I1 
resulted in flame velocities of 150 m/s or higher. The occurrence of  such high 
speeds is perhaps best explained in Gillis' own words (Reference 6.23): 
- - 
When an explosive gas is confined in a channel and ignited, the flow 
induced by the thermal expansion of  the gas in the combustion wave 
is restricted b y  the channel wall. Consequently, the flow attains 
much higher velocities than under conditions of free expansion in an 
open flame and flame and flow commonly augment each other by a 
feedback mechanism as follows: stream turbulence, however slight it 
may be initially, produces a wrinkling of the combustion wave 
surface; the resulting increase of surface increases the amount of gas 
burning per unit time, namely, the flow of gas in the channel; this in 
turn produces more turbulence and hence, increased wrinkling of the 
wave, and so on, so that the progress of the combustion wave 
becomes nonsteady and self-accelerating. In addition, the burning 
velocity increases as the unburned gas ahead of the flame is 
preheated and precompressed by the compression waves that are 
generated by the mass acceleration in the combustion wave. The 
compression wave is initially a comparatively weak pressure wave, 
which is overtaken and reinforced during its travel by numerous 
other pressure waves originating in the combustion zone. The 
coalescence of these pressure waves into a strong shock front in a 
configuration which is dead-ended can result in a reflection of the 
shock wave back toward the conlbustion zone. The effect of the 
passage of this reflected shock wave through the combustion wave is 
similar to the effect of a sudden release of pressure by a rupture of a 
diaphragm. A rarefaction wave propagates backward into the 
unburned gas and a jet of unburned gas develops which penetrates 
deeply into the burned gas. The shear between burned and unburned 
gas in this flow configuration produces extreme turbulence so that a 
sudden large increase in the burning rate occurs. 
In three of the 13 tests mentioned above, localized pressures of  sufficient 
intensity to distort 3- to 5-foot sections of the duct were developed in the 
rectangular vent duct.  A subsequent hydrostatic pressure test of a 1 m section of 
similar duct showed that a pressure of  approximately 475 psig was required to  
produce similar distortion. This pressure exceeds the structural limitations of  
typical aircraft fuel tank and vent structures. 
Gillis concluded that the surge tank located just inboard of the vent outlet 
is a factor contributing t o  the high flame speeds because, when a flame reaches it 
from the vent outlet, the pressure permitted to  build up in it serves as a force to 
drive flames rapidly o n  down the vent lines towards the fuel tanks. This creates 
turbulence in these ducts, which further serves t o  accelerate flames down the 
ducts. Gillis' work is perhaps the most convincing demonstration t o  date that 
flames traveling at sonic velocities and with damaging overpressures can occur in 
typical transport aircraft vent systems. Since flame arresters or STP systenls 
reliably capable of  stopping such flames are not yet available, the importance of 
preventing any source of ignition within or  near the vent system is very clear. 
6.4.3 Summary of Vent Flame Research and Protection 
Considerations 
Table 6.1 summarizes the ignition and flame velocity results for each of 
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the research programs just discussed. While not all of the answers to  
lightning-related vent flame questions are in hand, a number of important 
conclusions and protection considerations can b e  drawn from the research. 
1. As of this writing there has been no positive evidence that a natural 
lightning strike ever ignited a vent effluent o n  a transport-type aircraft, although 
there have been several in-flight explosions after lightning has struck wing tips at 
places within a meter o r  so o f  the vent outlet. 
2. For  ignition to  occur, a lightning-type arc must attach directly t o  the 
edge of  a vent outlet or within a few centimeters of it, or must b e  swept over a 
vent outlet. Neither of these situations has been reported to  date. Most aircraft 
vent outlets are located in conformance with FAA Advisory Circular AC 20-53 
(Reference 6.24). This guideline says that  vent outlets should not be  located in 
lightning-strike Zone 1 or 2 and defines these zones by the "18 inch" rule, 
which, if interpreted literally, are as illustrated in Figure 6.1 ](a). If the points 
defined b y  the "fore and aft line passing through the Zone 1 forward projection 
points of  stroke attachment" are taken to be at the outboard tips only, then 
Zone 1 is restricted t o  a small area and Zone 2 may extend inboard only a little 
more than 18 inches (0.46 m) from the tip. If the tip is sharp, strikes are indeed 
most likely to attach only to  the edge, and Zone 1 would be limited t o  a small 
distance (several centimeters or so) inboard. However, if the tip has a large radius 
of  curvature, such as that illustrated in Figure 6.1 I ,  it is prudent to utilize a 
more conservative interpretation and consider Zone 1 to  extend inboard the full 
18 inches (0.46 m). 
If the radius of curvature of  the outboard tip is greater than 18 inches, the 
lightning attachment points will be even more scattered over the surface, and 
Zone 1 should be  considered to extend inward a distance equal t o  the actual 
radius of curvature. 
When nonmetallic skin materials are used on  the wing tips, it is probable 
that direct strikes will occur t o  the edge of the outermost metallic element, such 
as a rib or spar, instead of t o  the nonmetallic tip itself. Therefore, Zone 1 must 
include not only the nonmetallic tip but also an area extending 18 inches 
inboard from the  outermost metallic structure, as shown in Figure 6.1 l(b). If 
there is a metallic diverter assembly mounted on  the outboard edge of a 
nonmetallic tip, this diverter instead o f  the outboard rib (for example) may 
receive strikes and thus permit Zone I t o  begin at the outboard edge, as in 
Figure 6.1 ](a). Metal diverter bars intended for this purpose have been installed 
on  nonmetallic wing tips, and subsequently failed, however, in their intended 
purpose, with strikes circumventing the diverter and either puncturing the 
nonmetallic skin or attaching t o  an exposed metallic item inboard of  the 
diverter. The most common reason for this failure is that the diverter has been 
coated with a tough, erosion-resistant paint or coating. Moreover, most of these 
paints also have good electrical insulating capability, which inhibits formation of 
the electrical streamers necessary for the diverter to  intercept oncoming 
lightning flashes. Greater reliability for a diverter intended to protect a 
nonmetallic tip assembly or  t o  enable location of aven t  outlet farther outboard 
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Figure 6.11 Vent outlets must be located in Zone 3. With nonmetallic tips, the 
18-inch Zone 1 and Zone 2 areas must be measured from the out- 
board metallic structure and not from the nonmetallic tip. 
(a) Lightning-strike zones on all-metal wing tip 
(b) Lightning-strike zones on metal wing with nonmetal tip 
can be  assured if diverters are subjected to  such high-voltage attachment tests as 
those described in L ighfn ing Test Waveforms and Techniques for A erospace 
Vehicles and Hardware (Reference 6.25). Since the authenticity of this test has 
not been absolutely established, it is nevertheless prudent t o  locate a vent outlet 
in Zone 3 as defined more conservatively in Figure 6.1 I(b). 
3. Flame arresters of  the corrugated steel type shown in Figure 6.8 have 
been the most effective of those experimented with in stopping flames. The 
research t o  date has not turned u p  a completely successful arrester, however. 
Flame arresters are most satisfactory when located some distance away 
from the vent outlet, so that blast forces in the immediate vicinity of  the 
lightning arc will not propel flames through the arrester. The most successful 
location seems to be at  the surge tank end of  the vent outlet tube, as shown in 
Figure 6.8. A flame arrester at this location will certainly reduce the possibility 
of flames entering the surge tank, although there is no assurance that the arrester 
will stop all flames here. And if an arrester is located anywhere in the vent 
system, the possibility of its free air passage becoming blocked with ice must be 
evaluated, preferably by in-flight tests under the expected environmental 
conditions. 
4. Surge tank protection (STP) systems, the purpose of which is to sense 
flames initiated at vent outlets and extinguish them before they reach fuel tanks, 
are available and should be considered if the vent outlet must be located in or 
close to Zone 1 or 2. Since the time required from sensing of the flame to 
dispersion of the extinguishant is several milliseconds, there is a possibility that 
flames traveling at sonic velocities will outrace the STP system. Thus, while an 
STP system will unquestionably improve overall safety, it must not be relied 
upon to provide absolute protection of the vent system. 
5. Ninetydegree bends in the vent lines should be avoided because they 
expand the turbulence and surface area associated with propagating flames and 
thereby increase the velocity of propagation. Instead, straight or smoothly 
curved ducts should be utilized to minimize the possibility of explosive flame 
propagation. 
6. Location of the fuel vent outlet in an ascertained Zone 3 area will 
provide the highest degree of protection of any of the methods described above. 
A recessed or flush outlet is greatly to be preferred over a protruding tube 
outlet, which could become a source of corona or streamering when the aircraft 
is flying in a strong electric field. 
6.5 Fuel Jettison and Drain Pipes 
On some aircraft provision exists for dumping (jettisoning) fuel overboard. 
Often this provision consists of a pipe extending into the airstream from a fuel 
tank, as shown in Figure 6.12. A normally closed, electrically operated valve is 
inserted into the pipe, so that it is unlikely a flame could travel past this valve 
into the fuel tank. Even if the pipe were struck by lightning while jettisoning 
fuel, it is improbable that flames could propagate through the full pipe into the 
tank. 
A more likely hazard--if not guarded against in design--is that electrical 
sparks will occur from lightning currents flowing across a poor electrical bond 
between the pipe and the fuel tank wall, since the wall is frequently coated with 
an insulating, corrosion-resistant paint. Bonding jumpers installed across such 
joints may be adequate to equalize static charge differentials which sometimes 
occur in fuel systems, but these usually have too much inductance to prevent 
some lightning current from breaking down insulation and sparking at the 
interface between the pipe and tank wall. Clearly the best way is to make the 
shortest path also the conductive one, as shown in Figure 6.13. This may be 
done by making the faying surfaces of clean, uncoated metal and/or by 
providing bare metal-to-metal contact via the rivets or bolts. If there is doubt 
WING 
FUEL JETTISON PlPE 
' H E R E  - 
Figure 6.12 Fuel jettison pipe--a possible lightning attachment point. 
Good electrical bond between pipe and airframe desirable at  
point a, rather than forcing all lightning current t o  enter fuel 
tank wall a t  b. 
In every case a good electrical bond must be provided at b. 
INSULATING PAINT BETWEEN MATING 
SURFACES = SPARKING HERE 
\ 
- - 
PlPE 
BARE-METAL CONTACT BETWEEN PIPE 
FLANGE AND TANK WALL = N O  SPARKING 
\ 
WORST BEST 
Figure 6.13 Bonding of fuel dump pipes t o  fuel tanks. 
Bond straps have too  much inductance to prevent sparking 
across the shorter path. 
about the adequacy of  a particular bond, the bond should be  tested with 
simulated lightning currents t o  assure that sparking does not occur at the 
interface. The test currents to  be applied should be those recommended in 
Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware 
(see Reference 6.25) for the particular lightning-strike zone in which the jettison 
or drain pipe is located. 
6.6 Hot Spot and Hole Formation in Integral Tank Skins 
Integral tank skins are those in which fuel is in direct contact with the 
outside skin of the aircraft. Tanks of this type are commonly found in the wings 
of transport and some general aviation aircraft, and in the wings and fuselages of 
modern fighter aircraft. External fuel tanks of the type carried on pylons or 
wing tips by military aircraft are also of the integral type. 
If integral tank skins are located in direct or swept-lightning attachment 
zones, the possibility of hot spot formation or meltthrough of the skin must be 
protected against. For the aluminum skins in common use, making the skin thick 
enough to dissipate the heat from the lightning arc before the skin can be melted 
completely through will assure protection because ignition will occur only with 
complete penetration and the resulting arc contact with the fuel vapor. This 
phenomenon depends on the fact that the ignition temperature of most 
hydrocarbon fuel vapors (-1300 "C) is higher than the melting temperature of 
aIuminum (-500 "c); thus, ignition will not occur unless the skin is melted 
completely through to  the fuel vapor by the hot Iightning arc, which can reach 
upwards of 30 000 "C.  On the other hand, the melting temperature of titanium 
(-1700 OC) and stainless steel skins is higher than the fuel ignition temperature, 
so that, where this type is concerned, the skin need not be melted completely 
thkough for ignition to occur. 
The amount of lightning current required to erode or melt holes in aircraft 
skins has long been of interest, first, for the purpose of estimating how much 
lightning current actually was involved in the damage sustained by aircraft in 
flight and, second, for determining the minimum skin thickness required to 
prevent melt through of an integral fuel tank skin. Quantitative relationships 
between electric arcs and typical aircraft skin metals were reported in 1949 by 
Hagenguth (Reference 6.26), who made laboratory measurements of the amount 
of continuing current necessary to melt holes of various sizes in various metals. 
He found a nearly linear relationship to exist between the amount of charge (Q) 
delivered to an arc attachment spot and the amount of skin metal melted away. 
And, although he reported that "the type of metal appears to have very little 
influence" (Reference 6.27) (a fact later found to be untrue), he determined 
that the size of a hole melted in a metal sheet of a given thickness can be 
expressed by the following two equations: 
A = 2.53 Q (-4-0.9 for D(t<0.089 cm 
A = 2 4 5  Q(&) -1.54 for 0.089<t<0.38 1 cm 
where A = area of hole melted (square millimeters) 
136 
Q = charge (coulombs) delivered to the point by the arc 
t = thickness of metal sheets (centimeters) 
Results o f  Hagenguth's laboratory tests are presented in Figure 6.14 (Reference 
6.28). By comparing the size of holes produced by actual lightning strikes with 
those produced in the laboratory, Hagenguth was able to  estimate the amount of  
charge that had entered the aircraft through damaged parts, such as those shown 
in Figure 6.1 5. 
Taken at face value, the Hagenguth equations would predict a hole of 
some size (A) through skin metals of any thickness (t) up to  0.38 1 cm (0.15 in) 
40 80 120 160 200 
COULOMBS IN ARC 
Figure 6.14 Relation between coulombs in the arc and the size of hole burned 
in metal sheets. Arc current amplitude ranges between 5 0  and 
I000  A. 
1. Stainless steel - 10 mil (0.254 mm) 
2. Galvanized iron - 15 mi1 (0.381 mm) 
3. Copper - 20 mi1 (0.508 mm) 
4. Stainless steel - 40 mi1 (0.1 6 mm) 
5. Aluminum - 51 mi1 (1 2954  mm) 
6. Aluminum - 100 mi1 (2.54 mm) 
Figure 6.15 Natural lightning damage sustained by Airplane NC25629 about 
August 14, 194 1 .  Top views. 
Upper: trailing edge of  left wing; material - 24st Alclad, 0.89 cm 
(0.35 in) thick. Note numerous small pitted spots. 
Lower: rudder tip bow; material - 17st aluminum alloy, 2.54 cm 
(1 in) O.D. tubing, 0.07 cm (0.028 in) wall thickness. 
Coulombs estimated from laboratory tests on metal sheets and 
tubing. 
Wing edge: large hole 137 C Rudder bow: 300 C 
small hole 6 C 
150pi t s  1 5 0 C  
total 293 C 
no matter how small an amount of charge (Q) is delivered, but it can be 
concluded logically that, if the charge and resultant heating were too low, 
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damage would be limited to partial meltthrough and no hole would be formed. 
Robb, Hill, Newman, and Stahmann reported this result in 1958 (Reference 
6.29), based on tests in which a three-component simulated lightning current 
consisted of the following: 
1 IOOkA 0.069 x 1 o6 A ~ - S  Return stroke 
2 5 kA 0.172 x lo6 A2-s 30  C intermediate stroke 
3 200kA 0.040 x lo6  A2-s 200 C continuing current 
This current was applied to commonly used samples of 0.05 1 cm (0.020 in), 
0.1 02 cm (0.040 in), 0.1 63  cm (0.064 in), 0.206 cm (0.08 1 in), and 0.259 cm 
(0.102 in) aluminum skin materials. Robb reported that this discharge, which is 
about as severe as a similar combination of SAE (Reference 6.30) current 
components D, B, and C (in that order, which would be specified for tests in 
Zone 2B), did not puncture the skins which were 0.206 cm or greater. Kester, 
Gerstein, and Plumer confirmed this result by showing that over 200 C 
(delivered at 288 A) are required to melt through 0.163 cm aluminum 
(Reference 6.3 1). 
The t hree-component discharge including a 200 C continuing current 
would almost certainly appear only at a trailing edge (Zone 2B) after being 
swept there from an initial attachment point somewhere on a leading edge or 
forward extremity. Fuel is rarely in direct contact with trailing edges of aircraft 
or within direct stroke zones (Zone IB), where extended flash hang-on is likely; 
yet airworthiness certification criteria, such as those listed in Table 5.1, generally 
require that integral fuel tank wall thicknesses be at least 0.203 cm (0.080 in) 
wherever lightning strikes are expected. 
Robb also observed (Reference 6.32) that swept-flash pit marks from 
several centimeters to about 60  cm (2 ft) apart are commonly found, and that a 
slow, worst case aircraft velocity of 62 mls (140 mph, 205 ftls) would result in 
the lightning arc dwelling for 9.7 ms at each point. 
- 0 . 6 m  =9 .7ms  
'dwell - 62 mls 
If this is so, the amount of charge delivered to each dwell point across a typical 
3 m wing surface by a lightning flash similar to Robb's three-component dis- 
charge would be as shown in Figure 6.16 (Reference 6.33). 
Since the amount of charge entering any of the Zone 2A points in Figure 
6.16 is considerably less than the 230 C applied by Robb to melt through 0.1 6 3  
cm aluminum skins, it might be argued that a skin thinner than 0.203 cm would 
be adequate to prevent meltthrough. On the other hand, it has been found that 
the rate of charge delivery (current amplitude) is also important in determining 
whether sufficient energy is available to melt completely through, or not, and 
that smaller amounts of charge will also cause meltthrough of 0.163 cm 
aluminum if the amounts are delivered at a sufficiently high rate. Since any 
meltthrough of aluminum skins must be considered a possible source of fuel 
ZONE 2A 
ZONE 1A 
V) LY g looooo 
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Figure 6.16 Charge delivered at successive dwell points across a wing surface. 
Only a small amount of charge enters Zone 2A dwell points. 
ignition, it is imperative that the minimum amount of charge and current within 
the range of possible lightning characteristics be established for proposed integral 
fuel tank skins. This has been termed by Plumer the coulomb ignition threshold 
(Reference 6.34). 
6.6.1 Coulomb Ignition Thresholds for Clean Skins 
The amounts of charge and current required to melt through aluminum 
and titanium skins of various thicknesses and to cause fuel ignition were 
reported by Brick in 1968 (Reference 6.35) and by Oh and Schneider in 1972 
(Reference 6.36) to depend heavily on current amplitude as well as charge. 
Whereas earlier work had shown that over 200 C,  when delivered by a current of 
200 A, were necessary to  burn through 0.206 cm aluminum skins, the work of 
Brick, Oh, and Schneider shows that only about 10  C, when delivered by a 
current of 500 A, are required to melt completely through a 0.206 cm aluminum 
skin; and in laboratory tests as little as 2 C, when delivered by about 130 A, will 
melt a hole completely through 0.102 crn of aluminum. Oh and Schneider's 
meltthrough thresholds for these and other skin thicknesses are shown in Figure 
6.17 (Reference 6.37). The close (0.24 to 0.48 cm) proximity of their test 
electrode to the skins may have restricted natural movement of the arc on the 
surface of the skin and been responsible for these unusually low coulomb 
ignition thresholds. 
Work by Kester, Gerstein, and Plurner (Reference 6.38) with an L-shaped 
electrode spaced 0.64 cm above the skin, permitting greater arc movement, 
showed that 20  C or more, when delivered at 130 A, are required to burn 
through a 0.102 cm aluminum skin. Since a natural lightning arc is not restricted 
by an electrode, it is probable that the aluminum skin puncture threshold curves 
of Figure 6.17 are conservative, at least for unpainted surfaces. On the other 
hand, the electrical insulating properties of most paints tend to restrict arc 
movement and so would concentrate the heating effects at a smaller point, 
decreasing the amount of thermal energy required to melt completely through. 
Oh and Schneider have similarly determined the coulomb ignition 
thresholds for titanium skin materials of various thicknesses, as shown in Figure 
6.18 (Reference 6.39). They and other researchers have confirmed that, since 
the melting point of titanium is higher than the fuel ignition temperature, it is 
not necessary for a hole t o  be melted completely through for ignition to  occur. 
For ignition to  occur only a hot spot need be  formed on the inside surface of  a 
titanium skin. The lower thermal conductivity of titanium prevents rapid heat 
transfer away from the arc attachment point and accounts for the generally 
lower coulomb ignition thresholds than those for aluminum. 
Figure 6.1 7 Coulomb meltthrough and ignition threshold for aluminum skins. 
Coulomb ignition thresholds for stainless steel have not been studied as 
thoroughly as have those for aluminum and titanium, but they have been 
determined for currents of 80 to 130 A by Kester, Gerstein, and Plumer 
(Reference 6.40) to be 4.4 C for 0.051 cm (0.02 in) skins, 12 C for 0.102 cm 
(0.04 in), and 41 C for 0.152 cm (0.06 in) stainless steel skins. A comparison of 
these thresholds with those found by Kester and his colleagues for aluminum 
and titanium skins of the same thicknesses is shown in Table 6.2. The times 
required for ignition to occur in several of the tests reported in Table 6.2 are 
Listed in Table 6.3 (Reference 6.41). 
Table 6.2 COULOMB IGNITION THRESHOLDS FOR VARIOUS SKIN 
METALS. 1.5 STOICHIOMETRIC PROPANE-AIR MIXTURE 
Material Titanium Aluminum Stainless steel 
Thickness (Ti4AI-1 MO-IV) (2024T-3) (Series 304) 
Coulombs Coulombs Coulombs 
0.051 cm 
(0.020 in) 5.5 
0.102 cm 
(0.040 in) 5.75 
0.152 cm 
(0.060 in) 1001125 
not determined 4.4 
Table 6.3 DISCHARGE AND IGNITION TTMES AT 
COULOMB IGNITION THRESHOLD 
Thick- Cou- 
ness lomb 
0.05 1 cm 
(0.020 in) 6.0 
0.102 cm 
(0.040 in) 8.0 
0.152 cm 
(0.060 in) 107.0 
Dis. Ign. Cou- Dis. Ign. Cou- Dis. Ign. 
time time lomb time time lomb time time 
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) 
*Above threshold level 
The charges and times given in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for ignition to 
commence are somewhat greater than those associated with the lowest coulomb 
ignition thresholds (bottoms of  the curves) of Figures 6.17 and 6.18 because the 
currents (rates of charge flow into the skins) of 8 0  to 130 A were generally 
lower in the tests of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 than the 100 to 1000 A currents which 
produced the lowest coulomb ignition thresholds of Figures 6.17 and 6.18. But 
since intermediate currents (as in component B) and continuing currents (as in 
component C) of from a few amperes to 1000 A are common in natural 
lightning, both data sources must be considered authentic. Clearly, the lower 
currents must dwell longer at a single attach point to produce the same damage 
and possibility of ignition that higher currents produce in shorter times. An 
illustration by Plumer (Reference 6.42) of the resulting wide range of charge and 
dwell time combinations necessary to melt through aluminum skins and ignite 
fuels beneath is shown in Figure 6.1 9. 
DATA SOURCES: 
PLUMER 
O PHILLPOTT t=ls 
500 + BRICK / 
400 - 
AVERAGE = 15ms 
(.020) (.060) (.loo) (.140) (.180) (.220) (.260) (.300) 
0.51 0.153 0.25 0.36 0.46 0.56 0.66 0.76 
SKIN THICKNESS - cm (INCHES IN PARENTHESES) 
Figure 6.19 Range of minimum combinations of lightning dwell time and 
charge necessary to ignite fuels beneath bare aluminum skins. 
6.6.2 Dwell Times 
The data of Figures 6.17 and 6.18 and of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 can be used 
to determine the possibility of meltthrough or hot spot formation sufficient to 
cause ignition if the amount of time a lightning arc may dwell at a particular 
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point and the amplitude of the current that flows into this point are known. 
Figure 6.20 (Reference 6.43) shows a time exposure photograph of an actual 
lightning arc attaching to successive dwell points along the radome-mounted 
pitot boom of a fighter aircraft, and Figure 4.2 shows what similar points look 
like along a typical aircraft surface. 
Knowledge of dwell times at swept-stroke (Zone 2A) attachment points 
like these is of most importance because integral fuel tank skins are often found 
in these zones. Existing regulatory documents (Table 5.5) have specified that 
aluminum skins in lightning-strike zones should be at least 0.203 cm (0.080 in) 
thick to  withstand meltthrough because the simulated lightning current of 
Figure 6.16 would not melt through this thickness of aluminum, even if all of 
this current is delivered to one point. The regulatory documents also imply that 
other materials should be of thicknesses capable of withstanding an equivalent 
lightning current. 
Figure 6.20 Time exposure of a lightning arc at successive dwell points. 
Until recently, structural design demands also made it necessary to  use 
skins of at least 0.203 cm, so the need for this thickness for lightning protection 
was not challenged. But in some recent designs, including the designs of 
supersonic transports, thinner skins would have met structural requirements and 
have permitted a savings in weight and cost were it not for the lightning 
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protection requirement for a 0.203 cm thickness. Therefore, Brick, Oh, and 
Schneider (Reference 6.44) studied dwell times of 400 A decaying arcs blown by 
the exhaust from a wind tunnel over aluminum and titanium skin panels with 
several surface treatments to see how long such an arc might actually dwell at 
one point before reattaching to the next. Wind speeds of 67 m/s (150 mph) and 
112 m/s (250 mph), representing approach speeds for typical aircraft, were 
utilized. The test current they used was representative of lightning continuing 
current, and would have delivered an average charge of about 0.2 C/ms of dwell. 
The researchers reported that the arcs dwelled for 2 ms or less on uncoated 
surfaces of both metals, and for 4.8 ms on an anodized aluminum surface. At 0.2 
Clms of dwell these dwell points would have received 0.4 and 0.96 C, 
respectively. By Figures 6.17 and 6.18 this would not have been enough charge 
to melt through even the 0.05 cm thicknesses of either metal. If the lightning 
current amplitude experienced in Zone 2A never exceeded 400 A, this result I 
would indicate that skins as thin as 0.05 cm would be safe. The problem is, of 
course, that the occurrence of higher currents has now been recognized as 
possible in Zone 2A. 
At the end of the dwell at one point, the arc will reattach at a point 
farther aft on the aircraft, as shown in Figure 6.21 and explained in Section 2.3. 
During the dwell times the aircraft would be moving, and the distance covered 
would be D = v  td (6.4) 
Where D = distance arc is drawn along the aircraft surface (m) 
v = aircraft velocity (m/s) 
td = dwell time (s) 
Thus, at velocities of 67 and 112 m/s and with the dwell times of 2.0 and 
4.8 ms reported by Brick, spacings between successive dwell points would be as 
given in Table 6.4. 
EARLIER LATER 
DIRECTION 
OF FLIGHT 
Figure 6.21 Basic mechanism of swept-stroke reattachment. 
Table 6.4 DWELL POINT SEPARATIONS FOR TYPICAL LIGHTNING 
DWELL TIMES AND AIRCRAFT VELOCITIES 
Dwell 
Times (td) 
4.8 ms I D=32 .2cm D=53 .8cm Painted (12.7 in) 1 (21.1 in) I 
Aircraft Velocities (v) 
67 mls I 112 mls 
2.0 ms 
Unpainted 
surface 
surface I 
Because spacings of this order are often observed along aircraft surfaces, 
the dwell times predicted by the Brick tests are realistic. The later work of Oh 
and Schneider (Reference 6.45) basically confirms these results for uniform 
airflow conditions but shows that conditions which cause the airstream to leave 
the surface may force the arc to dwell longer at the last attachment point before 
the airflow is diverted. Oh and Schneider also demonstrate that higher aircraft 
velocities result in shorter arc dwell times, since the arc is stretched greater 
distances, allowing sufficient voltage to build up along it to break down the 
insulation at its heel (see Figure 6.21) at an earlier time. 
Validity of the wind tunnel technique for simulating swept strokes along 
metallic surfaces has sometimes been questioned because the airstream is used to 
blow the arc along the surface of the test object, whereas in flight both the air 
and the arc are stationary. It might be expected that the moving air would carry 
the arc along at an equal velocity, but in practice this doesn't quite happen. In 
addition, there must be cooling of the arc by the faster moving air, which allows 
it to build voltage that in turn might create a new attachment point sooner than 
had cooling not occurred. Also, the behavior of the upper terminus of the arc as 
it moves along the electrode probably has some effect on the behavior of its 
lower terminus at the test object. The scope of these effects and the extent to 
which they cause departure from an authentic simulation of natural lightning has 
not been investigated. 
A more realistic simulation would undoubtedly result if the test object, 
like an aircraft in flight, could be moved through a stationary arc. Plumer 
(Reference 6.46) attempted this by driving a wing tip fuel tank beneath a 
high-voltage electrode at a velocity of 15.5 mls (35 mph) A flash was triggered 
when the approaching tank, carried atop a truck, sufficiently closed the airgap 
between the electrode and ground. Limitations of this technique were the low 
velocity and the low ( 4 A )  test current amplitude. Nonetheless, subsequent 
in-flight lightning strikes to two fuel tanks of this type have confirmed the 
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D=13 .4cm 
(5.3 in) 
D=22 .4cm 
(8.8 in) 
occurrence of the predicted attachment points and breakdown paths. Despite 
the lower velocity and current amplitude, the arcs in Plumer's tests also dwelled 
for times of between 1 and 4 ms on unpainted aluminum surfaces, results closely 
parallel to those of the wind tunnel work. These parallel conclusions seem to 
indicate that the arcs in the wind tunnel tests may not have moved as fast as the 
wind itself, and, also, that current amplitude has relatively little to do with dwell 
time. 
Robb, Stahmann, and Newman (Reference 6.47) have utilized the wind 
tunnel technique to determine arc dwell times on various painted or coated 
surfaces. Most of these coatings are electrically insulating and thus require that 
the arc be further lengthened to allow the greater voltage buildup necessary to 
puncture the insulation and form the next attachment point. The reasonable 
agreement of test methods with the in-flight strike evidence makes it possible to 
show, with some confidence, in Table 6.5 the dwell times to be expected on 
several surfaces commonly found in swept-stroke zones (Zone 2A). 
Table 6.5 LIGHTNING DWELL TIMES ON TYPICAL 
AIRCRAFT SURFACES lN ZONE 2A 
Note 1 - Plumer (See Reference 6.46) 
Note 2 - Oh and Schneider (See Reference 6.45) 
Note 3 - Robb, Stahmann, and Newman (See Reference 6.47) 
Note 4 - Brick, Oh, and Schneider (See Reference 6.44) 
Aircraft Velocities 
There are many different coatings and paints of various thicknesses found 
on aircraft surfaces, and the effect of many of these on arc dwell time has not 
yet been determined. It may therefore be advisable to perform swept-stroke tests 
on  metallic skiits by considering the particular coatings for a particular design. 
Guidance for performance of such tests is given in Section 4.3 of the SAE report 
Lightrlirig Test Wale forms and Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles arld Hardware 
(May 1976). 
Once the expected dwell times are established, next it will be necessary to 
determine the amplitude of current that might flow during these periods. 
Surface Type 
Aluminum and 
titanium unpainted 
Aluminum anodized 
Aluminum painted 
15.5 m/s 
(35 mph) 
' 1 to 4 ms 
58 m/s 
(1 30 mph) 
'2.0 ms 
44.8 ms 
3 ~ p  to 20 ms 
103 m/s 
(230 mph) 
1.0 ms 
'2.6 ms 
6.6.3 Current Amplitudes 
A wide range of current amplitudes appears in typical lightning flashes. 
These are discussed in Chapter 1 ;  Figure 1.1, for example, shows that most of 
the charge in a flash is delivered by  continuing currents at a rate of about 200 A 
and b y  intermediate currents at a rate of about 5 kA. The higher amplitude 
strokes are usually of  too  short a duration to deliver appreciable charge. 
Therefore, emphasis should be  pIaced o n  the intermediate currents, which can 
occur to  surfaces in Zone 2A and which can deliver large amounts of charge a t  
appreciable current amplitudes. Section 4.4.2.3 of the SAE report specifies that 
current components B, C, and D should be applied in Zone 2A, with D applied 
first, since it is a restrike, which would be expected t o  create a new dwell point. 
Components B and C follow for whatever dwell time is expected--or for 5 0  ms 
if the dwell time is unknown and has not been determined from swept-stroke 
tests. This current is shown in Figure 6.22. If a dwell time of less than 5 ms is 
expected, an average current of  2 kA should be applied for the actual dwell time 
only. 
B AVG 2 kA DELIVERING 10 C IN 5 ms 
,/ 
look* 
/;= C 400 A, DELIVERING 0.4 o m s  
I 
I 
f 
I 
I 8 I I I 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
time - MILLISECONDS 
Figure 6.22 Current and charge expected at a Zone 2 A  dwell point. 
Delivers 1 0  C in first 5 ms at  any dwell point 
Delivers .04 C/ms thereafter (From Figure 3.3 SAE report) 
Delivers 400 A for all 50 rns if dwell time not known (Drawn 
with straight lines for explanation purposes only) 
The current amplitudes of Figure 6.22 are based on  the SAE study of 
natural lightning data and in-flight damage reported by aircraft operators over 
the years. As such, these current amplitudes are a good representation of  what to  
expect in a severe natural lightning flash, the type exceeded only 1 or 2% of the 
time. It is recognized, however, that more severe currents, like those which 
sometimes occur in a positive polarity, cloud-to-ground flash, could appear a t  
Zone 2A dwell points. An example of such flashes, recorded b y  Berger 
(Reference 6.48), is shown in Figure 6.23. 
The current measurement was made at an instrument tower on the ground, 
and the long, upward-moving leader which extended from this tower to  the 
cloud base accounted for the (approximate) 11.5 ms which elapsed before the 
Figure 6.23 Positive flash of type 4. 
Above: photograph on fast-moving film 
Below: oscillogram of stroke current 
return stroke appeared at the ground. Not all of this delay, therefore, would 
have occurred had the measurement been made o n  an aircraft in flight 
intercepted by  this flash. But the several milliseconds which still would have 
elapsed between initial leader attachment t o  a forward extremity of the aircraft 
and the occurrence of  the return stroke may have allowed the arc t o  move over 
Zone 2A. The positive polarity stroke of Figure 6.23 would have delivered about 
20  C t o  this dwell point during the minimum of 2 ms of  time it would have 
dwelled there. According t o  the data of  Figure 6.17 meltthrough of  a 0.1 6 cm 
(0.063 in) aluminum skin is possible under these conditions. There are reports of 
holes melted in 0.102 cm (0.040 in) skins from in-flight strikes in Zone 2A areas, 
but holes in 0.16 cm aluminum in Zone 2A have not been reported, a fact that 
demonstrates the apparent rarity of  the high-energy positive polarity flash in 
Zone 2A areas. Because of  the lack of  positive evidence that these flashes have 
struck aircraft in critical zones, they have not been fully accounted for in 
present test current waveforms. 
6.6.4 Determination of Skin-Thickness Requirements 
With the establishment of  methods to  predict the lightning current 
amplitude and charge, as well as dwell time, sufficient information is available t o  
utilize the charts of Figures 6.1 7, 6.18 o r  Tables 6.2 and 6.3 t o  determine the 
skin thicknesses which will or will not be melted through. 
For  example, let us assume that a bare aluminum skin is planned for an 
integral tank in Zone 2A, and that it is desired to  determine how thick this skin 
should be  t o  prevent meltthrough. Further, let us say this aircraft will fly at 
velocities as low as 58 m/s (130 mph). From Table 6.5 the expected dwell time 
for this unpainted skin would be  2 ms. From Figure 6.22, an average of 2 kA 
would flow into the dwell point during this period, delivering 4 C of  charge. 
According t o  Table 6.17 these parameters intersect at a point about half-way 
between the coulomb ignition threshold curves for 0.051 cm (0.020 in) and 
0.102 cm (0.040 in) aluminum skins, indicating that 0.102 cm is the thinnest 
skin that should be considered. Since there would be little margin of safety if a 
skin o f  this thickness were actually used, it would be prudent to  select instead 
the next larger thickness-0.16 cm (0.064 in). 
If one notes that the airworthiness certification criteria o f  Table 5.6 
generally call for an even thicker skin--0.203 cm (0.080 in)--in lightning- 
strike zones, one must also remember that these criteria make no distinction 
between painted and unpainted surfaces, and that dwell times on painted 
surfaces may be considerably longer than the 2 ms experienced on bare 
aluminum skins. 
Different dwell points, different coatings, and different thicknesses will 
cause correspondingly different dwell times. Consider, for example, the longest 
dwell time, 2 0  ms, recorded b y  Robb, Stahmann, and Newrnan (Reference 6.47) 
for a painted surface. During this period the current of Figure 6.21 would deliver 
16 C. These parameters intersect at a point just above the 0.229 cm (0.090 in) 
curve in Figure 6.17, indicating that even the 0.203 cm (0.080 in) thickness 
required by the certificating agencies is insufficient to  prevent ignition where 
certain paints are used. 
Therefore, if paints must be used, it is advisable t o  perform swept-stroke 
tests t o  establish the actual dwell time. The procurement or certificating agencies 
have generally been willing t o  accept test data in support of an alternate skin 
thickness t o  the aforementioned 0.203 cm (0.080 in) thickness, and such tests 
may lead t o  the use of  either thinner or thicker skins for ensuring adequate 
protection. 
6.6.4.1 Titanium and Stainless Steel Skins 
By using the chart of  Figure 6.1 8 ,  it is possible to  determine titanium skin 
thicknesses in a manner similar to  that for determining aluminum skin 
thicknesses. The coulomb ignition threshold for titanium occurs when the back 
side of  the skin reaches 1320 "C (2400 OF), a temperature sufficient t o  ignite a 
fuel-air vapor. Because titanium will not melt at this temperature, no hole will be 
formed when the coulomb ignition threshold is reached. 
No charts of  the type in Figure 6.17 and 6.1 8 have been generated for 
stainless steel or other metals, since, with the exception of certain space vehicles, 
these materials seldom appear as integral tank skins. Tables 6.2 and 6.3, while 
not accommodating as wide a variation in parameters, provide some guidance. 
Certain other materials, such as fiber-reinforced plastics (composites) 
behave differently from metallic materials under lightning stress. These are 
treated separately in 3ection 6.2 and Chapter 7. 
A comparison of the physical and electrical properties of titanium with 
those of aluminum has been made by Kosvic, Helgeson, and Gerstein (Reference 
6.49) and is presented in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 PHYSICAL AND ELECTRICAL PROPERTIES 
OF TITANIUM AND ALUMINUM 
Property Titanium Aluminum 
Density p (g/cm3) 4.5 2.7 
Thermal conductivity k (calls cm OK) 0.040 0.37 
Specific heat Cp (cal/g OK) 0.13 0.23 
Thermal diffusivity a (cm2/s) = k/p Cp 0.07 0.60 
Electrical Resistivity 01 CL-cm) 199 6.3 
Fusion point (OK) 1950 930 
Heat of fusion (callg) 77 93  
Vaporization point (OK) 3550 2750 
Heat of vaporization AHva, (caljg) 2140 2580 
As noted in this table, titanium has a markedly lower thermal conductivity 
and higher resistivity than has aluminum. These properties have given rise to the 
belief that the backside of titanium skins would reach the coulomb ignition 
threshold with a lower lightning current amplitude and charge transfer than 
those necessary for aluminum, raising the possibility that titanium skins might 
have to  be thicker than aluminum skins t o  provide the same degree of lightning 
protection. But, at the same time, it was evident that structural requirements 
with titanium could be met with skins thinner than the 0.203 cm (0.080 in) 
which was necessary to meet strength requirements' with aluminum. The 
question of lightning effects on titanium skins has also been of concern because 
this material is used in swept- or delta-shaped wings in some supersonic aircraft, 
and the swept-stroke zones may extend over internal fuel tanks in such shapes. 
Therefore, several in-depth studies of titanium behavior under simulated 
lightning arcs have been conducted. One of the most important of these is the 
work of Kofoid (Reference 6.50), who conducted both experimental and 
analytical studies of the lightning current amplitude and dwell times necessary to 
reach the ignition temperature (coulomb ignition threshold) on the inside 
surfaces of titanium skins. Kofoid's experimental results closely follow an 
empirical heat diffusion equation: 
where J = lightning current amplitude (A) (assumed constant) 
d = skin thickness (cm) 
tc = time to reach ignition temperature on inside surface (s) 
The constant (480) is empirical. Curves according to  Equation 6.5 are plotted in 
Figure 6.24, together with test data for simulated lightning continuing and 
intermediate currents of up to about 1900 A. 
The experimental data adhere closely to the curves, and both are also in 
good agreement with the data of Figure 6.18 and Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Figure 6.24 
(Reference 6.51) shows that the higher the lightning current amplitude, the 
shorter the time, tc, required to reach the coulomb ignition threshold, and that 
for thicknesses as great as 0.102 cm (0.040 in), only 5 to 6 C of charge are 
necessary to reach this threshold if the charge is delivered in 10 ms or more by  a 
current of 500 A or less. This means that if a titanium skin is proposed for use in 
Zone 2A, a lightning arc should not be permitted to dwell for more than about 5 
ms at any one point on the surface. According to the dwell time data of Table 
6.5, this means, in turn, that a 0.102 cm (0.040 in) skin may not have its outside 
surface painted. Anticorrosion paints or sealants on the inside surface of a 
titanium skin may ease the problem by providing thermal insulation between the 
fuel and the hot spot, but the degree of actual protection thus obtained should 
be determined by laboratory tests before such coatings are judged reliable in a 
design. 
6.6.4.2 Ways to Reduce Dwell Time 
The foregoing discussion makes clear the importance of lightning arc dwell 
time in establishing whether or not ignition from a strike to a certain skin is 
likely to occur. And dwell time is perhaps the only lightning characteristic over 
which the integral fuel tank designer may have any control. The objectives, of 
course, should be to have as short as possible a dwell time at any one spot and to 
spread thz arc attachment among many different spots. A bare metallic external 
finish will best achieve these aims, since most paints and other coatings act to 
concentrate the attachment at more widely separated points for correspondingly 
longer times than does a bare surface. 
If a paint must be used, lightning dwell times may be reduced by making 
the paint partially conductive. Robb and others (Reference 6.52) have 
demonstrated that aluminum powder is effective in increasing the conductivity 
of polyurethane paints, thereby increasing the ability of the arc to reattach to 
new points as the aircraft surface moves beneath the arc. Since no parametric 
data relating dwell time to amount of additive are yet available, it is advisable to 
determine in the laboratory the degree of improvement afforded by particular 
combinations. 
6.6.5 Integral Fuel Tanks in Trailing Edges 
If an integral tank skin is the aft-most trailing edge of an aircraft wing tip 
or other structure (Zones IB, 2B), metal skins of almost any thickness will be 
melted completely through because the flash is likely to hang on there for most 
of its life. This conclusion derives from the data presented; the application 
follows. Figure 1.25 shows that 99% of all flashes deliver 200 C or less, and SAE 
current component C reflects this in its requirement for transfer of 200 C in 1 s 
or less. Figure 6.1 7 shows that this much charge would melt through aluminum 
skins up to 0.8 cm (0.3 13 in) thick, and Figure 6.18 shows that it would 
produce the fuel ignition temperature of 1320 OC (2400 O F )  on the inside 
surface of titanium skins over 0.318 cm (0.125 in) thick. Therefore, because of 
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the excessive flash hang-on times, it is not safe to  have fuel in direct contact with 
trailing edge skins of practical thicknesses. If it is desired t o  have fuel in trailing 
edges, an extended, solid section capable of  sustaining up  t o  about 8 cm3 of 
melting at an attachment point about 2.5 cm wide should be provided, as shown, 
for example, in Figure 6.25. 
Externally mounted or tip tanks o f  the cylindrical variety may be 
protected by closing out  the aft-most volume of the tank (as shown in Figure 
6.7,6), so that if meltthrough occurs no fuel vapor will be contacted. 
LIGHTNING TRAILING 
METAL SKINS 
FASTENERS 
Figure 6.25 Trailing edge construction t o  avoid fuel ignition as a result of 
extended flash hangon. 
Volume of at least 8 cm2 available for melting away 
Fuel o r  vapor does not contact hot arc or 1320 OC hot spot 
LIGHTNING ZONE 2A 
FROM LEAKING TO VOID AREA 
ZONE 
1 A 
Figure 6.26 Trailing edge construction to avoid fuel ignition from extended 
flash hang-on. 
Hole melts into aft void area, but no vapor is present to  ignite. 
Void sections removable for replacement 
Forward void area not as necessary because leading edge dwell 
times are short 
6.7 Integral Fuel Tanks with Nonmetallic Skins 
In some cases nonmetallic materials such as fiberglass-reinforced plastics 
(FRP) are used instead o f  metals for integral fuel tank skins. For example, the 
light aircraft of  Figure 4.15 has FRP wing tips which include fuel tanks 
containing aviation gasoline; these tanks have suffered several in-flight explosions 
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when lightning strikes occurred. The fact that the fuel in these tanks is in direct 
contact with the inside surface o f  the tank skin and the fact that portions of  this 
skin are located in Zones 1 A and 2A undoubtedly accounts for these explosions. 
The basic differences between the lightning effects which may occur to 
metallic and nonmetallic skins result from the fact that nonmetallic skins are not 
electrically conductive. This means that the meltthrough or hot spot ignition 
mechanisms associated with attachment of  the lightning arc to  the skin will not 
occur. Instead, the lightning flash will either 
Puncture the skin and attach t o  an electrically conductive object 
inside the skin (tank), path (a) on Figure 6.27, or 
Divert around the  nonmetallic skin and attach t o  an adjacent 
metallic skin or other object, path (b). 
i 
METAL 
WING TIP 
Figure 6.2 7 Possible lightning-flash attachment to  nonconducting skins. 
If the flash reaches the skin but remains on its outside surface, path (b), it 
is not likely that the skin will be burned through or that its inside surface will 
become hot enough to ignite fuel. The reason for this is that none of the current 
is being electrically conducted into the skin, and the hot  arc does not lie close 
enough t o  o r  long enough against the skin t o  burn through it. In fact, its effects 
are usually limited t o  burning of external paints, if present, or to  slight singeing 
of the nonmetallic skin. 
The occurrence of punctures may be explained by the basic lightning 
attachment mechanism described in Chapter 2 .  An approaching leader induces 
streamers from conducting extremities on the aircraft--including objects 
located beneath nonconducting skins. These streamers are often restricted by  the 
insulating skin, but  if the electric field producing them is strong enough, the skin 
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may suffer dielectric breakdown (puncture) and allow the streamer to  reach the 
approaching leader. This is most likely to  occur when there is n o  external 
conducting object nearby from which another streamer could propagate and 
reach the leader first. Obviously, if a puncture occurs through a n  integral fuel 
tank wali, fuel is placed in direct contact with the lightning arc, and ignition is 
probable. 
It is believed possible that, even if a puncture does not occur, an internal 
streamer can ignite fuel b y  itself. Protection against ignition therefore requires 
that two basic criteria b e  met: 
1. Punctures be prevented 
2. Internal streamers be  prevented. 
These criteria are, of  course, in addition t o  other requirements such as 
elimination of ignition from strikes t o  vent outlets, or sparking across joints 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
Puncture of nonmetallic skins can be prevented, or a t  least greatly 
minimized, by  placement of conductive diverters on the outside surface of the 
tank. These diverters must be  placed close enough t o  each other or to  other 
conductors t o  prevent an internal streamer from puncturing the skin. In 
theory this means that the diverters must be close enough together t o  greatly 
reduce the internal electric field and prevent internal streamer formation in the 
first place, because such streamers, once formed, will intensify the field about 
themselves as they propagate outward. Prevention of internal streamers b y  
diverters is called electrostatic shielding, and successful accomplishment of this 
function is necessary t o  prevent skin punctures and, equally important, to  
prevent internal streamers from forming and becoming a source of ignition 
themselves. Types of diverters which have proved successful and criteria for 
placement and spacing of them are given in Chapter 7 (Structures Protection). 
Tests which may be used t o  verify diverter adequacy are also described in 
Chapter 7. 
Because streamers form most readily from sharp conducting edges and 
corners, the number of metallic parts inside a nonmetallic fuel tank should be 
minimized wherever possible, and those that remain should be located as far 
from nonmetallic skins as possible and designed with smooth, rounded edges 
instead of  sharp points. These concepts are illustrated in Figures 6.28 and 6.29. 
Also metallic parts should be located as far from nonmetallic skins as possible. 
If a diverter protection system such as that shown in Figure 6.28 is used, 
the diverter should not be  painted or covered with any other nonconducting 
material. The electrical insulation provided b y  most aircraft paints is nearly as 
good as that provided by the fiberglass skin itself, so the paint will mask the 
diverter and greatly reduce its effectiveness. Painting of the fiberglass skin itself, 
of course, is t o  be encouraged, as the added insulation provided by  the ~ a i n t  will 
further reduce the probability of skin puncture. 
Plumer (Reference 6.53) has successfully tested a diverter arrangement of 
the configuration shown in Figure 6.27, and similar arrangements have been 
flown on some light aircraft with nonmetallic wing tip tanks. 
FUEL QUANTlN UNIT 
MOUNT AS FAR INBOARD 
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NAVIGATION LIGHT 
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Figure 6.28 Location of metallic parts within nonmetallic fuel tanks. 
6.7.1 0 ther Methods of P r o t e c t i n g  N o n m e t a l l i c  T a n k s  
If a diverter arrangement is not practical for  some reason, a conductive 
coating may be applied t o  the tank instead. Such a coating may be a metal foil 
or a paint heavily doped with metal or carbon particles. The major disadvantage 
of these coatings is that a relatively large portion of the coating may be melted 
or burned away when the flash attaches t o  it. A coating would have t o  be 
prohibitively thick (one approaching the thickness of conventional metallic skins 
themselves) t o  avoid these results. 
On the other hand, a conductive coating has the important advantage of 
providing an overall electrostatic shield that will virtually eliminate internal 
electric fields and streamering. Thus, if metallic objects must be located inside 
the tank in such a manner that streamers are of concern, it may be advisable t o  
consider a conductive coating over the entire nonmetallic skin. This precaution is 
particularly appropriate if occasional burnoff of part of the coating is acceptable 
from a maintenance standpoint. 
Coating materials which have been tested for such applications include 
aluminum foils 5 -  to 15 mm thick, braided and woven aluminum wire meshes of 
between 40 and 80 wires per centimeter, and various conducting paints. These 
coatings are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7. 
6.8 Current F l o w  T h r o u g h  S t r u c t u r e s  and C o m p o n e n t s  
In each of  the aircraft accidents that were attributed to  lightning and that 
occurred as a result of in-flight explosion of  fuel, the exact cause of fuel ignition 
has remained obscure. Ignition at  fuel vent outlets or by meltthrough o f  integral 
tank skins has been suspected in several cases, but no conclusive evidence t o  this 
effect has ever been found. While it is not correct t o  eliminate vents and skins 
from further consideration as the prime factors, it may be possible that minute 
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Figure 6.29 Avoid sharp edges on metallic parts inside nonmetallic fuel tanks. 
sparks resulting from lightning current having been conducted through the fuel 
tanks caused some of these disasters. Whereas the relatively large amount o f  
thermal energy released at  the points of concentrated lightning current entry 
into the aircraft would be expected t o  leave tell-tale evidence, the marks left by 
a several-millijoule spark are very difficult, if not impossible, to  detect. 
In the past, much attention has been given to keeping lightning currents 
out of  the interior of the aircraft by providing conductive and tightly bonded 
skins. While most lightning currents, by  virtue of their short duration, d o  not 
have sufficient time t o  diffuse completely t o  interior structural elements such as 
spars and ribs, it is not correct t o  assume that n o  current flows in these interior 
structures. Nor is it correct t o  assume that none of the lightning current flows in 
other internal conductors such as fuel and vent lines. Since so little energy is 
needed for an igniting spark, the behavior of  these internal currents is of great 
importance t o  fuel system safety. Of course, when the lightning currents which 
d o  flow in the skin encounter discontinuities at access doors, filler caps, and the 
like, a possibility of  sparking exists if electrical bonding is inadequate; therefore, 
the behavior of lightning currents remaining in the skins-is important. 
Electrical wires entering fuel tanks from other locations in the aircraft 
pose another potential problem if they are routed in areas which may be reached 
by high electromagnetic fields when lightning strikes occur. 
Figure 6.30 shows the possible lightning current paths in a typical fuel 
tank and calls attention t o  these areas of greatest concern. In the following 
paragraphs we discuss each of these and present guidelines for protection design, 
referring t o  related research or  testing experience that exists. We also call 
attention t o  other areas of concern for which little or n o  quantitative data is yet 
available. 
6.8.1 Filler Caps and Access Doors 
The need t o  provide a liquid-tight seal around fuel tank filler caps and 
access doors has led to  use of  various gaskets and seals between the cap or door  
and its mating surface in the tank. Most of  these have little or n o  electrical 
conductivity, leaving the metallic screws o r  other fasteners as the only 
conducting paths into the cover. If these fasteners are inadequate or if they 
present too much inductance, lightning currents may build sufficient voltage 
along such paths t o  spark across the nonconducting seals, creating shorter paths. 
Some of these sparks may occur at the inside surfaces of the joints and be a 
source of fuel ignition. 
Newman, Robb,  and Stahmann were among the first-to recognize and 
evaluate this possibility in the laboratory. They demonstrated (Reference 6.54) 
that direct strikes to  filler caps o r  access doors of (then) conventional design 
would cause profuse spark showers inside the tank--spark showers of ample 
energy t o  ignite fuel. They applied simulated strokes t o  typical fuel filler caps 
and access doors. Their test strokes ranged in energy from a very mild 35 kA, 
0.006 x 1 o6 A2-s stroke t o  a very severe 180 kA, 3 x I o6 A2-s stroke; profuse 
sparking occurred under all conditions. When an ignitable fuel mixture was 
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Figure 6.30 Lightning current paths in a fuel tank and potential probIem areas. 
placed in the tanks, these spark showers readily produced ignition. 
Newman and his colleagues did not report sparking or fuel ignition when 
the same access doors o r  filler caps were not directly struck but were 
nevertheless located in a tank skin, which instead was conducting the same 
simulated lightning currents distributed throughout its surface. Nor has sparking 
under such a condition been reported elsewhere in the literature. The possibility 
of such an occurrence, however, has perhaps not been evaluated as thoroughly as 
it should be. 
6.8.1 .1 Lightning-Pro tected Filler Caps 
After observing the sparking from direct strikes t o  the original access doors 
and filler caps, Newman evaluated several design modifications t o  prevent this 
sparking. Figure 6.3 1 shows the locations of sparking at the inside surfaces of an 
unprotected filler cap and a modified design intended 'to prevent internal 
sparking. It incorporates a plastic insert that precludes any sparking at interior 
faying surfaces and replaces the previous ball chain with a nonconducting plastic 
strap. Newman successfully tested a mockup of this modified cap with direct 
strikes (Reference 6.55). Since then lightning-protected fuel tank filler caps 
embodying this principle have become commercially available and are being used 
in many aircraft where filler caps must be located in direct or swept-lightning- 
strike zones (Zones IA,  l B ,  2A, 2B), and at least one specification, 
MIL-C-38373A (ASG), has been written prescribing a lightning-protected cap. 
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Figure 6.31 Fuel filler cap designs. 
(a) Unprotected 
(b) Protected 
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Lightning-protected caps should always be used if there is any possibility 
that the cap may receive a lightning strike. The consequences of not doing so 
have been demonstrated by Plumer (Reference 6.56) in tests of a light aircraft 
nonmetallic wing tip fuel tank equipped with an automotive-type fuel filler cap 
located in a region where it would be subject t o  direct and swept strokes. The 
cap sparked t o  its grounded adapter even when struck b y  a very low-amplitude 
(-5 kA) stroke, igniting a flammable mixture of AVGAS and air. The resulting 
flame exhausted through a blowout hole that had been cut in the underside of 
the tank, as shown in Figure 6.32. The same type of cap on the same type of tip 
tank was also struck during the in-flight incident described in Section 4.5 (Figure 
4.16); however, n o  ignition occurred, presumably because the tank contained 
sufficient fuel t o  keep the ullage vapor overly rich, as would be predicted by the 
AVGAS flammability envelope limits of  Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.32 Direct strike to  unprotected fuel filler cap resulting in internal 
sparking and ignition of fuel. 
The flammability limits for a particular fuel should not be relied upon, of 
course, t o  establish adequate lightning protection because there are factors-- 
such as fuel quantity, misting, and venting--which may cause the actual 
conditions prevailing in a particular tank t o  deviate from the limits shown in 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 .  Major emphasis should always be placed upon 
eliminating possible sources of ignition, regardless of the expected flammability 
conditions in the tank. 
If any doubt about the protection capability of the particular design 
exists, the cap should be tested as described in the SAE report Lightning Test 
Waveforms and Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware. (Reference 
6.57). 
6.8.1.2 Ligh tning-Pro tec ted Access Doors 
Newman also reported sparking at access door interfaces when the mating 
surfaces had O-ring seals or phenolic or anodized clamp ring surfaces which were 
electrically insulating. It was found (Reference 6.29) that the application of a 
Boeing Service Bulletin modification (SB-1955) successfully prevented this 
sparking when the access doors were directly struck. The modification consisted 
of the following: 
(1) Removing phenolic and anodized coatings from the clamp ring 
(2) Removing anodized coating from faying surfaces of the access door 
(3) Sealing of the door t o  the surrounding skin adapter with conductive 
grease consisting of 35% by weight of aluminum powder and 65% by 
weight of Aeroshell 14  grease. 
Other modifications in access door seal design have proved equally 
effective in preventing sparking. In some cases anodized clamp rings or insulating 
gaskets have been acceptable when sufficient metal-to-metal conductivity exists 
via the bolts or fasteners alone. The door requiring the SB-1955 modification 
described above to resist sparking had only 23 bolts, whereas other doors having 
over 4 0  bolts have been found to resist sparking even if insulating finishes or 
paints such as anodize or zinc chromate remain on the mating surfaces. 
A recent survey of different manufacturers' access door designs showed a 
wide range of different materials and sealing practices in use and relatively little 
documented lightning test data upon which to  judge their adequacy. If access 
doors are located in Zones 1 or 2,  where direct or swept strokes may attach 
directly to them, they should be tested with direct strokes in accordance with 
the SAE report Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques for Aerospace 
Vehicles and Hardware (See Reference 6.57). Even if these doors are not located 
in direct or swept-stroke zones, they are likely t o  be involved in conducting 
some lightning current, since this current passes along the aircraft surface 
between other attachment points. This report also describes appropriate tests to 
be performed (for Zone 3) t o  evaluate this possibility. 
The importance of adequate electrical conductivity between access doors 
and their surroundings can not be overemphasized, especially in cases where the 
access door is itself a large part of  the aircraft skin and where this skin encloses 
fuel. Such a case is illustrated in the small fighter aircraft of Figure 6.33, in 
which several large access doors cover a fuselage fuel tank. The doors cover a 
large area and are located in Zone 2A, a zone that requires them to be designed 
to safely accept strokes up t o  100 kA, 0.25 x l o6  A ~ - s .  
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Figure 6.33 Large access doors in Zone 2A over fuselage fuel. 
Swept-lightning strokes will attach to these doors. 
Adequate electrical conductivity and protection can not be verified by 
measuring the dc resistance between the door and the surrounding airframe 
because this resistance may change under high-current stress, permitting a 
voltage rise, and also because the inductance of current paths through fasteners 
is equally capable of causing the voltage rises that cause sparking. Structural 
bonds that do  not spark have often had dc resistances below 2.5 ma, but there 
is no universal correlation between this resistance and the degree of sparking. It 
is, in fact, quite possible that a joint with less than 2.5 mR of resistance may 
nevertheless have enough inductance to cause a spark. 
Some guidelines t o  follow in designing a protected door include the 
following: 
1. Provide as much bare-metal-to-bare-metal contact as possible. 
2 .  If bare-metal-to-bare-metal contact at the mating or faying surfaces 
is not practical because of corrosion problems, provide as much bare 
metal contact via screws or fasteners as possible, and make the 
current paths through these fasteners as short as possible. 
3. Seal door with conductive greases or conductive gaskets if possible. 
The adequacy of an3 design should be verified by performing the 
simulated lightning tests described in the SAE report Lightning Test Waveforms 
and Techniques for A erospace Vehicles and Hardware. 
6.8.2 Joints Between Skins, Spars, and Ribs 
The large numbers of  rivets o r  fasteners typically employed to attach a 
metal skin to  a metal rib, spar, stiffener, o r  other internal structural element 
have usually also provided adequate electrical conductivity for lightning currents. 
The most common situations found are those where both mating surfaces are 
painted with an insulating zinc chromate paint and sometimes further insulated 
with environmental sealers, as shown in Figure 6.34. There are, however, usually 
enough rivets or fasteners which make bare metal contact with the mating 
surfaces t o  provide the necessary electrical conductivity for lightning currents. 
High-density patterns of  rivets or fasteners, such as are commonly utilized to  
join fuel tank skins t o  stringers, ribs, and spars, have been found t o  be capable of 
conducting 200 kA stroke currents, even when nonconductive primers and 
sealants are present between the surfaces, as in Figure 6.34 (Reference 6.58). 
Short,  for example, reports 200 kA stroke tests of skin-to-stringer joint samples 
fastened with double rows of taper-lock fasteners. The sample tgsted had 16 
fasteners on  each end of  the joint, and n o  sparking was detected anywhere on 
the joint (Reference 6.59). 
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Figure 6.34 Bonding through mechanical fasteners. 
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There is no hard-and-fast rule for the number of fasteners per meter of 
joint (density) which are necessary to  avoid sparking. After all, a single No. 8 
AWG copper o r  aluminum wire is capable of  conducting 200  kA, 2 x l o 6  A ~ - S  
strokes, so a single fastener of this or larger diameter would also, by itself, be 
capable of conducting this much current. Any sparking usually occurs at the 
interfaces between the fastener and surrounding metal, and the occurrence of  
such sparking depends on other physical characteristics, such as skin metal 
thickness, surface coatings, and fastener tightness. Tests in which simulated 
lightning currents are conducted through the joint should always be made on 
samples of joints involving new materials or designs. The type and amount of 
lightning current to  be applied for these tests and diagnostics t o  be used, should 
be  as described in Lightning Test Waveforms and Technques for Aerospace 
Vehicles and Hardware for Zone 3. 
The foregoing relates t o  the case where the joint is in Zone 3 and must 
conduct some portion of  the lightning current, but other zones can be, and are 
likely t o  be, struck directly by  the lightning arc itself. In direct and swept-stroke 
zones (1 A, 2A) and hang-on zones (IB, 2B), it is possible for the lightning arc to  
attach directly t o  a single fastener o r  rivet. I f  it persists, the hot  arc may melt or 
otherwise damage surrounding skin. Figure 6.35 (Reference 6.60) shows an 
example of the damage that can be done at such a place. Here, a 1 cm-diameter 
rivet head and much of  its surrounding aluminum skin have melted away. If an 
arc persists long enough at  such a spot,  it may melt completely through the skin, 
beyond the inside member. Such penetration occurred at the point shown in 
Figure 6.35. The danger involved may require that, if ignitable fuel vapors can 
exist beneath any joint in a swept-stroke zone (]A,  2A), the skin may have t o  be 
thicker than that required on the basis of  swept-stroke dwell times only; or some 
other provision may have to be made to prevent complete meltthrough near a 
rivet. 
Some other guidelines which should be noted in designing integral tank 
joints are as follows: 
1. Avoid use of  anodizing in joints which may have t o  carry lightning 
currents. Anodizing is usually applied t o  prevent corrosion and results in a hard 
oxide surface which is nonconductive and difficult t o  break down at less than 
about 3 0 0  V. Thus, when breakdown eventually does occur, the resulting spark 
will be more energetic than if a poorer insulator were present. The best coating 
of all for lightning protection is, of  course, no coating. 
2. Design short, direct lightning current flow paths because lightning 
currents want t o  flow in straight, direct paths between entry and exit points on 
the aircraft. Voltages which may cause sparking will build up wherever diversions 
in these paths exist. The diversions through the fasteners and stringer of  Figure 
6.34 are acceptable. More extended paths may not be. 
3. Do not depend on resistance measurements t o  confirm the adequacy of  
lightning current conductivity in a joint. The inductance of the lightning current 
flow path through the joint plays an equally important part, but this inductance 
is rather small (a few hundredths of a microhenry) and difficult to  measure. 
Resistance measurements (ac o r  dc) may be useful as a production quality 
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control tool, but they are not useful for establishing the adequacy of the 
lightning current path through the joint. 
4. Account for aging and mechanical stress which may cause reduced 
electrical conductivity. Continued flexing of structures under flight load 
conditions may eventually loosen a joint to the point where sparking could 
occur. To evaluate this possibility, perform simulated lightning tests on joint 
samples previously given fatigue or environmental tests. 
Figure 6.35 Typical lightning damage to a m e t .  
Meltthrough to inside beyond rib surface. 
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6.8.3 Joints and Interfaces in Pipes and Couplings 
Because they are metallic and come in contact with structure, the myriad 
of fuel, hydraulic and vent pipes, and other plumbing inside a fuel tank will have 
to conduct some, however small, amounts of current when lightning currents are 
flowing through the structure containing them. This current may cause sparking 
at pipe joints and couplings where there is intermittent or poor electrical 
conductivity. Some pipe couplings, for example, are designed to permit relative 
motion between the mating ends of a pipe so as to relieve mechanical stresses 
caused by wing flexure and vibration. Also, anodized or other electrically 
insulating coatings are often applied to the pipe ends and couplings to control 
corrosion. Relative motion and vibration may wear this insulation away, 
providing unintentional and intermittent conductive paths. To date, almost no 
quantitative information has been developed to describe the amounts of current 
or voltage necessary to cause a spark, nor has this possibility been related to the 
design or condition of a particular system. Yet this sparking may have been a 
factor in the cause of the several in-flight explosions associated with lightning 
strikes cited earlier in this book. This aspect should, therefore, be given 
particular attention in the design of aircraft fuel systems. 
6.8.3.1 Lightning Currents in Plumbing 
Because of their relatively short duration, the high-amplitude, short- 
duration stroke currents will not have time to spread very deeply into interior 
structural elements or other interior conductors. Most of this current will remain 
in metallic skins, but this current does begin immediately to diffuse into 
underlying metallic structure. Appreciable current levels may be reached in 
spars, stringers, pipes, and other internal conductors if the lightning stroke 
persists long enough. 
The basic penetration, or current redistribution, process is described in 
Chapter 8, and it is shown that penetration times for typical aircraft skins are of 
the order of several tens of microseconds. If the stroke current were to remain at 
its peak amplitude for a time longer than this, dc conditions would be 
approached and the current would be distributed resistively, with a significant 
portion of it flowing in the internal structure. Fortunately, the stroke current 
does not remain at its peak level for more than a few microseconds. The amount 
of this stroke current which, under typical lightning-stroke conditions, can 
actually flow on internal pipes is not yet known, and determination of the 
magnitude of this current cannot yet be done confidently by analysis. 
Laboratory tests in which simulated lightning currents are forced through 
complete fuel tank structures can be performed, however, and the current in 
particular pipelines can be measured. 
Intermediate and continuing currents do persist for times long enough for 
the penetration process to be completed, and it is possible to estimate, as 
follows, the amount of intermediate current that may flow in a pipe after dc 
conditions are reached. 
Assume that the leading and trailing edge sections of the wing in Figure 
6.30 are nonconductive or sufficiently isolated as to be unavailable for 
conduction and that the remaining wing box comprised of skins and spars has 
chordwise dimensions as shown in Figure 6.36. The cross-sectional area of the 
spars and skins forming this box is 135 cm2. The tank also contains a 0.05 cm 
I.D., 10 cm O.D. aluminum vent pipe which is electrically bonded to the 
structure at each end of the tank. The cross-sectional area of this tube is 1.57 
cm2. 
Figure 6.36 Hypothetical wing box with integral fuel tank. 
Assuming an intermediate stroke whose average amplitude is 2 000 A for a 
duration of 5 ms (in accordance with component B of the SAE report Lightning 
Test Wavefoms and Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware) the 
current in the pipe can be calculated as follows: 
1.57 cm 
- (2 000 A) = 22.9 A 
'tube -137- 
This current would flow for as long as the lightning intermediate current 
flows, which is 5 ms if component B is assumed to be representative. The ability 
of currents of the order of 20 A to cause a spark at pipe interfaces and couplings 
presently used in aircraft is not known, but the sparking that commonly occurs 
at similar current levels between other conductors in relative motion (such as 
battery clamps and motor commutators) raises a distinct possibility of sparking 
at couplings where relative motion and/or poor electrical conductivity exists. 
Electrical bond straps are sometimes installed across poorly conducting 
pipe couplings, as shown in Figure 6.37. 
These bond straps are usually intended to equalize static electrical charges 
such as those carried into the tank during refueling operations. 
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ELECTRICAL 
BONDING 
SAFETY WIRE 
COUPLING 
Figure 6.37 Electrical bonding jumper across insulated coupling. 
BONDING JUMPERS SUCH AS THOSE SHOWN IN FIGURE 6.37 
SHOULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO PREVENT SPARKING FROM 
LIGHTNING CURRENTS! 
The reason that jumpers like this are unsatisfactory is that, when 
fast-changing lightning currents begin to flow in these jumpers, voltage rises 
occur along the inductance of the strap equal to 
where E = inductance voltage (volts) 
L = bond strap inductance (henries) 
I = current in tube (amperes) 
This voltage appears across all other possible current paths through the coupling. 
If there exists another possible but unintentional path, such as a safety wire, a 
retaining chain, or the coupling interface itself, this inductive voltage may be 
sufficient to force current through these paths and cause sparking if the 
conductivity is poor or intermittent. For example, if the 20 A portion of the 
intermediate current were to begin to flow in the bonding jumper of Figure 6.37 
and if this current were to reach its peak in 100 ps, its rate of rise would be 
If the inductance of the bonding jumper is 0.1 pH, then the inductive 
voltage developed along the jumper would be 
By itself this voltage is too low to break down coupling insulation such as 
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anodized or zinc chromate primer, but if it is applied across preexisting surfaces 
where these treatments have been worn through, this voltage may be sufficient 
to  cause current flow and sparking. 
As stated earlier, the fraction of  stroke current which enters a bonding 
jumper and the inductive voltage it produces are not known. It is quite probable 
that at least some stroke currents would produce even higher rates of current rise 
in the bonding jumpers than d o  the intermediate currents. 
6.8.3.2 Conductivity through Couplings and Interfaces 
Here again is an area where little electrical data is available. The extensive 
use of  anodized coatings to  provide noncorrosive mating surfaces in pipe 
couplings would seem t o  preclude arcing across the pipe interface, bu t  relative 
motion between these surfaces can wear through the anodized coating, causing a 
conductive path. If there happens to  b e  bare metal-to-metal contact within the 
coupling, this would probably represent the shortest path, and it is altogether 
possible that n o  sparking would occur anywhere else in the coupling. A slight 
change in the relative position of  the mating surfaces or in some other aspect, 
such as the tightness of  its threaded assembly or introduction of dirt or residue, 
may drastically change the electrical conductivity of a coupling. In fact, it is 
probable that the electrical conductivity o f  a typical pipe coupling changes many 
times during a flight as a result o f  relative motion caused by structural vibrations 
and flexing. 
In the absence of definitive data on  the electrical conductivity of pipe 
couplings under in-service conditions, it is advisable t o  take the following 
approach: 
1. Determine the fraction of lightning current expected t o  flow in a 
particular pipe, b y  analyses similar t o  the analysis of Section 6.8.3.1, 
or, if available, a more authentic means. 
2. Inject this expected current through a sample of the desired 
coupling, under simulated in-flight vibration and contamination 
conditions. 
3. Perform this test in a darkened enclosure t o  enable inspection for 
sparks. Repeat the test until a reliable result is established. 
If sparking does occur in a coupling, a redesign is likely to  be required for 
assured prevention; however, it may be possible t o  provide adequate conduc- 
tivity with the addition of  two or more short, wide braided jumpers or a braided 
sleeve, as shown in Figure 6.38(a) and (b). 
Alternatively, completely insulated couplings might be designed. If such an 
insulated coupling were used, a jumper as shown in Figure 6.38(c) could be used 
to conduct lightning currents and static charges, provided the length of  the path 
through the jumper is not  much longer than the path through the air along the 
surface or through the insulated coupler. 
Before using any one of  these or any other protective method that has to  
be added to an existing coupling design, its adequacy should be verified by 
impulse current tests to check for sparking. 
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Figure 6.38 Possible methods to reduce sparking at  pipe couplings. 
6.8.4 Electrical Wiring in Fuel Tanks 
Another result of  lightning current flow through a structure is that the 
fields it produces may  induce voltages in electrical wiring. If this wiring enters a 
fuel tank, the possibility o f  these induced voltages being high enough t o  cause a 
spark in the fuel tank is a matter for concern. 
Electrical wires found inside fuel tanks are typically those that run to 
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capacitance-type fuel quantity probes o r  small electric motors which operate 
pumps o r  valves. If these wires are totally enclosed b y  metal skins and ribs or 
spars, the internal magnetic fields and induced voltages will be relatively low. 
Electrical devices, such as fuel probes, have been intentionally designed to 
withstand comparatively higher voltages without sparking. The fuel system 
designer, however, must be continually alert for structural design or materials 
changes that may alter this situation and permit excessive induced voltages t o  
appear in fuel tank electrical circuits. 
A number of measurements have been made of the voltages which 
simulated lightning currents may induce in fuel probe wiring found in 
conventional aircraft. Measurements have also been made of the voltages 
required to  cause a spark between the elements of  typical capacitance-type fuel 
quantity probes. The sparkover voltages have always been found t o  be much 
higher than those found to be induced in the wiring. Newman, Robb, and 
Stahmann (Reference 6.61) found that at least 3 000 V of d c  voltage were 
required to cause a spark between the active and grounded cylinders of a 
capacitance-type fuel probe found in a KC-135 aircraft wing, and that even 
higher voltages were needed t o  spark over the other gaps in this probe. Plumer, 
(Reference 6.62) ran a similar test using the 1.2 x 5 0  ,us impulse voltage 
waveform specified as Voltage Waveform C of SAE Report Lightning Test 
Waveforms and Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware and found that 
12 kV were required t o  cause a spark between the inner and outer cylinders of 
the probe. Small gaps like this will withstand more impulse than dc voltage, and 
the impulse test more realistically represents an induced voltage. 
The tests reported above were made at atmospheric pressure on  the 
ground; the same gap would break down a t  a lower voltage when at the lower air 
pressures associated with flight altitudes. The amount of reduction t o  be 
expected in impulse sparkover voltage at various altitudes can be determined 
from the curves of Figure 6.39(a) and (b) (Reference 6.63). The product, pd, of 
pressure (mm Hg) and gap distance (mm) is first determined by obtaining 
pressure at altitude from the chart of Figure 6.39(c). If it is desired to  find the 
sparkover voltage of a 5 mm gap at  1 0  0 0 0  m altitude, for example, the pressure 
at this altitude is first determined from the chart t o  be 198.16 m m  Hg. The 
product, pd, would then be (5 mm) (198.16 mm Hg) = 990.8 mm Hg mm. From 
Figure 6.39(b), the gap would spark over at about 5500 V. 
The sparkover voltages of  Figures 6.39(a) and (b) should be considered 
approximate, since these curves were determined for plane parallel electrodes 
only. Other electrode configurations, such as a sharp point-to-plane, would spark 
at  voltages perhaps 25% more or less than these. Impulse sparkover tests should 
be made on particular gap configurations to  determine the actual sparkover 
voltages. 
Contaminants on the electrode surfaces may also act t o  reduce the 
breakdown voltage; therefore, it is wise in any case t o  reduce voltage levels 
measured by  laboratory tests b y  a factor of a t  least 2 when assigning a withstand 
voltage t o  a fuel probe or other electrical gap that might appear in a fuel tank. 
Pressure 
mm of Hg 
When determining the breakdown voltages of an object such as a fuel 
quantity probe, care must be taken to apply test voltage t o  all of the electrode 
combinations which may exist (this need not all be done simultaneously). In 
most cases both the "high" and "low" electrodes in such a device are insulated 
from "ground" (the airframe), as shown in the simplified drawing of Figure 
6.40, but  there is always a mounting bracket which brings the probe in 
proximity t o  the airframe. Thus, the test voltage should be applied across each 
of the basic electrode combinations shown in Figure 6.40. Usually, the gaps to  
the mounting bracket or airframe will be  larger than the others and require a 
higher voltage to cause sparkover. Typical impulse sparkover voltages to  be 
expected across these gaps, at a flight altitude of 3000 m, might be as shown in 
Table 6.7, where the "high" and "low" electrodes are defined as shown in Figure 
6.40. 
CONDUCTIVE TUBES J 
---------- 
TERMINALS -+ 
Figure 6.40 Possible breakdown of gaps in capacitance-type probe. 
1. High to Low 
2. High to Airframe 
3. Low to Airframe 
Table 6.7 TYPICAL EMPULSE SPARKOVER VOLTAGES 
FOR A CAPACITANCE-TYPE PROBE 
Figure 6.40 illustrates that the proximity of the probe to the airframe 
structure on which it is mounted is very important in determining breakdown 
voltages to the airframe. Because of this, design of adequate insulation between 
the active elements of the probe and the airframe may not be entirely within the 
probe designer's control. 
CARE MUST BE TAKEN BY THE FUEL SYSTEM DESIGNER TO SEE 
THAT ADEQUATE GAPS ARE MAINTAINED BETWEEN THE ACTIVE 
ELECTRODES OF THE PROBE AND THE AIRFRAME. 
It is particularly important that sufficient insulation be provided between 
Figure 6.40 
Electrode Pair 
High to Low 
High to 
Airframe 
Low to 
Airframe 
Sparkover Voltage at 3 000 m Altitude 
3 kV 
6 kV 
8 kV 
active electrodes and the airframe because the highest induced voltages usually 
appear between all of the incoming wires and the airframe. The reason is 
illustrated in Figure 6.41. The wires are most closely referenced to the airframe 
at the electronics end, which is usually in the fuselage. If one or more of  the 
wires are shielded, usually only the electronics ends of the shields are grounded 
to the airframe because grounding o f  both ends permits stray ac fields t o  induce 
circulating currents in these shields. These currents are a source of steady state 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) sufficient t o  interfere with the operation of  
the fuel quantity electronics. This EM1 has been avoided by  leaving the shields 
ungrounded at  the fuel tank end. 
INDUCED 
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/am 
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Figure 6.41 Typical fuel probe wiring. 
Most magnetic flux and induced voitaie appears between either 
wire (or shield) and the airframe at probe end. 
Less flux and induced voltage exists between any two wires. 
Even less flux and voltage exists between a wire and its shield. 
The performance of shielded circuits within magnetic fields is discussed in 
Chapter 13, Section 13.2, where it is shown that a shield grounded at only one 
end actually provides n o  magnetic shielding of an enclosed wire whose return 
path (the airframe) is outside of  the shield. If a shieId is grounded at only one 
end, the magnetic flux encircled in the loop this shield forms with the airframe 
will induce a voltage in this loop of 
where 4 = magnetic flux 
Most of  this induced voltage will appear between the open end of the shield and 
the airframe. The same field will induce a similar voltage between the enclosed 
wire and the airframe. Only if the shield is grounded t o  the airframe at  both ends 
will it prevent these voltages from being induced. If the ungrounded end of the 
shield is in a fuel tank, the highest induced voltages will appear there. 
Induced voltages will also appear between two or more wires or shields at 
the probe end, but any one of these wire-to-wire voltages will usually be less 
than the voltage between either conductor and the airframe because the area 
between wires in a cable bundle is usually less than the area between any one of 
them and the airframe. 
The routing of the fuel probe wires, therefore, has a lot to do with how 
much induced voltage appears at  apparatus inside fuel tanks. Since fuel tanks are 
often completely enclosed with metallic walls which are electrically bonded and 
well sealed, the magnetic fields from lightning (or any other source) are likely to 
be lowest inside the tanks. Thus, wires that must eventually enter the tanks 
should be routed through them from the start. Newman, Robb, and Stahmann, 
for example, have measured up to 11 V, or less, in the fuel quantity probe 
circuits routed inside a KC-135 wing fuel tank (Reference 6.64) through which 
50  kA strokes with a 50 kA/ps rate of rise were being conducted. This voltage 
would extrapolate to a maximum of 44 V at a severe stroke amplitude of 200 
kA. Plumer (Reference 6.65) measured up to 4 V in a fuel probe circuit routed 
inside the tanks of an F-89J wing. The simulated lightning current in this case 
was 40 kA, with a rate of rise of 8 kA/ps. From these results Plumer predicted 
that a 200 kA, 100 kA/ps lightning stroke would induce 185 V in the same 
circuit. At the time these measurements were made, most researchers looked for 
induced voltages of the same duration as that of the lightning current and paid 
little attention to other signals, suspected to be "noise," appearing within the 
first microsecond of an induced voltage trace on an oscilloscope. These "noise" 
signals, however, often had higher amplitudes than the more familiar, longer 
duration voltages considered to be authentic. With the advent of better 
instrumentation, these high-frequency voltages became known to be legitimate, 
induced perhaps by  the higher frequency traveling wave currents that may 
appear in the airframe as a result of the mechanism described in Chapter 8, 
Section 8.2. Thus, higher voltages than those reported by Newman and Plumer, 
may in fact be induced in fuel quantity probe circuits, although the literature 
shows no recent measurements of induced voltages in fuel tank electrical circuits 
to establish what the amplitudes of these voltages might actually be. 
If it is not possible to route wiring inside the fuel tank, it may be routed 
outside of a tank as pictured in Figures 6.30 and 6.41; but, if this is done, great 
care must be taken to minimize the amount of magnetic flux that may link these 
wires or their shields. This precaution is particularly pertinent for wings where 
wires are routed within leading and trailing edges, which are often exposed to 
higher magnetic field levels than Asewhere. Fiberglass has replaced aluminum in 
some leading edge skins, and, in some aircraft, control surface openings allow 
magnetic flux to penetrate directly to the aft wing spar, along which electrical 
cables are often routed. 
If fuel system wiring must be routed outside of the tanks, there are several 
methods that can be used to control induced voltages, often to levels far below 
those required to cause a spark at a fuel probe. These involve routing 
improvements, grounding of the shields to the airframe at both ends, and use of 
an overall shield grounded at both ends to enclose a bundle of individually 
shielded wires whose shields are left ungrounded at one end for EM1 purposes. A 
relative comparison of six possible wiring methods is shown in Figure 6.42. It is 
recommended that methods a and b of this figure not be used, and that c and d 
be used only if the (leading or trailing edge) enclosure has an electrically 
conductive skin or coating that can provide some electromagnetic shielding 
against the outside world. Methods e and f are preferable because they will 
provide the lowest induced voltages at the probe. Method f is to be used if the 
individual shields must be left ungrounded at one end for EM1 control purposes. 
The comparisons shown in Figure 6.42 apply also for wiring to  fuel tanks in 
other parts of the aircraft. 
For whatever method is used, assurance should be obtained that the 
expected induced voltages are lower by a factor of 10 to 1 than the probe 
sparkover voltage at altitude. An estimate of the induced voltages to be expected 
in the fuel tank wiring can be obtained by analysis as described in Chapter 12 or 
by lightning transient analysis tests, as described in Chapter 17. 
6.9 Fuel System Checklist 
A considerable amount of information on various aspects of fuel systems 
has been presented in the preceding paragraphs. With reference to these 
paragraphs, the following checklist is provided to summarize key points and to 
focus the designer's attention on the important aspects of fuel system lightning 
protection: 
1. Are the fuel tanks located in Zones 1 and 2, where lightning strokes 
may directly contact their skins? (Chapter 5, Sections 5.2 and 5.3) 
If so, 
a. What is the expected arc dwell time on these skins? (Section 
6.6) 
b. Are the skins thick enough to avoid meltthrough? (Section 
6.6) 
c. Can a lightning arc attach directly to an access door or filler 
cap?; if so, can the lightning current be conducted into the 
surrounding skin without sparking inside the tank? (Section 
6.8) 
2. Are there "dry bay" areas into which fuel may leak from adjoining 
tanks or plumbing? If so, these are also subject to questions la, lb ,  
and 1 c. 
3. Are fuel vent outlets or jettison pipes located in direct strike zones 
(Zones 1 A or 1 B) or swept-stroke zones (Zones 2A or 2B) where the 
arc may attach or sweep close to the vent outlet? (Chapter 5, 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3; Sections 6.4 and 6.5) 
a. If so, is an effective flame arrester or surge tank protection 
(STP) system used?; has its effectiveness been verified by test? 
(Section 6.4) 
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b. Is the response time of the STP system shorter than the 
possible flame propagation time from the STP sensor to the 
extinguisher? (Section 6.4) 
c. Is the STP system protected from false trips resulting from 
lightning-induced voltages in its electrical wiring or light from 
nearby flashes? 
4. If nonmetallic skins are used, is an adequate diverter or conductive 
coating system that will prevent skin puncture or internal streamer- 
ing provided? (Section 6.7) 
5. Is the fuel tank structure capable of mnducting Zone 3 lightning 
currents even if the tank itself is not located in a direct or 
swept-stroke zone? Has this been demonstrated by a test in which 
simulated lightning currents are conducted through a complete tank 
structure? (Section 6.8) 
6. If a simulated lightning test of the complete tank assembly is not 
feasible, have all of its individual joints, seams, access doors, filler 
caps, drains, vents, plumbing, and electrical systems been tested for 
their ability to conduct simulated lightning currents and found to be 
free of sparking? (Sections 6.5 and 6.8) 
7. Are electric circuits entering the fuel tanks protected against high 
induced voltages? (Section 6.8) Have they been routed away from 
other wiring, such as navigation lamp circuits, which may be 
susceptible? 
8. Are clearances between exposed electrical parts and each other or 
between any of them and the airframe sufficient to withstand the 
induced voltages that may occur without sparking? (Section 6.8) 
9. Have the electrical circuits inside nonmetallic tanks been adequately 
shielded so that excessive induced voltages will not occur? (Section 
6.8) 
10. Have applicable government airworthiness certification regulations, 
military standards, or other specifications pertaining to  lightning 
protection been adhered to? (Section 5.4) 
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CHAPTER 7 
STRUCTURES PROTECTION 
7.1 Introduction 
It was not easy, however, to escape from Crete, since Minos 
kept all his ships under military guard, and now offered a large 
reward for his apprehension. But Daedalus made a pair o f  wings for 
himself, and another for Icarus, the quill feathers of which were 
threaded together, but the smaller ones held in place by wax. Having 
tied on Icarus' pair for him, he said with tears in his eyes: "My son, 
be warned! Neither soar too high, lest the sun melt the wax; nor 
sweep too low, lest the feathers be wetted by the sea!" Then he 
slipped his arms into his own pair of wings and they flew off. 
'rFollow me closely," he cried, "do not set your own course." 
As they sped away from the island in a north-easterly 
direction, flapping their wit~gs, the fishermen, shepherds, and 
ploughmen who gazed upward mistook them for gods. 
They had left Naxos, Delos, and Paros behind them on the left 
hand, and were leaving Lebynthos and Colymne behind on the right, 
when Icarus disobeyed his father's instructions and began soaring 
towards the sun, rejoicing in the lift of his great sweeping wings. 
Presently, when Daedalus looked over his shoulder, he could no 
longer see Icarus; but scattered feathers floated on the waves below. 
The heat of  the sun had melted the wax, and Icanrs had fallen into 
the sea and drowned. Daedalus circled around, until the corpse rose 
to the surface, and then carried it to the nearby island now called 
Icaria, where he buried it. Robert Graves, The Greek Myths I 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955): 3 12-1 3. 
The materials of which an aircraft is made and the methods used to hold 
these materials together, forming the aircraft structure, are factors as important 
in protecting a modern aircraft from hazardous natural environments as they 
were for the mythical Icams. Conventional aluminum airframes of riveted 
construction have, by virtue of their excellent electrical conductivity, rarely 
suffered critical damage from lightning strikes; and these structures have 
provided excellent protection for more vulnerable systems, as well as for 
personnel, carried within. But the day of all-metal aircraft is ending. Taking their 
place will be aircraft constructed partly of new, fiber-reinforced plastics with 
desirable light-weight and highstrength properties but with poor electrical 
conductivity. Some of these materials will be fastened together with equally 
nonconductive adhesives, the strength of which may be lost if the adhesives are 
exposed to lightning currents. Whereas the designer of the all-metal structure 
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needed to add little, if anything, to his design to achieve adequate lightning 
protection, the designers of nonmetallic structures must pay particular attention 
to the lightning environment, taking positive measures to protect against its 
adverse effects lest safety o f  flight be endangered. 
In this chapter we first review lightning effects on metal structures and 
discuss how t o  design protection for the few situations where special protection 
is necessary. We then review the expected lightning effects on nonmetallic 
materials such as fiberglass and the advanced composites. 
Concern for the potential hazards has prompted a large number of 
laboratory studies of  lightning effects and protection techniques for these 
materials. We summarize the important results of these studies and discuss those 
protective techniques and devices which appear most promising. Our discussion 
emphasizes the electrical performance, leaving to the structures designer (who 
himself is best equipped t o  answer them) questions of  compatibility with other 
requirements or manufacturing methods. 
7.2 Metallic Structures 
Because of their inherently good electrical conductivity, conventional 
aluminum aircraft structures have rarely suffered serious damage from lightning 
strikes, and few protective measures have had to be added. The metal skins, ribs, 
spars, stringers, and other substructures may themselves be utilized to  provide 
the safe conducting path for lightning currents between possible attachment 
points called for as a basic protection principle in Chapter 5. No special 
conductor dedicated only for lightning currents need be added to conduct 
lightning currents through the aircraft, as long as care is taken in the design of 
basic skins and structures. It would, in fact, be highly impractical, and even 
dangerous, t o  design a separate "lightning conductor" to  be run through a metal 
aircraft. No further mention of  such a conductor will be made. 
Thus, in accord with the principle of providing a safe conductive path for 
lightning currents, metallic skins and substructures should be designed t o  provide 
this conductive path and t o  minimize, or safely tolerate, the following lightning 
effects: 
Melting at  lightning attachment points 
Resistive temperature rise 
Magnetic force effects 
Arcing across bonds, hinges, and joints 
Ignition of vapors within fuel tanks. 
Techniques to  assess these effects and design protection, if needed, are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
7.2.1 Melting at Lightning Attach~iient Points 
The quantity of metal melted away at a lightning attachment point has 
been shown to be most closely related to  the charge carried into the point by the 
lightning flash together with the type of metal and its thickness. Most of the 
charge is delivered by  intermediate and continuing current components of the 
flash, and the amount of  this charge that is necessary to  initiate a hole (i.e., a 
pinhole) in a metal skin has been discussed in Section 6.6 of  Chapter 6. The 
charge required t o  initiate a hole, however, is of little concern except where the 
skin is over a fuel tank. Of concern from a structural integrity point o f  view is 
the eventual quantity of metal that can be melted away. This aspect is of 
primary concern for skins and structures t o  which the arc can hang on  for 
prolonged periods, as it may in Zones 1 B and 2B. 
Plumer (Reference 7.1) has performed laboratory tests to determine the 
area of holes which may be melted through aluminum or titanium skins of 
various thicknesses, by varying amounts of  continuing current delivered at rates 
of between 200 A and 800 A. Figure 7.1 shows the hole areas t o  be expected in 
typical aluminum and titanium skin metals. The volume o f  metal melted away 
may be found by  multiplying the area by  the thickness of  the particular skin 
material. 
900- A10.051 cm (0.020 in) 
800- 
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LIGHTNING FLASH CHARGE (COULOMBS) 
Figure 7.1 Area of holes melted through aluminum and titanium aircraft skins 
by lightning flash charge. 
Normally, holes may be permitted to  occur anywhere on the aircraft as 
long as safety of flight is not impaired. The conditions under which safety of 
flight might be endangered from hole formation follow. 
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When the hole is melted through a fuel tank skin or other enclosure 
of flammable materials 
When the hole is melted through the wall of a pressurized enclosure 
When the hole sufficiently degrades the mechanical strength of a 
flight-critical component to cause failure 
The problem of hole formation in fuel tank skins has been dealt with in 
Chapter 6 .  There have been n o  reports of holes having been melted through the 
walls of a pressurized container, except for the very small (less than 0.1 cm dia) 
holes sometimes found at swept-stroke dwell points along the surface of a 
pressurized fuselage--holes that have been far too small t o  cause depressuriza- 
tion problems. Since trailing edge areas are usually not pressurized, the larger 
holes melted by longer duration currents hanging on to trailing edges have also 
not posed a depressurization problem, although the possibility of this event 
should be considered in any design that involves pressurization of a trailing edge 
section. 
The structural integrity o f  a traiIing edge closeout member or other 
loadcarrying part may be degraded if a significant portion of metal is melted 
away by a lightning arc hanging on for a prolonged period of time. For design 
purposes the worst case should be taken as 200 C, in accordance with the SAE 
report Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques for A erospace Vehicles and 
Hardware (Reference 7.2). Estimates of the amount of metal to be melted away 
by 200 C of charge entering a hang-on point may be made from Figure 7.1 or by 
the use of Equations 6.1 and 6.2 of Section 6.6. 
7.2.2 Mechanical Property Degradation of Structural Metals 
Aside from the burning of holes at attachment points, the flow of 
lightning current will not degrade the mechanical strength properties of metal 
skins and other basic structures unless temperature rises approaching the melting 
temperature occur. Except within a centimeter or two of the points of entry, 
lightning currents will normally spread out sufficiently so as not to produce a 
noticeable temperature rise. 
A case in which an excessive temperature rise may occur is one in which 
lightning current remains in a single conductor, such as a bond strap or pipe. In 
this case, the action integral ( ~ 1 ~ d t )  of the lightning current and the resistance of 
the conductor may both be high enough to allow sufficient energy to be 
deposited in the conductor to raise its temperature appreciably. Since the 
resistance of most metal conductors increases with temperature, an even higher 
amount of energy will be deposited in the conductor as its temperature rises 
during current flow, and this, in turn, will increase the temperature even further. 
If the action integral is high enough, the conductor will be unable to absorb all 
of the energy and will explode. This will happen for currents whose action 
integrals are sufficient to raise the conductor temperature above its melting 
point. 
It is therefore important to be able t o  determine the expected temperature 
rise which lightning may produce in conductors of small cross-sectional area and 
t o  obtain assurance that the melting point will not be reached. The temperature 
rise in a current-carrying conductor is expressed by  the basic equation (units in 
parenthesis): 
JIZ dt (AZ -s) Resistivity ( R c m )  
AT("C) = (7.1) 
Specific heat (g*) ( ) Density Areaz (cm4 ) g-"C cm 
It is evident that temperature rise is directly proportional t o  the square of 
the lightning current and inversely proportional to the square of the cross- 
sectional area of the conductor. As it stands, however, Equation 7.1 has two 
shortcomings: 
1. It assumes n o  energy (heat) loss resulting from radiation during the 
time current is flowing 
2.  It assumes that resistance does not change with temperature. 
Since little energy is lost during the short time duration of lightning 
strokes, the first shortcoming has a negligible effect on the accuracy of the 
predicted temperature rise. Resistance does depend on temperature, however, 
and, since resistance also affects the amount of electrical energy that can be 
deposited in the conductor, it is important t o  account for this dependency. This 
can be done by expressing resistivity as a function of temperature, using the 
following expression: 
where X is the temperature coefficient of resistivity. Incorporating Equation 7.2 
into the expression of Equation 7.1 gives the following equation: 
~ 1 ' d t  (A' -s) Resistivity (R-cm) [ 1 + h ($)AT('C)] 
"TCC) = 
Specific heat (g@) Density (A) ~ r e a '  (cm4) 
g-°C cm3 (7.3) 
Since everything but is a material property constant, this equation is 
most easily solved by combining the conductor dimensions and material 
properties in a constant, k, in the following expression: 
where k is equal t o  the right side of  Equation 7.1. 
Physical and electrical properties needed in Equations 7.5 and 7.6 for 
common structural metals and electrical conductors are provided in Table 7.1. 
The melting points of these materials are also provided. 
Table 7.1 PHYSICAL AND ELECTRICAL PROPERTIES 
OF COMMON METALS 
Stainles I 
Aluminum Copper ntanium Steel (304) Magnesium Silver 
Resistivity, 2.8 x lod 1.72 x lo6 42 x lo4 72 x lod 4.45 x lo6 1.59 x lo6 
(0-cm) 
Temperature 0.00479 0.00393 0.0035 0.001 0.0165 0.0041 
coefficient of 
resistance, h 
(11°C) 
Thermal 0.254 x lo4 0.164 x lo4 0.085 x lo4 0.120 x lo4 0.025 x lo4 0.019 x lo4 
coefficient 
of linear 
expansion 
(]PC) 
Specific heat 0.2 15 0.092 0.124 0.120 0.245 0.056 
(g-~al/~?C) 
Density 2.70 8.89 4.51 7.90 1.74 10.49 
(dcm3) 
Melting point 660 1084 1670 1150 6 50 962 
e c )  
Because of their high amplitudes, the return stroke and restrike currents 
have the highest action integrals and may be expected t o  produce higher 
temperatures than the other components of the lightning flash d o  when they are 
conducted through structural metals o r  other electrical conductors. For design 
purposes, the action integrals associated with current waveform Components A 
andlor D of  the SAE report Lightning Test Wuveforms and Techniques for 
Aerospace Vehicles and Hanlwarc should be used for determining temperature 
rise in conductors, depending on the lightning-strike zone in which the particular 
conductor 1s located. 
It should be remembered that if several parallel conductors are available to  
share the stroke current, the current in each will be divided by the number of 
conductors but that the actiorl integral in each will be reduced by the square of 
the number of conductors. Consider, for example, a case in which a NAV light is 
mounted on a plastic vertical fin cap and grounded t o  the airframe via two bond 
straps, as shown in Figure 7.2. If this case is considered to be located in Zone 
IB, its bond straps must be able t o  conduct the entire flash current. If i t  is 
assumed that the arc will not touch the bond straps, the limiting lightning design 
criterion for these straps is that together they must be able t o  carry safely 
current Components A and D, which have a total of 2.25 x lo6 A ~ - s .  However, 
the one-half of the total current flowing in each strap will produce only 
one-fourth of the total action integral, or about 0.51 x lo6 A ~ - S  in each strap. 
NAVIGATION 
STRUCTURE 
Figure 7.2 Bond straps for NAV light. 
If each strap is made of copper with a cross-sectional area of 0.1 cm2 
(0.015 in2), the temperature rise produced by 0.5 1 x lo6 A ~ - S  in a strap would 
be determined from Equation 7.4, using the physical and electrical properties for 
copper given in Table 7.1. Solving for k first 
This, of course, would be the actual temperature rise if the resistivity remains 
constant. But the resistivity actually increases as temperature increases; 
therefore, Equation 7.5 must be used as follows to calculate the actual rise: 
ATCC) = (25.6 "C) 
A conductor with this cross-sectional area is about the same size as an 
AWG 15 wire. Since a 28 "C temperature rise would not damage the wire, two 
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bonding straps or wires of this cross-sectional area could, theoretically, be 
utilized to conduct current Components A and D. If one of them had worked 
loose, however, all of the current would have to flow through the other one. If 
the same equations are used in this circumstance, the total action integral of 
2.25 x lo6 A ~ - S  would cause a calculated temperature rise of over 200 "C, a 
temperature that should be considered excessive. 
In fact, it is prudent to keep conductor temperature rises below 100 "C in 
order to avoid explosion where flammable materials or vapors may exist and also 
to avoid mechanical stresses resulting from thermal expansion (See Section 
7.2.3). The temperature coefficients of resistivity which are given in Table 7.1 
remain reasonably constant only through the range of -50 "C to +I00 "C; thus, 
calculations that are based on these coefficients and which produce temperatures 
above 100 "C should not be considered accurate. 
Consideration of temperature rise effects in conductors carrying lightning 
currents is most important where all or a large fraction of the stroke currents 
need to be carried in individual conductors. Examples include radome diverter 
straps, bonding straps (or jumpers), conduits or cable shields, ground wires 
passing through plastic radomes or wing tips, and certain hydraulic or control 
lines which may become exposed to lightning-strike currents. 
Figure 7.3 presents calculated temperature rises for conductors of the 
metals of Table 7.1 as a function of cross-sectional area for action integrals of 
0.25, 2.0, 2.25, and 3 x lo6 A ~ - s .  These curves may be used to determine the 
expected temperature rise in structural elements, diverter bars, bond straps, or 
other conductors expected to carry lightning currents. The temperature rises 
determined from Figure 7.3 should be added to the ambient temperature of the 
conductor to determine the actual temperature. - 
If the reader desires to calculate the temperature rise for action integrals 
other than the four of Figure 7.3, he may do so manually by using Equations 7.1 
and 7.5, or he may use the computer program written for the Texas Instruments 
SR-52 programmable calculator included in Appendix 1. The program requires 
the action integral, resistivity, specific heat, density, and cross-sectional area of 
the conductor as inputs from which it calculates temperature rise. The program 
also calculates the elongation that takes place in the metal as a result of the 
temperature rise. 
A separate SR-52 program is provided in Appendix 2 for calculation of 
temperature rise and elongation in tubes and pipes. This program accepts 
dimensions of the outside diameter and wall thickness, thereby saving the user 
the need to calculate manually the cross-sectional area of the pipe wall. 
If several parallel conductors of the same length and cross-sectional area 
are present, the current may be expected to divide equally among them; the 
action integral associated with each portion of the current will be 
JI' dt (each conductor) = $r2 dt (total) d 
where N is the number of parallel conductors. This distribution would suggest 
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that the use of several conductors of small cross section would be advantageous, 
since the total amount of metal required for all of them would still be less than 
that required for one large conductor. This conclusion is sound, but there are 
two factors that should be given careful consideration before any decision to 
utilize several thin conductors instead of one thick one to conduct lightning 
currents is reached: 
1.  As a result of vibration or corrosion stresses, thin conductors may 
break sooner, leaving a situation in which the remaining conduc- 
tor(~) may be greatly overstressed by lightning currents 
2. The magnetic forces which act upon parallel current-carrying 
conductors may cause excessive damage to these conductors. 
On the other hand, magnetic forces may sometimes be reduced sufficiently 
by separating the conductors a sufficient distance from each other (See Section 
7.2.4). 
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7.2.3 Thermal Elongation 
Most metals expand when their temperatures rise. This phenomenon will 
not be a problem for flexible conductors which can deflect when expanded, but 
large stresses may arise in some rigidly held conductors, such as the diverter strap 
or the pitot probe air pressure tube shown in Figure 7.4. By virtue of its location 
at the nose of the aircraft, the pitot probe will be in Zone I A and must therefore 
be designed to conduct return stroke currents of 2 x lo6 A ~ - s .  The purpose of 
the air pressure tube is to transmit pitot-static pressure back to the flight 
instruments, but the tube may also provide a safe path for lightning currents to 
enter the airframe if the tube is designed to safely withstand the resistive 
heating, thermal elongation, and magnetic force effects. 
NOSE RADOME 
-- AIR GROLINnINC: PRESSURE AND/OR TI IRF 
DIVERTER 
Figure 7.4 Examples of rigidly held lightning current conducton. 
Cross-sectional area should be sufficient to prevent excessive 
temperature rise and thermal expansion. 
For example, if the air pressure tube in the radome of Figure 7.4 is made 
of copper and has an outside diameter of 0.476 cm (3116 in) and a wall 
thickness p f  0.124 cm (0.049 in), it will have a cross-sectional area of 0.138 cm2 
(0.021 in2). According to the curves of Figure 7.3(c) an action integral of 7- x lo6 
A ~ - S  will raise the temperature of a conductor of this cross-sectional area 67 OC. 
The amount of thermal expansion to be expected along any dimension of 
a part is dependent on the temperature rise and the thermal coefficient of linear 
expansion of the metal, according to the following relation (dimensions in 
parenthesis): 
A L  = Expansion coefficient (7 -9) 
where L is the length of the dimension of concern. Of course all dimensions of a 
homogeneous material will elongate proportionately, but frequently only one 
dimension is of much concern. The most significant expansion in a part such as 
the pressure tube would be along its length. 
Based on the coefficient of linear expansion for copper given in Table 7.1 
as 0.1 64 x 1 o ' ~  (1  1°C) and the assumption that the tube has a length, L, of 2 m 
when "cold," a 67 "C temperature rise would cause an elongation of 
If the tube is fastened rigidly, this elongation may cause sufficient stress to break 
clamps or force the tube to bend. Thus, the tube supports should be designed to 
accept this elongation without undue stress. 
Thermal elongation calculations may be made for other conductors by 
using Equation 7.9 or the SR-52 programmable calculator programs in 
Appendices 1 and 2. These programs calculate the elongation in millimeters per 
centimeter of conductor length for the basic conductors and in inches per foot 
of conductor length for tubes, since dimensions of tubes are commonly 
presented in inches. 
The temperature rise and elongation expressions described in this and in 
the previous section have been closely confirmed up to 100 "C by laboratory 
tests in which simulated lightning currents of known action integral are passed 
through conductors whose temperature and elongation are measured. Temper- 
ature rise is most easily measured by temperature-sensitive tapes or by an 
optical pyrometer. Elongation can be measured by a mechanical deflection 
indicator attached to the specimen. Calculated results above 100 "c, however, 
will begin to diverge from the actual because of physical property changes at 
higher temperatures. 
7.2.4 Magnetic Force Effects 
As mentioned earlier, there are situations in which several conductors in 
parallel may carry lightning currents and, in such cases, each conductor will be 
acted upon by a magnetic force proportional to the product of the currents in 
each conductor. One such case is shown in Figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5 Magnetic forces among parallel current-carrying conductors. 
Based on Ampere's Law, the force per unit length on wire 2 is 
where pa = permeability of media between conductors 
= 1 0 ' ~  for air 
P I  ,2 = force on conductor 1 or conductor 2 (N/m) 
Q 1  ,2 = unit of length of conductor 1 or conductor 2 (m) 
D = center-to-center distance between conductors (m) 
I1 ,2 = currents in conductor 1 or conductor 2 
These forces act to pull the conductors together when the currents in them 
flow in the same direction and to repel the conductors when the currents are in 
opposite directions. In either case, the magnetic forces are strongest when the 
conductors are close together. One such case would exist, for example, in a 
radome-mounted pitot system in which two air pressure tubes are needed to 
convey both static and dynamic air pressure to the flight instruments. If these 
tubes are mounted 2 cm apart and half of the lightning current is assumed to 
flow in each, the peak force in each conductor, as a result of the currents in 
both, will be 
= 100 000 N/m of tube length 
= 6 854 Ib/ft of length 
This peak force, of course, would exist only at the instant when the lightning 
current is at its peak, with lower forces active when the current is lower. During 
the short duration of the higher amplitude stroke currents, the mass of the 
conductor may prevent its being deflected appreciably because of its relatively 
slow mechanical response time, although it can absorb appreciable kinetic energy 
in that time and continue deflecting afterward. The resulting deflection also 
depends on the degree of restraint provided by supports, but forces of this 
magnitude have been shown to cause tubes in one typical installation to slam 
together, leaving permanent deformations, as shown in Figure 7.6. Deformations 
like those in Figure 7.6 (Reference 7.3) are sufficient to disrupt the transmission 
of pitot pressure to flight instruments. 
Mathematical calculation of expected deformations from impulsive forces 
such as these is difficult, and such calculation is further complicated by 
unknown mechanical factors. James and Phillpott, however, have defined an 
effective transient force, Pt which, if applied slowly but continuously, results in 
the same stress as that produced by the peak magnetic force, Po, calculated by 
Equation 7.1 1. This effective force, Pt, is a function of the angular frequency, 
Figure 7.6 Air pressure tubes deformed by magnetic forces (after carrying a 
120 k A ,  2 x lo6 A ~ - S  stroke). 
w ,  of the meclzanical system being acted upon and of the electric current decay 
time constant, 7. In most practical applications the angular frequency will be 
between about lo3 for heavy, flexible systems and lo4 for light, stiff systems. 
James and Phillpott give relative values of Pt/Po (Table 7.2 [Reference 7.41) for 
each of  these frequencies and three lightning current waveforms. Their 300 kA 
and I kA currents represent a return stroke and continuing current of the same 
magnitude as those represented by Components A and C of Ligl?miizg Test 
Wavefornzs and Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware. However, the 
50 kA intermediate current would deliver much more energy than would the 2 
kA intermediate current, represented by Component B of Lightning Test 
Waveforms and Techniques. A 50 kA current decaying in as long as 2 ms would 
be found only in the severest of positive polarity flashes, which occur very 
seldom. In any event, Table 7.2 shows that the 200 kA stroke current creates a 
much higher effective transient force, P t ,  than does either of the other currents. 
Table 7.2 EFFECTIVE TRANSIENT MAGNETIC FORCE Pt 
An example of how the table is used may be found in the case of the two 
parallel air pressure tubes 2 cm apart, for which a peak force, Po, of 100 000 
N/m of length was calculated. Assuming that these tubes have an angular 
frequency of lo4, Table 7.2 shows that the effective transient force, Pt ,  would 
be 
Pt = 0.45 Po (7.13) 
or 45 000 N/m (3084 Ib/ft) of length. This is the amount of force which should 
be used in performing mechanical response calculations or mechanical strength 
tests. 
James and Phillpott also conclude from Table 7.2 that 
(a) Continuing current pulses do not give rise to a high effective force 
because l2 and therefore the peak magnetic forces are too low. 
1 (b) If 7<- as for relatively heavy flexible systems (a = lo3) the W 
effective force is roughly proportional to ~ ~ t .  Thus the fast and 
intermediate components give about the same effective force 
although the peak forces are very different. 
1 (c) If 7% - as for relatively light stiff systems (a = lo4), the effective W 
force equals twice the peak force and is therefore proportional to I ~ .  
For this doubling of the peak force to occur it is assumed that the 
1 
current rise time is < -. 
1 W (d) If TZ - the effective force is 45% of the peak force for the case of a' 
the fast component with w = I@. This alternative also gives the 
highest effective force because the high value of more than 
compensates for the effects of a small value of 7. (Reference 7.5). 
These authors conclude that "[tlhe effect of magnetic forces on 
currentcarrying components is influenced by a large number of parameters, but 
the contribution from the continuing current is negligible." Concurring with the 
authors of this book, they also conclude that future studies of or tests on 
components likely to be damaged by magnetic forces should be performed with 
simulated lightning currents having values of I and 12t similar to Component A 
of Lightning Test Wavefoms and Techniques. 
Outer portions of the airframe and control surfaces sometimes become 
badly damaged by magnetic force effects. One example is the wing tip trailing 
edge shown in Figures 7.7 and 4.4, in which the upper and lower surfaces of the 
wing were wrinkled, pinched, and pulled forward. The upper and lower surfaces 
of this wing were made respectively of 0.71 mm (0.028 in) and 0.80 mm (0.031 
in) aluminum. Hacker (Reference 7.6) has made a very interesting analysis of the 
magnetic forces acting upon these surfaces and found, as illustrated in Figure 
7.7, that the directions of the calculated forces correIate well with the damage 
pattern. Hacker calculated that a 100 k A  stroke would have created 21 500 N/m 
(1476 Ib/ft) on a 4 cm wide path across the skins. This amounts to 5.4 x lo5 
~ / m ~ ,  or 78 psi, an extremely high compressive pressure for a wing structure 
reportedly designed for a steady state loading of 1.7 x 103 ~ / m ~  (0.25 psi). The 
reader is referred to Hacker's report for a more thorough discussion of the 
procedure followed in making this analysis. 
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Figure 7.7 Approximate geometry of chordwise cross section of wing tip trail- 
ing edge of Figure 4.4. 
The foregoing examples have illustrated the case in which the magnetic 
forces are attractive (when parallel currents flow in the same direction). Cases 
exist, however, where currents in adjacent conductors, or in adjacent legs of the 
same conductor, flow in opposite directions. When this happens, the magnetic 
force acts to separate the conductors, a fact that may create a problem for the 
unwary designer. One such case is the folded protective foil splice shown in 
Figure 7.8. 
Figure 7.8 Reverse current paths through joint. 
A splice of this sort was considered (Reference 7.7) for joining two plastic 
laminates protected with aluminum foils. An aluminum edge wrap was utilized 
to provide electrical conductivity between the foils on the lower and upper 
laminates. This arrangement, however, forced the lightning current to travel in 
opposite directions through the edge wrap, as shown in Figure 7.8. When a 100 
kA simulated lightning current was passed through a sample of this joint, the - 
edge wrap pulled away from the fasteners as shown in Figure 7.9. 
Jacobsen (Reference 7.8) gives the force, P, per unit length of current 
path, d, acting to repel two parallel plates whose separation, X, is small compared 
to width, b, and which carry current, I, in opposite directions as follows: 
where p = 4 n x  I O - ~ H / ~  (7.1 5) 
Assuming the aluminum edge wrap of Figure 7.8 was 0.1 m (4 in) wide, 
the peak force for the 100 kA test current would have been 
For a length of current path, d: of 0.013 m (0.5 in) through the edge wrap 
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This force was evidently adequate to blow off the upper surface of the edge 
wrap. 
Figure 7.9 Aluminum edge wrap torn away from fasteners by magnetic force. 
Another, more common, example of the forces created by currents 
flowing in opposite directions is the bent bond strap shown in Figure 7,10(a). 
Even if the strap has a cross-sectional area sufficient to conduct the current, it 
will frequently break, as shown in Figure 7.10(a), if it forms a bend of more 
than about 45". Such straps should be installed, whenever possible, in a straight 
line, as is the strap in Figure 7.10(b). 
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Figure 7.10 Magnetic force on a bent bond strap. 
Another reason for keeping the bond strap straight--and as short as 
possible--is that the inductive voltage rise occasioned by lightning currents 
flowing in a longer strap may be sufficient to spark over a direct, shorter path 
across the air gap. Some other do's and don'ts regarding the design of bond 
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straps intended to carry lightning currents are presented in Figure 7.1 1. The 
basic rules to follow are these: 
Use conductors with sufficient cross-sectional area to conduct 
intended lightning current action integral 
Keep bond straps as short and close to the air gap length as possible 
Avoid bends of more than 45", or other features that result in 
reversal of current directions 
Avoid all sharp turns 
If two or more parallel straps are used, separate them sufficiently 
(usually 30 cm or more) to minimize magnetic force effects. 
Of course, the above rules should also be followed not only for bond straps but 
for any other structural element that must carry lightning currents. 
Because of weight limitations, the strength and rigidity of some metallic 
components, such as wing tips, flaps, and ailerons, may not be sufficient to resist 
deformation as a result of the magnetic forces from lightning currents 
concentrated in these extremities. Such deformations will not normally impair 
safety of flight, but they may require repairs or replacement. Normally, only 
severe lightning currents cause this deformation; therefore, increased reinforce- 
ment of the extremity, if it were deemed economical, could minimize or prevent 
deformation in many cases. 
Since determination of magnetic force effects by mathematical analysis for 
all but the most elemental geometries is very difficult, laboratory tests may 
prove the most straightforward and economical way to determine whether or 
not magnetic force effects are likely to cause deformation of prospective 
structures. For such tests, simulated lightning strokes in accordance with the 
SAE criteria of Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques (Reference 7.9)  
should be passed through the component being evaluated. 
7.2.5 Arcing across Bonds, Hinges, and Joints 
Basically, the riveted skins and substructures found in conventional 
aluminum aircraft are adequate to safely conduct lightning currents through the 
aircraft, and, aside from the special considerations relating to fuel tank areas 
discussed in Chapter 6, no provisions need be made to improve this conductivity 
for lightning protection purposes. Even with the profusion of electrically 
insulating primers and wet sealers now used to coat joined surfaces, the great 
number of rivets or fasteners needed to meet mechanical strength requirements 
provides the necessary electrical path between mating surfaces. This generaliza- 
tion has proved to be reliable even when the fasteners and holes themselves have 
been coated with primers or wet sealants. 
If hinges or bearings are located where lightning currents may pass through 
them (such as on control surfaces in Zone 1B or 2B), they should be able to 
safely withstand these currents with no impairment of their function. Otherwise 
suitable means should be provided to divert much of the lightning current 
around them. In a few cases, passage of lightning currents through some hinges 
or bearings may roughen or  even weld the mating surfaces together, occasionally 
impairing further movement. 
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Figure 7.11 Design of bonding straps, or jumpers. 
Damage such as this occurs only when a hinge or bearing has a single point 
of contact through which most of the lightning current must pass. In such cases 
the point(s) of hinge contact may be damaged. Hinges with multiple points of 
mechanical contact are usually able to safely withstand lightning currents with 
only minor pitting or erosion. For example, a piano-type hinge such as that 
shown in Figure 7.12 may be considered as self-bonded provided the dc 
resistance across the hinge is less than 0.01 R (Reference 7.10). In hinges where 
excessive damage occurs, additional conductivity should be provided to carry a 
major portion of the lightning current across the hinge to relieve it from 
excessive lightning current flow. Flexible bonding jumpers of the type shown in 
Figure 7.1 1 have often been installed across hinges for this purpose. In most 
cases, however, these jumpers have provided little or no increase in conductivity 
for lightning currents. The reason is that they almost always offer a longer and 
more inductive path than do  the paths directly through the hinges, even though 
the resistances of the latter are high. Because of their fast rates of change, 
lightning current paths are governed much more by inductance than by 
resistance. Stahmann (Reference 7.1 1) has demonstrated that bonding jumpers, 
in fact, make little or no difference in the amount of superficial pitting that 
occurs on typical piano-type control suifaces or door hinges, such as those 
shown in Figure 7.12. Stahmann found the same to be true of ball joints and 
other hinges utilized on control surfaces or landing gear doors, even when the dc 
resistance through the hinge was as high as several ohms. No binding or other 
adverse consequences were found to occur from the small amount of pitting that 
did occur in Stahmann's tests of piano-type hinges and ball joints. 
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Figure 7.12 Piano-type hinge. 
Often capable of conducting lightning stroke currents without 
need for bonding jumpers. 
To be sure of the ability of a particular hinge design to safely conduct 
lightning currents, a test similar to Stahmann's, in which simulated lightning 
currents were conducted through a prototype hinge, should be performed. The 
test waveforms and current described in Lighbzirzg Test Waveforms and 
Techniques for the zone in whlch the hinge is located should be used. If 
excessive pitting, binding, or welding of the hinge is found to  occur, additional 
conductivity may be necessary. The most satisfactory way of providing this 
additional conductivity may be to provide additional areas of contact in the 
hinge itself, or else to provide additional hinges. 
Bond straps across hinges are sometimes required to prevent the 
electromagnetic interference that arises from precipitation static charges being 
conducted through hinges with loose or resistive contact. The low currents 
involved are sometimes unable to follow uninterrupted paths through hinges, 
with the result that minute sparking occurs. Bond straps are usually able to 
provide enough conductivity to reduce this sparking. If bond straps are applied 
for this purpose, the guidelines of Figure 7.1 1 should be followed. 
7.3 Nonmetallic Structures 
With the use of nonmetallic materials in aircraft structural and fuel system 
components, the question of lightning vulnerability becomes important. An 
all-metallic airframe is in many ways quite compatible with basic lightning 
protection requirements; often only minor design modifications have been 
needed to provide adequate lightning protection. Nonmetallic structural com- 
ponents, however, may be considerably more vulnerable to lightning from lack 
of electrical conductivity. Thus, protective measures must usually be applied. If 
this is not done, hazardous consequences, such as those illustrated in the 
example described in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4, may result. 
There are three basic types of nonmetallic materials found in aircraft. 
These are fiberglass-reinforced plastics (commonly called "fiberglass"), boron- or 
graphite-reinforced plastics (commonly called "advanced composites" or simply 
"composites"), and polycarbonate resins such as Lexan' and Plexiglas2 . The 
latter materials are used for windshields or canopies. Fiberglass is used most 
commonly to achieve light weight in wing tips, fin caps, access doors, and in 
other applications where high mechanical strength is not required. The advanced 
composites, on the other hand, are capable of sustaining very high tensile and 
shear loads; for this reason they are being considered for primary structural 
applications. 
Since the electrical conductivity and high-voltage withstand capability of 
each of these types of nonmetallic materials vary widely from those of the 
others, in the following paragraphs we shall discuss the important lightning 
effects problems and design of protective measures for structures made of each 
basic material. 
7.3.1 Fiberglass Structures 
Fiberglass-reinforced plastics have essentially no electrical conductivity. 
Moreover, they are usually incapable of withstanding the high-voltage stresses 
created by the approaching lightning leader and frequently will undergo 
dielectric breakdown, allowing the flash to puncture them and terminate on 
some conducting object inside. The ensuing return stroke current can blast a 
' Trademark of the General Electric Company 
2~rademark of the Rohm and Haas Company 
large hole in fiberglass skins such as the skin of the nose radome shown in Figure 
4.1 1.  Each of the component materials, glass and resin, has relatively good 
voltage withstand capability; however, the many interfaces which exist between 
the glass fibers and the plastic resin when the two are put together create voids 
and seams which will withstand much less voltage stress before ionization and 
charge mobility (breakdown) begin. Thus, an external conductor, or diverter, 
must usually be placed on the outside surface of a fiberglass skin to provide a 
place to which lightning flashes can attach. The need for such a diverter and the 
guidelines for its proper design and location can best be understood by reviewing 
the lightning attachment mechanism itself. 
7.3 . l .  1 Lightning Attachment to Fiberglass Materials 
In Chapter 1 ,  Section 1.2.4, we described the basic lightning breakdown 
process, and in Chapter 2, Section 2.2, we considered how this process causes 
attachment to an aircraft in flight. As noted there, when the intense electric field 
created by the oncoming leader reaches the ionization potential of air in the 
neighborhood of extremities and sharp edges on the aircraft, ionization occurs 
and streamers propagate outward from the aircraft in the direction of the 
oncoming leader. Since fiberglass has no electrical conductivity, the electric field 
passes directly through it, which phenomenon can cause streamers to originate 
from objects inside as well as outside of the fiberglass structure. What happens 
may be viewed as a race between streamers propagating from conducting objects 
inside and outside of the fiberglass structure, as shown in Figure 7.13. 
FIBERGLASS 
LEADER 
Figure 7.13 Streamers induced by approaching leader. 
Streamers occur from objects inside and outside the fiberglass 
structure. 
Examples are wing tips, external fuel tanks, and radomes. 
Both the voltage withstand capability of the fiberglass and the distances 
along alternate breakdown paths are important in establishing whether puncture 
or external flashover will occur. Usually, of course, a higher intensity electric 
field is necessary to permit the internal streamer to puncture the fiberglass wall 
and contact the leader than would be necessary merely to draw the external 
streamer through the air to the leader. As the leader approaches, the field 
intensity increases until one of the streamers reaches and joins the Ieader. The 
electric field about this extremity of  the aircraft then collapses (breaks down), 
and the leader proceeds from another extremity of the aircraft (as described in 
Chapter 2). 
Figure 7.14 (Reference 7.1 2) shows the results of two simulated lightning 
attachment tests on a typical fighter aircraft nose radome performed in 
accordance with SAE Report Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques for 
Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware. The approaching leader is represented by the 
striped electrode, t o  which a high voltage was applied by a Marx-type generator. 
When the field between the probe and the radome became high enough, 
streamers began from conducting points both inside and outside the radome and 
also from the high-voltage electrode. In Figure 7.14(a) the streamer drawn from 
the external conducting base reached the leader first; thus the base became the 
attachment point. In 7.1 q b ) ,  however, an internal streamer, emanating perhaps 
from the radar antenna, punctured the fiberglass wall and reached the leader 
before the external streamer from the conducting base. The antenna, therefore, 
became the attachment point. 
Figure 7.14 Simulated lightning attachment point tests of a nose radome. 
(a) Outside streamer intercepts leader. 
(b) Internal streamer punctures fiberglass wall and intercepts 
leader. 
Since these photographs were taken outdoors in daylight, only those 
streamers that reached the leader and were brightened by the generator discharge 
current are visible. Figure 7.15 (Reference 7.13) shows similar lightning 
attachment tests performed o n  a fiberglass section of an external fuel tank. The 
tests were made in a darkened area indoors; thus in Figure 7.15(a), in addition to 
the main discharge, streamers emanating from alternate points can be seen. 
Streamers also occurred at the same time from objects inside of  the tank, and 
one of these succeeded in puncturing the tank wall, as is evident from Figure 
7.15(b). Here, both an external and air internal streamer reached the leader, 
causing some of  the generator discharge current t o  follow the internal streamer, 
as evidenced by the reduced brightness of  the external flashover. Since the tank 
had no external diverters, the result illustrates the poor insulating capability of 
fiberglass alone. 
Figure 7.15 Simulated lightning attachment tests of fiberglass fuel tank section. 
(a) External flashover 
(b) Simultaneous external and internal flashovers 
If the test voltage applied between the electrode and the tank were t o  rise 
at a slower rate, the electric field might not become intense enough to puncture 
the fiberglass wall before a streamer coming from an external point reached the 
leader and collapsed the field. Thus, the rate o f  voltage rise (dV/dt) is also 
important in determining whether puncture o r  external surface flashover will 
occur. 
This important factor can be further explained by comparing the 
breakdown timelag characteristics of solids and air. All insulating materials, 
whether solids or gases, respond to high voltages and break down according t o  a 
timelag curve of the shape shown in Figure 7.16. Timelag effect means simply 
this: the shorter the time for which a voltage is applied across a given insulation, 
the higher that voltage must be to cause breakdown; and conversely, the longer 
the time, the lower the voltage necessary to cause breakdown. There is, of 
course, a voltage level below which breakdown will not occur at all, even if the 
voltage is applied for a long time. Most solids show a flatter timelag 
characteristic than do air or surface flashover paths, as shown in Figure 7.16. 
Time TO BREAKDOWN 
Figure 7.16 Breakdown timelag curves for solids and air. 
In general, for fiberglass components, such as the radome of Figure 7.14 
and the fuel tank section of Figure 7.15, an oncoming lightning flash has 
alternate paths to a metallic conductor. One is via a puncture of the nonmetallic 
skin to an internal metallic component, such as the radar dish. The other is via 
surface flashover to the nearest exposed metal. While the path via the puncture 
may be much shorter than that along the outside surface, the added insulation 
provided by the solid skin often compensates to some degree for this, making 
both paths viable alternatives. The significance of voltage rate of rise now 
becomes evident. Because the timelag curve for the alternate paths cross each 
other, there are voltage waveforms that will intersect either timelag curve, as 
shown in Figure 7.17, where both a "fast" and a "slow" voltage waveform are 
superimposed on the breakdown timelag curves of Figure 7.16. 
From Figure 7.17 it is evident that the faster rising test voltage is the more 
severe in terms of increased probability of puncture. Thus, for attachment tests, 
such as those of Figures 7.14 and 7.15, a test voltage with the fastest rate of rise 
expected from a natural lightning leader is desirable. 
No time-domain measurements have as yet been made of the electric fields 
surrounding an aircraft during the lightning-strike formation process because 
such measurements present formidable instrumentation problems. However, in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3, we state that the leader advances at about I to 2 x I o5 
m/s, which would result in an average of 5 to 10 ys for the leader to travel a 
distance of 1 m. Since about 500 kV are required to break down a 1 m air gap in 
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5 ps, an appropriate rate of voltage rise to use for attachment tests might be the 
following: 
APPLIED VOLTAGE WAVEFORMS 
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Figure 7.1 7 Fast and slow applied voltage waveforms superimposed on break- 
down timelag curves for solid and air breakdown paths. 
Higher voltage rate of rise intersects solid curve and puncture 
occurs. 
Lower voltage rate of rise intersects air curve and surface flash- 
over occurs. 
On the other hand, if it is remembered that the actual breakdown of a single step 
of the leader is itself a series of smaller step breakdowns and pauses, it is likely 
that the rate of voltage rise across segments only a few meters long might be 
faster (or slower) than the average. Thus, to encompass the worst case, a rate of 
voltage rise 10 times as fast, or 1000 k V / p ,  has been prescribed in SAE Report 
Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques for attachment tests of aircraft 
components. 
In practice, the timelag curves representing different paths through solid 
and air insulation are flatter and closer together than those drawn in Figures 
7.1 6 and 7.17, and the point where the solid and air curves cross is less clearly 
defined. Thus, a relatively wide difference in applied voltage rate of rise exists 
between waveshapes causing breakdowns 100% of the time along one path as 
compared with waveforms causing all breakdowns to occur through the other 
path. This fact is additional support for the selection of 1000 kVlps as the rate 
of rise for qualification test purposes. This waveform should create a faster 
(but not excessively fast) rising electric field than most natural lightning flashes 
create. In cases where a comparison between the results of laboratory tests using 
this rate of rise and subsequent in-flight lightning attachments to the same 
fiberglass component has been made, the laboratory tests have accurately 
predicted the in-flight attachment points and breakdown paths. 
Figure 7.18 shows the high voltage applied between the test electrode and 
the fuel tank of Figure 7.15. Tn this test the electrode was at negative polarity 
with respect to the tank; thus the waveform has a negative deflection. Both 
polarities, of course, should be applied in the course of any complete test 
program. The rate of rise of this test voltage was 1000 kV/ps; it had reached 
1000 kV when complete flashover of the 1 m air gap and fiberglass tank 
occurred. 
250 kV/div. 0.5 ps/div. 
Figrtre 7.18 Typical high-voltage test waveform for attachment tests. 
d V 
- = 1000 kV/ps 
dt 
Flashover on rise at 1000 kV 
The 1000 kV reached by this test voltage (Figure 7.18) was of course 
applied across the total breakdown path between the high-voltage electrode and 
the metallic parts of the tank, shown in Figure 7.1 5. That amount of this voltage 
which must develop across the fiberglass wall for puncture to occur can be 
determined by applying test voltage directly across the wall. Figure 7.19 shows 
such a test of the wall of the fuel tank of Figure 7.1 5, using only 2.54 cm (1  in) 
of air gap between the electrodes and the wall. Each test voltage was allowed to 
reach its peak and to decay through the test circuit if breakdown did not occur, 
and the tests were repeated with successively higher peak voltages until 
breakdown occurred. 
In the tests of Figure 7.19(a), peak impulse voltages of up to 125 kV were 
withstood by the wall, but partial breakdown occurred when a peak of 152 kV 
was applied. Complete breakdown occurred at 173 kV. From this test it might 
be concluded that the path involving puncture of the tank wall would require 
173 kV more voltage than would the path along the outside of the tank, and 
that if the external and internal paths were otherwise the same, the external path 
would always be fully ionized before the wall was punctured. In practice, 
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however, the weaker segments of a path such as this through different dielectric 
media break down first and allow the total voltage to become concentrated 
across the remaining, stronger, segments. Thus, in such situations, where both 
the internal and external surface flashover paths are long compared with the wall 
thickness, the presence of the wall makes little difference: punctures occur 
randomly together with external flashovers. 
FIBERGLASS WALL 
(FILAMENT-WOUND) 
(a) SWEEP: 0.5ps/div. 
VERTICAL DEFLECTION 90 kV/div. 
Figure 7. I9 Impulse voltage test of typical fiberglass wall. 
(a) Withstands at  110 kV and 125 kV 
(b) Partial breakdown at 141 kV and 157 kV; complete puncture 
at 173kV 
An important point to remember is that the voltage withstand capability 
of a path through or along several different insulating materials, including air, is 
less than the sum of the separate segment withstand voltages. Thus, the 
breakdown voltage of a complex structure cannot be determined reliably by 
testing its components individually and adding up the individual withstand 
voltages. Laboratory tests of the complete structure, such as those of Figures 
7.14 and 7.15, offer the best method of determining breakdown voltages and, as 
a result, the need for protection. 
7.3.1.2 Protection for Fiberglass Components 
The fiberglass punctures of Figures 7.14 and 7.15 indicate a need for 
external conductors that will inhibit internal streamer formation and provide 
external points from which streamers can originate. Such external conductors, 
called diverters, also shorten the surface flashover paths. If properly placed, 
diverters make puncture of a fiberglass skin unlikely. The following guidelines 
and tests should be followed to orient and space diverters properly on a 
fiberglass structure : 
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1 .  Orient the diverters as nearly as possible in the line of flight so that 
flashes which originally strike the diverter can reattach farther aft on 
the same diverter as the aircraft moves forward. 
2. While the fore-aft arrangement recommended in Guideline 1 is 
desirable for reattachment purposes, an adequate path must also be 
provided for Iightning current to be conducted into the airframe. 
This requirement usually calls for some of the diverters to be 
oriented perpendicularly to the line of flight. Examples of preferred 
arrangements incorporating both of these guidelines are shown in 
Figure 7.20. 
3. The surface flashover voltage from any point over the external 
surface to the nearest diverter strap must be less than the maximum 
voltage required to puncture the skin and attach to a conducting 
object beneath. Thus, the diverter must be within a maximum 
displacement distarzce from a point on the skin directly opposite the 
enclosed conductor. This relationship is defined as follows: 
Maximum Skin puncture voltage (kV) displacement < (7.19) 
distance (cm) Surface flashover voltage (kV/cm) 
This criterion should be met for lightning voltage stresses of either 
polarity applied at up to 1000 kV/ps rate of rise. 
4. The maximum voltage drop from the original attachment point to 
any other point on a lightning arc swept aft directly above a 
nonconducting surface must not exceed the skin puncture voltage 
from that point through the skin to any conducting objects inside. 
The maximum arc voltage drop will occur during a restrike 
formation in a multiple-stroke flash and can be assumed to be equal 
to or less than the free air breakdown voltage, or about 500 kV/m of 
arc length. Since this voltage will be applied from a point directly 
above the surface, instead of from an approaching leader, this 
swept-stroke environment may be more severe than one produced by 
an initial strike. 
5. The inductive voltage rise, VL, along any diverter segment carrying 
lightning-stroke currents to conducting structure must be less than 
the skin puncture voltage between the diverter and the nearest 
conducting object inside the structure. The inductive voltage rise, 
VL, may be expressed as follows: 
where L = diverter segment inductance (henries) 
IL = lightning current (amperes) 
t = time (seconds) 
In practice, L may be assumed to be 1 pH/m for most diverter 
straps or foils, and d I l j d t  may be  assumed t o  be 100 0 0 0  Alps (I  x 
l o 1  A/s). 
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Figure 7.20 Arrangement of diverter straps on nonmetallic structural com- 
ponen ts. 
The intent of Guideline 3 is to  assure that sufficient diverters are utilized 
to  prevent punctures resulting from initial strikes. Guideline 4 extends this 
criterion for swept strokes, and Guideline 5 is aimed a t  preventing punctures 
resulting from inductive voltages that arise when lightning currents flow through 
the diverter. This means that a diverter strap can, in fact,  be too close t o  the 
internal conductor it is supposed to protect. If the maximum inductive voltage 
along the diverter is greater than the skin-puncture voltage, the diverter will have 
to  be moved a minimum displacement distance away from a point on the skin 
directly above the enclosed conductor. This distance may be written quantita- 
tively in the following way:  
If 
(Diverter inductive voltage) <(Skin puncture voltage), (7.21) 
then 
Minimum Diverter inductive voltage (kV) - Skin puncture voltage (kV) displacement = 
distance (cm) Surface flashover voltage (kV/cm) (7.22) 
This distance may also be expressed in terms of the diverter inductance and 
lightning current rate of rise as follows: 
LGH) dIL/dt (kA/ps) - Skin puncture voltage (kV) 
displacement = 
distance (cm) Surface flashover voltage (kV/cm) (7.23) 
If a minimum displacement distance applies, then the diverter, to be 
effective, must be positioned somewhere between the minimum and the 
maximum displacement distances from a point directly above the enclosed 
conductor. 
Clearly, the skin-puncture voltages of nonmetallic skins must be known 
before protective diverter systems can be designed. The skin-puncture voltage for 
a particular nonmetallic skin construction is obtainable by impulse voltage 
breakdown tests, and is a function of the material type and thickness, as well as 
of layup patterns, core fillers, surface treatments, etc. Examples of skin puncture 
voltages determined from 1000 kV/ps impulse tests are given in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3 TMPULSE BREAKDOWN VOLTAGES OF TYPICAL 
FIBERGLASS SKIN MATERIALS 
Skin Construction 
Total Breakdown 
Thickness Voltage 
One fiberglass sheet 0.163 cm 
(0.064 in) 2 1 kV 
Two filament-wound fiberglass tape skins 1.27 cm 
enclosing polyimide foam filler (0.500 in) 150 kV 
Two fiberglass skins enclosing foam filler 0.99 cm 
(0.388 in) 70  kV 
Surfrlce flashover voltage levels depend most significantly on the type of 
surface finish applied. Most rainerosive paint surfaces will flash over at an 
average stress of around 10 kV/cm of surface. For example, if a diverter to 
prevent punctures to the grounding tube located directly beneath the fiberglass 
skin of the radome of Figure 7.4 was desired, and if this skin was found to have 
a puncture voltage of 50  kV and surface flashover voltage of 10  kVlcm, then, by 
Equation 7.19, the maximum displacement distance would necessarily be as 
folIows: 
Maximum 
displacement = 150kV = 15 cm (7.24) 
distance (cm) l o  kV/cm 
If this diverter has an inductance of 1.0 pH, then the minimum 
displacement distance, by Equation 7.23, is as follows: 
Minimum 
displacement = ( 1 f l )  ( luu  BA/, 
distance (cm) l o  kV/ 
Thus, it can be concluded that the diverter strap should be placed between 5.0 
and 15 cm away from a point directly over the protected conductor. 
The above analysis assumes that the internal conducting objects are at the 
same potential as the conducting structure to which the diverter is bonded. This 
assumption is valid because no lightning current flows through the internal 
conducting objects, and thus there are no potential differences between them 
and a common conducting structure. 
The protection of a nonmetallic structure is most important when the 
structure contains an integral fuel tank. If this combination is located in Zone 1 
or Zone 2, a protective diverter system to  prevent punctures and the ignition of 
fuel should be applied. Of course the number or size of diverters that may be 
required can be minimized by making as many as possible of the internal fuel 
tank components of nonconductive materials. By so doing, some objects within 
the tank which could otherwise be the source of streamers and eventual 
attachment points will be eliminated. Any conducting parts that must remain 
inside should then be positioned as far away from the outside skins as possible, 
and they should be devoid of sharp edges, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.7. 
Plumer (Reference 7.1 4) discusses a particularly challenging situation: an 
entire wing, including an integral fuel tank, is made of fiberglass; moreover, a 
metal capacitance probe, vent pipe, end panels, and filler cap are present. The 
tank is shown in Figure 7.21. The vent line and end plates of this tank could be 
made of nonconducting materials. The capacitance-type fuel quantity probe, on 
the other hand, must of necessity be made of conducting material, and the probe 
should be positioned as far as possible from the top and bottom skins. 
Figure 7.21 also shows the protective diverters that were designed for the 
bottom and top skins of this tank. Diverters will usually be required if there is 
any conducting object within the tank--and sometimes even if there are no 
conducting objects inside. If the puncture and surface flashover characteristics of 
the enclosing skin materials are known, the diverter arrangement can be designed 
using Equations 7.19 to 7.23. Frequently, however, when newer materials are 
used, puncture and surface flashover information is not available. In this case, a 
section of the proposed skin material can be given a high-voltage test to 
determine the required diverter spacings, as illustrated in Figure 7.22. The skin 
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material to be tested should have the same surface treatments and thickness as 
those proposed for the tank. Conducting objects simulating those in the actual 
tank shouId be positioned appropriately beneath the tank skin and together 
serve as one of the test electrodes. The other electrode should be a rod of at least 
1 cm diameter, positioned about 1 cm above the skin, as shown in Figure 7.22. 
Test voltage at up to 1000 kV/ps rate of rise should be applied between these 
electrodes. 
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Figure 7.21 Protective measures for integral fuel tank within all-fiberglass wing. 
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Figure 7.22 Test setup for experimental determination of maximum diverter 
displacement distance, S. 
Proper testing is begun with the diverter strap directly beneath the test 
electrode. Since all discharges in this position will terminate on the diverter, the 
diverter can subsequently be moved from a point directly beneath the electrode 
to a spot where S equals 1 em, for example. When the test is repeated, arcs will 
flash down to the nonmetallic surface and along it to the diverter. The test 
should be repeated with the diverter moved another centimeter away, and so on, 
until a puncture occurs and the arc terminates on the conducting object beneath 
the skin instead of on the diverter. When this point has been reached, the 
diverter is no  longer effective, and the largest spacing, S, at which no punctures 
occurred defines the maximum displacement distance. If more than one diverter 
is to be used, the diverters should be arranged so that the conducting object is 
between them. In this case their maximum separation must not exceed 2S, as 
shown in Figure 7.23. 
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Figure 7.23 Arrangement of multiple diverter straps for maximum separation. 
One such test was run by Plumer on a section of the wing tank shown in 
Figure 7.21, with the aluminum vent line imbedded in the upper tank wall and 
the capacitance probe along its side wall, as recorded in his report. The diverter 
was found to be effective within a spacing, S, of 6.7 cm; but a spacing of 9.2 cm 
caused the arc to puncture the skin and terminate on the'vent line beneath. 
Thus, allowing for a margin of safety, the diverter should be no more than 5 cm 
away from a line directly above the vent tube. 
From the same test performed for the capacitance probe, it was found that 
the diverters could be over 15 cm away before puncture occurred. The reason 
for this difference is that the capacitance probe was farther away from the upper 
skin; hence more voltage was required to puncture the skin and allow 
termination on the probe. Since the probe was angled, however, and did come 
closer to the tank surface farther outboard, it can be concluded that the 5 cm 
criterion determined for protection of the vent tube should also be applied for 
the capacitance probe. Since in this tank the capacitance probe and vent tubes 
are about 25 cm apart, two diverter straps (or perhaps a single strap 15 cm wide) 
would be required to provide adequate protection. Straps would be required on 
both the top and bottom of the tank for prevention of punctures to the 
capacitance probe, but only on the top surface to prevent punctures to the vent 
tube, since the vent tube is located just beneath the top surface. Fabrication of 
the vent tube from nonconducting material would therefore eliminate the need 
for a strap as wide as 15 cm. 
Each diverter strap utilized should adhere to the outer skin surface and 
should be electrically bonded to the wing tip doubler or diverter assembly at the 
outboard end and to those metallic structural components at the inboard end 
which are capable of conducting lightning current o n  through the airframe. 
Protection against the lightning effects on  fuel systems discussed in 
Chapter 6 should also be accomplished. 
A variety of conductors for diverter applications may be considered. 
Selection of the one to  use depends on  such factors as weight, obstruction of the 
airstream, single- o r  multiple-strike capability, radar antenna pattern inter- 
ference, and cost. Brief descriptions of typical diverters follow. 
External Diverter Strap 
The external diverter strap, a simple metal bar, as shown in Figure 7.24, is 
mounted on an external surface. This type of diverter is designed to receive more 
than one stroke without sustaining significant damage and is intended, therefore, 
for permanent applications. External diverter straps are commonly used to 
protect radomes and wing tips, which receive frequent strikes. The straps are 
usually made of  aluminum, with a rectangular cross section of at least 0.1 crn2 
(20 0 0 0  circular mils) t o  permit conduction of 200  kA, 2 x lo6  A ~ - S  stroke 
currents without excessive temperature rise or elongation. In order t o  remain 
intact by minimizing melting, most straps now in use have areas larger than 0.1 
crn2. Thicknesses of  up to 0.64 cnl (0.25 in) and widths of up  t o  1.27 cm (0.5 
in) have been used. A common design is 0.32 cm (0.125 in) thick by 0.95 cm 
(0.375 in) wide. 
Figure 7.24 External diverter strap. 
The straps are usually attached t o  the wall with steel screws or bolts; the 
larger dimensions allow holes and countersinks to be made in the strap without 
reducing to less than 0.1 cm2 the strap cross section. In nose radomes, the 
threaded portions o f  the screws are often surrounded by plastic inserts to 
prevent sparking from the screws to the radar antenna during lightning 
encounters. 
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Since the metal straps are installed on the outside surface, there may be a 
small drag penalty. This drag can be minimized by orienting the straps parallel to 
the airstream or by shaping the cross section of the straps aerodynamically. 
Internal Strap with Protruding Studs 
Mounting of external straps flush within the nonmetallic wall not only 
creates tooling and manufacturing problems but also degrades the strength of the 
wall because of stress concentrations along the grooves required for flush 
mounting. Therefore, metal straps or tubes have sometimes been mounted on 
the inside surface structure, with metal studs protruding through the wall to 
serve as lightning attachment points, as shown in Figure 7.25. 
/ '/ 
BENEATH SURFACE 
Figure 7.25 Internal strap with protruding studs, 
Although this type of diverter installation may reduce the aerodynamic 
drag created by external mounting, it fails to take advantage of the insulation 
capability of the nonmetallic wan, and, in fact, may even intensify the electric 
field stress through the wall, promoting punctures if the protruding studs are too 
far apart. In general, the thicker the wall, the farther apart may be the studs. In 
many cases, 30 cm (1 ft) is close enough, but individual cases should be 
evaluated by high-voltage tests similar to that of Figure 7.22, or by tests of the 
complete structure similar to those of Figures 7.1 4 and 7.1 5. Appropriate test 
conditions for the latter are described in Lightning Test Wavefornzs for 
Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware. The possibility of puncture to an internal 
strap or tube can be minimized if the portion of it between the protruding studs 
is covered with an insulating sleeve. 
When lightning currents travel through any internal conductor, of course, 
there is also the possibility of the inductive voltage rise causing sparking to 
nearby conductors which are not carrying current. Covering of the lightning 
conductor with an insulating sleeve in the vicinity of nearby conductors will 
reduce the possibility; the internal strap or tube can be used without such a 
sleeve if the spacing between the strap and adjacent conductors is great enough 
to prevent sparking. For purposes of estimating what this spacing should be, 
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assume that the diverter strap has an inductance, L, of 1.0 pH/m of length. 
Assume a maximum lightning current rate of rise of 100 kA/ps, and determine 
the air-gap impulse sparkover voltage from Figure 6.39 or from impulse voltage 
tests of the particular configuration. Then make sure that the inductive voltage 
rise 
is less than the gap sparkover voltage. It is prudent to add a safety margin of 50% 
or more to the calculated inductive voltage when making this comparison. 
Thin Foil Strips 
Thin foil strips, usually made of aluminum 0.008 to 0.040 cm (0.003 to 
0.015 in) thick, are capable of conducting moderate strokes or of melting and 
vaporizing on severe strokes. In the latter case they leave an ionized channel 
through which subsequent currents in the flash may travel. Because they are 
thin, foil strips have good aerodynamic characteristics, but they usually provide 
protection against only one severe flash. The thin foil strips are generally used 
when aerodynamic drag requirements prevent thicker straps from being installed 
on external surfaces. A typical strip is shown in Figure 7.26. 
Figure 7.26 Thin foil strip. 
The skin of the structure must be thick enough to withstand safely the 
blast pressure that occurs if the strip vaporizes. Thick foil strips may also be 
used; however, they release more energy during vaporization than the thinner 
foil strips and, therefore, require a thicker radome outer skin. Wide foil strips are 
preferred because they distribute the explosive forces over a larger surface area. 
A 0.008 cm (0.003 in) thick by 0.64 cm (0.375 in) wide aluminum strip 
will protect a 0.1 cm (0.040 in) thick fiberglass wall from one 200 kA, 2 x lo6 
A ~ - S  stroke and associated intermediate or continuing current, but the strip will 
have been vaporized and must be replaced. 
Thus, the foil strips should not be used for applications where more than 
one strike might occur in the same flight. This caution means that they should 
not be used to protect fiberglass fuel tanks or other structures in which a 
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puncture might result in a flight safety hazard, for, contrary to the old adage, 
lightning does strike the same place twice, even in the same flight! Thin foil 
strips are appropriate only for inexpensive protection of fiberglass fairings, wing 
tips, fin caps, or other non-flight-critical components. 
Radio frequency interference may be created if the strips are improperly 
grounded to metallic structures, or if fatigue cracks occur in the strips, which 
may result in a broken electrical connection. Fatigue cracks are often caused by 
adhesive bonding of a single strip to a surface with several panels or segments 
that may move with respect to one another. Cracks may cause severe damage 
when lightning currents flow across them, as illustrated in Figure 7.27. This 
figure shows a 2.54 cm (1 in) wide by 0.018 cm (0.008 in) thick strip of 
pressure-sensitive aluminum foil tape after a test in which a (moderate) 54 kA 
stroke, followed by a 9 0  A continuing current, was discharged into the strip at 
Point b. The continuing current conveyed 18 C of charge into the strip. A 
razor-thin cut had been made in the strip at Point c; the damage which resulted 
as the current arced across this confined cut was more extensive than that 
produced by the same current when it entered the strip at Point b. Unblemished 
portions of the strip itself, however, were able to conduct these currents without 
damage. In fact, a previous test had delivered a 54 kA stroke and 187 C of 
charge to Point a, causing only the erosion shown at this point. The 
cross-sectional area of foil necessary to conduct more severe stroke currents can 
be determined from the curves of Figure 7.3. 
Figure 7.27 Damage produced by moderate stroke and continuing current in 
0.018 (0.008 in) thick, 2.54 cm (1 in) wide aluminum foil with 
crack. 
Point a - erosion resulting from previous stroke 
Point b - arc entry 
Point c - location of crack 
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Metallic Coatings 
Coatings are thin metallic foils, paints, or plasma flame sprays that 
completely cover the nonmetallic structure to make the surface entirely 
conductive and enable it to accept strikes anywhere. Such coatings, however, 
may suffer considerable vaporization unless they are prohibitively thick. They 
are recommended only in cases where diverters are not practical. 
Woven Wire Fabrics 
Flexible metallic fabrics woven of fine aluminum, copper, or stainless steel 
wires about 80 to the centimeter, as shown in Figure 7.28, are usually more 
effective in resisting damage than are coatings because woven wire fabrics permit 
gases from arcing to be vented through the holes in the mesh instead of 
containing them, as do continuous foil and paint coating. Development of these 
fabrics came about in response to a need for the effective protection of advanced 
composites. Their use is discussed more fully in that context in Section 7.3.2.5. 
Figure 7.28 Woven wire fabric. 
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Segmented Strips 
Segmented strips, sometimes called "button strips," are one of several 
developments in lightning protection technology. These segmented strips, 
developed by Arnason and Cassell of Douglas Aircraft Company (Reference 
7.1 51, consist of a series of thin, conductive segments, or "buttons," fastened to 
a strap of resistive material, which is then bonded to the surface to be protected, 
as shown in Figure 7.29. Instead of attempting to conduct lightning currents, 
these segmented strips provide many small air gaps that ionize and spark when 
an intense electric field is applied along the strip, as is the case when a lightning 
leader approaches. Since the small gaps are close together, the resulting 
ionization is nearly continuous. Thus the segmented strips provide a conductive 
path, initially for streamers to follow outward from the aircraft and, after these 
reach the leader, for return stroke and other currents to flow into the airframe. 
The construction of the strip and breakdown process are pictured in Figure 7.30. 
Figure 7.29 Segmented strips. 
Laboratory tests such as the one illustrated in Figure 7.31 show that the 
segmented diverters are nearly as effective in intercepting strikes and preventing 
punctures of fiberglass walls as are the solid conductors. Since ionization of the 
strips requires that an electric field be able to exist in the direction of their 
length, the segmented strips will perform best if oriented normal to conductive 
portions of the airframe rather than parallel to such structure. Also, the strips 
should not be positioned parallel to a conducting object lying beneath the 
nonmetallic surface. For example, the grounding tube within the radome of 
Figure 7.4 will reduce the electric field gradient along its length to nearly zero, 
so that a segmented diverter positioned near the tube may not ionize and an 
approaching flash may puncture the radome wall and attach, instead, to the tube 
itself. Thus, segmented diverters should be positioned on either side of the 
grounding tube but not directly over it. This positioning is also necessary to 
prevent inductive voltage along an ionized strip from puncturing the radome 
wall, as discussed in Section 7.3.1.2. 
The maximum spacing between segmented diverters--or the minimum 
permissible spacing between them and underlying conductors--is dependent, 
among other things, upon the amount of voltage required to ionize the 
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Figure 7.30 Segmented strip design and breakdown process. 
(a) Segmented strip design 
(b) Segmented strip breakdown and conduction process 
segmented strips. Ideally, a very low voltage would be desirable--a voltage even 
lower than that required to ionize a path along the bare surface itself and much 
lower than that required to puncture the surface. While the developers report 
(Reference 7.16) that the strips ionize at about 10 kV/30 cm, they do not state 
what rate of voltage rise this applies to, nor have any oscillographic 
measurements showing test voltage rate of rise and strip ionization voltage yet 
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been reported in the literature. The authors, meanwhile, have found the strips to 
ionize at voltages of up to 70 kV/30 cm (1 ft) when tested with a voltage rising 
at 200 kV/ps. The conductivity of the surrounding surface and the proximity of 
underlying conductors undoubtedly play a role in the function of the strips, but 
no laboratory investigations of these factors have yet been reported either. 
Figure 7.31 Simulated lightning strike to a segmented diverter. 
Streamers propagate up diverter and outward to join oncoming 
leader. 
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The developers d o  report (Reference 7.17) that the segmented strips 
remain undamaged after passage of a 170 kA stroke and 200 C continuing 
currents. This capability has been confirmed bv the authors, who have found the 
strips capable of  sustaining two strokes of 180  k A  and 2 x l o 6  A ~ - S  (Component 
A) before destroying their ability t o  ionize another time. The authors have also 
found the segmented strips to  be capable of sustaining a much larger number of 
the more common 5 0  kA strokes. Other investigators, including Conti and Cary 
(Reference 7.1 8), have reported the strips t o  be severely damaged after one 200 
kA discharge or  one "high coulomb" continuing current discharge has been 
delivered, a finding that has aroused controversy over the effectiveness of the 
strips. The continuing current charge (500 C )  delivered by Conti and Cary, 
however, is more charge than that conveyed by  any natural lightning discharge 
yet measured. 
The segmented strip design might be modified to  lower the ionization 
voltage or  t o  improve durability; however, the basic principle is sound, and there 
are many applications where the presently available strips will afford lightning 
protection improved over other methods, while not interfering with radar 
performance. The present lack o f  strip performance data simply means that the 
proper location of the strips can not yet be determined analytically bu t ,  instead, 
must be accomplished with the aid of  laboratory tests of candidate arrangements 
on the particular structure being protected. 
The selection of protective devices and the arrangement of them on a 
fiberglass structure comprise a major part of the protection task. The best design 
can be completely undone, however, if other, seemingly innocuous, features of 
the structure are left unchanged. Figure 7.32 illustrates some particularly 
troublesome situations. They usually arise when practices perfectly acceptable in 
metallic structures are continued without modification in nonmetallic structures. 
The several ways of providing protection for the fiberglass wing tip of 
Figure 7.30 should include the following: 
Remove paint from the diverters 
Electrically bond the lamp housing directly t o  the diverters 
Enclose the lamp power wires in a conduit or braided shield inboard 
t o  the metal rib 
Electrically bond the diverters to  metallic structure. 
7.3.2 Advanced Composites 
Advanced composites, consisting of boron- or graphite-reinforced plastics, 
are being used increasingly often as replacements for aluminum load-bearing 
applications in aircraft. The high strength-to-weight characteristics of these 
materials make them attractive for structural applications, but  because they are 
nonmetallic, they are inherently more vulnerable to  lightning effects. 
In contrast to  aluminum, which by  virtue of its electrical and thermal 
conductivity suffers few direct effects of lightning and which provides excellent 
electromagnetic shielding, the advanced composites are neither good conductors, 
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nor good insulators, nor good providers of shielding against electromagnetic 
fields. If these materials are used in lightning-strike zones, it is possible that they 
will require some form of protection. The questions which must be  answered are 
these: Just how vulnerable are particular advanced composites to  lightning? and 
What protection, if any,  may be necessary? 
LAMP HOUSING NOT 
BONDED TO DIVERTER 
ALLOWS CURRENT TO 
ENTER POWER WIRES 
Figure 7.32 Inadvertent causes of  disaster. 
Unlike fiberglass-reinforced plastics, which have n o  electrical conductivity, 
the boron filaments or graphite fibers which are imbedded in the matrix are 
resistive conductors and will conduct some lightning currents. However, the fact 
that, like any resistor, they heat up  when electric current flows in them causes a 
serious problem. For example, typical boron and gra hite composites have B resistivities of 4 t o  9 x a - c m  and 0.9 t o  1.1 x 10 a c m ,  respectively, as 
compared to 2.8 x a - c r n  for aluminum. This means that the composites 
will try to  absorb between 100 and 1000 times more energy from the lightning 
current than will aluminum. Moreover, the materials may not  be able to  dissipate 
this much heat without some change in or destruction of physical properties. 
Simulated lightning-strike tests of typical composite laminates have demon- 
strated this problem, with results similar to those shown in Figures 4.12 and 
4.1 3. 
A number of  careful studies of the electric current conduction and damage 
mechanisms within advanced composites have been made in order to  learn the 
quantitative relationships between current intensity and the amount of 
mechanical strength degradation. It has been confirmed that damage results 
primarily from electric current flow through the boron filaments or graphite 
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fibers, but the mechanisms differ for these two types of composites. The current 
flow processes and degradation mechanisms for each type are reviewed in the 
following paragraphs. 
7.3.2.1 Boron Composites 
Because of initial interest in boron composites for aircraft structural 
applications and because of their higher resistivities, the lightning current 
degradation mechanisms for boron were studied first. Fassell, Penton, and 
Plumer (Reference 7.19) began with a study of the degradation process in a 
single boron filament. These filaments were formed by deposition of boron on a 
0.13 mm (0.0005 in) diameter tungsten filament called the substrate. The boron 
sheath, which provides the filament's strength, was about 1.3 mm (0.005 in) in 
diameter. The tungsten substrate is a resistive conductor, but the resistance of 
the boron is much greater by several orders of magnitude. Thus, electric currents 
entering a boron composite will want to flow in the tungsten substrates instead 
of in the boron. Tungsten has a positive temperature coefficient of resistivity, 
which means that, as its temperature increases, its resistivity increases as well, 
and it becomes even hotter as current flows. When temperature rise is calculated 
as a function of current action integral by Equation 7.5, the temperature rise 
curve of Figure 7.33 results. The quantity $12dt is, of course, equal to the unit 
energy dissipation in the substrate (per ohm of resistance) and is dependent 
solely upon the lightning current amplitude and waveform. 
Figure 7.33 shows that very little temperature rise occurs as $12dt is 
increased to 20 x A2-s. However, increases beyond this value cause 
moderate temperature increases, and increases beyond 100 x A2-s result in 
extreme temperature rise. Fassell, Penton, and Plumer injected currents beyond 
100 x A2-s into single filaments and found them to become severely 
cracked and to lose all mechanical strength. Correspondingly, filaments exposed 
to pulses with $ ~ ~ d t  values of 100 x lo6 A2s or less exhibited little or no 
evidence of degradation. The mechanism of filament failure was found to be 
transverse and radial cracking of the boron sheath, presumably caused by 
excessive thermal expansion of the tungsten substrate. (Examples of cracked 
filaments are shown in Figure 4.12.) Thus, the calculated temperature rise is a 
significant indication of filament failure onset. 
In comparison to natural lightning currents, it is noted that when 
distributed over several thousand filaments, a stroke of several thousand amperes 
may provide only 1 A of current per filament. If this current exists for 100 ps, it 
will indeed provide an $12dt of 100 x A2-s in a single filament; if this 
current exists for 20 ps, it will provide an jI2dt of 20 x A2-s in a single 
filament, etc. 
WhiIe the previous example illustrates the manner in which lightning 
currents may cause mechanical property degradation of composite materials, it 
also illustrates the relatively flat region in which increasing d u e s  of $ ~ ~ d t  do 
not result in corresponding increases in temperature rise. For protection design, 
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this fact emphasizes the desirability of  distributing lightning currents throughout 
as many filaments as possible. 
To  explain the process of current flow into the many boron filaments in a 
composite, Penton, Perry, and Lloyd (Reference 7.20) formulated an electrical 
model of two boron filaments in a resin matrix, as shown in Figure 7.34. Each 
filament is made up  of incremental portions of the tungsten substrate resistance. 
These researchers found that the filament-to-filament breakdown voltage is 
about 300 V and that the insulation breakdown at  this level is represented by  
the back-to-back Zener diodes, which have a reverse conduction (Zener) voltage 
of 300 V. 
A lightning current flowing in the outer filament, they found, would 
remain in this fiIament until the resistive voltage rise d o n g  it exceeds the boron 
and resin breakdown voltage represented by  the Zener diodes, a t  which point the 
diodes in the electrical model conduct and permit current to  enter the 
neighboring filament. In most cases this would be a filament in the next 
laminate. While some material strength degradation undoubtedly occurs from 
the breakdown of the resin and boron sheaths, the major loss of strength was 
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found to be a result of temperature rise in the fdaments and cracking of the 
boron sheaths along the entire length of current flow. The appearance of a 
filament so  damaged is shown in Figure 4.12. 
END VIEW BORON FILAMENT 
Figure 7.34 Electrical model of two boron filaments within a laminate. 
When the filaments in an outer layer fail by the transverse, or axial, 
cracking, the resistances of  their tungsten substrates also increase (by cracking) 
and so does the voltage rise along this layer, until the breakdown level of the 
boron sheaths and resin between it and the next layer of filaments is reached. 
When this happens, the current enters this next layer of  filaments, and the 
process continues. The depth of penetration, of course, depends on both the 
amplitude and duration of the lightning current and the number of filaments 
into which this current can distribute. 
In addition to the current conduction effects just described, the high 
temperature and blast forces from the arc have been found t o  cause substantial 
damage t o  a boron composite at the point of  attachment; this, in fact, may be 
the only damage which is visible. Yet ,  because loss of strength also results from 
cracking of  the embedded filaments, there may be little or n o  visible change in 
the outer appearance of a boron composite away from the arc attachment point. 
An example of this is the 16-ply boron composite panel (pictured in Figure 7.35 
[Reference 7.211) after receiving an 88 k A  simulated stroke. The action integral 
of this stroke was 0.2 x lo6 A ~ - s ,  one that might be expected from a restrike to  
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a wing or fuselage surface in Zone 2A. A damaged area approximately 7 cm wide 
and 10 cm long is visible in Figure 7.35; yet the photomicrograph of Figure 7.36 
(Reference 7.22) shows that nearly all the filaments in a cross section cut from 
the visibly undamaged area near the base of this panel are cracked. This cracking 
resulted in a 50% reduction in the shear strength of this region. 
A hole was blown completely through the panel of Figure 7.35 at the arc 
attachment point by this 88 kA stroke. Strokes of somewhat less amplitude and 
action integral would not puncture a hole; strokes of higher energy would 
produce larger holes in this 16-ply boron panel. 
The amount of damage to expect in unprotected panels of other 
thicknesses depends primarily upon the action integral of the lightning current 
and the number and orientation of the plies in the composite. An estimate of the 
visible damage to typical boron laminates as a function of lightning current 
amplitude and number of plies is presented in Figure 7.37. 
The area throughout which invisible damage will occur in a boron 
composite depends on the cross-sectional area available for conduction of 
current away from the arc attachment point. This area becomes greater with 
distance away from this point, and can be estimated from Table 7.4 in the next 
section. 
7.3.2.2 Graphite Composites 
Graphite yarns provide the reinforcement in graphite composites. These 
yarns are made up of a great many graphite fibers, each much thinner than a 
boron filament. Since the melting point of graphite (3735 "C) is much higher 
than that required to cause melting and pyrolysis of the surrounding resin 
(315 "C), damage to graphite composites occurs by pyrolysis and, usually, 
ignition of the resin, which in turn causes gross delamination. This result is in 
contrast to the initial destruction of the reinforcing fibers which occurs in boron 
composites. The burning of the resin then leaves the entire composite in 
disarray, as shown in Figure 4.1 3. 
The spectacular nature of the graphite composite damage mechanism and 
the gross disarray in which the composite is left might lead one to worry more 
about exposing graphite composites to lightning than boron composites. The 
reverse is actually the case, however, because, for the same cross-sectional area, 
the graphite composites have a much lower resistivity than has boron and 
therefore can conduct much more lightning current before dangerous temper- 
atures are reached. 
Arcentry damage to graphite is somewhat similar, though less extensive 
than that produced by comparable arcs striking boron composites. Figure 7.38 
(Reference 7.23) shows a typical 12-ply graphite composite panel after a 98 kA, 
0.25 x lo6 A ~ - S  stroke. Photomicrographic analysis and mechanical strength 
tests showed no damage other than that which is visible at the attachment point. 
Figure 7.39 presents an estimate of the amount of damage to expect in 
unprotected graphite laminates under other conditions. 
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Figure 7.36 Boron filaments in visibly undamaged region at base of panel in 
Figure 7.35. 
Filaments are extensively cracked. 
Current has entered all 16 plies. 
Front of panel is at top. 
standardization of test conditions was attempted, the tests have produced results 
which, while valid for the particular cases of interest, are too voluminous and 
diverse to normalize and reproduce here. From tests in our own laboratory, 
however, we have learned that composite strength degradation is closely related 
8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 
NUMBER OF PLYS 
Figure 7.37 Estimated visible damage to unprotected boron composites. 
to the lightning current action integral, even when this quantity is delivered over 
a period of up to one second, as it is in continuing currents. Table 7.4, which is 
based on these tests, compares the capability of boron and graphite composites 
to conduct lightning currents with and without degradation of their mechanical 
strength properties. 
Since this table has been prepared from a variety of tests, the numbers in it 
must be considered approximate. When results were compiled, a range of about 
one order of magnitude of action integral was found to separate samples which 
experienced no discernible loss of strength from those which lost 50% or more 
of their former tensile or shear strength. From Table 7.4 it is evident that a 
cross-sectional area of about 16 crn2 of boron composite is necessary to conduct 
a severe stroke of 2 x lo6 A ~ - s ;  yet only 2 or 3 cm2 of graphite composite 
would be needed to conduct the same current. 
In many cases it may not be practical or necessary to prevent localized 
damage at the arc attachment point, but it is important to assure that the 
surrt 
dam 
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ng composite can conduct away the lightning current with 
in the process. The information of Table 7.4 can be use 
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Figure 7.39 Estimated visible damage t o  unprotected graphite composites. 
For  graphite composites, the damage extends only throughout 
the visibly damaged region. 
Table 7.4 COMPOSITE j12 dt CONDUCTION CAPABILITY 
Composite 11' dt (AZ s) 
Cross-Sectional Boron Graphite 
Area 
Non- Non- 
cm2 in2 degraded Degraded degraded Degraded 
1. Assume that only half of the surrounding composite is available to 
conduct current, as shown in Figure 7.40. The reason for this is that 
the lightning current will want to flow in one predominant 
direction--toward its eventual exit point somewhere else on the 
aircraft. 
2. In this case the relationships among damage, radius, cross-sectional 
area, and composite thickness are given by the following: 
where d = the necessary skin thickness (cm) 
A = cross-sectional area required to conduct the required jI2dt, 
from Table 7.4 (cm2) 
r = radius of permissible damage (cm) 
GENERAL DIRECTION 
OF CURRENT FLOW 
IN AIRCRAFT 
Figure 7.40 Composite thickness vs area of damage from conducted currents. 
As an example, consider fuselage skin in Zone 2A to be made of graphite 
composite. It is desired that the area of strength loss extend no more than 5 cm 
outward from an arc attachment point. What thickness must the composite be to 
meet this requirement? 
The SAE report Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques for Aerospace 
Vehicles and Hawlware defines the lightning current action integral for Zone 2A 
as 0.25 x lo6 A ~ S .  Table 7.4 shows that 1.61 cm of graphite composite will 
conduct this action integral without being structurally degraded. Thus, from 
Equation 7.26, the necessary composite thickness needed to limit the degraded 
region to within a 5 cm radius from the arc attachment point may be calculated 
as follows: 
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If a boron composite were to  be used, its thickness would have to be at 
least ten times greater to  restrict the damage radius to  the same 5 cm. The 
thicknesses o f  either composite would have to be even greater, of  course, if the 
composites were located in Zone 1 ,  where an action integral of  2 x lo6 A ~ - S  is 
t o  be expected. In such a case, it is likely that either the area of damage or the 
composite thickness required t o  reduce this damage would be intolerable. And in 
such a case the addition o f  some protective device(s) capable of  keeping some or 
all of the lightning current out  of  the composite should be considered. The 
coatings and diverter strips for fiberglass described in Section 7.3.1.2 may also 
be applicable for advanced composites; and several coatings were developed 
specifically for use on  composites. The most promising of these are discussed in 
Section 7.3.2.5. 
7.3.2.3 Problems at Joints 
In addition to lightning currents causing direct effects b y  entering or 
flowing in composite materials, these same currents may also cause damage at 
the places where they leave the composite--for example, a place where the 
original panel is joined t o  another one or to  substructure such as ribs and spars. 
Two basic methods of joining composites are in use. One of  these is bonding, in 
which the composite is joined (glued) with an adhesive to  another member. The 
other method is with bolted joints, in which bolts, rivets, or other mechanical 
fasteners are employed t o  hold two members together. 
Unfortunately, most adhesives used in bonding are highly resistive and by 
themselves are not able to  conduct lightning currents. Instead, arcing occurs 
within the adhesive, releasing sufficient gas pressure to make the structure 
literally "come unglued." Either the adhesive must be made electrically 
conductive or  a separate conducting path must be provided to carry lightning 
currents across the joint. A conductive paint o r  foil may be able to  accomplish 
this if it is necessary only t o  transfer lightning current from one composite panel 
to  an adjacent one. But if the composite is also fastened to substructure, 
electrical contact must be made to this substructure as well. A metal foil 
wrapped around the edge of the composite panel may suffice; however, such a 
foil must be held securely t o  the composite surface so that the magnetic force (a 
problem of  Figure 7.8) does not cause the foil t o  pull away. If bolts or fasteners 
are used, they may provide the necessary electrical path, whether intentional or 
not, but  the concentration of  current near them may degrade the composite's 
strength in this important region. 
Relatively little work has yet been accomplished t o  evaluate the degree of  
strength loss caused by lightning currents in composite joints; however, further 
research is now in progress. Schneider, Hendricks, and Takashima (Reference 
7.24) are studying the effects of lightning currents on  typical bonded and bolted 
joints of graphite composites, and their preliminary findings show that bonded 
joints suffer more damage from lightning currents than do bolted joints. Other 
tests (Reference 7.25) have also been made on various joints, with similar results. 
The reader is referred to these sources for further information on the specific 
joints researchers have evaluated and the results they have obtained. 
7.3.2.4 Electromagnetic Field Penetration 
The importance of keeping the electromagnetic fields produced by 
lightning currents away from the aircraft's electric wiring is by now clear. In 
conventional aircraft this is conveniently and successfully accomplished by the 
aluminum skins, and the electrical system designer benefits greatly from this 
assistance heretofore given him by the structures designer. Substitution of 
composites for aluminum, however, poses an additional threat to the electrical 
systems because composites do not possess the excellent shielding property of 
aluminum, with the result that the electrical system designer may now have to 
provide his own protection against these fields. 
The relative shielding effectiveness of composites as compared with various 
metals has been measured for magnetic (H) fields by Fisher and Fassell 
(Reference 7.26) by establishing an H-field of known intensity on one side of a 
composite surface and measuring the amount of it reaching the other side. 
Continuous sine-wave fields at several different frequencies were applied to the 
top side of a test sample in the arrangement of Figure 7.41, and the shielding 
capability of the sample was determined by measuring the voltage induced in a 
receiving coil on the other side by that portion of the field which penetrated it. 
The current, I, in the transmitting coil was kept constant during the tests to 
make sure that reflected fields did not change the level of field radiated in the 
first place. The amount of H-field attenuation was then determined by the usual 
expression: 
v 1 Attenuation = 20 Log - 
v 2  
where V1 is the voltage induced in the receiving coil when no test sample is 
present and V2 is the voltage when a sample of composite or other material is 
placed between the coils. The metal enclosure was used to avoid fringing effects. 
Figure 7.42 shows the H-field attenuations for boron and graphite composites by 
themselves, and Figure 7.43 shows the improvements in shielding effectiveness 
gained by application of conductive coatings (Reference 7.27). 
The measurements of the shielding effectiveness of panels covered with 
flame-sprayed aluminum and aluminum foil indicated that most of the shielding 
came from the aluminum. Values of 16 dB and 20 dB were measured at 0.5 MHz 
and 1.0 MHz for 2.1 mm (0.083 in) boron with a coating of flame-sprayed 
aluminum. The thickness of the aluminum was about 0.4 mm. 
Many investigations into the shielding effectiveness of conductive coatings 
of enclosures have, of course, been made for other purposes. One is that of Uhlig 
(Reference 7.28), who evaluated several conductive coatings applied to 1.2 m 
cubic boxes made of wood. The coatings tested were the following: 
1. Flame-sprayed aluminum approximately 0.18 mm (0.007 in) thick 
2. Aluminum foil 0.025 mm (0.001 in) thick 
3. Two coats of conducting paint (300600 R/square) 
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Figure 7.41 Arrangement for shielding effectiveness tests. 
FREQUENCY - MEGAHERTZ 
Figure 7.42 H-field shielding effectiveness of boron and graphite composite 
materials. 
-. . 
FREQUENCY - MEGAHERTZ 
Figure 7.43 H-field shielding effectiveness of boron and graphite composites 
with protective coatings. 
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The box was placed in an impulse-type H-field with amplitude and waveform as 
shown in Figure 7.44(a) (Reference 7.29). This field has a rise time of 
approximately 2 ys and a decay time of approximately 60 ps, such as would be 
produced by a lightning-stroke current with the same rise and fall times. 
(Component F of the SAE report). Its amplitude of 150 A/m is of the order 
produced by a typical lightning-stroke current (discussed in Chapter 9). 
ONE LAYER OF ALUMINUM FOIL 
u L L I - - l  _L_L_LI 
CONDUCTIVE CARBON 
1 I 1 -0.22 ~BATTENUATION I 1 
(c) (4 
Figure 7.44 H-field shielding effectiveness of various conductive coatings on a 
1.2 m cube. 
Figure 7.44(b), (c), and (d) shows the actual field strength within the 
center of the box when coated with each of the three materials. The 0.18 mm 
flame-sprayed aluminum gave an H-field attenuation of 5.2 dB produced by a 
0.025 mm thickness of aluminum foil. Conductive paint gave practically no 
attenuation. 
The numerical data presented in Figures 7.42,7.43, and 7.44 are of course 
appIicable only for the coil spacing used in these tests, since the coil spacing 
affects the impedance of the magnetic field and the shielding is determined in 
part by the impedance mismatch between the field and the shielding material. 
However, implications of the data are quite clear: 
1 .  The shielding effectiveness of both graphite-epoxy and boron-epoxy 
materials is much less than an equivalent thickness of aluminum. 
2. A thin piece of aluminum foil has much greater shielding effective- 
ness than has even a 3 mm panel of graphiteepoxy. 
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3. Graphite composites, by  virtue of their higher conductivity, provide 
more effective shielding than d o  boron composites. 
4. When conductive coatings are present for control of the direct 
effects of lightning, they will have more effectiveness as electro- 
magnetic shields than the composites they protect. 
5. When conductive coatings are not needed for direct effects protec- 
tion, electrical wiring enclosed within these composites may need to 
be placed in conduits o r  otherwise shielded from the intense fields 
which will pas. through the composites. 
Electric fields (Efields) are also associated with lightning strikes and may 
cause as much interference in some electrical systems as d o  the magnetic fields, 
or more. No E-field shielding effectiveness data have as yet been reported, 
however. 
Furthermore, n o  measurements have yet  been made of the voltages which 
lightning may actually induce in the electrical circuits inside of composite 
aircraft structures because there have been few such structures yet available. Nor 
are there analytical techniques yet  available for prediction of field levels within 
composite structures. The shielding effectiveness measurements reported by 
Fisher and others have always involved small panels usually clamped to a simple 
test receptacle, like that of Figure 7.41. However, when panels are employed in a 
structure, with provisions made for conducting currents out  of edges and joints, 
it is likely that some improvement in shielding effectiveness will result, and the 
situation will not  be as bleak as it is indicated t o  be by  the small panel data now 
available. 
7.3.2.5 Protection for Advanced Composites 
That it is necessary to  supply lightning protection for all composites wher- 
ever they are employed on the aircraft is certainly not a foregone conclusion. 
Graphite composites greater than 4 plies thick and located in Zone 2A, for 
example, will not be completely punctured and will suffer only localized surface 
damage, as indicated by Figure 7.39. Some lightning protection may be 
necessary, however, for Zone 1 applications of graphite and for virtually arzjl 
lightning-stroke zone application of boron. 
A number of programs have been undertaken to develop suitable 
protective coatings for composites. The most important of these was conducted 
by Quinlivan, Kuo, and Brick (Reference 7.30), who developed and tested a 
wide variety of conductive coatings, and Brick, King, and Quinlivan have 
continued this work (Reference 7.31). Coatings evaluations have also been 
carried ou t  by Fisher and Fassell (Reference 7.32) and others; the reader is urged 
to study these references to obtain the performance data necessary for the 
selection of a coating for a particular application. Coatings that have performed 
especially well include the five discussed below. 
Wire Fabrics 
Wire fabrics are flexible meshes woven or knitted from very fine aluminum 
245 
or copper wires, as shown in Figure 7.28. These perform well as lightning 
protective coatings because of their use of the skin effects for electrical 
conduction and because their transparency allows hot gasses to escape without 
damaging the composite beneath. For example, the skin area of an 80 by 80 
mesh (80 wires/cm) fabric of 0.05 mm wire is over 200 times that of the 
composite surface area actually coated by the fabric. Consequently, the fabric is 
a highly efficient conductor of current away from the arc contact point. This 
fabric has been found capable of withstanding successive 100 kA discharges at 
the same location with little visible damage to the fabric and no reduction in the 
mechanical strength of the coated laminate. At the 200 kA, 2 x lo6 A ~ - S  level, 
the only significant damage to the coated boron laminate is that directly under 
the arc contact region, and, even in this region, the tensile strength is reduced 
only about 20%. 
One can expect paint coatings to be used on aircraft structures for various 
reasons such as camouflage, environmental protection, and marking. Because 
paints over 8 0  by 8 0  mesh wire fabric reduce the area of arc entry, damage to 
the coating increases at the point of arc entry, allowing some of the wire to be 
melted or vaporized. However, there is no  additional damage to the composite. 
If mechanical conditions warrant its use, 50 by 50 wire mesh may also be used; 
however, this mesh offers somewhat less protection because the wire surface area 
is less. 
Aluminum fabrics were found by Quinlivan, Kuo, and Brick to provide the 
- 
best combination of lightning protection, light weight, environmental resistance, 
- and ease of application. For 8 0  by 8 0  mesh woven aluminum wire fabric, the 
area density is 0.019 lb/ft2; for a 50  by 50  mesh fabric the area density is 0.042 
1b/ft2. These weights are increased to 0.036 and 0.072 lb/ft2, respectively, if the 
resin required for encapsutation of the fabric is accounted for. Employing 
calendered wire cloth permits some weight saving. Calendering reduces the 
thickness of the cloth by flattening the intersections of the wires; weight savings 
occur because less resin is required to encapsulate the flattened mesh. As a point 
of reference, 6-mil-thick aluminum foil has an area weight of 0.084 lb/ft2. The 
weights of environmentally protective topcoats or adhesive required for bonding 
the foil (or fabric) must be added to these figures. 
Wire fabrics possess the hand and drape necessary for use as an overlay on 
complex contoured parts, and the composite matrix which fuUy encapsulates the 
fabric has been found to protect it from environments such as humidity, salt 
spray, and jet fuel. 
Aluminum Foils 
Aluminum foils from 0.05 mm to 0.2 mm thick will provide protection 
simdar to that of wire fabrics, but the mechanical properties of the foil, its 
weight, and the need for an adhesive between the foil and the composite may 
make aluminum foil less attractive as a protective device. 
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Flame-Sprayed Aluminum 
An equal weight of flamesprayed aluminum offers approximately the 
same protection as that of aluminum foil. It has sometimes been difficult to 
control the thickness of flame-sprayed coatings, a phenomenon that could create 
inconsistencies in the protection afforded by this type of coating, but 
flame-sprays may be easier to apply to some contoured surfaces than are foils. 
Diverter Straps and Foil Strips 
One might wonder if the metal diverter straps or foil strips recommended 
for protection of fiberglass in Section 7.3.1.2 are also applicable for advanced 
composites. As discussed in that section, these devices provide an external 
conductor from which a streamer may originate, reaching an approaching leader 
before a streamer from an internal conductor has a chance to puncture the 
fiberglass wall. The electrical conductivity of the strap, in contrast to the 
surrounding nonconductive fiberglass, is depended upon to assure that this 
streamer will come from the strip and not from some other place. 
Advanced composites, of course, have some electrical conductivity-- 
enough to supply the few milliamperes of current needed for a streamer. Thus, a 
metal diverter on a poorly conducting surface is not nearly as effective as it is on 
a nonconducting surface. This fact has been demonstrated repeatedly on nose 
radomes protected by diverters but with partially conductive antistatic paints 
also applied to their outside surfaces to reduce EM1 from P-static charge 
buildups on the radome surface. Streamers have occasionally initiated from the 
antistatic paint instead of from a diverter, causing the ensuing stroke to attach to 
the painted surface and destroy a large part of the radome while finding its own 
path to metal structure. 
Lubin and Dastin (Reference 7.33) report that, in laboratory tests, closely 
spaced aluminum foil strips did keep strikes from attaching to the boron 
composite surface of a horizontal stabilizer. Their tests--which are the most 
extensive yet reported of conducting strips on a composite--showed that 2.54 
cm (1 in) wide, 0.2 mm (0.008 in) thick aluminum foil strips had to be spaced 
within 6.35 cm (2.5 in) of each other to keep strikes from hitting the boron 
composite surface between them. A simdar spacing was necessary for 6.35 cm (2 
in) wide strips that were half as thick. Wider spacings permitted some strikes to 
terminate on the boron composite surface. 
It is likely that such strips would not work as well as this over a graphite 
composite, which is more conductive than boron. The performance of strips on 
either composite, of course, would be enhanced if the composite surface were 
covered with a dielectric (insulating) material that would inhibit streamer 
formation. A system in which a dielectric film is first applied to the entire 
composite surface, with the conducting strips then applied over the dielectric, is 
likely to work best, since this would also help to keep lightning currents in the 
foil strips from entering the composite. No thorough tests of such a system have 
been reported, however. 
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Dielectric Coatings 
Dielectric coatings such as polyurethanes or Kapton' film have been 
proposed by Kung, Amason (Reference 7.34), and others, as a means of 
protecting composite surfaces in swept-stroke zones (Zone 2A). These re- 
searchers acknowledge that some external conductors must still be used, but 
they suggest that the distance between such conductors could be extended by 
applying a dielectric coating to the composite surface, as shown in Figure 7.45. 
In tests of a 0.076 mm (3-mil) polyurethane coating over a graphite composite, 
Kung and Amason report that a 78 cm (31 in) separation is possible between 
conducting strips. In their tests a strike to the first conductor is initiated and 
caused to sweep aft in a wind stream across the dielectric coating until it 
reattaches to the second conductor, in the manner of Figure 6.2 1 .  As discussed 
in Section 6.6.2 of Chapter 6, the distance this arc will sweep depends on the 
voltage withstand capability of the surface paint versus the amount of voltage 
which can be developed along the arc. The greater the insulation capability of 
the coating, the longer the sweep to the next attachment point; the higher the 
arc voltage, the shorter the sweep. The principle of the dielectric coating concept 
is simply to make the coating from a good dielectric able to withstand high 
voltages. But there is a pitfall: if a puncture of the dielectric should occur, the 
arc will remain attached to this point much longer than it would have had no 
dielectric coating been present, and in so doing the arc will inflict more damage 
to the composite than if the arc had been uninhibited by the dielectric coating 
and allowed to move quickly from one place to another. 
METAL FOIL 
DIELECTRIC COAT 
Figure 7.45 Dielectric coating protection system. 
' ING 
'~ rademark of the E. I. duPont de Nemours Company, Inc. 
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The voltage withstand capability of polyurethanes and similar materials 
considered for this application is very high, a characteristic that may permit large 
spans of the materials to exist between conductors in laboratory tests, such as 
those of Figure 7.45. The withstand capability of these dielectrics is drastically 
reduced, however, if their surfaces become scratched or cracked, as might occur 
in service. Thus, if a dielectric protection scheme is considered, it should be 
given the lightning tests described in Lightning Test Waveforms and Techniques 
for nonmetallic materials in Zone 2 A - d f t e r  the test sample has been exposed 
to vibration, temperature cycling, abrasion, and any other environment that is 
likely to degrade the condition of the dielectric coating. Even then, such a 
protection system may become damaged by unexpected contact with a foreign 
object and its degraded status go unnoticed until a lightning strike occurred. 
These coatings contrast with conductive coatings, which may sustain many 
abrasions or cracks with much less, if any, degradation in their protection 
capability. 
Dielectric coatings, at their present stage of development at least, should 
not be considered, therefore, for protection of flightcritical composite 
structures except where a puncture of the coating would not create an 
unacceptable hazard. Rather, dielectrics are likely to  be most beneficial when 
they are used to supplement the performance of a primarily conductive 
protection system, such as the closely spaced foil strips discussed previously. 
In addition to protecting composite surfaces, it is necessary to provide a 
means to safely conduct lightning currents through joints, as discussed in Section 
7.3.2.3. If the composite is protected by a conductive coating and bolted joints 
are used, the coating should be extended into tapered bolt holes (to make good 
electrical contact with the bolts) and the bolts used to transfer current through 
the joint. If adhesive bonding joints are used instead, a conducting additive 
should be added to this adhesive; otherwise a different conducting path should 
be provided. 
If a composite is to be used in a flight-critical application, in every case the 
performance of its lightning protection system should be verified by the 
simulated lightning tests described in SAE Report Lightning Test Wavefomzs and 
Techniques for Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware. 
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CHAPTER 8 
VOLTAGES AND CURRENTS INDUCED BY LIGHTNING 
8.1 Definition and Elementary Considerations 
The term indirect effects of lightning refers t o  the damage t o  or 
malfunction of electrical equipment that results from lightning flashes. These 
effects may range from tripped circuit breakers to computer upset, t o  physical 
damage to input o r  output circuits of  electronic equipment. There may be other 
indirect effects of lightning flashes that pertain to  aircraft safety, such as flash 
blindness of the crew or acoustic shock waves. These effects, however, are not 
treated in this chapter. Included in this definition and discussed here are the 
voltages and currents induced by lightning on the electrical wiring of  the aircraft, 
regardless of whether or not such voltages and currents cause damage or upset of 
electrical equipment. 
The demarkation line between direct and indirect effects may be 
somewhat arbitrary in some instances. An example might involve a lightning 
flash terminating on a wing tip navigation light. In this case, the burning or 
blasting damage to the light fixture would be considered a direct effect of  the 
lightning. If the lightning flash were t o  contact the filament of the bulb and 
inject current into the wiring, there would be produced electrical effects ranging 
from overvoltage breakdown of the insulation at the socket to  tripping of 
remote circuit breakers or upset of equipment, effects of the resulting surge 
voltages on  the power system. All of these effects will be considered indirect 
effects in this discussion, even though the initiating event was the direct 
injection of current into the filament. Another hypothetical possibility would 
involve a lightning flash that passed close to  but did not contact the aircraft. The 
changing electromagnetic field produced by that flash might upset electronic 
equipment. The circuit upsets produced by such a flash would clearly be of  an 
indirect nature, since there was no direct involvement of  the aircraft with the 
lightning flash. Usually, however, the indirect effects of  concern are produced by  
a flash that contacts the aircraft. 
In this section as a whole we shall attempt t o  explain some of  the electrical 
phenomena involved and to discuss some of the analytical techniques through 
which indirect effects may be analyzed, some of the measurements that have 
been made on aircraft to  determine the nature of the indirect effects, and some 
of  the measures one may take to control the indirect effects of lightning. 
The arts of analysis and control of indirect effects are embryonic at 
present. Accordingly, the analytical procedures to  be described are not as well 
developed as might be desired. Neither can very many examples of successful 
protective measures be given, since protective measures against indirect effects 
are as yet seldom included in aircraft design. 
The problem of  analysis of indirect effects is a complex one, but, 
fortunately, analysis can be divided into several stages. These stages are 
illustrated in Figure 8.1. The overall task is t o  determine how the lightning 
current, IL, leads t o  voltages and currents on the internal wiring. The individual 
tasks are as follows: 
(a) T o  determine the amplitude and waveform of the current on 
the exterior of the aircraft. This external current may or may not be 
the same as the undisturbed lightning current. 
( b j  T o  relate the internal response of  the aircraft structure to  the 
current flowing on its exterior. This internal response may be 
expressed either in terms of an internal electric field or an internal 
magnetic field. 
(c) T o  determine how the internal response of  the structure affects the 
response of  the aircraft's wiring. The response of  the wiring may be 
expressed either in terms of  voltages or currents induced on  active 
electrical conductors or in terms of currents induced on shields. 
(d) T o  determine how these currents and voltages affect the electrical 
equipment in the aircraft. 
8.2 The Exterior Response of the Aircraft Structure 
The problem of how the aircraft as a whole responds to  the passage of  
lightning current is illustrated in Figure 8.2. There are two parts of  this problem, 
one involving a direct flash t o  the aircraft and the other involving a nearby flash. 
While it is generally true that the indirect effects produced by a direct flash are 
more severe than those produced by a nearby flash, they are not necessarily so, 
since the response of the aircraft external structure is different in the two cases. 
Consider Grst a direct hit on the aircraft. The return stroke current enters 
the aircraft at one extremity, flows through it, and exits from the other end. As 
a result of the different impedances of the lightning channel and the aircraft, the 
current flowing through the aircraft may undergo some distortion in waveform. 
The result is that the waveform of the current leaving the aircraft may be 
different from that entering the aircraft. Typically, the exit current rises to  crest 
over a longer time than does input current. 
The phenomena involved are shown in Figure 8.3. A waveform is shown 
traveling along the conductor having surge impedance Z1. Surge impedance is 
defined as 
where Z = surge impedance (ohms) 
L = inductance (henries) per unit length 
C = capacitance (farads) per unit length 
at the point under consideration. At some point the current encounters a 
transition point between the conductor having surge impedance Z 1  and a 
different conductor of  surge impedance Z2. At this transition point, part of  the 
incident current is transmitted onto the second conductor, but part of it is 
reflected back in the direction from which it came. The magnitudes of  the 
transmitted and reflected components of voltage or current at this transition 
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Figure 8.1 Indirect effects. 
(a) The total system 
(b) The internal response of the structure 
(c) The response of cables 
(d) The response of piece parts 
point are given by the values of transmission and reflection operators, a and /3 
for voltage and h and 6 for current, shown in Figure 8.3(a). 
If there are two discontinuities, as in the case of  Figure 8.3 (b), there will 
be reflections a t  each discontinuity with currents traveling back and forth, and 
thus oscillating, in the intermediate conductor. The amplitudes of  these 
oscillatory currents will diminish as energy is transmitted from the intermediate 
conductor to  the conductors on either end. 
The geometry of Figure 8.3(b) approximates that of a lightning current 
entering an aircraft, since the surge impedance of  the lightning channel is higher 
than the surge impedance of the aircraft. When account is taken of  all the 
reflections and transmissions at the various transition points, the result is that 
Figure 8.2 Response of the structure t o  the lightning current. 
(a) To a direct flash 
(b) To a nearby flash 
the current waveforms will appear as shown in Figure 8.3(c). If the entering 
lightning current has a fast front and a slower decay, the current at the entrance 
of the low-impedance section (in the aircraft) will exhibit an overshoot. The 
current a t  the center of the aircraft will have an oscillatory component 
superimposed upon a waveform fundamentally like that o f  the input current, 
and the current leaving the aircraft will have a slower rise time than that of the 
incident lightning curren f .  
A way in which one can tally the various reflected and transmitted 
currents is through the use of the lattice diagram shown in Figure 8.4. A current 
wave of  unit amplitude enters from the left, sees the transition point, and is 
partly transmitted and partly reflected. Since Z2 is less than Z l ,  the exiting 
(leaving) current is of higher amplitude than the entering current. In the limit, a 
current wave traveling on  a conductor and encountering a short circuit (Z2 = 0) 
would double at that discontinuity. The transmitted current then passes along 
the low-impedance c o ~ ~ d u c t o r  and after a time delay of At encounters the 
discontinuity at the exit end. Here part of the current on conductor 2 is again 
reflected. Since the impedance of  conductor 3 is greater than the impedance of 
conductor 2, the transmitted current is less than the incident current. A liniiting 
condition of this would consist of  a current wave traveling on a conductor and 
then encountering an open circuit. The current transmitted into the open circuit 
is of course zero. 
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Figure 8.3 Surge propagation at transition points. 
(a) A single transition point 
(b) Two transition points 
(c) Waveshapes 
The current amplitude at any point is then the algebraic sum of the 
reflected and transmitted components at that point. For example, the current 
leaving the intermediate conductor is 0.556 at 1At after the current enters the 
left-hand portion of  it, 0.803 after 2At, and 0.913 after 3At, etc. The exit current 
thus rises more slowly than does the incident current. At the center of the 
low-impedance intermediate conductor, the current is oscillatory. 
If instead of a step function a current wave of finite rise time encounters 
the transition, there will be a less pronounced oscillation of  current in the 
intermediate conductor and less difference between the waveforms of the 
entering and exiting currents. 
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Figure 8.4 Lattice diagram showing amplitude of reflections 
An example of  this effect was demonstrated on a simple model of the 
Space Shuttle (Reference 8.1). A twedimensional outline of the Shuttle was cut 
from metal foil and the outline split in the center so that the two halves could be 
slightly separated. The model was suspended in the air and connected to a fine 
wire; a pulse current was passed along the wire, through the model, and along 
the rest of the fine conductor wire to  a termination resistor. The fine wire 
represented the channel of the lightning arc. The input and output currents and 
the current at the center of the model were measured with small transformers. 
Typical results are shown in Figure 8.5. One significant point about the 
results was that fast-rising incident currents excited a higher degree of oscillation 
of the aircraft than did slower rising currents. The second significant point 
demonstrated was that in most cases the waveform of the lightning current 
passing through the center of the aircraft was sufficiently similar to  the 
waveform of the basic lightning current that the oscillatory component 
superimposed as a result of the change in impedance between the arc channel 
and the aircraft was not significantly large. 
In the case of a nearby lightning flash, the electric field from the flash will 
excite a dipole oscillation of the aircraft. In terms of Figure 8.4, the effect could 
be viewed as one in which the impedance of conductors 1 and 3 was infinite, 
leading to  complete reflection and no transmission at the entry and exit points 
on a low-impedance aircraft. A dipole kind of oscillation excited on an aircraft 
structure would be the typical response considered if one were evaluating the 
effect on aircraft of the electromagnetic fields produced by nuclear explosions. 
The period of oscillation would be proportional to  the length of the aircraft; 
thus, large aircraft would tend to ring at lower frequencies and higher amplitudes 
than would shorter aircraft. While the response of aircraft and missile systems to  
the rapidly changing electromagnetic fields produced - by nuclear explosions has 
been extensively studied, there have not been any c ~ r r e s ~ o n d l ~ ~ - s t u d i e s  of the 
response of aircraft to the electric fields associated with the passage of a nearby 
lightning flash. Accordingly, in this record we will not treat further the case of a 
nearby lightning flash, except to add the cautionary statement that it has not 
been proven finally that the indirect effects associated with a nearby lightning 
flash are necessarily lower than those associated with a lightning flash that 
contacts the aircraft. In the case of a nearby lightning flash it would appear that 
the aircraft structure would be subjected to currents of much lower amplitude 
but currents much more oscillatory in nature. These lower amplitude-higher 
frequency currents might lead to more upsets of sensitive electronic circuits than 
- - 
would currents of higher amplitude and lower frequency. 
8.3 The Internal Response of the Aircraft Structure 
A metallic aircraft is often viewed as a ~ a r a d a ~  screen, a concept from 
electrostatics which implies that the electrical environment inside the aircraft is 
separate and distinct from the environment outside. To some extent this is true 
for the electrical environment inside the structure: the environment is not nearly 
as harsh as is the external environment. There are, however, some important 
mechanisms by which electrical energy couples to the interior of the aircraft. 
The basic coupling mechanisms are shown on Figure 8.6. The first of these 
relates to the electric field produced alo~lg the inner surface of the aircraft. This 
2.2 ps - (EQUIVALENT) 
Figzire 8.5 Dipole oscillation of an aircraft excited by the passage of lightning 
current. On each oscillogram 
(a) Fast rise of current d is the current entering the aircraft 
(b) Average rise of current e is the current at the center of the aircraft 
( c )  Slow rise of current f is the current leaving the aircraft 
coupling mechanism might be defined as a resistive voltage drop. In some cases a 
definite resistance will be involved, though frequently the resistance will be of a 
distributed nature and pwbably frequency- or time-dependent. 
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Figure 8.6 Coupling mechanisms. 
(a) Resistive 
(b) Magnetic fields 
(c) Electric fields 
The second coupling mechanism involves magnetic fields in the interior 
volume of the aircraft. The most common and important type of magnetic field 
is that drawn through apertures from the outside of the aircraft to the interior, 
26 1 
as shown in Figures 8.6 and 8.7. This is frequently called the apertwe fieM. 
There will also be magnetic fields produced by the diffusion of lightning currents 
to the inside surfaces of the aircraft skins. These are referred to  loosely as the 
diffusion fields. The diffusion fields are also related to the frequency- 
dependent properties of the resistively generated electric field. Because some of 
the concepts involved in the study of the diffusion fields are central to an 
understanding of other effects, particularly with respect to the response of 
shielded wires, they will be discussed in detail before fields of other origins are 
considered. 
Figure 8.7 Aperture-type magnetic field coupling. 
(a) External field patterns 
(b) Internal field patterns 
The third type of coupling involves electric fields passing directly through 
apertures, such as windows or canopies, t o  the interior of the aircraft. In metal - 
aircraft this coupling is entirely through apertures, since virtually any thickness 
of metal provides comparatively good shielding. Aperture-type electric field 
coupling is shown in Figures 8.6(c) and 8.8. 
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Figure 8.8 Aperture-type electric field coupling. 
(a) External field patterns 
(b) Internal field patterns 
The hos t  easily understood mechanism by which the passage of lightning 
current gives rise to voltages on aircraft electrical circuits is that in which the 
current, flowing through joint resistances, produces a voltage by the elementary 
IR voltage drop. Such a case is shown in Figure 8.9. Here lightning is shown 
contacting a wing tip navigation light. The lightning current flowing through the 
resistance of the mechanical mounting structure of the lamp housing produces a 
voltage across that resistance. The voltage drop across the resistance will have the 
same waveform as that of the lightning current. The voltage at some remote 
point, however, may not have the same waveform, since the distributed 
inductance and capacitance of the wire supplying power to the filament of the 
light will be set into oscillation by the suddenly developed voltage. The result is 
that at remote points there probably will be an oscillation superimposed upon 
the basic IR voltage. 
Figure 8.10 shows two other examples of cases in which resistive voltages 
might be encountered. The first would be at the pylons for mounting external 
NAVIGATION LIGHT 
MOUNTED ON THE WING 
(b) I time 
I 
(4 
Figure 8.9 Resistive voltages. 
(a) Physical structure 
(b) Current waveshape 
(c) v 1  
( d l  V2 
stores, shown in 8.1qa). If lightning current were to  contact such external 
stores, it would have t o  flow through the pylons to  enter the aircraft. The 
pylons, not generally designed as current-carrying members and being points 
where the lightning current would be concentrated, might have a high voltage 
developed across them. Another example might be the structural bolts attaching 
a large segment of  the airframe, such as the vertical stabilizer shown in Figure - 
8. I q b ) .  
The effects of  joint resistance on circuits are strongly influenced by the 
manner in which circuits are grounded, as shown in Figure 8.1 1.  Current flowing 
LIGHTNING FL 
Figure 8.1 0 Other examples of resistance. 
(a) The pylons for  external stores 
(b) Joints in structural members 
Figure 8.1 1 Effects of grounding. 
(a) Structural return, V1 = IR 
(b) Single-point ground, V2 = low 
(c) Single-point ground, V3 = IR 
across the joint resistance, R, produces a driving voltage: V = IR. Since the 
circuit across which V1 is measured employs the structure as a ground-return 
path, the circuit couples all of this voltage; thus V1 would be high. A circuit 
employing a single-point ground does not include this resistive drop; hence V2 
would be low. The use of a single-point ground, however, does not eliminate the 
voltage, since in this latter case the voltage at the source end of the circuit, V3, 
would be high. 
These elementary descriptions of joint resistance should not be relied upon 
t o  predict coupling into circuits extending throughout the entire aircraft. The 
more massive the joint and the lower the dc resistance, the greater will be the 
dependence of resistance on the waveform and frequency content of the 
lightning current, and the greater will be the proportionate effects of changing 
magnetic fields. While these effects will be discussed in more detail in other 
sections, one common oversimplification, shown in Figure 8.12, should be 
pointed out  here. If the total end-teend resistance of the aircraft were 2.5 m a  
and a lightning current of 200 000 A were flowing through the aircraft, the 
end-to-end voltage on any circuit could not be depended upon to  be less than 
500 V, the product of the lightning current and the dc resistance. 
Figure 8.12 An oversimplified model. 
Maximum voltage is not determined only by total end-to-end resistance. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE EXTERNAL MAGNETIC FIELD ENVIRONMENT 
9.1 Elementary Considerations 
If a long conductor is carrying a current, I,  and the return path is far 
removed, the average field intensity, Hav, at a distance, r, from the conductor, as 
shown in Figure 9.l(a), is 
If instead of a solid wire the current is carried on a hollow tube of radius r, 
as shown in Figure 9.l(b), the field intensity, H, at radius r is again 
and at the surface of the tube, where r = ro, the field intensity is 
I H = -  
2nro (9.3) 
In the interior of the tube, r < ro, the field intensity is zero, a concept that 
will be treated in more detail later. 
Since the circumference, P, of the tube is 
P = 2nro (9.4) 
it follows that the field intensity at the surface of the tube is also equal to the 
total current divided by the circumference. 
In all the cases the units of  field intensity are amperes per meter if the 
radii are measured in meters. 
If the conductor is not cylindrical, as shown in Figure 9.l(c), the field 
intensity at different points on the surface will be different. However, the 
average field intensity will still be equal t o  the total current divided by the 
circumference: 
The actual field intensity will be greater than average at points where the radius 
of curvature is less than average; it wd1 be less than average at points where the 
radius of curvature is greater than average, as shown in Figure 9.2. For example, 
the circumference of the fuselage of a typical fighter aircraft just forward of its 
wing is about 5.5 m. Assuming a lightning stroke current of 3 0  000 A to flow 
through the fuselage, the average field intensity at the surface would be 
Since there are no points of  very sharp radius, the field intensity around the 
fuselage would probably not vary greatly from the average value. 
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Figure 9.1 Magnetic fields around current-carrying conductors. 
(a) Current-carrying filament 
(b) Tubular conductor 
(c) Irregular conductor 
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Figure 9.2 Field intensity vs radius of curvature. 
The situation along a wing carrying lightning current is considerably 
different in that the leading and trailing edges have radii of curvature much 
less than the average. Field intensity along the leading and trailing edges would 
be quite high compared to the field intensity along the top and bottom surfaces, 
for example. 
Figure 9.3 shows, in general, how the magnetic field strengths would vary 
with position on an aircraft if a lightning flash enters through the nose pitot 
boom and leaves through the vertical stabilizer. The field intensity would be 
highest around the pitot boom, lowest around the midsection of the fuselage, 
and high again around the vertical stabilizer. In the vicinity of the nose 
equipment bays, the field would be of greater than average intensity. Since the 
field intensity is inversely proportional to the radius of curvature, it then follows 
that the field intensity outside the fuselage of a large transport aircraft would be 
considerably less than that outside the small fighter aircraft shown on Figure 
9.3. 
Since both the average current density, Jav, and average field intensity, 
Ha,, are equal to the total current divided by the circumference, or 
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Figure 9.3 Variation of magnetic field strength with aircraft radius of curvature. 
it follows that the tangential field intensity at  the surface of a conducting object 
is equal t o  the current density at  that point. This is in fact true, at least for 
transient currents. The relation is not true for dc currents or transients 
sufficiently slow that appreciable magnetic fields penetrate the skin. The 
orientation of  the H field vector is always at right angles to the direction of  the 
current vector. While small gaps in the structure (Figure 9.4) direct the current 
around the gap, the magnetic field is virtually unaffected, except directly on the 
surface and on  a length scale that is small compared to the dimensions of the gap 
interrupting the current flow. 
9.2 Determination of the External Current and Magnetic Flux 
Density 
Both the resistive voltage drops inside a structure and the amounts of 
magnetic or electric field which penetrate through apertures depend upon the 
external field distribution, most importantly upon the magnetic field distribu- 
tion. This section will discuss some of the ways in which this field distribution 
might be determined. 
The current density a t  the surface of a conductor is seldom determined by 
the dc resistance o f  the conductor; rather, it is primarily controlled by magnetic 
effects. The magnetic distribution of  current density can be calculated in simple 
geometries. Around the periphery of a cylinder, for example, the current density 
is uniform, assuming the return path for that current is far removed from the 
cylinder: greater than ten times the diameter of the cylinder. 
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Figure 9.4 Current flow and magnetic field around structural gaps. 
(a) Current entering typical wing 
(b) Resultant magnetic field virtually unaffected 
by slot interrupting flow of current 
9.2.1 Elliptical Conductors 
Another geometry of considerable practical importance is the ellipse, 
d 
shown in Figure 9.5. At the center (X = 0, Y = +-) the magnetic field intensity 
is given by 2 
b 
and at  the edge (X = +-, Y = 0) 
2 
At intermediate points the magnetic field intensity or current density is given by 
the expression (References 9.1 and 9.2) 
I 1 H surface = - (9.1 1) 
0 
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Figure 9.5 Magnetic field intensity at the surface of an elliptical conductor. 
This current distribution does not hold for dc currents where the current density 
over the surface is determined by the dc resistance. If the conductor were an 
elliptical cylinder of uniform thickness, the current density would be uniform. 
The region over which a transition takes place between the uniform distribution 
of current governed by resistance and the nonuniform distribution governed by 
magnetic fields (Equation 9.1 1) is indicated as follows: 
where 
The classical skin depth, 6, is 
where 
b = width 
d = depth 
p = resistivity 
p = permeability 
o = angular frequency 
As an example of the frequency range over which the transition takes 
place, consider an elliptic cylinder made from aluminum @ = 2.69 x a m )  
with width (b) 1 m, depth (d) 0.25 m, and a wall thickness of 1 mm. The skin 
depth and value of the term 
is given in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 SKIN DEPTH AS A FUNCTION OF FREQUENCY 
Frequency Skin depth 
f 6 
Even at  1 0  Hz the  current crowds t o  the edges of the ellipse and has a current 
density given b y  Equation 9.1 I .  At 1 kHz the skin depth is about 0.25 cm,and 
at 10 kHz it is less than 1 mm. 
Thus, the region over which the current density changes from its uniform 
dc value to  the limiting ac distribution is 1 to  10 Hz. The current density 
remains a t  that value u p  t o  indefinitely high frequencies, probably until the 
width of the cylinder becomes on  the order of a tenth of a wavelength. The 
current density through the wall thickness of the cylinder remains constant over 
the range 0 t o  3 kHz (approx.). 
In many cases the external current density may be determined with 
accuracy sufficient for practical purposes by approximating the surface under 
consideration by an ellipse or ellipses. If such an approximation does not give 
sufficient accuracy, there are other techniques that may be used. 
9.2.2 Numerical Solution of Fields 
Analytically the solution of  the field around a currentcarrying conductor 
may be determined by a solution of Laplace's equation: 
where 
v2@ = 0 (9.14) 
@ = the potential. 
In rectangular coordinates Laplace's equation becomes 
For some geometries Laplace's equation can be solved analytically: an 
elliptical geometry is one of  those cases The equations defining the field 
distribution will not be presented here, but Figure 9.6 shows an example o f  the 
field around an elliptical conductor. This field may be viewed as the electric field 
around an isolated ellipsoid, the figure showing the field in one plane passing 
through the major axis of  the ellipsoid or the field around an elliptic cylinder of 
infinite length. Alternatively, it may be viewed as the magnetic field around an 
infinitely long elliptic cylinder carrying current into the plane of the figure. If 
the field is viewed as an electric field, the flow lines represent the path along 
which displacement currents flow, and if it is viewed as a magnetic field, the 
equipotential lines define the paths along which magnetic flux lines flow. The 
return path for either the voltage maintaining the charge or the return path for 
the current is assumed to be sufficiently far away from the conductor that it 
does not influence the field around the indicated region. 
The indicated flow lines divide the region into 44 sectors. At the surface of 
the conductor, the magnetic field strength is inversely proportional t o  the 
spacing between the flow lines. Since the average field strength around the 
surface is 
I H = -  (9.16) 
P 
it follows that the field strength a t  the surface between any two flow lines is 
- 
1 
"surface (9.1 7) 
FLOW LINES 
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Figure 9.6 The field around an elliptical conductor. 
In only the simplest geometries is it possible to  calculate the field 
analytically. Usually one must resort to  some numerical or graphical method of 
determining the field. Numerically, the field may be determined by a numerical 
solution of Laplace's equation. Figure 9.7 shows a conductor at  potential P 
surrounded by a return conductor, a circle in this case, at potential 0. To this 
geometly is fitted a rectangular grid, shown here as a very coarse grid. 
Initially, all the grid points that lie on the conductor would be assigned a 
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Figure 9.7 A rectangular grid for evaluation of Laplace's equation. 
potential P, and all the grid points that lie on the return path would be assigned 
a potential zero. Laplace's equation in two dimensions can be shown t o  be 
approximately 
From this it follows that Laplace's equation is satisfied if the numeric values at 
four points surrounding a central point have values that satisfy the equation 
A determination of the field around the conductor then involves assigning 
field values at all of the points between the conductor and its return path, and 
adjusting the value of these points until Equation 9.19 is satisfied everywhere 
within the grid. The literature (Reference 9.3 and 9.4) indicates a number of the 
numerical techniques by which the potentials at the points may be adjusted t o  
their final values. While the process is tedious, it is not completely impractical t o  
d o  by hand. Usually the process is done by computer routines that solve the 
field equations. In addition t o  tabulating the numerical values of  the field at  the 
grid points, frequently such computer routines allow one t o  plot the flow and 
equipotential lines. 
Any solution of  Laplace's equation will also allow the pattern of coupling 
through an aperture, as well as the external field pattern, t o  be calculated. Most 
computer routines deal either with two-dimensional problems or problems with 
rotational symmetry. In a twedirnensional case, the aperture would run the 
length of the conductor being studied. This is not necessarily a disadvantage, 
since some important geometries and apertures are basically two-dimensional. 
An important aperture is that which may exist on the trailing edge of  a wing 
when the flaps have been extended. Since i t  is a convenient region t o  reach, 
wiring is often placed in this region. Electrically it is a poor place, since the 
aperture is near a region where the magnetic fields external to  the wing are high. 
Another important set of  apertures that may be approximated as a continual 
opening is that formed by the windows in the fuselage of a transport aircraft. 
In principle, the field around three-dimensional objects may also be solved 
numerically by extending Equation 9.18 to include 8 points on a cube 
surrounding a central point. Solutions of the fields around three-dimensional 
objects not involving rotational symmetry are seldom attempted because o f  the 
great increase in the amount of computer storage locations required t o  define 
the field satisfactorily in three dimensions. 
9.2.3 Hand Plotting of Fields 
The fields around any geometry may also be determined graphically by  a 
cut-and-try process in which flow lines and equipotential lines are drawn o n  the 
geometry and adjusted until repeated subdivision always yields smalI squares and 
the flow and equipotential lines intersect a t  all points a t  right angles. 
Cut-and-try field plotting, of which Figure 9.8 is an imperfect example, 
may with care, patience, and liberal use o f  a soft pencil and eraser yieId a field 
pattern of any desired accuracy. 
9.2.4 CaIculation Using Wire Grids 
Another approach t o  determining current density, shown in Figure 9.9, is 
based on the premise that a two-dimensional geometry can be represented as an 
array of parallel wires. If the current in each wire is known, the average current 
density along the surface d e f i e d  by  any  two wires will be the average of the 
current on  the two wires divided by  the spacing between the wires. 
Figure 9.8 Cut-and-try field plotting 
If the wires are all of infinite length, so  that n o  end effects need be 
considered, and are all connected together a t  their ends, the manner in  which 
current divides among the wires may be calculated with the aid of the simple 
computer program MAGFLD, the elements of  which are discussed below, and 
the program given in Appendix 1. The equations governing the current 
distribution are given below. 
Let the location of the wires be defined in terms of the rectangular 
coordinates xi and yi, and Iet the radius of the conductors be r l .  The 
self-inductance per unit length of each wire is 
henries per meter. In this equation R is defined as the distance from the 
conductor, o r  from the group of conductors, t o  an arbitrary return path. The 
numerical accuracy of  the current distribution t o  be calculated does not depend 
critically upon the value assigned t o  R, but  it should be o f  the order of 10 to 20 
times the greatest dimension of  the structure being modeled. 
Between any two conductors, ij, there will be a mutual inductance: 
henries per meter. 
The spacing between conductors, ri,, can be determined from the 
coordinates of  the conductors. If a group of conductors, each carrying a current, 
(Figure 9.10) is considered, and if the self- and mutual inductances of and 
between each conductor are known, the voltages across the self-inductance of 
each conductor will be as follows: 
I 
CONDUCTOR i 
\ (4 / 
Figure 9.9 A structure defined as an array of wires. 
(a) The array 
(b) Coordinates defining location 
(c) Definition of the return path fo r  current 
V l / u  = L l i l - M i 2 i 2 - M I 3 i 3  . . . .  -Mlnin (9.22) 
V 2 / u  = -M 21 i 1 t L2i2 - MZ3i3 . . . . -M2,,in (9.23) 
V31u = -Mj , i ,  - Mj2i2 - Lj i j  . . . . -Mjnin (9.24) 
V V / a  = -M n l  i 1 -Mn2i2 - Mn3i3. . . . Lni n (9.25) 
Equations 9.22 through 9.25 may be placed in matrix notation as follows: 
Figure 9.10 Mutually coupled inductances. 
or, in more compact notation 
In Equations 9.26 and 9.27 the normalized angular frequency o has been 
set equal to unity. 
Multiplying by the inverse of  the M matrix, I M 1-I , gives the following: 
where ml I ,  m l 2 ,  m l 3  are the elements of the inverse of the M matrix. 
If all of  the  voltages are the same and equal t o  V, as is the case if all of  the 
inductances are connected in parallel, the absolute current in each element is 
- in - (mnl  + mn2 + mn3 . . . . + m n n ) V  (9.34) 
The total current that flows, which is proportional t o  the impressed voltage, is 
ir = (il + i2 + i3 + .... i n ) V  (9.3 5) 
The fraction of the total current that flows in each circuit is 
9.2.5 Measurements Using Wire Grids 
An alternate experimental method of determining current distribution is 
shown in Figure 9.1 1. I t  would be entirely feasible t o  model the surface of an 
aircraft by a grid o f  wires spaced over a supporting framework or placed on the 
surface of  a complete model made from nonconductive materials. If a 
high-frequency current were passed through the wire grid in a path similar to  
that expected for a lightning flash, it would be possible to  measure the current 
in the individual wires by  a clamp-on current probe. 
T o  the author's knowledge such a wire grid model has not yet  been used t o  
study current distribution resulting from lightning flashes striking aircraft, but 
somewhat similar models have been used to measure the current distribution in 
ground-based launching facilities (References 9.5 and 9.6), for studies of  the 
interaction of aircraft and missile systems with the electromagnetic fields 
generated b y  the explosions of nuclear weapons, and for the study of magnetic 
fields in and around the towers used t o  support high-voltage transmission lines. 
In principle, the wire grids should follow as closely as possible the expected 
current distribution paths and should be interconnected frequently by  other 
wires circling the structural member being modeled. It would probably be best if 
the interconnecting wires tended t o  form orthogonal squares with the wires 
running along the flow lines, in a manner similar t o  the orthogonal squares 
formed by flux and equipotential lines shown on Figure 9.6. 
In the studies mentioned for current distribution on ground-based 
launching facilities, current with a frequency on the order of  5 0  t o  100 kHz 
proved satisfactory. Clamp-on current transformers of the requisite size and 
sensitivity are commercially available. 
It  may well be that the cost of  building such a model and making actual 
measurements o f  current distribution might be cheaper than the cost of  trying to 
study current distribution by field plotting methods, either manual o r  computer 
aided, or by analytical determination of the distribution of currents in parallel 
filaments. 
WIRES TENDING TO 
JOIN AT RIGHT ANGLES 
OSCILLOSCOPE MONITORING 
CURRENT DENSITY 
RRENT MEASURING 
TRANSFORME 
OSCILLOSCOPE MONITORING 
TOTAL CURRENT 
Figure 9.1 I The wire grid model. 
9.3 Examples of External Magnetic Fields 
The magnetic field within and around the cluster of wires can be 
determined by taking the proper summation of the magnetic field produced by 
each individual wire. The computer program MAGFLD provides such a 
summation. 
Some examples of  calculations performed with MAGFLD will now be 
described. They will serve to  illustrate some of the points discussed in previous 
sections. The geometry chosen for analysis is the fuselage of the hypothetical 
aircraft shown in Figure 9.12. The aircraft, whose airworthiness is not under 
discussion, has a fuselage of elliptical cross section, two meters along the major 
axis and one meter along the minor axis. The fuselage is considered long enough 
that n o  end effects need to be considered. A lightning current of 1000 A is 
assumed t o  enter the nose and to exit through the rear of the fuselage. This 
elliptical fuselage is represented by 48 parallel conductors distributed in the 
manner shown in Figure 9.13. Figure 9.13 also shows the current density, or 
magnetic field strength, at the surface of the cylinder, both as determined from 
the program MAGFLD and analytically according t o  Equation 9.1 1. 
Figure 9.12 A hypothetical fuselage t o  be modeled as a wire grid. 
One quadrant of  the elliptic cylinder is shown on Figure 9.14. This figure 
shows the magnetic field strength both within and around the wire grid as 
calculated by MAGFLD. The orientation of the magnetic field is shown by  the 
direction of the arrows, and the strength both by the length of  the arrows and 
by the indicated contour lines. The magnetic field strength inside the grid is 
much smaller than that outside, since on the inside the fields from each of  the 
filaments tend to cancel, whereas outside the grid they tend to add. In Figure 
9.14 the fields inside the grid are largely the result of the finite number of wires 
defining the elliptic cylinder. If the cylinder were defined by  more conductors, 
the fields inside would be smaller, presumably vanishing if the number of  wires 
were t o  become infinite. Figure 9.15 shows a similar plot with one important 
difference: the current was forced t o  be equal in each wire. The magnetic field 
pattern produced here would be that determined by  the resistive current 
distribution, the pattern that represents the final stage after currents and current 
density have become uniform. The orientation of the field external to  the grid 
shows only relatively slight differences from that in Figure 9.14, but those 
differences are sufficient t o  account for the increased field intensity in the 
interior o f  the grid. A third example o f  field distribution, shown in Figure 9.16, 
assumes that on each side of  the fuselage there is a recessed cavity. Such a cavity 
would be an approximation of the equipment bays for electronic equipment 
frequently found on military aircraft. Figure 9.16 again assumes the current in 
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Figure 9.13 Wire grid approximation of the elliptical fuselage. 
each fdament t o  be controlled by the magnetic distribution. The field patterns 
clearly show the field in the recessed cavity to  be less than the field at other 
exterior points on the fuselage. 
The degree t o  which the MAGFLD program can calculate the magnetic 
field external t o  the aircraft fuselage, while interesting, may not be of great use 
for aircraft studies, since it is usually only the field intensity at the surface of  the 
structure that is o f  interest. The program, however, is capable of calculating the 
field distribution interior t o  these simple geometries with sufficient accuracy for 
many purposes. One such purpose is to  help determine the effective area through 
which circulating currents flow. For  such calculations, as shown on  Figure 9.1 5, 
the number of  filaments defining the structure can be greatly increased, since 
each of them will carry a uniform current. Determining the current distribution 
on  many more fdaments when that current is determined magnetically might 
lead t o  numeric problems, since the order of the matrix that must be inverted is 
equal to  the number of conductors involved. The greatest utility of the 
MAGFLD program would be t o  calculate the current density or magnetic field 
density at the surface of a structure. Figure 9.17 shows the current distribution 
on the filaments for the geometry previously shown on Figure 9.16. The current 
density here is determined magnetically. 
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Figure 9.1 7 Current distribution and magnetic field strength at the surface 
(one quadrant only shown). 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE INTERNAL MAGNETIC FIELDS CREATED BY DIFFUSION 
10.1 Circular Cylinders 
Consider Figure 10.1 in which a current, I, is entering a circular cylinder. 
The cylinder is considered long compared to other dimensions, so that there are 
no end effects, but short compared to the electrical wavelength of any o f  the 
frequency components of the current I .  The return path for the current is not 
shown, but it is assumed to be sufficiently far away from the cylinder that there 
are no proximity effects. Also shown are two conductors, one external ( I )  and 
one internal (2) to  the cylinder. These are connected to an end cap considered 
sufficiently massive that n o  electromagnetic fields penetrate the cap. At the 
other end of the cylinder are shown two voltages, V 1  measured from conductor 
1 to  the external surface of the cylinder, and V2 measured from conductor 2 to 
the inner surfilce of  the cylinder. 
10.1.1 Resistance 
The cylinder will have a dc resistance 
where p = resistivity 
Q = length 
A = cross-sectional area 
r = radius 
a = thickness (a<<r) 
If the cylinder has the following dimensions and is made of aluminum o f  the 
indicated resistivity 
Q = 2m 
r = 15.7cm 
a = 0.28 1 mm (0.01 5") 
p = 2.69x10-~ !2. rn 
then the dc resistance, R, will be 1.43 x 10-4 R. I f  we consider that the input 
current is 116 A, there will then be developed a voltage 
If the current of  116 A is established and allowed to flow for a time sufficiently 
long that steady state conditions are reached, the voltage developed along the 
cylinder will then be 16.6 mV. This same voltage drop would be measured by a 
conductor external t o  the cylinder or by one internal t o  the cylinder. 
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Figure 10.1 Magnetic fields around a circular 
(a) Geometry 
(b) Field intensity vs radius (for 
cylinder. 
I = 116 
10.1.2 The External Loop Voltage 
Until such steady state conditions have been established, V1 will not be 
equal t o  V2, and neither of them will be equal to the steady state resistance 
voltage drop. Consider first voltage V1. External to the cylinder the flow of 
current sets up a magnetic field of intensity. 
where I = current 
r = radius 
H = field strength 
having a pattern as shown in Figure 1 O.l(b). V1 will then be 
and @, the flux passing through the loop ABCD, is represented by the shaded 
area of Figure lO.l(b). The flux, @, would be measured in webers. Remembering 
that 
V I  becomes 
If 12 is 31.4 cm andtheindicated current of 116 A rises to crest in an equivalent 
time of 0.25 ps (Figure 10.2), V1 will then rise to an initial voltage of 129 V. As 
steady state conditions are reached and the external magnetic field ceases to 
change with time, V1 will decay to its steady state value of 0.0166 V. 
-4 0 . 2 5 ~ ~  time 
Figure 10.2 External voltage (not to scale). 
This analysis ignores the skin effect, a phenomenon that causes the 
effective resistance to be higher under transient conditions than under steady 
state conditions. For conductors external to the cylinder, the increased 
resistance resulting from skin effect will be of little consequence compared to 
the much larger voltage induced by the changing magnetic field. 
While conductors external to  a current-carrying cylinder, such as an 
aircraft fuselage, are not common, they are not unknown. An example might be 
the cables on a missile or rocket that run between a control assembly in the nose 
and the engine controls at the tail. Of necessity, such cables must run, as shown 
in Figure 10.3, external to the fuel and oxidizer tanks. If the cables are not in a 
shielded cable tunnel, they will be exposed to the external magnetic field. 
If the spacing between the wires and the surfaces of  the vehicle is not 
large, Equation 10.5 may be somewhat simplified, since the magnetic flux 
density does not vary greatly with distance away from the surface of the vehicle 
and may be considered uniform. 
10.1.3 The Internal Loop Voltages 
Let us  now consider the conditions internal t o  the cylinder, where 
conditions are very different. First o f  all, the magnetic field internal t o  the inner 
surface o f  the cylinder will be zero. This may be shown as in Figure 10.4. Let 
there be passed two planes parallel t o  the axis through any internal point, P, the 
planes separated b y  a small angle, a. The magnitudes of the currents in the two 
filaments are t o  each other as the ratio of the distances from point P. 
Furthermore, the magnetic intensity effects of the filaments at P have the ratio 
unity 
These two filaments then create no field at any internal point; nor does the tube 
as a whole, as it is composed of filament pairs. 
The second important factor is that the phenomenon of skin effect delays 
the buildup of current on the inner surface of the cylinder. The origin of the 
skin effect phenomenon is shown in Figure 10.5. If a magnetic field line is 
assumed to be suddenly established internal t o  the wall of the conducting 
cylinder, there will be induced eddy currents circulating around that field line. 
These eddy currents will induce a magnetic field of their own of polarity 
opposite to  that set up  by  the external magnetic field. Only as the eddy currents 
decay will the magnetic field penetrate the wall o f  the cylinder. 
The current density across the wall thickness at several times is shown in 
Figure 10.5(b). Initially, the current density for a step-function input current is 
entirely confined t o  the outer surface. At a slightly later time, t 1,  the current 
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Figure 10.4 Cylindrical tube of current. Internal magnetic field intensity is 
zero. 
density will still be high near the outer surface, but a small amount of current 
will have penetrated to the inner surface. As time increases, the current density 
on the outer surface will fall, and the current density on the finer surface will 
increase, until at tfinal the current density will be uniform across the surface of 
the wall. At any time, the area under the current density curve multiplied by the 
peripheral distance around the cylinder will equal the input current. The resistive 
voltage drop along any surface (including any line internal to the wall of the 
cylinder) will be equal t o  the product of the current density at that point times 
the resistivity of  the material. Accordingly, the voltage drop along the inner 
surface must folldw the curve defining the buildup of current density on the 
inner surface. 
10.1.4 The Characteristic Diffusion-Type Response 
The nature of this response is shown in Figure 10.6 and is governed by the 
following equation : 
Figure 10.6 is plotted in terms of a characteristic time constant, T ,  sometimes 
called the penetration time constant. 
r EXTERNAL MAGNETIC FIELD LlNE / INTERNAL MAGNETIC FIELD LlNE 
/I r CIRCULATING CURRENT d l  1 r MAGNETIC FIELD LlNE PRODUCED BY THE CIRCULATING CURRENT 
(b) 
Figure 10.5 Factors governing the internal voltage. 
(a) Geometry and decaying eddy currents 
(b) Current density at different times 
R,  the dc resistance of  the tube, is 
where p = resistivity of the material 
a = thickness o f  the wall 
r = radius o f  the tube 
L, the internal inductance of  the tube, is given by 
where p = permeability of  the material 
Hence the penetration time constant is seen t o  be 
pa2 7 = -  
n2p 
time 
Figure 10.6 Diffusion-type response t o  a step function. 
The response curve, shown in Figure 10.6, is called a drfusion-type 
response and is characteristic of many types of situations involving the 
transmission of energy through a distributed medium. An example would be the 
transfer of heat into a block if a heat flux were suddenly applied to one face of  
the block. Another example would be the transfer of electrical energy through 
an R/C or L/R ladder network. Figure 10.7 shows examples, with Figure 10.7(b) 
often being used as the best illustrative example of the phenomenon of skin 
effect. Several important observations might be made about the shape of  the 
response curve shown in Figure 10.6. The first is that the response initially 
changes only slowly and thus has a zero first derivative, unlike a simple 
exponential response, which has a finite first derivative. The second is that the 
response approaches its final value much more slowly than does a simple 
exponential response. The third is that in three tirne constants the response has 
reached a large fraction of its final value. In three tinie constants the 
diffusion-type response reaches 90%', while the exponential response reaches 
95% of its final value. 
R/n (n SECTIONS) 
(n SECTIONS) I ouf 
(b) 
Figure 10.7 Ladder networks displaying a diffusion-ty pe response. 
(a) R/C network 
(b) L/R network 
With respect to Equation 10.13 it should be noted that the penetration 
time constant is directly proportional t o  the pernieability of the material, 
inversely proportional to the resistivity of the material, and directly proportional 
to  the square of thickness of  the material. The relative pernieability of  structural 
material used in aircraft is almost always very nearly unity. Thickness and 
resistivity can vary over wide ranges. 
For reference, Equation 10.13 is shown plotted in Figure 10.8 as a 
function of material thickness and the resistivity of the material. The resistivities 
of  some typical metals are shown in Table 10.1. As an exarnple, if we assume an 
aluminum alloy of resistivity twice that of copper and a skin thickness of 0.040 
inches, the penetration tinie constant would be 3.9 ps. If a step-function current 
were established on  the outside of  a sheet of such metal, it would take 11.7 ps 
for the current density on  the other side to  buildup to 90% of  its final value. 
Returning to Figure 10.5, we are now in a position to  evaluate V2. The 
fundamental definition of the voltage between any two points is 
where P is the potential at any point. There is an infinite variety of paths that 
one (night take going from point A t o  point D, but the simplest to  consider is 
the path A-B-C-D. The path A-B is along the inner surface of the cylinder. 
Integrating along this path, the potential difference obtained is the internal 
voltage drop on  the wall of the cylinder. Along path B-C there will be n o  
potential difference, since we have assumed that the end cap is sufficiently 
massive that there will be n o  voltage drops along its inner surface. Along path 
C-D again there will be no potential difference, since we will assume that the 
conductor is not carrying any current. To  the resistive drops will then be added 
the voltage produced around the loop by the passage of  changing magnetic fields 
through the loop ABCD. As explained earlier, in a circular geometry there is n o  
magnetic field internal t o  the cylinder. Consequently, there will be n o  
magnetically induced component of voltage, and V2 will have the shape shown 
on Figure 10.6, where the final value is given by the dc resistance drop along the 
cylinder. 
INCHES 
Figure 10.8 Skin thickness vs penetration time constant. 
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Table 10.1 RESISTIVITIES OF TYPICAL METALS 
Conductivity Resistivity 
Resistivity as a fraction of relative t o  
Material ohm-meters that of copper copper 
copper 1.68 x 1 oe8 1 .O 1 .O 
aluminum* 2.69 x lo-' 0.62 1.6 
magnesium** 4.46 x 0.38 2.65 
nickel l o x  lo-8 0.17 6 
Monel 42  x 0.04 25 
stainless steel 7 0 x  0.024 4 2 
Inconel lOOx lo-8 0.01 7 60  
titanium 180 x 0.009 107 
*Aluminum alloys range from 2.8 to 5.6 x S2.m; harder alloys generally 
have higher resistivities. 
**Magnesium alloys containing aluminum and zinc range from 10 to 17 x 
O m .  
10.2 Elliptical Cylinders 
If we consider a cylinder of other than circular shape, conditions may be 
considerably different. Figure 10.9 shows an elliptical cylinder into which a 
step-function current is injected. As previously, we will assume that the cylinder 
is long enough that all end effects may be neglected, that it is short compared to 
the wavelengths of any frequency components of the injected current, and that 
the return path for the current is far enough removed that no proximity effects 
need be considered. 
We will also treat the instantaneous current in the cylinder as being 
composed of the sum of a steady state and a transient component of current. 
The transient component takes the form of a circulating eddy current. For the 
following section it should be kept in mind that the eddy currents described 
represent only the transient component of current and that the total current at 
any point or time is the sum of the two components. 
10.2.1 Eddy Currents and the External Magnetic Field 
Under steady state conditions the current density along the wall of the 
cylinder will be governed by the dc resistance and, if we assume uniform wall 
thickness, will have a uniform current density. The current in the cylinder will 
produce a magnetic field. Most of the field lines will completely encircle the 
cylinder, as shown in Figure 10.9(a), but some, because of the uniform current 
density, will pass through the cylinder. The greater the eccentricity of the 
Figure 10.9 Magnetic fields around an elliptical cylinder. 
(a) Penetrating lines of flux 
(b) Detail showing resolution into components 
(c) Circulating currents induced by 
penetrating lines of flux 
cylinder, the greater will be the number of lines of flux passing through the 
cylinder. Those lines that d o  pass through the walls of the cylinder will have 
important effects on the ~nternal  response of the cylinder prior to  the time that 
steady state conditions have been established. One such penetrating line is shown 
in Figure 10.9(b). The vector defining that line may, at the point of entry, be 
resolved into two vector components, one normal to the surface, @,, and 
another tangential to the surface, Cbt. I f  the field line @ is suddenly established, it 
will induce a circulating, or eddy, current in the conducting sheet which it 
attempts to  penetrate. The eddy current will produce a magnetic field of its 
own, and the intensity of the eddy current will be of a nature such that the 
magnetic field produced is exactly that required t o  cancel the normal 
component of the exterior field. If, as shown in Figure 10.9(c), a number of 
lines of magnetic flux attempt t o  penetrate the surface of the elliptical cylinder, 
the eddy currents produced by each line of flux combine to  produce a 
circulating current. In an elliptical cylinder of this nature there will be four 
regions of circulating current, two on each of the two sides. These circulating 
currents will be of a nature such as to  increase the current density at  the edges of 
the cylinder and to reduce it along the center. They also cancel any penetrating 
magnetic field, forcing the field around the cylinder t o  be entirely tangential to  
the surface, a t  least initially. 
The eddy currents cannot exist forever, since energy will be lost as the 
currents circulate through the resistance of the metal sheet. Accordingly, the 
current density at all points will vary with time, eventually becoming uniformly 
distributed in structures having uniform thickness and made of  uniform 
resistivity materials. Figure 10.10 shows the manner in which the current density 
will vary. As the circulating current shown in Figure 10.10(c) decays to zero, 
the current at the edge will decay from its initial high value to  the final 
resistively determined value, and the current at the center will increase from its 
initially low value. The current densities will change according to an essentially 
exponential pattern, though the transient increase in surface resistance produced 
by skin effects will prevent the circulating current from following a true 
exponential decay. 
One expression giving the magnitude of this redistribution time constant 
that has appeared in the literature (Reference 10.1) is: 
where A = enclosed area of structure 
P = peripheral distance around the structure 
The thickness of  the wall, a, is assumed to be very small compared t o  other 
dimensions. For a rectangular box of  sides height h and width d ,  Equation 10.15 
becomes 
A physical treatment of the redistribution time constant can also be given. 
I f  the decay is treated as exponential, the factors governing that decay are the 
characteristic inductance and resistance o f  the path through which the 
circulating currents flow. These factors are illustrated in Figure 10.1 1.  The 
circulating currents may be viewed as flowing in one direction along a strip along 
the edge of the cylinder and back along another strip towards the center of the 
cylinder. The rate at which the circulating currents decrease is governed by the 
inductance and resistance of  the pair of hypothetical strips. Such a pair is shown 
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Figure 10. I0 Variation of current-density with time. 
(a) Current components defined 
(b) Edge and center currents 
(c) Circulating currents 
at the top of Figure 10.1 l(a). The resistance of the pair of strips will be 
where S = width 
Q = length 
a = thickness 
(b) 
Figure 10.11 Geometrical factors governing the decay of the circulating current. 
(a) The character of the L-R circuit 
(b) The width of the strip involved 
The inductance of a similar geometry (Figure 10.12) is given by Grover 
(Reference 10.2) as 
where K and e are factors relating to the geometrical mean radius of the strips. 
For the limiting case of Figure 10.1 2(b) 
log, K = -.I137 
log, e = 0 
L = 0.555 x 10% 
Figure 10.12 Inductance of parallel strips. 
(a) General case 
(b) Limiting case 
The inductive time constant would then be 
and for a lu~~tinurn of resistivity 2.69 x S2-m 
The time constant governing the decay of  the circulating currents is thus 
seen t o  depend upon the width of the region through which the lines of flux 
would tend to penetrate. Since the penetrating lines of flux would tend to be 
confined to the outer portion of the ellipse, it appears that the effective width 
would be of the order of one-eighth of the peripheral distance around the 
cylinder. 
A numerical example is as follows: if the effective-width strip through the 
circulating currents flow is 0.123 m and the thickness is 0.038 cm (0.015 
inches), the L/R time constant is 4 8 0  ps. 
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10.2.2 Eddy Currents and the Internal Magnetic Field 
As the circulating currents die out and the external lines of flux penetrate 
the walls of the cylinders, there will be set up an internal magnetic field oriented 
as shown in Figure 10.13. In its latter stages the rate at which the internal field 
builds up will be dependent upon the rate at which the externally induced 
circulating currents die away. For an elliptical cylinder made of aluminum of 
thickness 0.038 cm, having a major axis of 4 7  cm, a minor axis of  9.4 cm, and a 
peripheral distance of  98.7 cm, the internal field will build up with a time 
constant of the aforementioned 480  MS. 
FINAL FLUX ORIENTATION 
INITIAL FLUX ORIENTATION 
t t 
I 
/ 
/ 
Figure 10.13 The internal magnetic field that arises as a result of flux 
pentration. 
The early time buildup o f  the magnetic field will be strongly influenced by 
the phenomenon of skin effect, and the initial rate of buildup of magnetic field 
will now be seen t o  have an important effect on the voltages induced on circuits 
contained within such an elliptical cylinder. Figures 10.5 and 10.6 showed how 
an electric field will be built up  along the inner surface of a circular cylinder. In 
a similar manner, an electric field will be built up along the inner surface of  the 
elliptical cylinder, but,  unlike the circular cylinder, the electric field intensity 
will be different a t  different points on the internal surface of the elliptical 
cylinder, since the initial current density on the outer surface is not uniform. 
The internal electrical field will be essentially proportional to  the current density 
on the exterior surface, but delayed and distorted as a result of the pulse 
penetration time produced by eddy currents (shown in Figure 10.6). The 
internal electric field, Ei ,  being different a t  different points on the inner surface, 
will give rise to circulating currents on the inner surface. The currents may again 
be visualized as flowing on paired strips. There will be four pairs of strips, two 
on each of  the sides of the cylinder. Each of these strips will have associated 
with it an inductance and resistance which may again be calculated from the 
expressions given earlier. The equivalent circuit governing the rate of buildup of 
internal current then becomes that of  Figure 10.14, which may be simplified to  
that of  Figure 10.15. If eie were a step function, the buildup of current would 
follow the expression 
'circ 
(b) 
Figure 10.14 Factors governing the early time buildup of the internal magnetic 
field. 
(a) Physical factors 
(b) Equivalent circuit 
eie = on effective driving voltage 
reloted to the initiol non- 
uniformity of external current 
Figure 10.15 Final equivalent circuit governing increase of internal circulating 
circuit. 
If the internal voltage were not a step function but were governed by some other 
function of time, such as the pulse penetration predicted by Equation 10.9, the 
internal current would be 
The convolution integral of Equation 10.25 need not be evaluated analytically, 
since only the early time rate of change of current is important. So long as the 
current is small, the voltage across the resistive part o f  the circuit will be small 
and the voltage across the inductive part will be equal to  the internal resistance 
drop. Under these conditions the internal current will be 
The internal magnetic field will follow the same time pattern as that of  the 
buildup of the internal circulating currents. 
10.2.3 Internal Loop Voltages 
We are now in a position t o  evaluate the voltages on conductors contained 
in a cylinder of noncircular geometry. Figure 10.16 shows an elliptical cylinder 
with two internal conductors, one adjacent to  the surface and one in the center. 
Both are connected at one end to an end cap sufficiently massive that no voltage 
drops will appear along its inner surface. The other ends are open circuited. The 
usual assumptions about the length of the cylinder and the return path for the 
injected current are assumed to apply. Voltages V1 and V2 are shown, both 
being measured between their respective conductors and a point on the inner 
wall of the cylinder. Figure 10.16(b) shows that all of the internal flux will pass 
between conductor 2 and the inner wall of  the cylinder, while only a small 
amount will pass between conductor 1 and the inner wall. Correspondingly, a 
large fraction of  the internal flux passes through the plane defined by 
conductors 1 and 2. 
A POINT ON THE 
INNER WALL 
CONDUCTOR 1 . CONDUCTOR 2 
I \ SMALL AMOUNT OF INTERNAL FLUX I I 
(b) \ LARGE AMOUNT OF INTERNAL FLUX 
Figure 10.16 Factors governing the internal voltaye, 
(a) The geometry 
(b) Internal flux linkages 
The voltage between any two points is defined again as the line integral of 
the potentials around a closed path. Figure 10.17(a) and (b) shows the sinlplest 
paths t o  consider. V1 would be the sum of  the potentials developed around the 
loop ABCD. If  there is n o  current along conductor 1 ,  the potential along path 
A-B will be zero. The potential drop along the path B-C will be zero because of  
the assumptions regarding the end cap. The potential along the path C-D will 
then be the voltage drop produced by the inner current density times the 
=resistive = 1 
--------- ---- 
(4 
0 time 
Figure 10.1 7 The internal voltages. 
(a) Detail o f  the edge surface 
(b)  Paths o f  integration 
(c)  Components o f  V 1  
(d) Components o f  V2 
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resistivity of the material along the path C-D. To  these potentials must be added 
the voltage induced magnetically by the changing magnetic flux passing through 
the loop defined by the points A, B, C, and D. If the spacing of the conductor to  
the wall is made vanishingly small, so that C-B and D-A become zero, there will 
be n o  magnetic flux; hence the voltage V1 between points A and D will be only 
the resistive voltage drop along the path C-D. As in the cylindrical geometry 
case, the voltage for a step-function current injected into the exterior of the tube 
will build u p  according to the pattern shown in Figure 10.6. Its magnitude will 
be greater than the d c  resistance drop by the ratio t o  which the initial current 
density on the exterior along the end of the ellipse exceeds the steady state 
current density. 
V2 will again be the sum of  a resistive voltage drop and a magnetically 
induced drop, this time along the path E-F-C-D. The resistive component will be 
identical to  the resistive component of V1, the resistance drop along the path 
C-D. For V2, however, there will be a nonzero magnetic component of voltage 
produced by the passage of a finite amount of magnetic flux through the finite 
loop EFCD. The magnetically induced component o f  voltage will be given by  
where K is a proportionality constant relating the flux produced in the loop 
EFCD t o  the internal current. In Equation 10.26, however, it was shown that 
the internal current was proportional to  the integral of the internal resistance 
drop. This leads to the rather unusual observation that the magnetically induced 
component of voltage has, initially at least, the same waveshape as the 
component o f  voltage produced by the flow of  internal current density through 
the resistance of the material. The long term response of the magnetically 
induced voltage will be different from the resistively generated component, 
since, as steady state conditions are reached and the internal magnetic field 
reaches its final value, its rate of change of the internal magnetic field will 
decrease t o  zero. 
The amount of the magnetically induced voltage will depend upon the 
location of the conductor and upon the degree to  which the initial distribution 
of  magnetic flux around the outside of  the cylinder differs from the final 
distribution of magnetic flux. Since the difference between the initial and the 
final flux patterns is greater for cylinders of high eccentricity than it is for 
cylinders of low eccentricity, it follows that the flatter the cylinder, the greater 
will be the influence of  the magnetic component. 
10.2.4 Experimental Verification 
In order to  demonstrate the above principles, a test was made in which 
current was injected into an elliptical cylinder and the voltage on several internal 
conductors measured. The physical arrangement o f  the test setup is shown in 
Figure 10.18. The cylinder had a major axis of 47 cm, a minor axis of 9.4 cm 
SCREEN ROOM n 
ELLIPTICAL CYLINDER 
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ABOUT 14 mm 
Figure 10.18 Setup of test t o  demonstrate internal voltages in an elliptical 
cylinder. 
(majorlminor = 5) and was made from two sheets of aluminum bent over a 
wooden framework with the overlapping edges stapled at close intervals to  the 
internal wooden framework. The edges overlapped by about 1.4 cm. After 
stapling, the seam was covered with a 5 cm wide sheet of adhesive-backed 
aluminum fod. The thickness of the metal sheet was 0.38 mm (0.015 inches). 
One end of the cylinder was bolted t o  a metal plate facing the outer wall of a 
screen room. The other end of  the cylinder was sealed w ~ t h  metal strips and 
connected to  a pulse generator. The pulse generator consisted of a capacitor 
bank capable of  being charged t o  a maximum of 20 kV. For most of the tests 
the capacitor was 48 pF and was discharged through 160 R into the end of the 
elliptical cylinder. Current was brought into the end of the cylinder through four 
conductors so arranged as t o  minimize any local end effects. Current was 
returned to the pulse generator through six equally spaced return wires spaced 
about 18 inches from the center of the cylinder. Multiple return wires were used 
both t o  minimize the external inductance through which the generator had to 
discharge and to minimize any possible proximity effects. Internal to  the 
cylinder were placed eight conductors at different locat~ons, the locations being 
as shown in Figure 10.19. Two of  the conductors were taped against the inner 
surface of the metal sheet. One of these, conductor number 1 ,  was located at the 
narrow end of the cylinder, while the other, conductor number 8, was located 
about halfway to the center. The rernaining conductors were all located at 
different points along the major axis o f  the ellipse. The conductors were number 
22AWG and insulated with the th~ckness of insulation normal to such 
conductors. Each conductor was connected at the current input end to the inner 
surface of the end cap through a resistor of 68 L2, the purpose of  the resistor 
being t o  damp out  any internal oscillations that might be developed. The 
conductors were terminated on  switches so that measurements could be made t o  
ground on any conductor or be made between any two conductors. 
CONDUCTORS 1 AND 8 WERE TAPED 
2 FLUSH AGAINST THE INNER 
SURFACE OF THE METAL SHEET 
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*y 
4 1 
ABOUT 400 mm 
OF RG 58 A/U 
COAXIAL CABLE 
ELLIPTICAL CYLINDER 
Figure 10.1 9 Arrangement of conductors inside elliptical cylinder. 
(a) Detail 
(b) End view showing locations of conductors 
(c) ElectricaI termination of internal conductors (typical) 
The measurement principles are shown in Figure 10.20. Line-ground 
voltage measurements were made with the normal input preamplifiers of  an 
oscilloscope. The oscilloscope was located in the screen room directly adjacent 
t o  the end of  the elliptical cylinder and connected t o  the output jacks on the 
cylinder by only a short length of coaxial cable. Accordingly, the measurenients 
would not be influenced by any loading effects of the measurement cables. 
Voltages between pairs of conductors were made with the oscilloscope 
preamplifier in the A minus B mode. Since the voltage between any  pair of 
conductors would depend only upon the magnetically induced component of 
voltage, the resistive component being rejected by the d~fferential amplifier, it 
was then possible to  integrate the difference voltage and derive a signal 
proportional to the internal magnetic field. This was done using an operational 
amplifier connected as an integrator, shown in Figure 10.10(c). 
Typical tests results are shown in Figures 10.11 and 10.22. Figure 10.21 
shows, on four different time scales, the injected current and the line-to-ground 
voltage on two different conductors, conductor I located adjacent t o  the small 
radius end of the ellipse and conductor 7 located near the center. With the 
1 
eo = - I (V ,-V ,) dt 
R c  
'+ = I (Vl-V2) dt 
Figure 10.20 Measurement principles. 
(a) Line-ground measurements 
(b) Line-line measurement 
(c) Magnetic field measurement 
exception of the oscillograms displayed at 500 ps per division, the input current 
can be considered as a step-function current. In both cases the line-ground 
voltage is seen to display the pulse penetration-type response shown in Figure 
10.6. The small bump at the leading end of the voltage on conductor 1 is 
primarily the result o f  leakage from the surge generator into the screen rooni 
housing the measuring instruments and to coupling from the trigger pulse used 
t o  fire the surge generator. In both cases the initial rise of voltage follows the 
same pattern and reaches essentially its final value in about 3 ,us, a time in 
accordance with the calculated pulse penetration time constant of 1.7 ps 
discussed previously. At later times the voltage on conductor I is seen to decay 
back toward a lower final value in the manner shown in Figure 10.17. Likewise, 
the voltage on  conductor 7 is seen t o  be nearly flat, rising only slightly, as shown 
in Figure 10.21. It is probably only a fortuitous combination of conductor 
location and the characteristics of the elliptical cylinder that result in the voltage 
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CURRENT 
CONDUCTOR 
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Figure 10.21 Variation of conductor voltage with time. 
(Leading edges of waveforms retouched for photographic clarity) 
on conductor 7 beirtg nearly flat. If the injected current were truly a step 
function, the two voltages would eventually become equal to the dc resistance 
drop. The bottom set of oscillograms indicates that the current significantly 
departs from a step-function current pattern at later times, and this is reflected 
in the long-time response o f  the two line-ground voltages. Just as the voltage on 
conductor 7 lagged behind the voltage on conductor I during the initial phase of 
the response, it lags behind during the final decay of  the current. The 
redistribution time constant with which V I  decays toward its final value is seen 
to be of the order of 300  ps, in accordance with the calculations predicated on 
the theoretical factors described in Figure 10.10. 
VOLTAGE - 
CONDUCTOR 1 - CONDUCTOR 7 
Figure 10.22 Difference voltages and total flux. 
(Leading edges of waveforms retouched for photographic clarity) 
Figure 10.22 shows the voltages between conductors (displayed on two 
separate oscilloscopes and hence displayed on two separate oscillograms) and the 
i;igral of  the conductor-to-conductor voltage.  his latter is of course 
proportional to  the magnetic flux that builds up  internally t o  the cylinder. 
Since, at early times, the line-to-ground voltages have the same waveshape but  
different amplitudes, it follows that the line-line voltage will also have that 
waveshape. Unlike the line-ground voltages, the line-line voltage decays toward 
zero. Since the input current was not  a step-function current, the oscillograms 
displayed at 500 ps  per division show the line-line voltage decaying t o  zero and 
then reversing as the input current decays and the internal magnetic fields 
attempt t o  follow the decaying external magnetic fields. The input current did 
not last long enough for the magnetic field t o  reach a steady state value, but the 
oscillograms do indicate that it seems t o  crest at about 850 ps. Why the 
indicated magnetic field does not crest at the time the line-line voltage goes 
through zero, 1300 ps, is not known. Perhaps instrumentation errors in the 
integrator are t o  blame. At any rate, the decay time constant for the line-line 
voltage agrees with the value predicted by Equation 10.23. 
With a somewhat different waveshape of injected current, Figure 10.23 
shows the voltages as a function of  the position o f  the conductor. The voltage on 
conductor 8 is not  shown; however, it was virtually identical with that shown for 
conductor 5 .  
(5ps/div.) 
Figure 10.23 Voltages as a function of position. 
10.3 Fields Within Cavities 
I t  frequently happens that in the fuselage of  an aircraft there will be i 
cavity that is effectively exposed to the external field on only one face, either 
because the inner walls of  the cavity are thick enough to provide more shielding 
from the other parts of the external field or because the cavity is much closer to 
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Figure 10.24 A cavity exposed to a field on only one side. 
(a) Cavity and field orientations 
(b) An image in the reflecting surfaces defining the cavity 
( c )  Current path defining the loop inductance 
one of the external surfaces than it is to any of the other external surfaces. A 
typical cavity would be a gun bay or an electronic equipment bay located dong 
the fuselage of the aircraft and accessible through access panels. For the moment 
the effects of the access panels will be ignored. The geometry is shown in Figure 
10.2qa). 
The cavity may be viewed as being formed from one face exposed to the 
external magnetic field and the current producing that field, and with its other 
faces formed by metal sheets, which, like the exposed surface, may be assumed 
to extend toward infinity. Mirrored in the reflecting surface defining the back of 
the cavity will be an image of the face of the cavity exposed to the magnetic 
field. The image will be spaced a distance, D, behind the face carrying the 
current, and in the image the reflection of the external current will be of 
opposite polarity. The electric field produced on the inner surface of the face 
exposed to  the external current, shown in Figure 10.24(c), will act to force a 
current, Icirc, around the interior of the circuit defining the cavity. The length 
of the loop involved will be the same as the length of the cavity, and the width 
will be twice the depth of the cavity. The internal voltage gradient will be 
proportional to the product of the inner current density and the resistivity of 
the face carrying the external current and, as described earlier, will exhibit the 
characteristic pulse penetration buildup described in Figure 10.6. This voltage 
may be viewed as impressed across a loop or cavity inductance, Z 
The resistance and inductance will both be governed by the effective 
characteristics of the loop defining the cavity. 
Typical current paths and their characteristic impedances are shown in 
Figure 10.25. Some cavities may be viewed as being sufficiently long and narrow 
that they may be defined by parallel strips. Others are basically of rectangular or 
circular shape, or of some simple shape that may be approximated by an 
equivalent circular cylinder. The inductance and resistance of each configuration 
are shown. Each of the inductance equations (Reference 10.3) has a correction 
factor--loge k, F', or K-- that relates to the shape of the enclosure. These 
correction factors are shown in Figure 10.26. 
If the cavity is provided with a removable cover, and if this cover is in the 
external current flow or is exposed to the external magnetic field, the effects are 
as illustrated in Figure 10.27. If the cover is assumed to be of the same material 
and thickness as the rest of the face upon which it is mounted, the principal 
effects relate to the resistance of the fasteners used to  hold the cover in place. 
The covers will seldom make good electrical contact to the rest of the surface 
except at the fasteners themselves. Accordingly, the external currents flowing in 
the face will be constricted in the vicinity of the fastener and pass from that face 
onto the cover through the fastener. The major effect of this constriction of 
current flow is to introduce a lumped resistance into the electrical circuit, 
although there is a certain amount of inffuence on the inductance of the circuit 
whenever the current is constricted. It will be seen, then, that the greater the 
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Figure 10.25 Typical current paths and characteristic impedances. 
(a) Long sheets 
(b) Rectangular box 
(c) Circular cylinder 
number of  fasteners, the less the restriction of current flow and the less 
resistance inserted into the current path. The resistance introduced by the 
fasteners is important because it is frequently much higher than the intrinsic 
resistance of the metal surface and because the resistance is not subjected t o  the 
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Figure 10.26 Correction factors for inductance. 
(a)  Parallel strips 
(b) Rectangular boxes 
(c) Circular cylinders 
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Figure 10.27 Effects o f  covers and fasteners. 
skin effects that retard the buildup of current density on the inner surface. 
An equivalent circuit o f  the cavity including the effects of  fasteners is 
shown in Figure 10.28. Rf is the equivalent resistance of the fasteners. 
Circulated through this resistance is the undistorted current flowing in the 
exterior face of the fuselage. The sum of R1 and R2  is equal to  the intrinsic 
resistance of the loop defining the cavity, the resistances given by the equations 
in Figure 10.25. The external current will develop a voltage across only a portion 
of this resistance, since it flows in only a portion of the loop. Letting R I  be the 
resistance through which the external current flows, that resistance may be 
assumed t o  be subjected to the current as retarded by the pulse penetration time 
constant. The two voltages developed across these resistances then circulate 
current around the entire loop. The rate at which the current builds u p  will then 
be the rate a t  which the magnetic field inside the cavity builds up. 
CURRENT WITH 
WAVEFRONT 
RETARDED BY 
PENETRATION 
TIME CONSTAN 
UNDISTORTED 
CURRENT 
Figure 10.28 Equivalent circuit governing buildup of magnetic field inside a 
cavity. 
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CHAPTER 1 1  
THE INTERNAL FIELDS COUPLED THROUGH APERTURES 
11.1 MagneticFields 
The most important mode by which magnetic fields are coupled from the 
exterior of the aircraft to the interior is coupling through magnetic apertures. 
There are two major reasons for the importance of aperture-coupled fields. The 
first is that some apertures may be quite large, windows being a prime example. 
The second reason is that, unlike fields coupled by diffusion through metal 
surfaces, the waveshape of the interior field is not retarded, but tends to be the 
same for small apertures as that of the external magnetic field. The most 
important consequence of the coupled magnetic fields relates to the voltages 
induced by such fields. A field of given peak intensity is more apt to cause 
trouble if it rises to its peak quickly than if it is delayed and distorted. 
Physically, the basic problem is as shown on Figure 11.1. An external 
magnetic field tangential to a metal surface passes across an aperture. At the 
aperture some of the lines of magnetic force leak into the interior region. 
Analytically, the problem is to be able to determine the field strength at any 
point in the interior volume, preferably to be able to determine both the 
magnitude and the direction of the magnetic field. 
Often the analytical problem is best solved by placing in the plane of the 
aperture an equivalent magnetic dipole, the fields around which may then be 
determined from dipole theory. The strength of the equivalent dipole is 
determined by the strength of the external magnetic field and by the size, shape, 
and orientation of the aperture. A geometry amenable to mathematical analysis 
(Figure 11.2) is that of an elliptical aperture in a conductive sheet of a size large 
enough t o  separate completely the interior volume in which the fields are to be 
calculated from the exterior volume in which the basic magnetic field exists. In 
the following analysis we will treat only fields tangential to the conductive 
surface, since, as explained in the previous sections, a magnetic field with 
components perpendicular to the conductive surface induces circulating currents 
that initially cancel the penetrating component. 
Mathematically the problem is most directly solved if the external 
magnetic field is resolved into two components, Hx and Hy, lying along an axis 
directed through the major and minor axes of the elliptical aperture. These field 
components give rise to two equivalent magnetic dipoles, M, and My, again 
oriented along the major and the minor axes of the aperture. The strength of 
these dipoles is a function of the strength of the external magnetic field that 
would exist in the plane of the aperture if the aperture were absent. The 
governing expressions (Reference I I . I )  are 
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Figure I I .  I The aperture-coupling problem. 
(a) A field across an aperture 
(b) Equivalent dipole producing 
the same internal field 
Figure 11.2 An elliptical aperture. 
(a) Geometry and the components of the 
external magnetic field vector 
(b) The equivalent magnetic dipoles 
The expressions Ke and Ee are elliptical integrals of the first and second kinds, 
respectively. The quantities a\ 1 and a52 are shown in Figure 11.3. Since thc 
dipole strength is proportional to the cube of the major axis length of the 
aperture, it follows that large apertures will couple much more field into an 
inner volume than will small apertures, the strength of the dipole increasing 
faster than the area of the aperture increases. 
The pattern of magnetic fields in the interior volume produced by a dipole 
1 2 1 1  1 
Figure 11.3 Shape factor for elliptical apertures. 
lying along the X axis would appear as on Figure 11.4; Assuming the dipole to 
lie in the XY plane, the field patterns will be concentric closed loops lying in 
planes passed through the X axis. At any point, P, the total magnetic field will 
be tangential to the corresponding closed loop. The components of the magnetic 
field at point P--Hx, Hy, and Hz--(Reference 1 1.2) will be 
Figure 11.4 Field patterns produced by a dipole lying along the - X axis. 
-------.-. 
L -  J 
. ,  
~ ~ ~ i c a l l ~ , - ~ h ~  external &&'gnetic field would include an equivalent dipole 
oriented along the Y axis as well. 'This dipole would likewise produce a magnetic 
field at  the point P, the componenjs of which would be 
The total magnetic field strength at P, then, would be the sum of the 
components produced by  the dipoles lying along the X and Y axes. 
If = H,, + Hxy X 
The total field strength at  point P would be the vector summation of the X, Y, Z 
components of the field. 
The field strength is seen t o  be inversely proportional t o  the cube of the 
distance from the aperture t o  the point in question. Accordingly, the 
aperture-coupled fields will be localized in space near the aperture. Small 
apertures are thus less troublesome than large apertures, both because of the 
decreased magnetic field strength associated with the corresponding dipole and 
h y a u s e  of the lesser distance one must be removed from the aperture before the 
field strength becomes negligible compared to the field strength closer to  the 
aperture. = 
The above formulation has one major restriction: it is valid only in the 
low-frequency region, low-frequency imply~ng that the aperture is small 
compared to the wavele~gths o f  the field under consideration. Coupling through 
apertures increases with increasing frequency, as witness the quarter-wave 
resonant slot antenna. The fo~mulat ion also treats only the internal magnetic 
fields produced by  external magnetic fields and does not treat the electric field 
produced b y  a changing magnetic field or the magnetic field produced by a 
changing electric field. Taylor (Reference 11.1) treats the interaction in more 
detail. This interaction between changing electric ~d .~?agne!ic fields is greater 
a t  high frequencies and, for the frequency s$c;um associated with lightning, is 
possibly of importance only at those frequenc'les for which the aperture is not 
electrically small. 
The above formulation is also valid on'$ when the point at which the field 
is t o  be  calculated is a t  a distance from the ap,:rture that is large compared t o  the 
dimensions of  the aperture. If a n  attempt is rnade to calculate the fields close to 
the aperture, the results are inaccurate. If the distance from the point to  the 
aperture goes t o  zero, the calczated magnitude of fieldsbecomes infinite, 
whereas the  field itself can never in fact b e c ~ m e  larger (barring reflections) than 
the external field. It can be  shown, in fact, h a t  the actual field strength in the 
plane of the aperture, as distinct from the strength of the equivalent dipole, will 
be half the field strength that would exist if the aperture were not there. This 
intractable behavior of the calculated magnitude of the field near the aperture 
arises as a result of a simplifying assumption commonly used in dipole analysis. 
This assumption, illustrated in Figure 11.5(a), is that point P is sufficiently far 
from the center of the dipole that each of the radial distances r l  and r2 from the 
ends of the dipole to the point P may be represented by the average radial 
distance, r, and that each of the angles B1 and 02 may be represented by the 
angle 8.  
Figure 11.5 Dipole approximations. 
(a) Elementary dipole 
(b) Dipole of finite size 
With a great increase in numerical complexity, it is possible to develop a 
formulation for the fields at point P that, as shown in Figure 11.5(b), allows the 
dipole to have a finite length. Such a formulation allows one to determine with 
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better, though not perfect, accuracy the field strength close to the aperture. The 
governing equations (Reference 1 1.3) presented here, without proof, are 
H,=G1 x F 1  + G 2 x F 2 - G 3 x F 3  (1 1.16) 
H Y = G 4 x F 1  + G 5 x F 2 - G 6 x F 4  (1 1.17) 
H,=G7 x F 1  + G 8 x F 2  (1 1.18) 
where 
Frequently a calculation made to determine the effects of coupling 
through apertures needs to take into account the presence of reflecting surfaces. 
'Ihe simplest case, shown in Figure 1 1.6, treats one reflecting surface of infinite 
dimensions and parallel to the surface containing the aperture. The total field at 
any point between the two surfaces is the sum of the fields produced by an 
infinite array of images of the original magnetic dipole. The field strength from 
each of the images would again be determined from Equations 11.6 through 
1 1.1 1 or 11.1 6 through 1 1.32. Fortunately, in most cases only a few of the 
images need be considered because of the dependence of field strength on the 
cube of the distance to the point under consideration. In principle, additional 
reflecting surfaces could be included in the formulation to define completely an 
interior volume. Such multiple reflecting surfaces are shown on Figure 11.7. 
Typically, one is concerned, not with the magnitude of the fields 
themselves, but with the effects of the fields on electrical circuits. A typical 
problem, as shown in Figure 11.8, might be determining the voltage produced by 
an aperture-coupled magnetic field between a conductor and a metal surface 
containing the aperture. That voltage would be determined by the total magnetic 
flux passing through the plane defined by the conductor and its projection onto 
the metal surface. This total magnetic field would be the summation, both along 
the length and across the width of the loop so defined, of the magnetic field 
strength normal to  the loop. If the field strength were to vary considerably with 
position along the loop, it would be necessary to evaluate the field strength at a 
number of points across the area of the loop and to perform some sort of 
graphical integration to  determine the total magnetic flux passing through the 
loop. The numerical calculations, while straightforward in principle, would be of 
sufficient complexity to make the problem insoluble in any practical sense if all 
the calculations had to be made by hand. In order to overcome the numerical 
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Figure 11.6 Reflecting surface. 
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Figure 11.7 Multiple reflecting surfaces. 
problems, a computer program, APERTURE, has been written and is described 
in the literature (Reference 11.4). This program allows one to define an arbitrary 
elliptical aperture in an X-Y plane. The orientation of the aperture and the 
orientation and strength of the external field are defined as input quantities and 
do not necessarily have to be oriented along the X and Y - -- reference - -- - axes. - The 
program allows one to tabulate the interior field strength at whatever points are 
desired, in either rectangular or polar coordinates. The program also allows one 
to determine the total magnetic flux passing any arbitrary four-sided plane 
Figure 11.8 Determination of the voltage produced by aperturecoupling. 
surface. The program calculates the field strength normal to  that surface and 
performs the graphical integration suggested in Figure 11.8 and necessary to  
determine the total magnetic flux passing through the plane of the loop, 
If the aperture under consideration is not elliptical, a corresponding 
equivalent elliptical aperture can generally be specified, as shown in Figure 11.9. 
The equivalent elliptical aperture would have the same area and the same 
eccentricity as those of the aperture under study. If the aperture were of an 
irregular shape, its area might have to  be determined numerically. 
An example of an aperture-coupled field is shown in Figure 11.10 in 
which the elliptical fuselage described earlier has been approximated by two 
sheets of infinite size, one containing the aperture and another serving as the 
reflecting surface. The figure shows only the top half of the field pattern, the 
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Figure 11.9 Equivalent apertures. 
(a) Rectangular aperture 
(b) Irregular aperture 
field in the bottom half being symmetrical. The aperture considered was 0.2 m 
high by 0.1 m wide, the long axis of the ellipse being oriented at right angles to 
the plane of the figure. The field strength at the surface of the aperture, 
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assuming the aperture not to be there, was 167 Alm, the field strength that 
would be produced by the aforementioned current of 1000 A flowing axially 
along the elliptical fuselage. The field strength is seen to  decay very rapidly with 
distance away from the aperture. In this particular case, the reflecting. surface 
was sufficiently far from the aperture under study that the field through most of 
the interior volume would have been virtually the same had the reflecting surface 
been disregarded. Doubling the size of the aperture leads to the field pattern 
shown in Figure 1 1.1 1. Roughly in accordance with simplest theory, doubling 
the dimensions of the aperture leads to an 8-fold increase in the field strength at 
points removed from the aperture. Looked at in another light, if one considers 
the volume in which the magnetic field is of a given strength or greater, doubling 
the lineal dimensions of the aperture will double the volume through which the 
given field exists. 
Figure 11.10 Fields coupled through an aperture. 
Major axis oriented vertically 
(0.2 x 0. l rn aperture) 
Figure 11.1 1 Fields coupled through an aperture. 
Major axis oriented vertically 
(0.4 x 0.2 m aperture) 
1 1.2 Electric Fields 
Unlike magnetic fields, which may penetrate into an interior region either 
through apertures or by diffusion through continuous walls, electrical fields, as a 
practical matter, can couple only through apertures. Any metallic surface 
provides sufficient shielding against electric fields that considerations of direct 
penetrations of the field through a metal surface can be neglected. Electric fields 
of practical consequence can exist only perpendicular to a metallic surface, since 
in a manner analogous to penetrating magnetic fields, electric fields of oblique 
incidence have all but the perpendicular component of the field shorted out by 
the low impedance of the metallic surface. The appropriate geometry for electric 
field coupling is then as shown on Figure 11.12. The electric fields of the 
interior region may be calculated as though they were produced by an electric 
dipole of strength (Reference 1 1.5): 
The quantity a 3 3  has previously been presented in Figure 11.3. Subject t o  
the provisions that the dimensions of the aperture be small compared t o  the 
wavelengths of  the highest frequency component in the external electric field 
and that electric fields produced by  changing magnetic fields can be neglected, 
the electric field in the interior region becomes 
Figztre 11.12 Geometry appropriate t c  electric field coupling. 
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These expressions are based upon the further assumption of a pure dipole and, as 
with Equations 11.6 through 11 .I 1 for the magnetic field formulation, would 
indicate infinite field strengths as one approached the plane of the aperture, 
whereas in fact the field in the plane of the aperture would be one-half the field 
strength that would exist at that point if the aperture were absent. A power 
series expansion of the field from a dipole of finite size could be prepared but, as 
of this writing, has not been. The bookkeeping routines necessary to  handle 
electric fields are virtually identical with those used for magnetic fields and 
could be incorporated into the APERTURE program, although, as of this 
writing, they have not been so included. 
11.3 Magnetic Field Zones 
From the foregoing it can be seen that the task of mapping the magnetic 
field inside a vehicle and actually calculating the voltage on any particular circuit 
could be a formidable task. A possible solution to the problem lies in recognizing 
that aircraft, or at least aircraft within a particular category, tend to  possess 
characteristic zones. On a fighter aircraft, for example, the cockpit can be 
regarded as a magnetically open zone exposed primarily to aperture-coupled 
magnetic fields. Within reasonable limits, all fighter aircraft probably have 
approximately the same magnetic field in the cockpit. Another type of 
equipment zone characteristic of fighters would be equipment bays located in 
the forward section and behind the radome. All such equipment bays tend to be 
alike, the differences, perhaps, relating mostly to the type of fasteners used to 
hold the covers in place. The structure within a wing is a type of magnetic field 
structure fundamentally different from either the cockpit or the forward 
equipment bays. Accordingly, it would seem possible t o  divide an aircraft into a 
relatively small number of typical zones, to assign a ruling or charactxistic 
magnetic field intensity t o  those zones, and t o  provide rather simplified tables of 
nomograms listing the characteristic transient likely t o  be induced in wiring of a 
given length. 
This concept of dividing an aircraft into shielding zones was first used on 
the Space Shuttle (Reference 11 -6). The zones so defined are shown in Figure 
11.13 (Reference 11.7). The electromagnetic fields assigned to each of these 
zones were initially determined by "seat of the pants" engineering by a group of 
engineers knowledgeable in the field. These magnetic fields were then refined 
during the course of an extensive analytical investigation. The magnetic field 
amplitudes assigned to  each of these zones, based on the analytical study, are 
given in Table 11.1 (Reference 11.8). The fields Were divided into two 
components, an A-component referring t o  fields coupled through apertures and 
a B-component referring to  fields coupled by diffusion through metal surfaces. 
The A-component of the field would tend to  have the same rapidly changing 
waveshape as the external magnetic field, while the B-component would have a 
much slower waveshape. In the Space Shuttle study the waveforms of the 
different components were taken to  be as shown on Figure 11.14 (Reference 
11.9). In each case the field intensity was based on a worst case 200 kA lightning 
A THROUGH D - MOST PROBABLE LlGHTNlNG ARC ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS 
SHUTTLE ZONES 
1 FI IT.UT nFCK A PAY1 CIAn RAV 
. . - . - . . - - - . . - . . . . - - . . - - . . . 
2 CENTER EQUIPMENT BAY 7 AFT EQUIPMENT BAY 
3 LOWER EQUIPMENT BAY 8 ENGINE COMPARTMENT 
4 FORWARD TOP 9 VERTICAL STABILIZER 
5 FORWARD CENTER 10 WING 
Figure 11.13 Shielded zones within the Orbiter structure. 
current passing through the Orbiter vehicle. The field amplitudes of Table 11.1 
were the maximum amplitudes calculated for any of the possible lightning 
current entry or exit points. While no particular claim for accuracy can be made 
about any individual point within the Orbiter, the field amplitudes at  least seem 
reasonable. 
The concept of dividing an aircraft structure into different magnetic field 
zones and assigning a ruling magnetic field strength t o  each zone, while 
imperfectly formulated at present, is fundamentally no different from the civil 
engineering practice of designing a structure to withstand a standard (generally 
worst case) wind loading. While the wind loading may differ widely at different 
points on the structure, the task of calculating the wind loading on each and 
every structural member would probably be sufficiently expensive that it would 
offset the savings that one might realize by tailoring each structural member to 
its own specific wind loading. 
Table 11.1 MAGNETIC FIELDS IN DIFFERENT ZONES 
O F  THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
Aperture Fields Diffusion Fields 
Zone A-component (Aim) Bcomponent  (Alm) 
*Payload 
**No payload 
The task of dividing aircraft into typical magnetic field zones and of 
calculating and assigning the appropriate field strength to each of the zones is 
probably of sufficient complexity that it should be done by specialists in the 
field. 
Analytical studies of field intensity could well be supplemented by  
experimental studies in which currents were circulated through an aircraft and 
the magnetic fields inside measured. Aircraft used for such studies should be in 
realistic condition in regard to  the mechanical soundness of the structures, 
particularly relating to  the access panels, but otherwise they need not contain 
complete electronic systems. They should not, however, have been cannibalized 
unduly, leaving an excessive number of empty bays where equipment niight 
normally have been expected t o  help provide some electromagnetic shielding 
capability. The use of older aircraft for such studies might well be realistic in 
that the electromagnetic shielding capability of a structure is in large measure 
determined by the electrical characteristics of the various access panels and 
fasteners. Because these tend to degrade with age, an older aircraft might be a 
more realistic test vehicle than a new and carefully maintained aircraft. 
TABLE 1 1 . 1  FOR AMPLITUDE 
- - SEE TABLE 11.1  FOR AMPLITUDE A 
Figure 11.14 Waveforms of aperture- and diffusion-coupled magnetic fields. 
(a) Lightning current 
(b) Aperture-coupled field, A-component 
(c) Diffusion-coupled field, B-component 
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CHAPTER 12 
VOLTAGES AND CURRENTS INDUCED ON WIRING 
12.1 Elementary Considerations 
The fields b y  themselves are of little concern; of primary concern are the 
voltages and currents produced by the changing magnetic fields. In principle, 
these may be calculated from the geometry of the aircraft wiring and knowledge 
of the strength and orientation of  the internal magnetic and electric fields. While 
calculation of the voltages and currents on  actual wiring in aircraft may never be 
practical, because of the mechanical complexity of the wiring harnesses, 
calculations may be performed for simplified geometries. Such calculations will 
illustrate the scope of the problem and indicate the direction of practices that 
minimize the voltages and currents, and hence minimize the risk of circuit 
damage or upset. 
The simplest geometry to  consider is that of a conductor, or group of 
conductors, placed adjacent t o  a metal surface and exposed to a uniform 
magnetic field oriented t o  produce maximum voltage in the wiring. The 
geometry is shown in Figure 12.l(a). 
If only common-mode voltages are considered and only cable systems 
short enough that transmission line effects need not be considered, the induced 
voltage will be 
where A = area of  the loop involved in meters squared 
po = 4n x in henries per meter (permeability of  free space) 
@ = total flux linked in webers 
H = magnetic field intensity in amperes per meter 
t = in seconds 
e = in volts 
Expressed in inch units: 
* 
where II = length of cable bundle in inches 
h = height above ground plant. in inches 
H = magnetic field intensity in amperes per meter 
t = in seconds 
( ~ 1  0 time 
Figure 12. I Response to a changing magnetic field : open circuit voltage. 
(a) G r a ~ n e t r y  
(b) M~gnct ic  field waveshape 
(c) Voltage waveshape 
I t  luust be emphasized that the voltage so calculated is that existing 
between the entire group of conductors (comprising the cable) and the vehicle 
structure. The voltage will divide between the loads at  the ends of the cable 
inversely as the impedance of the loads. For worst case analysis, consider one 
end of the cable grounded with the other end open-circuited. All the voltage so 
developed will appear at  the open circuit end of the cable. 
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Line-to-line or circuit voltages will be less, generally by  a factor of 1 0  to 
200, or 2 0  t o  46 dB, down from the common-mode voltages because individual 
conductors are usually close together and are often twisted, thus reducing the 
total loop area. 
The maximum cable current is that which flows when both ends of the 
cable are connected t o  the vehicle structure through a low or zero impedance. 
Such an impedance may be an overall shield grounded at  each end, or it may be 
a group of  semiconductor circuits, each having low input impedance. In the first 
case, the current will flow on the overall shield with the current on  the input 
circuits determined b y  the shielding properties of the shield. In the second case, 
the current will flow directly through the input semiconductors and their bias 
sources 
The short circuit current that flows (Figure 12.2) may be determined from 
the familiar expression 
whence 
where I = amperes 
L = self-inductance of cable in henries 
e = open circuit induced voltage in volts 
t = time in seconds 
Cable inductance may be  estimated from the expression 
4h L = 2 x 1 o - ~  loge-- H/m (12.5) 
d 
where h = height above a ground plane 
d = conductor diameter 
The induced voltage, e, which drives the current, is proportional t o  the cable 
height, but the cable inductance, which impedes the flow of current, is 
proportional t o  the logarithm of the cable height. 
12.2 Transmission Line Effects 
12.2.1 Response to Magnetic Fields 
Conductors always have associated with them some distributed capaci- 
(4 0 time 
(dl 0 time 
Figure 12.2 Response to a changing magnetic field: short circuit current. 
(a) Geometry 
(b) Equivalent circuit 
(c) Magnetic field waveshape 
(d) Current waveshape 
tance and inductance, the values of which are determined by the size of the 
conductors and the distance of the conductors from adjacent ground planes and 
other conductors. When these are considered, the effect of a changing magnetic 
field is to produce an oscillatory open circuit voltage. As shown in Figure 12.3, 
these oscillations will be superimposed on an underlying voltage proportional to 
the rate of change of the magnetic field. When the internal magnetic field is of 
complex waveshape (as is the usual case) and not the idealized ramp function 
shown in Figures 12.1 and 12.3, the resulting open circuit voltage may be of a 
very complex nature. A few examples will be shown in Chapter 14. While the 
maximum voltage may be difficult to predict, given the complex nature of the 
superimposed oscillations, the amplitude of the envelope can at least be 
approximated from Equations 12.1 and 12.2. The frequency of the superim- 
posed oscillations tends t o  be inversely proportional to the conductor length. 
Conductors, such as shields, grounded at one end tend to ring as quarter-wave 
dipoles: for example, a conductor 10 m long tends to ring at 7.5 MHz. Even this 
simple relationship is difficult t o  apply, since one conductor is seldom free of 
the influence of adjacent conductors. 
Aircraft wiring is grouped into bundles, the bundles usually containing 
both short and long conductors. The assembly, even if exposed to a magnetic 
field of simple waveshape will oscillate in a complex manner. Generally there 
will be one dominant frequency with several other frequencies, usually higher, 
superimposed. Each will have its own characteristic decrement. Almost the only 
reliable generalization is that the cables associated with large aircraft will be 
longer than the cables associated with small aircraft and will characteristically 
oscillate at lower frequencies. On fighter aircraft, measurements of induced 
voltages have shown the characteristic frequencies to be in the range 1 to 10 
MHz. 
Currents measured on bundles of conductors tend to be oscillatory, like 
the voltages, as long as the conductors are part of a wiring group employing a 
single-point ground concept. If the conductors are part of a wiring group 
employing a multiple-point ground concept, the conductor currents tend not to 
be oscillatory but to  follow the underlying shape of the internal magnetic field. 
12.2.2 Response to Electric Fields 
When the aircraft is struck by lightning, it is forced to assume the electric 
field potential of the lightning flash at that point, perhaps 100 MV with respect 
to ground. The magnitude of voltage with respect to ground is of no real 
importance, but the electric field intensity at the surface of the aircraft is of 
importance. This electric field intensity depends upon the total amount of 
charge stored on the aircraft surface and the size of the aircraft surface, and 
could, in principle, be extremely high. In practice, the electric field intensity at 
the surface cannot exceed more than about 500 kVIm before intense electrical 
discharges take place from the aircraft surface into the surrounding air. The 
electric field strength will be greatest about points of small radius of curvature. 
The discharges from those points will tend to reduce the electric field strength at 
(b) time 
(a) Geometry 
(b) Magnetic field waveshape 
(c) Voltage waveshape 
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other points on the aircraft. As a result, the maximum field stress to which most 
points of the aircraft can be raised is probably on the order of 100 kV/m. This 
electric field will be radial with respect to the metal surface of the aircraft. In 
places where there are apertures, the electric field lines will pass through the 
apertures and will produce electric fields on the inner surface of the aircraft. 
The response of a conductor to a suddenly applied electric field is shown 
in Figure 12.4. If a conductor is a height, h, above a metal surface upon which 
an electric field is incident, the conductor will assume the potential of the field 
at that point: 
This holds true only if the conductor is isolated from ground. If the conductor is 
completely grounded, as shown in Figure 12.4(b), the voltage on the conductor 
will be zero. If we were dealing only with static electric fields, any ground on the 
conductor would reduce the conductor voltage to  zero. However, here we are 
dealing with conductors having distributed inauctance and capacitance, and 
exposed to a suddenly applied electric field. Accordingly, the electric field 
applied at point 1 will raise the conductor to the voltage e = hEi, and the voltage 
will maintain itself at that level until such time as a voltage wave has had time to 
propagate from point 1 to the ground conductor at  the left and back to point 1. 
Thus, at point 1 the conductor experiences a square-wave voltage lasting for 
twice the travel time required for the wave to travel from point 1 to  the 
grounded end and back. The electric field applied at point 2 likewise raises the 
conductor at point 2 to e = hEi, and it again remains there until a wave has had 
time to propagate to the grounded end and back. Since less of the conductor is 
involved, this voltage lasts for a shorter period of time. Nearing the limit, the 
field applied at point 4 can raise the conductor to a voltage of e = hEi for only a 
very short period of time. 
As the voltage waves that are produced return to the open end of the 
conductor, they again experience a reflection. The voltage waves reflect back 
and forth between the open and grounded ends, reversing their polarity at the 
grounded end and doubling in amplitude at the open end. Thus, the voltage at 
the open end is oscillatory (Figure 12.5), the amplitude of the oscillation 
decreasing with time as energy is lost in the resistance of the conductor or 
radiated into surrounding objects. 
Associated with these traveling waves of voltage are traveling current 
waves. The degree to which the waves are excited depends not only upon the 
magnitude of the incident electrical field but upon its rate of change. Fields with 
longer rise times are proportionately less effective in exciting oscillations. If the 
conductor of Figure 12.4 is viewed as the shield on a group of wires, the current 
and voltage on the shield will be oscillatory. The commonly accepted practice of 
grounding shields at only one end is based on the premise that the electric fields 
to which the shielded conductors will be exposed are of such low frequency that 
all points of the shield may be held at ground potential with only the one 
ground point. When the rapidly changing electric field associated with lightning 
time (4 
Figure 12.4 Response to  a suddenly applied electric field. 
(a) Ungrounded conductor 
(b) Well-grounded conductor 
(c) Conductor grounded at one end 
(d) Waveshape at indicated points 
356 
Figure 12.5 Oscillatory response excited by a suddenly applied electric field. 
is present, frequently this condition is not met. 
12.3 Aids for Calculation of Voltage and Current 
In Section 1 1.3 there was introduced the concept of magnetic field zones, 
according to which in any particular area of the aircraft the total magnetic field 
may be viewed as the direct superposition of two components, one the result of 
coupling through apertures and the other the result of diffusion-type coupling. If 
the assumption of a ruling field is made, there may be derived some simplified 
relationships between the magnetic field and the resulting induced voltages and 
currents. Additional assumptions are the following: 
The conductor is of length Q, diameter d, and spaced a height, h, 
above a ground plane. 
The magnetic field is oriented to produce maximum voltages in the 
conductor. 
One end of the conductor is grounded. 
The magnetic fields are of the shape shown in Figure 11.14. 
These are the same assumptions as those illustrated in Figures 12.1 and 12.2, and 
upon which Equations 12.1 and 12.2 were based. Under these assumptions 
where KI = 0.63 if Q and h are in meters 
K1 = 0.63 x lo4 if Q and h are in centimeters 
K1 = 0.41 x l o 3  if Q and h are in inches 
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In all cases H is expressed in amperes per meter. The waveshape of the open 
circuit voltages would typically be proportional to the derivative of the H field, 
and hence oscillatory. 
If we assume the conductor to be grounded at each end 
where K2 is given by either Figure 12.6 or 12.7, according to the units used for 
measurement of the conductor. Conductor length does not influence short 
circuit current. The waveshape of the short circuit current tends to be the same 
as that of the incident magnetic field. 
The height, h, of the cable bundle above a ground plane is difficult to 
specify because the ground plane is seldom purely a plane surface and because 
cable bundles are frequently strapped directly to a supporting structure. For 
purposes of this analysis, assume 
That the height, h, is measured to the nearest substantial metallic 
structural member 
That if the cable bundle is laid directly on that member, h equals 
one-half the cable diameter 
That if the cable bundle is elevated above the metallic structural 
member, h equals the clear height above the member plus one-half 
the cable diameter. (If the cable height differs along its length, use 
an average height.) 
h/d 
Figure 12.6 K 2  - metric units. 
12.4 Voltage and Currents in the Space Shuttle 
Based upon Equations 12.1 t o  12.8, Figure 1 1.14, and Table 1 1 . l ,  one 
may calculate the voltages and currents that would be  developed o n  typical 
wiring. The results are shown on  Table 12.1 (Reference 12.1). 
Figure 12.7 K 2  - inch units. 
Table 12.1 OPEN CIRCUIT VOLTAGE AND SHORT CIRCUIT CABLE 
CURRENT IN THE VARIOUS ZONES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
h = l in. (0.0259 m) h = 2 in. (0.0508 m) h = 5 in. (0.1270 m) h = I0  in. (0.254 m) 
Zone Voltage Curent Voltage Current Voltage Current Voltage Current 
(volts) (amperes) (volts) (ampms) (volts) (amperes) (volts) (amperes) 
'All values based on cable length of 157.48 inches (4 rn) and diameter of 1 inch (0.0254 m). For other lengths, 
scale the voltage proportionately. 
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CHAPTER 13 
EFFECTS OF SHIELDS ON CABLES 
13.1 Introduction 
If electronic equipment is to be operated in a region where there are 
changing electromagnetic fields and if experience or analysis indicates that the 
currents and voltages induced by those fields may be harmful, the most 
straightforward approach toward achieving transient compatibility is to shield 
interconnecting wiring from those fields. In aircraft, shielded conductors are 
most commonly used to control low-level and low-frequency interference 
signals, For many good and legitimate reasons shields on cables are often 
grounded at only one end. If the wiring is subjected to the rapidly changing 
electromagnetic fields associated with lightning, however, shields grounded at 
only one end may not be effective, and in some cases can make the surge 
voltages even larger than they would be if the conductors were not shielded in 
the first place. In this section of the report we shall discuss the ways in which 
shielded cables reduce surge voltages, some of the ways in which common 
practice regarding the use of shields may be at variance with the use required for 
the control of lightning effects, and some of the ways in which this apparent 
conflict of use may be resolved. We shall also discuss how the noise currents 
flowing on shields of cables may be related to  the noise signals coupled onto the 
signal conductors. 
13.2 Some Elementary Illustrations 
To illustrate some of these effects let us consider a series of tests 
(Reference 13.1) that were made on a 5m long length of RG-58/U coaxial cable. 
The cable was placed adjacent to a metal ground plane and a magnetic field 
passed between the cable and the ground plane. The magnetic field was not a 
distributed field but was confined to the core of a pulse injection transformer in 
the manner shown in Chapter 17. Measurements were made of the voltage 
between the center conductor and ground at each end of the cable. These 
voltages thus represent the common-mode voltages that would exist. The first set 
of results is shown in Figure 13.1. Tn an unshielded conductor or one in which 
the shield on a conductor is not used, equal and opposite voltages appear at the 
two ends if all of the loading impedances are balanced. The voltages at the two 
ends of the conductor are of equal amplitude but opposite polarity, as would be 
produced if the conductor were considered to have an equivalent voltage 
generator at its center, as shown in Figure 13.l(c). If the load impedances at the 
ends are unbalanced by the addition of a 50 fl resistor at one end (Figure 13.2), 
the total voltage induced around the loop remains unchanged, but most of it 
appears at the end with the highest impedance. With reference to the equivalent 
circuit of Figure 13.2(c), the fact that there is any voltage at V2 implies the 
existence of some capacitive loading as well as the desired resistance load; 
otherwise there would be no voltage across V2. 
INCIDENT MAGNETIC FIELD 
END 1 
(4 
Figure 13.1 Shield not grounded at either end. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) V1 
(c) v2 
(d) Equivalent circuit 
Grounding the shield at one end, shown in Figure 13.3, does not 
significantly affect the common-mode voltage at the other end. The changing 
field induces a voltage between the open end of the shield and ground. The 
conductor is exposed to  the same field, and there is thus the same voltage 
developed between the ends of the conductors as that between the ends of the 
shield. Because of the unbalanced load impedances, all this voltage must appear 
between the conductor and ground at end 1. Leaving aside considerations of 
unequal load impedance, the shield can reduce voltage at one end only by 
increasing it at the other end. This effect is shown in Figure 13.4. The reason the 
shield reduces the line-to-ground voltage at V2 is that the capacitance between 
shield and conductor at the grounded end loads the signal conductor, just as did 
the 50 R resistor on Figure 13.3. 
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Figure 13.2 Unequal load impedances. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Voltages 
(c) Equivalent circuits 
Grounding the shield at both ends, as shown in Figure 13.5, produces an 
entirely different response. If the shield is grounded at both ends, the voltage 
induced by the changing magnetic field in the shield produces a flow of current 
through the shield. 
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Figure 13.3 Shield grounded at one end. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Voltages 
(c) Equivalent circuit 
where E' = voltage induced between ends of the shield 
364 
I = current on the shield 
L = self-inductance of the shield 
Figure 13.4 Shield grounded at one end. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Voltages 
(c) Equivalent circuits 
This shield current reduces the voltage induced between the signal conductor 
and ground. The reduction in voltage can be viewed equally well from two 
different viewpoints. 
The first is that the shield current produces a magnetic field that tends to  
cancel the incident field. From this viewpoint the voltages on the signal 
conductors to  ground respond only to  the difference between the incident and 
the canceling fields. Alternatively, the reduction in voltage can b e  viewed as the 
effect of the mutual inductance between the shield and the signal conductor. 
This latter approach is illustrated by the equivalent circuit of Figure 13.6(c). The 
voltage between the ends of the conductor is the sum of that resulting from the 
voltage induced in the signal conductor, E, and that coupled through the mutual 
inductance between the shield and the signal conductor. Since the shield is 
grounded a t  both ends and able to carry a current, the voltage appearing across 
2 - SHIELD 
I- I 
Figure 13.5 Shield grounded at both ends. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Shield current 
(c) Equivalent circuit 
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Figure 13.6 Shield grounded at both ends. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Conductor voltages 
(c) Equivalent circuit 
the primary inductance of the equivalent transformer is equal to the voltage E' 
induced between the ends of the shield by the incident magnetic field. Since the 
mutual coupling between the shield and the signal conductor is very nearly 
unity, the voltage induced in the secondary, or signal conductor, side of the 
equivalent transformer is about equal to  the voltage originally induced in the 
shield. Accordingly, the voltages appearing at the ends of the conductor are 
much lower than they would be if the shield could not carry current. 
An alternative form of the equivalent circuit of Figure 13.6 is shown in 
Figure 13.7. There are two parts of the circuit, one relating the magnetic field to 
the current flowing on the shield and one relating the current on the shield to 
the voltage developed on the conductor. Both the measurements and the circuit 
indicate that voltage on the center conductor is affected by the relative 
impedance of the loads on the ends. A low impedance at one end pulls the 
voltage at that end down but raises the voltage at the other end. M12 and R 
represent transfer quantities, the values of which depend upon the type of 
shield. 
Figure 13.7 Shield grounded at both ends. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Conductor voltages 
(c) Equivalent circuit 
13.3 Transfer Quantities 
If the mutual inductance between the shield and the signal conductor were 
equal t o  the self-inductance--unity coupling--the flow of current on the 
shield of the cable would not cause any voltage to  be developed between the 
shield and the signal conductor. This section of the report will now discuss the 
factors that prevent the coupling between shield and signal conductor from 
being perfect. Consider first a shield in which only resistance effects are treated, 
shown in Figure 13.8. In this condition an external noise current flowing 
through the resistance of the cable shield produces an electric field o n  the 
internal surface o f  the shield. The nature of the coupling between this internal 
field and the signal conductor depends upon the connections at  the ends of the 
cable and upon the distributed inductance and capacitance of the circuit internal 
t o  the cable. As a simple case, imagine the left-hand end of the signal conductor 
to  be shorted t o  the cable shield. The internal electric field would then be 
completely coupled to the signal conductor, and the voltage between the signal 
conductor and the shield at the right-hand end of the cable would be equal in 
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Figure 13.8 Coupling resulting from resistance effects. 
(a) Current and field polarities 
(b) Current and field waveshapes 
magnitude to the total internal electric field along the length of the shield. This 
simple type of coupling is valid for low-frequency or slowly changing external 
noise currents. For noise currents sufficiently slow that this model applies, the 
waveshape of the internal electric field is the same as the external noise current, 
being related by Ohm's Law: 
E =IR (1 3.3) 
13.3.1 Physical Phenomena 
Generally the coupling is not as simple as this. If the overall shield is a 
solid-walled cylinder, as shown in Figure 13-9, the internal electric field depends 
upon the product of the resistivity of the shield material and the density of the 
current on the internal surface of the shield. As discussed in Section 10.1, this 
internal current density, Ji, will not, in general, be the same as the density of the 
current on the external surface of the cylinder. Because of the phenomenon of 
skin effect, the current density on the inner surface of the shield will rise more 
slowly than does the external noise current. The rate at which the current 
density on the inner surface increases will be directly proportional to the 
permeability of the field material and to the square of the wall thickness and 
inversely proportional to the resistivity of the wall material. Cables with 
solid-wall shields and cable trays of solid metal with tightly fitting covers will 
typically exhibit this type of  behavior. 
A different type of behavior is commonly observed on cables with braided 
shields, shown in Figure 13.10. The shields do not provide a perfect conducting 
cylinder, for they have a number of small holes which permit leakage. The holes 
between the individual bundles of wire forming the shield can be approximated 
as a group of diamonds, the size and orientation of which depend upon the 
weave angle of the braided shield. The long axis of the triangles may be oriented 
along the shield, as at end A of the cable shown in Figure 13.10(a), or, if the 
weave angle is great, the long axis of the hole may be oriented circumferentially 
to the cable, as at end B of the cable. The external noise current produces a 
circumferential magnetic field around the outside of the shield. As a first 
approximation, one may visualize the external field lines looping in and out of 
the holes in the braided shield. There will be more leakage in holes with long 
axes oriented circumferentially to the end of the shield (end B of the cable, large 
weave angle) than there will be if the long axes of the holes are oriented along 
the shield, (end A of the cable, small weave angle). Viewed from the end of the 
cable, as in Figure 13.10(b), the field that leaks into the cables produces a net 
magnetic field circumferentially around the inside surface of the shield. This 
magnetic field produces an internal electric field of an amplitude dependent 
upon the degree of leakage into the shield and upon the rate of change of the 
magnetic field. The rate of change of this internal magnetic fieId is to a first 
approximation proportional to the rate of change of the external noise current. 
The total internal electric field, then, is proporti.onal to the resistance of the 
cable shield, to the rate of change of external noise current, and to the number 
of holes in the cable. 
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Figure 13.9 Coupling via diffusion through a solid wall. 
(a) Current and field polarities 
(b) Current and field waveshapes 
Frequently braided cables exhibit a phenomenon, shown in Figure 13.1 1, 
in which the net polarity of the internal magnetic field is opposite to  the 
polarity of the external magnetic field. The result of this phenomenon is that a 
change in external noise current induces an internal electric field of the opposite 
polarity. The reasons for this behavior are not clear to this author, but the 
phenomenon seems t o  depend upon the thickness of the braided covering of the 
shield and the total diameter of the shield, as well as upon the degree of 
tightness of weave of the shield. ' 
Some illustrative examples of the behavior of braided shields are shown in 
Figures 13.12 and 13,13, The figures show the test geometry and the 
conductor-to-ground voltage produced by currents having waveforms of several 
different times to crest. The 47 R resistors shown provide the termination for 
the signal conductor and prevent the voltage at the other end from being 
obscured by the internal oscillations of the cable. Figure 13.12 shows a 
double-shielded cable with the voltage measured from the inner shield to ground. 
This particular cable exhibits the phenomenon shown in Figure 13.8. In Figure 
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Figure 13.10 Coupling via magnetic leakage through holes. 
(a) Current and field polarities 
(b) Field leakage through holes: end view 
(c) Current and field waveshapes 
13.1 3 a cable similar to RG-8/U cable is shown. This cable exhibits the negative 
coupling inductance shown in Figure 13.1 1. 
Another source of coupling is via capacitive leakage through the holes in 
the shield, as shown in Figure 13.1 4. If the shield is held at ground potential by 
deliberate grounds, if the signal conductor is held near ground potential by 
external loads, and if the shielded cable is subjected to  an external and changing 
electric field, dielectric flux will pass through the holes in the cable from the 
external source and onto the signal conductor. The flow of these dielectric, or 
displacement, currents through the external load impedances produces a voltage 
between the signal conductor and the shield. An alternate source of coupling, 
shown in Figure 13.14(b), involves the voltage on the shield itself. Noise currents 
flowing through the external impedance of the shield may, if the shield is not 
perfectly grounded, produce a voltage between the shield and any external 
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Figure 13.1 I Magnetic coupling giving effect of a negative coupling inductance. 
(a) Current and field polarities 
(b) Direction of field 
(c) Current and field waveshapes 
ground structure. External impedances between the signal conductor and the 
shield, as well as the inherent capacitance between the shield and the signal 
conductor, force the signal conductor t o  assume nearly the same potential as the 
shield. Because the signal conductor is then at  a potential different from the 
surrounding ground, dielectric flux can pass from the signal conductor through 
the holes in the shield and to ground, the dielectric currents again giving rise t o  a 
voltage between the signal conductor and the shield. 
In most cases the effects of magnetic leakage are probably more important 
than the effects of capacitive leakage. 
1 3.3.2 Calculation of Transfer Quantities 
The factors that affect the voltage which may appear between a signal 
conductor and the  shield of a cable, as  distinct from the voltages that may 
appear between the signal conductor and ground, are, then, the resistance of the 
shield, the degree t o  which the shield allows magnetic fields t o  leak t o  the inside, 
and the degree t o  which the shield allows electric fields t o  leak t o  the inside. 
These latter two characteristics may be expressed in terms of an equivalent 
CURRENT VOLTAGE 
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Figure 13.12 Coupling from overall shield to center shield of a double-shielded 
cable. 
transfer inductance of the shield and an equivalent transfer capacitance. These 
effects may be expressed in terms of the equivalent circuits shown in Figure 
13.15. Figure 13.1 5(a) shows the equivalent circuit by which noise current on 
the shield of the cable may be related to the voltage induced between the signal 
conductor and the shield. In the frequency domain, this may be expressed as 
As will be seen momentarily, the term Zd may frequently be treated simply as 
the dc resistance of the cable shield, shown in Figure 13.1 S(b), in which case the 
relation between current and voltage becomes simply 
CABLE LENGTH = 
28 FEET 
dc RESISTANCE = 
0.0326 R 
CURRENT VOLTAGE 
No.40 I No. 41 
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Figure 13.13 Coupling from overall shield t o  center conductor of a cable 
similar t o  RG8/U.  
Treatment of  capacitive effects yields the equivalent circuit shown in 
Figure 13.15(c), in which the relation between loop current induced on  the 
signal conductor and external noise voltage becomes 
Vance (Reference 13.2) gives an excellent dissertation on  how the transfer 
inductance M 1 2  and transfer capacitance C12  may be  related to  the character- 
istics of  the  braided shield. Many of the equations and figures that follow are 
reproduced from his work. 
A braided shield would, if rolled out  on a plane, typically have the 
SOURCE OF A 
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Figure 13.14 Coupling via capacitive leakage through holes. 
(a) Coupling from an external source 
(b) Coupling from voltage on the shield 
appearance shown in Figure 13.1 6 (Reference 13.3). The characteristics of the 
shield may be  described in terms of the following symbols: 
a - the radius of  the shield 
t - the number of carriers, or bands of wire, that make up the shield 
N - the number of ends, or the number of wire strands, in each carrier 
P - the number of picks, or carrier crossings, per unit length 
d - the diameter of the individual wires 
Some important quantities that  may be defined in terms of the above 
characteristics are 
4naP Weave angle: a =tan-'- (13.7) 
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Figure 13.15 Equivalent circuits. 
(a) Transfer impedance 
(b) Transfer impedance simplified 
(c) Transfer admittance 
PNd Nd NdC Fill: F = = =  
sin a W 4na cos a 
Optical coverage: K = 2F - F~ (1 3.9) 
2 Volume of metal: v = n adF (13.10) 
The optical coverage, K,  relates to the size of the small holes not covered 
by the carriers. The greater the optical coverage, the smaller the total area of the 
holes with respect to the total area covered by the shield and, other things being 
equal, the better the electrical performance of the shield. The weave angle 
affects the orientation of the diamond-shaped holes. Since holes oriented along 
the axis of the cable are less effective in coupling energy into the interior than 
are holes oriented circumferentially around the cable, it follows that, other 
Figure 13. I 6  Properties of a typical braided shield. 
(a) Braid pattern developed on a plane 
(b) Properties of a typical braided shield 
things being equal, a shield with a small weave angle will give better electrical 
performance than a shield with a large weave angle. 
Presented here without proof, the elements of the equivalent circuit of 
Figure 13.15(a) are 
3 78 
Zd = 4 (1 + j) dl6 
nd2 NCo cos a sinh (1 + j) d/6 
npo MI2 = - ( I - K ) ~ / ~  e2 (a < 45") (1 3.12) 
6C E(e) - (1 -e2) K (e) 
In the above expressions 
a = conductivity of the wires 
p o =  4 n x 1 0 - 7  
K(e) and E(e) = complete elliptic integrals of the 
first and second kinds 
For many analyses Zd may be taken, with sufficient accuracy, as the dc 
resistance of the shield. This dc resistance is also slightly dependent on the 
coverage. 
4 
- 
1 % "  2 2 (13.17) 
nd2 N C ~  cosa  n ad o F cos a 
For the specific cable with construction as indicated, Figure 13.17 
(Reference 13.4) shows how the transfer impedance varies with frequency for 
different degrees of optical coverage. Several observations might be made about 
this figure. The first is that at low frequencies, below about 500 kHz, the 
transfer impedance is basically just the dc resistance of the cable shield. The 
second is that for frequencies above about 2 MHz the transfer impedance is 
primarily reactive, being represented by the transfer inductance of the cable 
shield. The third is that for the most common types of shields (those with 
optical coverage of less than 90%) the dip in transfer impedance below the dc 
resistance (the dip being a result of skin effects) is not great. It is for this reason 
that the equivalent circuit of Figure 13.15(b), in which the frequency-dependent 
properties of the shield resistance are ignored, is adequate for most engineering 
analyses. 
The transfer admittance of the braided-wire shield, governing the degree to  
which the shielded cable may be affected b y  external electric field, is 
Yt = j C 1 2  (13.18) 
C1 is the capacitance per unit length between the internal conductors and the 
shield, C2 is the capacitance per unit length between the shield and its external 
current return path, and e is the permittivity of the insulation inside the cable. 
The preceding equations indicate that both the mutual inductance and the 
mutual capacitance depend on  the weave angle of  the shield. For  a constant 
coverage and for a specific size cable, the  variations of M and C with weave angle 
are as shown in Figure 13.18 (Reference 13.5). The mutual inductance per unit 
length increases rapidly with increasing weave angle, since, as explained earlier, 
apertures with their major axes oriented parallel to  the lines of magnetic flux are 
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Figure 13.1 7 Transfer impedance of a braided-wire shield. 
100 
- I  1 l I l l 1  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 0 = 30° 
a =  l c m  
T I  1 I l l l C  
- 
d 
- 
- 
- 
K = 85 4% C = 42 
- d = 6 3  m~lr  
N = 10 
- 
K 89 5%, C = 46 
- 
- 
- 
- 
K = 97 8%, C = 58 
1 o5 lo7 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
WEAVE ANGLE, cr - degrees 
Figure 13.18 Variation of mutual inductance and mutual capacitance with 
weave angle for constant coverage. 
more effective in allowing flux t o  leak inside than are apertures of the same area 
but with their major axes oriented at right angles to  the liues of flux. The mutual 
capacitance varies only slightly with weave angle, since the major factor 
governing the mutual capacitance is simply the projected area of the apertures. 
To simplify the task of estimating M and C from the preceding equations, 
the functions of the eccentricity of the apertures are plotted in Figure 13.19 
(Reference 13.6) and the variation in ( I - K ) ~ / ~  plotted in Figure 13.20 
(Reference 13.7). 
Tape-wound shields, as shown in Figure 13.21, are often used where 
flexibility of the shielded cable is required. The shield may be formed either 
from a narrow metal sheet spiraled around the core or from a carrier of fine 
wires, again spiraled around a core. Flexible armor and flexible conduit, which is 
normally used primarily for mechanical protection, may also be analyzed as 
tape-wound shields. The tape-wound, or spiral-wound, shield is a rather poor 
shield for preventing coupling of current from the shield onto the internal 
conductor because the shield tends to  behave as a solenoid wound about the 
internal conductors. There is thus a rather large mutual coupling term relating 
the internal voltage t o  the shield current. This is particularly true if the tape is 
WEAVE ANGLE, t2 - degrees 
Figure 13.19 Variation of the eccentricity functions for braided-wire shields. 
wound without any overlap because in this case the entire cable current is forced 
to spiral around the core. Vance analyzes a 1 cm radius cable wound with 
.25 mm thick, I cm wide copper tape, the tape applied without overlap. The 
dimensions of the cable are thus similar to those for the braided-wire shield 
shown in Figure 13.18. The mutual inductance of the tape-wound shield was 
calcuIated as 3.9 pH/m of the order lo4 greater than the mutual inductance 
obtained for a braided-wire shield. 
The thin-waned tubular shield consists of a metal tube of uniform cross 
section and uniform wall thickness. Coupling through the shield can occur only 
by diffusion of the electromagnetic fields through the walls of the tube. The 
transfer impedance of thin-walled tubes such as these, as derived by Schelkunoff, 
(Reference 13.8) is 
1 ( l+ j ) t /6  za =- 
2nrut sinh (1 + j) t/6 
where r is the radius of the shield, a is its wall thickness, u is the conductivity of 
the shield, and 8 is the skin depth in the shield given by 
It is assumed that the wall thickness, a, is small compared to the radius, r, of the 
tube and that the radius, r, is small compared to the smallest wavelength of 
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Figure 13.20 Variation of ( 1 - ~ ) 3 / 2  with shield coverage K. 
interest. It is also assumed that the shield is made from a good conductor (metal) 
so that  the displacement current in the shield material is negligible compared t o  
the conduction current. 
Figure 13*21 Tape-wound shield. 
The maximum transfer impedance is found at dc or low frequencies, or 
frequencies low enough that the thickness of the shield is small compared to the 
skin depth. That impedance is the dc resistance 
The transfer impedance decreases with increasing frequency. Accordingly, 
the internal electric field will, in response to a step-function current, increase 
according to the pulse penetration time constant predicted by Equation 10.9 
and shown in Figure 10.6 of Section 10.1. 
In the absence of any end effects or openings through which magnetic 
fields can leak, the mutual inductance term M1 2 of Equation 13.4 will be zero. 
Cable trays are most often used for mechanical protection of wires, but if 
viewed as shields, they may also provide electrical protection. The characteristics 
of a cable tray that make for good electrical protection are the same as those of 
any other shield: 
It must be able to carry current along its axis. 
It should be of low-resistance material. 
It should completely surround the conductors, implying that the 
tray should be fitted with a conducting cover. 
It should have a minimum number of openings through which 
magnetic fields may leak, 
It should have as few joints as possible, and such p in t s  should be 
made in such a manner as to provide minimum resistance and 
leakage of magnetic fields. 
The transfer characteristics of the tray by itself would be about the same 
as those of the solid tubular shields discussed previously. This comparison 
assumes the tray to be of solid metal and fitted with a well-sealed cover. Since 
covers never form perfect seals, the pulse penetration time constant would 
probably not be as long as predicted by Equation 10.9. Even with an imperfect 
cover, the transfer impedance ZT would not be greater than the dc resistance. 
Trays are most commonly built in short sections and joined by splices or 
transition sections. Such sections frequently provide for thermal expansion and 
contraction and are, at any rate, seldom designed either to provide good 
electrical continuity or to protect against magnetic leakage. When joints are 
considered, the transfer characteristic of the tray is frequently found to depend 
almost entirely on the treatment of the joints. The transfer characteristics can 
seldom be determined by calculation; they must be determined experimentally. 
13.4 Multiple Conductors and Shields 
If there are multiple conductors in the core, each conductor will develop 
nearly the same voltage between that conductor and the shield. This holds true 
whether the conductor is located adjacent to  the shield or in the center of the 
bundle of conductors comprising the core. Accordingly, the voltage between any 
pair of  conductors in the core will be small. Present analytical tools d o  not seen1 
of sufficient accuracy t o  predict with any assurance the magnitude of line-line 
voltages; they are best determined b y  actual measurement. Line-line voltages are 
much more strongly influenced by load impedances t o  which the conductors are 
connected than by the position of the conductors within an overall shield. 
13.4.1 Physical Phenomena 
One very common situation involving multiple conductors within an 
overall shield is a configuration in which a shielded conductor is itself contained 
in an overall shield. Figure 13.22 shows such a condition and shows some of the 
basic considerations with which one must deal in order t o  predict the response 
of this two-cable network t o  a noise current flowing on the outer shield. The 
total circuit response is a combination of the internal field of the outer shield 
and the internal field of the inner shield plus the coupling from the internal field 
of the inner shield t o  the signal conductor contained within the inner shield. 
These internal fields are created b y  noise current flowing on the outer shield plus 
noise current flowing o n  the inner shield. The noise current on the inner shield 
depends upon the internal field of the outer shield and on  the impedance 
presented t o  signals traveling on the outer surface of the inner shield and 
returning along the inner surface of the outer shield. 
The most important factor concerning this latter impedance is whether or 
not the internal shield is grounded a t  both ends. Figure 13.32(b) shows the 
internal shield connected to the outer shield at the left-hand end and a switch 
that would allow connection t o  be made between the shields at the right-hand 
end. It is furthermore assumed that the impedance of any connection between 
shields is zero, a situation that definitely may not be true in practice. 
If the inner shield is not grounded a t  the right-hand end, the inteinal field 
of the outer shield (Ei-os) produces a voltage difference, Vis.os, a t  the right-hand 
end of the cable. Neglecting the distributed capacitances between the inner 
shield and the outer shield, the noise current on the inner shield, Iis, is then zero. 
If the inner shield is connected t o  the outer shield at both ends and the switch, 
S, is closed, the voltage difference between the two ends of the cable is reduced 
t o  zero. The internal field of the outer shield, however, will induce a circulating 
current, Iis, between the inner shield and the outer shield. The magnitude of this 
current is governed by  the strength of the field Ei-,, and the impedance around 
the loop between the inner shield with return on the outer shield. This 
impedance, a t  least for many cables, is predominantly inductive. The waveshape 
of the current on  the inner shield, Iis, is then proportional t o  the time integral of 
the voltage developed along the inner surface of the outer shield. The current on 
SIGNAL CONDUCTOR 
CURRENT ON INNER SHIELD 
I i s  
--------------- A 
INTERNAL FIELD OF INNER SHIELD 
------- 
Ei-is 
INNER SHIELD 
INTERNAL FIELD OF OVERALL SHIELD 
- 10s
CURRENT ON OVERALL SHIELD 
SIGNAL CONDUCTOR 
INNER SHIELD is-0s 
t t s  
OVERALL SHIELD xis v is-0s 
w b 
(b) 
Figure 13.22 Double-shielded cable. 
(a) Current and field polarities 
(b) Current on  inner shield and forced 
through Lis-os 
the inner shield thus typically has a slower rise time and a longer duration than 
does the field along the inner surface of the outer shield. This current, Iis, o n  the 
internal shield then produces a n  electric field along the surface of the inner 
shield, Ei-is. 
13.4.2 Examples of Response of Multiple-Shielded Cables 
It will be apparent that there are a number of combinations of shield 
connections and termination impedances which are possible, all of them 
affecting the overall response of the cable system. Some of these effects have 
been demonstrated during an extension of the tests described in Figure 13.1 
through 13.6. The piece of RG-58/U coaxial cable used for those tests was 
modified by pulling over the outer jacket another length of flexible copper 
braid. The test connections and results are shown on Figure 13.23. The 
equivalent circuit has three separate components--separate in the sense that 
each, for all practical purposes, may be treated independently. The first part of 
the circuit determines the voltage induced along the inner surface of the outer 
shield. This is governed by the outer current flowing through R1 and M I ,  the 
transfer factors of the outer shield. In the second stage of the problem, this inner 
shield voltage is impressed across the inductance existing between the inner and 
outer shields in order to determine the current flowing on the inner shield. In 
the third state, the current on the inner shield is passed through R2 and M2, the 
transfer parameters of the inner shield. 
The resultant voltages are then the voltages that appear between line and 
ground on the central signal conductor. The amplitudes and shapes of these 
(4 
Figure 13.23 Multiple-shielded cable. 
(a) Test conditions 
(b) Conductor voltages 
(c) Equivalent circuits 
voltages are also shown in Figure 13.23. More effects have been illustrated by a 
series of measurements on a rather complex multiconductor cable. The overall 
makeup of the cable itself is shown in Figure 13.34. It consists of eight shielded 
quads surrounding a shielded center complex of nine conductors. The entire 
group of conductors is contained within an overall shield. The overall shield and 
the shields on the individual complexes are insulated from each other. 
Figure 13.25 shows the waveshape of the current injected onto the overall 
shield of the cable. This current was transformer-coupled to the shield, allowing 
the overall shield to  be grounded at both ends. 
Figure 13.26 shows voltages measured on three of the different shielded 
INSULATING 
JACKET 
4 CONDUCTORS 
- 
Figure 13.24 Construction of a multiconductor cable. 
18A PEAK 
Figure 13.25 Current on overall shield. 
complexes within the overall shield. Measurements were made on the shields of 
two of the eight shielded quads and on the shield of the center complex. With 
high-impedance terminations at each end of the cable, the voltage from each of 
the individual shields to ground was the same. Voltages on individual conductors 
within the shielded groups would be the same as the voltage on the shield of that 
group. The position of a conductor within an overall shield thus has only a 
secondarder effect on the coupling from the internal electric field of the shield 
to the signal conductor. 
Figure 13.27 shows shield voltages measured with a low-impedance load 
connecting the center shield to ground. A load impedance of 47 52 approxi- 
mately matches the surge impedance of the transmission line existing between 
any of the shields on the internal groups and overall shield. It prevents the 
development of oscillations which would otherwise be superimposed on an 
underlying waveform, like those shown in Figure 13.26. Note that the voltage on 
the center shield is now increased to nearly twice what it was with a 
high-impedance load on the ends of the shields. Note, furthermore, that the 
voltage on the other shields remains nearly the same as it was with all shields at 
the left open circuited. The slight increase of voltage noted on the unconnected 
shields results from capacitive coupling at the left end between the unconnected 
shields and the one center shield that is held nearly at ground potential by the 
47 52 load. Oscillogram No. 11 on Figure 13.28 shows the nature of these 
superimposed oscillations if the shield on the center complex is grounded 
directly. The voltage, V, shown measured at the right-hand end of the cable was 
in fact measured on one of the conductors within the center complex. The same 
voltage would be measured on any of the other conductors or on the shield 
itself. 
If the ground on the center shield is moved to the right-hand side, the 
389 
1 A 0 .  7 
CENTER SHIELD 
No. 15 
- 0.5 ps/div--- 
Figure 13.26 Signal voltages vs source connections. 
voltage between a signal conductor and ground at the right-hand side is then 
reduced to zero because the capacitive coupling between the center conductor 
and center shield tries to hold the center conductor at the potential of the center 
shield, which, of course, is zero. A voltage of magnitude and waveshape as shown 
on oscillogram No. 11, but of opposite polarity, would then appear at the 
left-hand end of the cable. 
If both ends of the center shield are connected to ground, the voltage on 
the signal conductor is then held at zero at each end of the cable. Note that in 
this case a ground loop is formed between the two shields without the harmful 
effects commonly attributed to  ground loops. 
Some additional considerations regarding the effect of connections to the 
signal conductors and the shield around the signal conductors are shown in 
No. 22 
-0.5 ps/div---, I 
Figure 13.2 7 Signal shield voltages: low source impedance on one shield. 
Figure 13.29. Compare oscillogram No. 17 of this figure to oscillogram No. 11 in 
Figure 13.28. Connecting the signal conductor to ground via a low impedance at 
the same end as that at which the shield around that signal conductor is 
connected to ground does not change the voltage appearing at the other end of 
the cable on that signal conductor. If the ground on that shield is moved to the 
right-hand of the cable, however, the voltage on the signal conductor at the 
right-hand end of the cable remains virtually unchanged. This was not the case 
when there was no low-impedance termination on the signal conductor at the 
left-hand end of the cable. Compare oscillogram No. 16 of Figure 13.29 with 
oscillogram No. 14 of Figure 13.28. Finally, note that a ground on the internal 
shield at each end keeps the voltage on the signal conductor low even with a 
low-impedance connection to ground on the other end of the signal conductor. 
CENTER SHIELD 
No. 14 
2 
L3 
\ 
> 
m 
0 
- 0.5 ps/div--+ 
Figure 13.28 Signal voltage vs grounding of signal shield: high source irn- 
pedance - high receiving impedance. 
Compare oxillogram No. 18 in Figure 13.29 to oscillogram No. 12 in Figure 
13.28. 
The significant feature of these measurements is that rather complex 
phenomena can occur on multiple-shielded cables when the grounding of the 
inner shield is different from the grounding of the overall shield. Furthermore, 
the voltages on signal conductors can often be significantly lowered if the 
internal shield is grounded at each end, and the corresponding voltages are 
scarcely reduced at all if the inner shield is not grounded at each end. Most 
commonly, of course, an inner shield is grounded at only one end for control of 
low-frequency or low-level interference. Multiple grounding of the internal 
shields and the production of ground loops, then, is not automatically harmful; 
it may, in fact, be helpful. 
~ L ~ C K ; ~  
CENTER SHIELD 
0LUE SHIELD 
No. 18 
PLJk 
Fig 
+-- 0.5 )rs/div--- 
ure 13.29 Signal voltage vs grounding of signal shield: low source im- 
pedance - high receiving impedance. 
13.5 Transfer Characteristics of Actual Cables 
The transfer impedance of  a shielded cable is not a factor commonly 
specified either by the manufacturer or by  procurement specifications. Even 
among cables of the same nominal type, this transfer impedance may vary 
considerably between the cables supplied by different manufacturers. The most 
straightforward method of determining the transfer characteristic of a shielded 
cable, particularly if the cable involves multiple shields and multiple load 
impedances on conductors within the shield, is to  make actual measurements of 
the conductor voltages that are produced by  currents which are circulated 
through the shield. The techniques by  which transient currents may be  injected 
into the shields of cabIes through coupling transformers are desckibed in Chapter 
17. 
If actual measurements of coupling effects are not available, the transfer 
characteristics of many cables can be estimated from other published literature. 
One such summary giving the parameters of coaxial cable shields is shown in 
Table 13.1 (Reference 13.9). 
1 3.6 Transfer Characteristics of  Connectors 
The transfer impedance of a cable connector or splice can be represented 
by 
where & is the resistance measured across the connector and Mi2 is a mutual 
inductance between the external shield circuit and the internal conductors of the 
cable. The value of ZT is usually not calculable, but it can be measured by 
passing current through a cable sample containing the connector and measuring 
the open circuit voltage induced on conductors inside the shield. Some typical 
values of Ro and M I  2 have been measured on cable connectors and are listed in 
Table 13.2. 
The transfer impedance of a connector is a lumped element in the cable 
circuit, in contrast to the distributed nature of the transfer impedance of the 
cable shield. The effect of leakage through the connector can thus be 
represented by a discrete voltage source 
where I. is the shield current. 
Because most connectors that would be used for shielded cables have 
essentially 100% optical coverage, their transfer admittance is usually negligible. 
In addition, most bulkhead or panel-mounting connectors are located at points 
where the shield voltage is a minimum, so that excitation of the internal 
conductors by the transfer admittance is small even if the transfer admittance 
itself is not small. 
13.7 Grounding of Shields 
It should be emphasized that the transfer parameters of Table 13.2 refer 
only to the properties of the connector itself. Additional transfer impedances 
may be produced by the manner in which the cable shield is connected to the 
connector or by the manner in which the cable connector is mounted to a 
bulkhead. Even slight inattention to detail may introduce into the circuit 
transfer impedances far greater than the impedance of the connector or possibly 
far greater than that of the rest of the cable shield. A common treatment of a 
shield at a connector is to insulate the shield with tape and connect it to the 
back shell through a pigtail. Such treatment is shown in Figure 13.30(a). Equally 
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Table 13.2 RESISTANCE AND MUTUAL INDUCTANCE OF CABLE 
CONNECTORS 
'Too small to measure in presence of 4 inches of copper tube used to 
mount connector. 
Connector 
Multipin 
Aerospace 
connectors 
(Threaded) 
Type N 
Type BNC 
(Bayonet 1 
Anodized 
Open shell 
Split shell 
Identification 
Burndy NA5-15863 
Deutch 38068-10-5PN 
Deutch 38068-1 8-31 SN 
Deutch 38060-22-55SN 
Deutch 38068-14-7SN 
Deutch 38060-1 4-7SN 
Deutch 38060-14-7SN 
Deutch 38068-1 2-1 2SN 
Deutch 38068-1 2-1 2SN 
Deutch 38068- 12- 12SN 
Deutch 38060-1 2-1 2SN 
Deutch 38068-1 2-1 2SN 
AMP 
AMP 
AMP 
UG 21 B/U-UG58A/U 
UG 88C/U-UG1094lU 
MS 24266R-228-55 
MS 3126-22-55 
MS 3100-165-1P 
MS 3106A- 
R O  
(ohms) 
0.0033 
0.1 5 
0.005 
0.023 
0.046 
0.10 
0.023 
0.0033 
0.01 2 
0.01 2 
<O.M)l 
0.014 
0.0067 
0.0067 
0.0033 
' 
0.002 
5 x l o 4  
0.5-1 
0.001 
M12 
(H 1 
5.7 X lo-" 
2.5 X lo-' ' 
1.6 X lo-'' 
1.1 X 10-lo 
5.0 X 10-I ' 
8.2 X 10-I 
6.7 X lo-" 
3.0 X 10-l' 
1.3 X lo-" 
1.3 X lo-" 
2.5 X 10-l2 
3.5 X lo-" 
1.6 X lo-' ' 
1.5X lo- ' '  
1.9 X lo-' ' 
' 
4-8 X lo-" 
UM < R, 4 20 MHZ 
wM < R, @ 20 MHz 
a 20 X lo-'' 
common practice is t o  insulate a panel connector from a panel with an insulating 
block and to ground the panel connector either to the panel through a pigtail or, 
more commonly, to an internal ground bus. A very common treatment of a 
shield at a connector, shown in Figure 13.30(c), is for the shield to  be connected 
to one of the connector pins and grounded internally through a pigtail, either to 
the panel or to an internal ground bus. 
The coupling introduced by any of these configurations can be studied in 
terms of the self-impedance of the conductor used for the pigtail and the mutual 
inductance between a portion of the pigtail and the conductors in the connector. 
INSULATING 
CABLE CONNECTOR 
CONNECTOR PINS \ 0 
PIGTAIL ->-> 
Figure 13.30 Common treatment of shields at connectors. 
(a) Pigtail connection to a backshell 
(b) Pigtail grounding to a panel connector 
(c) Shield carried on a connector pin 
The flow of current through the self-inductance of the pigtail produces a voltage 
This voltage, less that induced in the mutual inductance between the 
pigtail and the conductors in the connector, will add directly to that produced 
by the flow of current along the shield. 
The self-inductance of a straight conductor is 
where P is the length of the conductor and r is its radius, both measured in 
centimeters. The inductance of a typical pigtail will not be significantly different 
even if it is not straight. 
The mutual inductance between the two conductors is 
where the factor Q, shown in Figure 13.31, is a function of the ratio of the 
length of conductors to their spacing. If d < Q, then 
Mutual inductance so defined is not the same as the mutual inductance 
referred to in Equations 13.4 and 13.1 2. This latter is best referred to as a 
transfer inductance, which one would normally want to be small. The 
corresponding quantity for the parallel conductors would be L minus M. One 
would normally want the mutual inductance (Equation 13.27) between two 
conductors to be large. 
A numerical example will illustrate the problems associated with pigtail 
grounds. Assume a shield is carried, as in Figure 13.30(c), through a panel on a 
pigtail and a set of connector pins. Assume the total length of the pigtail-pin 
combination to be 7 cm, the spacing between the pigtail and a signal conductor 
to be, on the average, 0.05 cm, and the pigtail to be made from number 22AWG 
wire having a radius of 0.0323 cm. The self-inductance of the pigtail would then 
be 74.5 nH, the mutual inductance between the two would be 65.0 nH, and the 
difference, the factor equivalent to the transfer inductance for the shielded 
cable, would be 9.5 nH. A rather mediocre shielded braid would have an 
inductance on the order of 1 nH/m, and a large-diameter, tightly woven braid 
might have an inductance on the order of 0.25 nHlm. The amount of voltage 
injected into a signal circuit by the current flowing through this one relatively 
short pigtail, then, would be as much as that coupled onto the signal conductor 
by 10 to 40 m of cable shield braid. This point may be illustrated by Figure 
13.32, an extension of the test series previously discussed in reference to Figures 
Figure 13.31 Mutualinductance. 
13.1 through 13.6. One end of the cable was grounded through a 33-inch length 
of wire, while the other end was connected to  the ground plane directly. Voltage 
V1 was increased from 0.4 V (Figure 13.6) to 13.5 V solely because of the 
inductive drop in the ground lead. 
There are two fundamental drawbacks to pigtail grounding. The first, 
shown in Figure 13.33(a), is that the shield current, being constricted to a path 
of small diameter, sets up a more intense magnetic field at the surface of the 
conductor than it would if the conductor were larger. Because of the higher flux 
density, the self-inductance of the conductor is larger. A more intense magnetic 
field of itself would not really be harmful if all the flux so set up would link the 
signal conductors as well, because then the mutual inductance would also be 
high, and the difference, L minus M, would be low. If the shield current is 
confined to a small-diameter path, the field intensity rapidly falls off with 
distance away from the conductor, and hence the mutual inductance will always 
be smaller than the self-inductance. 
If the shield current is carried to ground on a shell concentric with the 
402 
Figure 13.32 Effects of inductance in a ground lead. 
(a) Circuit 
(b) Voltage 
conductors within the shield, shown in Figure 13.33(b), there is much less 
voltage introduced into the conductors for the following reasons: 
The length of the path through which the shield current must flow is 
shorter. 
The field intensity external to the shield is reduced by virtue of the 
inherently larger diameter of the path upon which the current flows. 
The field intensity inside the shield is low--nearly zero. 
The shorter, and larger diameter, current path implies less self-inductance. 
The absence of magnetic flux within the shield implies that the signal conductors 
are exposed t o  as much flux as is the shield: that M = L, and L minus M = 0. 
403 
(a) INTENSE MAGNETIC FIELD 
AROUND PIGTAIL CAUSES 
HIGH SELF-INDUCTANCE 
SHIELD CURRENT PATH IS 
UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED 
AROUND SIGNAL CONDUCTORS \r 
(b) MAGNETIC FIELD ENTIRELY 
EXTERNAL TO REGION 
OCCUPIED BY SIGNAL CONDUCTORS 
Figure 13.33 Grounding of shields. 
(a) Pigtails 
(b) 360" peripheral 
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CHAPTER 14 
EXAMPLES OF INDUCED VOLTAGES 
MEASURED ON AIRCRAFT 
14.1 Introduction 
There have been several sets of  tests made on aircraft in which simulated 
lightning currents were injected into the aircraft and the resultant voltages and 
currents on the aircraft wiring measured. Space precludes giving in this report a 
con~prehensive summary of the test results, and the user is referred t o  the 
reports on the individual tests. A few examples of the measurements will be 
@en in the following sections, and an atternpt will be made t o  indicate the most 
important facts learned during the tests. 
14.2 Wing from F-89J Aircraft 
The first set o f  tests t o  be d~scussed (Reference 14.1) was one in which 
high lightning-like currents were injected into one wing of  an F-89J aircraft. 
During the test, represented in Figure 14.1, the wing was fastened onto a 
screened instrument enclosure, which may be viewed as representing the fuselage 
of the aircraft. Lightning-like currents of up t o  40 000 A were injected into the 
wing or into the external wing tip tank from a high-current surge generator, 
allowed to flow along the wing to the outer wall of the screened instrument 
enclosure, and then to ground. An example of one of the types of current 
injected Into the wing is shown in Figure 14.l(b). In order to  obtain maximum 
current, the surge generator was operated in a mode that essentially allowed the 
production of only one cycle o f  a damped oscillatory current, unlike a typical 
lightning current, which would rise t o  crest rather fast and decay at a much 
slower rate. The shape of the current wave must be considered when observing 
the waveshape of some of the voltages that will be discussed. In  particular, note 
that at about 20 p s  there appears a major discontinuity in waveshape. This 
discontinuity in current waveshape is reflected in the induced voltages. 
Within the wing there were a number ofelectrical circuits, such as those to  
navigation lights, fuel gauges, pumps, relays, and switches indicating position of 
flaps. Some of these ran in the leading edge of the wing and were well shielded 
from many electromagnetic effects, while others ran along the trailing edge 
between the main body of the wing and the wing flaps. These latter were most 
exposed to the electromagnetic fields. All of the circuits were relatively 
independent o f  each other; they were not,  as a general rule, bundled together in 
one large cable bundle, a practice that provides maximum coupling from one 
circuit to another and makes analysis difficult. 
The first circuit that will be discussed, shown in Figure 14.2, was a circuit 
supplying power to  a position light mounted on the external fuel tank. An 
electrical diagram of the circuit, shown in Figure 14.2(b), shows that the circuit 
consisted of one wire supplying power to  the filament of  the position light with 
the return circuit for the light being through the wingstructure. Accordingly, if 
the lightning current contacts the external tank, that circuit will be influenced 
by  the resistance Rl of the hangers fastening the tank t o  the wing, by R2, the 
inherent resistance of the wing, and by magnetic flux arising from the flow of 
current. 
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Figure 14.1 High current injection tests o n  the wing from an F-89J. 
(a) Test arrangement 
(b) Waveshape of injected current 
Typical results for the stroke position shown are given in Figure 14.2(c) 
and 14.2(d). The open circuit voltage is seen t o  rise rapidly to its crest and to 
decay more rapidly than does the injected curlent shown in Figure 14. I (b). As a 
result, the open circuit voltage was responding primarily to  magnetic flux. 
When the conductor was shorted t o  ground at  the instrument enclosure, 
the short circuit current rose t o  its crest in approximately the same length of 
time as did the injected current and displayed much the same waveshape as the 
injected current. 
Figure 14.2(e) shows an approximate equivalent circuit that might be 
derived. L1 and R1  represent a transfer impedance between the current flowing 
in the wing and the voltage developed on the circuit. L2 and R2 represent the 
inherent inductance and resistance of the wires between the fuselage and the 
light. The transfer inductance and resistance, which it should be emphasized do 
not necessarily represent any clearly definable resistance or inductance of  the 
wing, are merely those values which, when operated upon by the external 
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Figure 14.2 A wing tip circuit. 
(a) Circuit orientation 
(b) Electrical details of circuit 
(c) Open circuit voltage 
(d) Short circuit current 
(e) Equivalent circuit 
lightning current, produced the observed open circuit voltage. 
A different type of  circuit is that shown in Figure 14.3. I n  this circuit a 
conductor ran through the leading edge of the wing and terminated in an open 
circuit on a pylon mounted underneath the wing. In the electrical detail circuit 
shown in Figure 14.3(b), it can be seen that this circuit would not respond to 
;", PYLON 
I I 
NOT DETERMINED 
Figure 14.3 A Pylon circuit - open at  pylon. 
(a) Circuit orientation 
(b) Electrical details of circuit 
(c) Open circuit voltage 
(d) Equivalent circuit 
the voltage developed across the resistance between the tank and the wing. The 
circuit would respond in some measure t o  some fraction of  the wing resistance 
and t o  some fraction of the magnetic: field set up by the flow of current in the 
wing, but since the circuit was only capacitively coupled t o  the wing, the total 
coupling impedance should have been, and was, less than that of  the circuit 
shown in Figure 14.2. The purpose of the conductor shown in Figure 14.3 was 
to  supply power t o  a relay and to explosive bolts in the pylon used t o  hold a 
weapon. In Figure 14.3 the pylon was not installed, so there was no load on the 
conductor. Figure 14.4 shows the results when that pylon was installed, when 
the conductor was connected to a relay with a return through the aircraft 
structure, and when the lightning flash was allowed to contact the pylon. The 
combination of  a structural return path for the circuit and a lightning flash 
terminating upon the pylon and thus including the resistive drop across Rj, the 
resistance between the pylon and the wing, served t o  make the voltage much 
greater than it was when the conductor was open circuited. No attempt was 
made t o  completely analyze from which area the total amount of  magnetic flux 
was coming or whether the flux 91, representing that in the pylon, or 42, 
- 1 
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Figure 14.4 A Pylon circuit - loaded a t  pylon. 
(a) Circuit orientation 
(b) Electrical details of circuit 
(c) Open circuit voltage 
representing the flux within the wing, was the larger. 
A fourth circuit, and one which illustrates the interaction between the 
lightning-developed voltage and the circuit response is shown in Figure 14.5. In 
this circuit a slot antenna excited by a grounded stub and fed from a length of 
75 52 coaxial cable was installed in the leading edge of the wing. The shorted 
stub that excited the slot antenna was the predominant area intercepting the 
magnetic flux produced by the lightning current in the wing. As in the three 
previous examples, the basic voltage developed in this antenna and shown in 
Figures 14.5(c) or 14.5(e) followed the same pattern as that shown for the other 
circuits. The rapid transition on the leading edge of the voltage, however, was 
capable of  exciting an oscillation within the coaxial cable feeding the antenna. 
When the antenna circuit was terminated in a resistor matching the surge 
impedance of the cable, the higher frequency ringing oscillation disappeared, 
leaving only the underlying response of the antenna to the magnetic field 
surrounding the wing. 
Several significant things were learned during this test series. The first was 
that the voltages induced in a typical circuit within the wing consisted of a 
magnetically induced component and a component proportional t o  the 
resistance of  the current path. The location at  which the lightning flash 
contacted the wing had an important effect on the magnitude of voltages 
developed on different circuits. None of the circuits displayed the easily 
understandable response of  the conductors within the elliptical cylinder, and in 
none of the circuits could a clearly definable transfer impedance that was easily 
relatable t o  the structural geometry of the wing be derived. Nearly aU the 
voltages and currents measured on  the circuits could be explained in terms of  the 
simple equivalent circuit shown in Figure 14.6, but there did not seem to be any 
easy way in which the magnitudes of  the transfer impedance could be related to 
the physical geometry of  the wing or to  the location of  the conductors within 
the wing. It  was possible, however, t o  say that conductors located in the forward 
portion of  the wing were better shielded, and consequently had lower transfer 
impedances, than those along the trailing edge. Likewise, it could be observed 
that circuits which did not have any electrical return through the wing structure 
had lower transfer impedances than those circuits which did have a return 
through the wing structure. 
These equivalent circuits may be based upon the self-inductance of the 
wing, the self-inductance of the circuit within the wing, and the mutual im- 
pedance between the wing and the internal conductor. Alternatively, they may 
be based upon a transfer impedance, as shown in Figure 14.5(c). In the former 
the self-inductance o f  the wing would be nearly equal t o  the mutual inductance 
between the wing and the internal conductors. Their difference would be equal 
to  the transfer inductance in the latter approach. Since the values of the transfer 
impedance will be much smaller than the values representing the self-impedance 
of the circuit, the latter leads to  the more easily handled formulation. The latter 
approach is also compatible with the concept of mutual inductance or transfer 
impedance discussed for shielded cables in Chapter 13. 
Figure 14.5 An antenna circuit. 
(a) Circuit orientation 
(b) Electrical details of circuit 
(c) Open circuit voltage - RT = 
(d) Open circuit voltage - RT = 75C2 
(e) Open circuit voltage - RT = 00 
(f) Short circuit current - RT = 0 
14.3 F-8 Digital-Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) 
The second set of  measurements (Reference 14.2), about which some 
discussion will follow, was that made on an F-8 aircraft fitted with a fly-by-wire 
control system. The fly-by-wire controls, shown in Figure 14.7, consisted of a 
primary digital system, a backup analog system, and a common set of power 
actuators operating the control surfaces. The major components of the control 
Figure 14.6 Equivalent circuits. 
(a) and (b) Circuits based o n  self- and mutual inductances of 
the wing 
(c) Circuit based on an equivalent transfer admittance: 
Z = Rt + I , M t  
I 
system were located in three locations: the cockpit, where sensors coupled to 
the control stick provided signals for the control systems; an area behind the 
cockpit, where there was located the digital computer; and a compartment 
behind and below the cockpit on  the left side o f  the aircraft. This latter 
compartment was one that would normally have been occupied by  guns; 
accordingly, it will be referred t o  as the "gun bay." In this gun bay were located 
the interface and control assemblies. 
Several hydraulic actuators were located at  each of the major surfaces. 
LIGHTIJING , L  
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Tbese were interconnected t o  the fly-by-wire control systems through wire 
bundles that ran under the wings. The control systems did not depend upon the 
aircraft structure as a return path; the system was considered to have a 
single-point ground, and that single-point ground was located at a panel in the 
gun bay. By and large, none of the control wiring in the aircraft was shielded. 
In contrast t o  the tests on the wing of  the F-89J aircraft, in which 
high-amplitude currents were injected into the wing from a high-power surge 
generator, the tests on  the complete F-8 aircraft were made with what has been 
called the transient analyzer, a portable and relatively low-power surge generator 
capable of  injecting currents of  a waveform similar to  that found in lightning but 
of  a much lower, and nondestructive, level. During the tests on the F-8, the 
injected current was of the order of 3 0 0  A. Several different current waveshapes 
were employed; the one to  which most frequent reference will be made in 
this abbreviated set of test results is that described as the fast waveform, a 
current rising t o  crest in about 3 ps  and decaying to half value in about 16 p. 
These waveforms are shown in Figure 14.8. 
The first set of measurements t o  which reference will be made was that on 
a set of  spare conductors running between an interface box in the gun bay and a 
disconnect panel located near the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer. The 
routings of  the circuit and the waveforms are shown in Figures 14.9 and 14.10. 
The voltage measured between the conductor and ground consisted of a 
high-amplitude oscillatory component and a lower amplitude but longer 
duration component. The oscillatory component was excited by  magnetic flux 
leaking inside the aircraft, while the longer duration component was produced 
by the flow of current through the structural resistance of the aircraft. Since the 
voltages induced by  the leakage of magnetic flux were proportional to  the rate 
of change of  that flux, it followed that the oscillatory component would have 
been more pronounced for faster currents injected into the aircraft than it was 
M O D E  A N D  POWER PANEL 
STICK cENTE19;P 
SYSTEM ELECTR&IC"\ 
DISPLAY A N D  KEYBOARD 
Figure 14.7 Location of fly-by-wire control system hardware and wiring 
bundles in F-8 aircraft. 
for slower currents. This effect was noted as indicated by the oscillograrns. 
Voltages measured between conductors, shown in Figure 14.10, were much 
smaller than the voltages measured between either of the conductors and the 
airframe. Such results would be expected on a well-balanced circuit. 
SLOW WAVEFORM 
83 A/div. 20 ps/div. 
FAST WAVEFORM 
83 A/div. 20 ps/div. 
VERY FAST WAVEFORM 
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- 
83 A/div. 10 ps/div. 83 A/div. 
Figure 14.8 Simulated lightning test waveforms. 
NOTE: " - ps/div." is horizontal time scale and " A / d i v . "  is vertical 
amplitude scaIe. 
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Figure 14.9 Spare conductor measurements on P22 (Pin 24 to airframe). 
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PINS 74-75 
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Figure 14.10 Spare conductor measurement on P22 (line-to-line, Pins 24 to 
25). 
The second set of  measurements was made on a circuit running from the 
interface control unit and the gun bay t o  a wing position indicator switch 
located underneath the leading edge of the wing. The wing on the F-8 aircraft 
could be raised or lowered around a pivot point towards its rear in order t o  
change the angle of attack during landing and takeoff. The purpose o f  the 
switch was t o  indicate the position o f  the wing. The voltages induced on that 
switch circuit are shown in Figure 14.1 1. The voltages measured from 
line t o  airframe were higher than those measured from line to  line, but it is 
significant that the line-line voltages, while of a somewhat different waveshape, 
were not much lower than the line-to-ground voltages. The reason for this lay in 
the fact that the load impedances in the interface box in the gun bay were 
different from each other on the two sides of  the circuit. One side connected t o  
a power supply bus, while the other side probably connected to an emitter 
follower. Another significant feature about these voltages was that they were 
again of  an oscillatory nature. They were apparently excited by the leakage of 
magnetic flux inside the aircraft and were not excited by the drop in potential 
along the structural resistance of the aircraft. 
(SWITCH CLOSED 
WING UP) 
ONE LINE-TO-AIRFRAME 
0.2V/div. NO. 361 I ps/div. 0.2V/div. NO. 364 I ps/div. 
Figure 14.11 Voltages induced in wing position indicator switch circuit at open 
plug P22. 
Figures 14.1 2 and 14.1 3 show voltages measured on two different circuits 
going to actuators, one (Figure 14.12) going to the left pitch actuator and the 
other (Figurc 14.13) going t o  the left roll actuator. In both cases the voltages 
displayed were the output of the driver amplifier used t o  control the servo valve 
in the actuator. Both of these were differential measurements, line-line voltage 
measurements. The significant feature about these measurements was, again, that 
the characteristic response was oscillatory and apparently excited by the leakage 
of magnetic flux inside the aircraft. There was some dependence of the voltage 
FAST I WAVEFORM 
LEFT PITCH VALVE DRIVE OUTPUT 
(HIGH TO LOW) PINS 15-16 
0.2V/div. NO. 355 1 ps/div. 
Figure 14.12 Left pitch valve drive output  (high t o  low) at plug P22 (system 
battery powered). 
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O.ZV/div. No. 359 1 ps/div. 0.2V/div. NO. 360 1 ps/div. 
Figure 14.13 Voltages induced in left roll valve drive output  circuit (Pins 
44-45) at open plug P22. 
on the path of  current followed through the aircraft, but the dependence was 
not large. Both lightning current paths produced about the same peak voltage of 
transient. 
On  the F-8, as is typical of most aircraft, the control wires were laced 
together into fairly large bundles. The routing of some typical bundles in the gun 
bay housing the backup and interface electronic control boxes is shown in 
Figure 14.14. While it was not possible to  measure the current on individual 
wires within these cable bundles because of limitations of measurement 
technique and because of the large number of wires within the bundles, it was 
possible to measure the total current flowing on the various bundles. This was 
done by clamping around the bundle a current transformer having a split core. 
Typical results of these cable measurements are shown in Figures 14.15 and 
14.16. The bulk cable currents were also found to be oscillatory, just as were the 
voltages on conductors described earlier. Since the flight control wiring did not 
make use of multiple ground points within the aircraft, it follows that none of 
the currents in these cable bundles would exhibit any of the long time response 
characteristic of multiple-grounded conductors. 
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Figure 14.14 Cable bundIes within the gun bay. 
Figure 14.17 shows a statistical distribution of the peak amplitude of 
currents in all of the cable bundles upon which measurements were made. The 
distribution is shown both for the actual current amplitudes injected into the 
aircraft and in terms of what those currents would be if the results were scaled 
up to currents representative of actual lightning flashes. In terms of an 
average-amplitude lightning flash, 30 000 A,  the total current on most cable 
bundles would have been on the order of 20 to 100 A. 
Measurements were made of the amplitude and waveshape of the magnetic 
field at a number of points in and around the aircraft. One location upon which 
attention was concentrated was the cockpit, since the cockpit is an inherently 
unshielded region and one in which many control wires would be subjected to 
changing magnetic fields. The positions at which fields were measured, the peak 
amplitude of the fields, and the predominant orientation of the fields are shown 
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Figure 14.15 Currents on cable bundles leading toward cockpit and left-hand 
instrument panel. 
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ALL 2ps/div. 
Figure 14,16 Currents on cable bundles leading toward the area behind the 
cockpit. 
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Figure 14.17 Distribution of amplitudes of cable bundle cwrents (measured in 
left gun bay). 
in Figure 14.18. The magnetic fields were measured with a probe which had a 
characteristic time constant of  about 4 ps. When exposed to fields changing in 
times less than 4 ,us, it would respond t o  the absolute magnitude of the field 
intensity, and, when exposed to fields changing in times longer than 4 ps, it 
would respond t o  the rate of  change of the magnetic field. A few typical 
measurements of field waveshape are shown in Figure 14.19. The most 
significant feature about these measurements is that there was no orientation of 
the magnetic field probe that resulted in a zero output,  which indicated that the 
orientation of  the magnetic field was not uniform with respect to time. The field 
produced at any one point was the sum of the field produced by the total flow 
of  current through the aircraft and that produced by oscillatory current in the 
various structural members as the current in those structural members changed 
with time. Similar effects can be expected on other aircraft, and, accordingly, 
Figure 14.18 Magnetic field measurements in the cockpit. 
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Figure 14.19 Magnetic fields near pilot's seat. 
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there will seldom be any clear-cut manner in which electrical wiring can be 
oriented so as to pick up  the minimum value of  magnetic field and hence have 
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minimum induced voltages. One might best assume that the magnetic field at 
any point will always be oriented in the worst case. 
Some measurements of the magnetic field within the gun bay housing the 
backup control system and the interface electronics package are shown in Figure 
14.20. Clearly, the magnetic field inside the gun bay compartment was of lower 
amplitude than that of the field external t o  the gun bay. The waveshapes 
of the field are more difficult to understand. First of all, it must be kept in mind 
that the probe was responding to the rate of change in magnetic field after about 
4 ps and was responding to the field itself for times shorter than about 4 ps. 
Accordingly, the oscillograms displaying the field inside the gun bay indicated 
that there was, first of all, a component of magnetic field that rose to its crest 
about as fast as did the outside field. From then on, the field continued to 
increase at a slower rate, the final value of the field not being indicated by the 
oscillograms. The fact that the field continued to rise, but at a slower rate, was 
in agreement with the behavior predicted in Section 10.2.4, where it was 
predicted that the field would increase with a time constant characteristic of the 
No. 388 
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Figure 14.20 Magnetic fields inside gun bay. 
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internal inductance and resistance of the cavity in which the fields were to  be 
measured. 
Fields inside a battery compartment located aft of the gun bay are shown 
on Figure 14.21. The measurements showed first some oscillatory magnetic 
field, followed by a field which rose t o  crest at a time much longer than the crest 
time or even the duration of the lightning current that was injected into the 
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Figure 14.21 Magnetic fields inside the battery compartment (probe time 
constant = 4 ps). 
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aircraft. Oscillogram No. 452 in Figure 14.21 indicated the rate of change of 
field as failing t o  zero a t  about 4 0 0  ys. This would indicate that the field itself 
reached its crest value in about 4 0 0  ys. The different nature of the response of 
the fields inside the gun bay and the battery compartment can be explained in 
terms of the types of covers and fasteners used on the two compartments. The 
cover over the battery compartment was held in place by  fasteners spaced about 
every 3.8 cm, and hence made good contact t o  the rest of the airframe. The use 
of multiple fasteners resulted in minimum constriction of the current flow and 
minimum resistance t o  the circulating current within the battery compartment. 
The gun bay covers, on the other hand, since they were originally designed for 
fast access time, had far fewer fasteners. The fasteners in the gun bay, in fact, 
were spaced about every 30 cm. Accordingly, the cover on the gun bay provided 
a much greater constriction of  current flow and a much greater resistance than 
did the cover on the battery compartment. Both of these factors were of a 
nature t o  allow the field within the gun bay t o  reach its peak value faster than 
did the field within the battery compartment. 
Some of the significant points about the results of tests on this aircraft 
may be  summarized here. The first was that the use of a single-point ground 
system most emphatically did not eliminate all transient voltages produced by 
the flow of  lightning current through the structure of the aircraft. The second 
was that the characteristic response of the wiring, both for voltage and for 
current, was a damped oscillation with a frequency in the range I to 5 MHL. The 
very abbreviated series of test results just presented does not indicate the fact 
clearly, but the frequency of oscillation depended considerably on the length of 
the circuit involved: the longer the physical length of the wires, the lower the 
oscillatory frequencies. This was not a clear-cut rule, since the response of any 
one circuit was greatly influenced by the high degree of coupling between all of 
the different circuits. The third significant point is that the total current on any 
cable bundle was of the order of 20  to 100 A for an average lightning flash. This 
bulk cable current was again oscillatory with a frequency tending to correspond 
t o  the length of  the cable bundle. The equipment bays in this aircraft, not being 
designed for electromagnetic shielding qualities, allowed significant amounts of 
magnetic flux t o  develop within those bays. This is particularly true of those 
bays intended for ease of access. As a rule of  thumb, it might be expected that 
on aircraft the equipment bays housing electronic equipment might well be 
fitted with covers designed more with ease of access in mind than with magnetic 
shielding qualities in mind. It must thus be expected that those enclosures for 
which the electromagnetic shielding should In principle be the greatest may well 
be those enclosures having the poorest shielding. 
No attempt was made t o  determine in this aircraft the degree t o  which any 
circuit voltages could be reduced by the use of shielded conductors. I t  was 
noted, however, that on those circuits in which a shield was used and in which 
the shield was grounded at more than one point, the current on that shield 
tended more t o  have the slower double exponential waveshape of the external 
lightning current than t o  have the high-frequency oscillatory current excited on 
all of the unshielded cable bundles. 
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CHAPTER 15 
DESIGN TO MINIMIZE INDIRECT EFFECTS 
15.1 Some Premises and Goals for Design 
Any design program aimed at minimizing or eliminating the indirect 
effects of  lightning needs to  be founded on certain premises of  which the 
following might be  examples. The first premise is that it is desirable to  achieve a 
design that prevents the indirect effects from causing irreversible physical 
damage. The second premise is that it is essential t o  eliminate that interference 
which provides an imminent hazard t o  the safety of the vehicle or its crew or 
one that presents a severe risk of preventing the completion of the aircraft's 
mission. (It is, of  course, desirable to  minimize all interference.) For example, 
indirect effects that cause warning lights t o  appear might be acceptable whereas 
indirect effects that lead to the tripping of circuit breakers would be 
unacceptable, even if it were possible t o  reset the circuit breakers. Immediately 
after a lightning flash the pilot of the aircraft might have enough things to d o  
that he should not be called upon t o  reset circuit breakers. Further, interference 
that leads to  the scrambling o f  one channel of a redundant digital control system 
is probably acceptable, but interference that causes computers t o  shut down is 
unacceptable, particularly if the computers are shut down in a disorderly manner 
which results in the internally stored programs becoming scrambled. A third 
premise is that it is more productive t o  design electronic equipment that can 
accept transient signals on input and output leads than it is to  initiate a retrofit 
program to provide protection to an existing system. A fourth premise is that it 
is more practical to  design an electronic system around the capabilities of 
existing and proven protective devices or techniques than it is t o  develop and 
retrofit new and improved protective techniques t o  an electronic system 
designed without consideration of the transients that might be produced by 
lightning. A fifth premise is that trade-offs must be made between the cost of 
providing electronic equipment capable of withstanding lightning-induced 
transients and the cost of shielding equipment and interconnecting wiring from 
the electromagnetic effects of lightning. A sixth premise is that designers should 
take as much advantage as possible o f  the inherent shielding that aircraft 
structures are capable of supplying and should avoid placing equipment and 
wiring in locations that are most exposed to the electromagnetic fields produced 
by  lightning. 
15.2 Improvement Through Location of Electronic Equipment 
While it is recognized that the designer may not have much choice in the 
matter, it is often possible to  make improvements in the resistance to  indirect 
effects by locating electronic equipment in regions where the electronlagnetic 
fields produced by  lightning current are lowest and by avoiding the placement of 
equipment in the region where the electromagnetic fields are highest. For 
example, since the most important type of coupling from the outside 
electromagnetic environment to  the inside of the aircraft is through apertures, it 
follows that equipment should be located as far from major apertures as 
possible. 
Further, since access doors with their imperfectly conducting covers are a 
major source of  electromagnetic leakage, it follows that equipment should be 
located as far from such access doors as possible. In practice this may be more 
easily said than done, however, because frequently the purpose of access doors is 
t o  provide ready access t o  electronic equipment. 
One main goal should be  t o  locate electronic equipment toward the center 
o f  the aircraft structure rather than at  the extremities, since the electromagnetic 
fields tend t o  cancel toward the center of  any structure. 
Another main goal should be t o  locate electronic equipment away from 
the outer skin of  the vehicle - particularly away from the nose of the aircraft, 
where the radius of  curvature of a prime current-carrying path is smallest. 
Furthermore, if possible, electronic equipment should be located in shielded 
compartments. 
15.3 Improvement Through Location of Wiring 
The designer has somewhat more control over the routing of wiring used 
to interconnect equipment than he does over the location of equipment itself. 
Wiring should be located away from apertures and away from regions where the 
radius of curvature of  structural members or the outer skin is smallest. Moreover, 
wiring should be located as close t o  a ground plane or structural member as 
possible. If the structural member is shaped or can be shaped t o  provide a 
trough, the member will provide more inherent shielding than it will if the wiring 
is placed on  the edge of the member. Some examples of typical structural 
members and the best places for bundles of wiring are shown in Figure 15.1. In 
each case the structural niember is assumed to be carrying current along its axis. 
Some basic principles t o  follow are these: 
1. The closer a conductor is placed to a metallic ground plane, the less 
is the flux that can pass between that conductor and the ground 
plane. 
2. Magnetic fields are concentrated around protruding structural 
members and diverge in inside corners. Hence, conductors located 
a top  protruding members will intercept more magnetic flux than 
conductors placed in corners, where the field intensity is weaker. 
3.  Fields will be weaker on the interior of a U-shaped member than 
they will be on the edges of that member. 
4. Fields will be  lowest inside a closed member. 
Some examples of  cable routing are shown on Figure 15.2. Along the 
interior of a structure a cable clamped t o  stiffeners, as a t  position 1 ,  will 
effectively be spaced away from the metal skin by the height of the stiffeners. A 
conductor along the outside edge of  the U-shaped member, as shown by  
conductor 2 in Figure 15.2(a), may or may not be better placed than conductor 
1 : effectiveness depends on how closely the conductor is attached to the side of 
Figure 15.1 Flux linkages vs conductor position. 
(a) Conductors over a plane 
(b) Conductors near an angle 
(c) Conductors near a channel 
(d)  Conductors near a box 
In each case pictured 
Conductor I - highest flux linkages: worst 
Conductor 2 -- intermediate linkages: better 
Conductor 3 - lowest linkages: best 
Figlire 15.2 Conductor routing. 
(a) A fuselage structure 
(b) A wing structure 
In each case pictured 
Conductor 1 - highest flux linkages: worst 
Conductor 4 - lowest flux linkages: best 
the U-shaped member. Conductor 3, placed along the edge where the U-shaped 
member is attached to the stiffeners would probably be in a lower field 
environment than would either conductor I or conductor 7.  Conductor 4, 
located on  the interior of the U-channel, would be in the lowest field region and 
hence in the most effective position. Similar considerations apply to  conductors 
located in structures like wings or stabilizers. 
A conductor located along the outside trailing edge of  the wing, as shown 
by conductor 1 in Figure 15.2(b), will pick up much more flux than will any 
conductor located on the inside, probably by several orders of magnitude. Hence 
conductor 2, located on the inside of the trailing edge, would be better placed. 
Conductors 3 and 4,  in that order, would be in the regions of lowest magnetic 
flux. A conductor that could be run inside a major structural member, as shown 
by conductor 4, will be exposed t o  a minimum amount of magnetic flux. 
Conductor 5, located a t  the forward edge of the wing, would be in a well- 
shielded region if the forward edge of the wing were metal, but  it would be in a 
high field region and therefore vulnerable if the forward edge were a nonmetallic 
covering. However, even if the covering were metallic, conductor 5 would not be 
in as protected a region as that of either conductor 3 or conductor 4. 
Windshield posts, shown in Figure 15.3, tend to concentrate the current 
flowing on the exterior surface of the vehicle, particularly if a flash is swept 
back, contacting the windshield post directly or the eyebrow region above the 
windshield. Since the current is concentrated, the magnetic field intensity inside 
the crew compartment tends t o  be very high. The situation is aggravated by the 
fact that the windshields, unlike other regions where the field might have to 
diffuse through the metal surfaces, act as large apertures and so allow the 
internal magnetic flux t o  build t o  its peak values very rapidly. Instruments and 
wiring on the control panels are thus in a region of inherently high magnetic 
field strength. Conductors that run from overhead control panels (position A) to  
other instruments (position B) are often run along the windshield center posts. 
They are thus in a region of the most concentrated magnetic fields likely to be 
found on an aircraft, and accordingly they may have induced in them the highest 
voltages. 
1 5.4 Improvement Through Shielding 
In order to  make an electronic system immune t o  the effects of lightning, 
it is almost always necessary t o  make judicious use of  shielding on interconnect- 
ing wiring. Figure 15.4 shows some of  the basic considerations. In Figure 15.4(a) 
an unshielded conductor, being exposed to the full magnetic field inside the 
structure, will have high voltages developed across the high-impedance 
terminations. The presence of a shield grounded at  only one end will not 
significantly affect the magnitude of the voltage induced by changing magnetic 
fields, although a shield may protect against changing electric fields. While a 
shield may keep the voltage at  the grounded end low, it will allow the voltage on 
the signal conductors to  be high at the unshielded end. 
Shielding against magnetic fields requires the shield to  be grounded at both 
ends, as shown in Figure 15.4(b), in order that it may carry a circulating current. 
It is the circulating current that cancels the magnetic fields that produce 
common-mode voltages. There is some merit in grounding such a shield at 
multiple points, since frequently the cable will be exposed to a significant 
amount of  magnetic field over only a small portion of its total length. If the 
shield is multiple-grounded, the circulating currents will tend t o  flow along only 
one portion of the cable whereas, if it is grounded at only the two ends, current 
is constrained to flow the entire length of the cable. There is likewise some 
virtue in staggering the spacing between multiple ground points on a cable shield, 
Figure 15.3 Current flow along windshield posts. 
(a) External current flow 
(b) Internal magnetic fields 
since it is theoretically possible that uniform grounding can lead t o  troublesome 
standing waves if the shield is illuminated by a sustained frequency interference 
source. 
Of the different types of shields, shown in Figure 15.4(c), the solid shield 
inherently provides better shielding than does a braided shield, and a 
spiral-wrapped shield can be  far inferior t o  a braided shield in performance. In 
severe environments braided shields using two overlapping courses of braid may 
give shielding performance approaching that of a solid-walled shield. 
Conduits, shown in Figure 15.4(d), may or may not provide electro- 
magnetic shielding. Conduits in aircraft tend t o  be used more for mechanical 
protection than for electrical protection of conductors. Only if the conduit is 
electrically connected t o  the aircraft structure will it be able t o  carry current and 
thus provide shielding for the conductors within. Conduits for mechanical 
protection frequently are physically mounted in clamps that use rubber gaskets 
to  prevent mechanical vibration and wear. Such clamps, of  course, insulate the 
conduit and prevent it from having any magnetic shielding capability. Clearly, 
nonmetallic conduits will not provide electromagnetic shielding. 
The requirement that a shield intended for protection against lightning 
effects must be grounded at both ends raises the perennial controversy about 
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Figure 15.4 Types of shields. 
(a) Unshielded vs shielded 
(b) Multiple-grounded 
(c) Solid- vs braid- vs spiral-wrapped 
(d) Conduits 
single- versus multiple-point grounding of circuits. For many, usually legitimate, 
reasons low-level circuits need t o  be shielded against low-frequency interference. 
Most commonly, and usually legitimately, the shields intended for such 
low-frequency interference protection are grounded at only one end. But in this 
practice a fundamental concept often overlooked is that the physical length of 
such shields must be short compared t o  the wavelength of the interfering signals. 
Lightning-produced interference, however, is usually broad band and includes 
significant amounts of energy at quite high frequencies, frequencies higher than 
those the typical low-frequency shields are intended to handle. The dkhotomy 
between the requirements for shielding against high-frequency, lightning- 
produced interference and those for shielding against everyday, low-frequency 
interference is usually too great for both sets of requirements t o  be met by the 
use of only one shield system. 
Most commonly both sets of requirements can be met only by having one 
shield system t o  protect against low-frequency interference and a second shield 
system t o  protect against lightning-generated interference. The lightning shield 
can usually consist of an overall braided shield on a group of conductors with 
this overall shield being grounded t o  the aircraft structure at least at the ends. 
Within the overall shield may be  placed whatever types of circuits are needed. 
Frequently these circuits will have a shielded conductor of  their own. In a 
coordinated shielded system the designers of  individual circuits should have the 
option of  grounding such inner shields as their own requirements dictate, but 
they should not have the power of dictating the treatment of the overall shield. 
Such a n  overall shield (OAS) is shown in Figure 15.5. 
The method of grounding this overall shield can have a great impact on its 
effectiveness in protecting against lightning-generated interference. Figures 
15.5(b) through 15.5(e) show several methods of grounding such a shield when 
that shield is placed over a group of conductors being brought into an equipment 
case. For best performance the OAS should be terminated on the back shell of  a 
connector specifically designed for such termination. The shield should make a 
360" circumferential connection t o  the back shell of the connector. The 
connector shell itself should be designed t o  have low dc  resistance t o  its mating 
panel connector. Most commonly, such low-resistance mating requires the use of 
grounding fingers within the connector shell. Connectors without such ground- 
ing fingers frequently have high resistance between the mating shells, since the 
shells are frequently coated with an insulating coating to reduce problems of 
corrosion. The shell of  the panel connector should also provide a 360" peripheral 
connection t o  the metal equipment case. Providing such a connection frequently 
requires that paint or other coatings on the case of the equipment be removed 
and the bare metal exposed. 
In the absence of a 360" connector, an external pigtail is often used for 
grounding the OAS, as shown in Figure 15.5(c). Such pigtails are definitely 
inferior t o  the 360" connector because they force an interfering current on  the 
shield to  be concentrated through the pigtail, and hence t o  provide a much 
greater degree of magnetic coupling to the core conductors than does the 
distributed current flow on a properly designed connector back shell. If such a 
pigtail is used, it should be as short as possible and should terminate on the 
outside of the equipment case. A pigtail of only a very few inches may introduce 
inore leakage from the shield on to  the inner conductors than does a several-foot 
section of the shield itself. 
The practice of grounding an overall shield t o  the inside surface of an 
equipment case through a pigtail and a set of contacts in the connector is less 
effective than the use of an external pigtail, partly because the length of the 
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Figure 15.5 Types of grounding for shields. 
pigtail is inherently longer and partly because it brings currents directly t o  the 
inside of the case. Such grounding of an overall shield should be avoided 
wherever possible and, in particular, must be avoided whenever the overall shield 
runs through a region where it will intercept a significant amount of energy from 
the external electromagnetic field. 
In n o  case should an overall shield be  connected to a signal ground bus. 
15.5 Improvement Through Circuit Design 
One of  the most important considerations in the control of lightning- 
related interference through proper circuit design lies in the fundamental 
observation that a device with a broad band width can intercept more noise 
energy than can a narrow band-width device. Some of the considerations that 
derive from this observation are shown in Figure 15.6. The noise produced by 
lightning has a broad frequency spectrum. Considering for the moment only the 
spectrum of the lightning current, the observation is frequently made that most 
of  the energy associated with the lightning current is contained in the 
low-frequency region, below 10 or 20 kHz. Before any sense of  security is 
derived from that observation, it should be remembered that equipment is 
damaged or caused t o  malfunction in accordance with the total amount of 
energy intercepted. In a lightning flash there may be plenty of energy in the 
megahertz and multimegahertz region t o  cause interference. The energy that is 
available for damage or interference may well be concentrated in certain 
frequency bands by the characteristic response of the aircraft or the wlring 
within the aircraft. 
Without reference t o  any specific frequency regions, however, the energy 
spectrum of  the lightning-generated interference on electrical wiring within an 
aircraft will still be  a broad spectrum. A receptor with a broad pass band, shown 
in Figure 15.6(a), will inherently collect more energy than will a receptor with 
narrow pass band, shown in Figure 15.6(b). The narrower the pass band, the 
better. In this respect analog circuits have an inherent advantage over digital 
circuits, since a narrow-pass band digital circuit is almost a contradiction in 
terms. If possible, circuits should not have a pass band that includes dc, shown in 
Figure 15.6(c), because, when d c  is excluded, the circuits will inherently be able 
t o  reject more of the energy associated with the flow of  current through 
resistance of  the structure. 
The studies of types of interference produced in aircraft by the flow of 
lightning current have shown that the lightning energy excites oscillatory 
frequencies on aircraft wiring, particularly ~f the wiring is based on a single-point 
ground concept. Those characteristic frequencies have tended t o  be in the range 
of several hundred kilohertz t o  a few megahertz. If at all possible, the pass bands 
of electronic equipment should not include these frequencies, as does the 
hypothetical pass band shown on Figure 15.6(d). Higher or lower pass bands 
would inherently be  better than the one shown. As an extreme example, shown 
in Figure 15.6(e), fiber optic signal transmission operating in the infrared reglon 
avoids the frequency spectrum associated with lightning-generated interference 
almost completely. 
Basic considerations about circuit design and signal transmission are shown 
in Figure 15.7. First, as shown on Figure 15.7(a), signal circuits should avoid the 
use of the aircraft structure as a return path. If the structure is used as a return 
path, the resistively generated voltage drops will be included in the path between 
transmitting and receiving devices. On the other hand, signal transmission over a 
twisted-pair circuit with signal grounds isolated from the aircraft structure tend 
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to couple lower volt:rges in the signal path. It rnust not be forgotten, however, 
that the use of  twisted-pair t~.ansmission lines does not eliminate the common- 
mode voltage to  which electronic systems may be subjected. Comtnon-mode 
voltages applied to  the unbalanced transmission path, as in Figure 15.7(b), can 
lead to line-line voltages which may at times be as high as the common-mode 
voltage. 
Differential transmission and reception devices, shown in Figure 15.7(c), 
can offer a many-fold improvement in the ability to  reject the con~mon-mode 
voltages produced by lightning. 
In  general it is preferable that wiring interconnecting two different pieces 
of electronic equipment not interface directly with the junctions of semicon- 
ductors, as shown in Figures 15.7(a) and 15.7(c). Even modest amounts of 
resistance connected between the junctions and the interfacing wires, shown in 
Figure 15.7(d), can greatly improve the ability of sen3iconductors to  resist the 
transient voltages and currents. Chapter IG on coniponent damage mechanisms 
gives cxamples of the degree of improven~ent that may be obtained through the 
use of serics resistors. Transmission through balanced transmission lines and 
transformers, coupled with input protection for semiconductors, probably 
provides the greatest amount of protection against the transients induced on 
control wiring. 
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Figure 15.7 Considerations regarding circuit design. 
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15.6 Circuit Protection Through Use of Protective Devices 
Circuit protective devices can sometimes be used to limit the amount of 
electrical energy that a wire can couple into a piece of electronic equipment. 
While one can seldom eliminate interference through the use of circuit protective 
devices, circuit protective devices judiciously used can virtually eliminate 
physical damage t o  electronic devices. "Judicious use" usually means that 
protective devices must be incorporated into a piece of equipment at  the time it 
is built, not added after trouble has been experienced. 
There are two basic types of overvoltage or transient protection devices 
(TPD): those which, on sensing an overvoltage, switch t o  a low-impedance state 
and thus cause the impressed voltage across them t o  collapse t o  a low value; and 
those which, on sensing an overvoltage, tend (by virtue of  their nonlinear 
voltage-current relation) t o  maintain the voltage at that level but d o  not tend to 
collapse the voltage. Examples of the first type are spark gaps or arcing dielectric 
devices. Examples of the second type are Zener diodes and varistors. There are 
also devices which, on sensing an overvoltage, interrupt the power flow t o  the 
load. If this interruption is accomplished by electromechanical means, they 
should not be considered transient protection devices because they are 
inherently slow t o  respond. 
Switching devices inherently offer greater surge-power handling capability 
than d o  the Zener or varistor types of devices. The instantaneous power 
dissipated in a transient protective device is the product of the surge current 
flowing through the device and the voltage across the device. For a constant 
surge current, a switching device like a spark gap, across which the voltage is low 
while in the conducting state, will have less power released in it than a device 
like a Zener diode, across which the surge voltage remains high. For a given 
surge-power handling capability, a spark gap will thus be smaller physically than 
a Zener diode or varistor device. 
Another fundamental difference between switching devices (spark gaps) 
and nonswitching devices (Zener diodes or varistors) relates to  their recovery 
characteristics after the surge has passed. If a line is protected by  a spark gap and 
if that line is connected t o  a source of energy (a power bus, for example), that 
energy source must be disconnected from the line before the spark gap can 
switch back from its low-impedance conducting state t o  its high-impedance 
nonconducting state. Generally this requires opening a circuit breaker on the 
line. A Zener diode or varistor effectively ceases t o  conduct as soon as the 
voltage returns t o  its normal value. Operation of remote circuit breakers is not 
required. 
All types of overvoltage protection devices inherently operate by reflecting 
a portion of the surge energy to its source and by diverting the rest into another 
path, all with the intention of dissipating the surge energy in the resistance of 
the ground and interconnecting leads. The alternative t o  reflecting the energy is 
t o  absorb the surge energy in an unprotected load. Reflection and diversion of 
the surge energy are not without their hazards. Some are the following: 
The reflected energy can possibly appear on other unprotected 
circuits. 
Multiple reflections may cause the transient to  last longer than it 
would otherwise. 
The spectral density of the energy may be changed, either high or 
low frequencies being enhanced. Interference problems on other 
circuits may well be increased even though the risk of damage t o  the 
protected circuit is reduced. 
Most commonly the appropriate type of transient protective device t o  be 
used depends on the amount of surge energy t o  be dealt with. Generally, this 
energy decreases the further away one gets frotn the ~ t r o k e .  The surge energy to 
be expected can also be related crudely to the normal operating power of the 
circuit involved. One would normally expect lower surge levels on low-voltage 
signal circuits than on medium-power control circuits, and even lower levels than 
those on main-power distribution buses. Thus, one might logically use Zener 
diodes on individual circuit boards, var i~tors  on terminal boards, and spark gaps 
on leads running t o  prime entry and exit polnts. 
There are basically four generic types of transient protective devices 
applicable t o  lightning hardening of aeronautical subsystems. These types are 
gas-filled spark gaps, Zener diodes, varistors, and arcing dielectrics. The latter are 
currently in development, but the others are readily available commercially. 
Each rype has both advantages and disadvantages. 
15.6.1 Spark Gaps 
Spark gaps are generally composed of two metal electrodes separated by a 
dielectric and held at a fixed distance from edch other. The gap may be sealed in 
a container. Electrodes may be spherical, but in sophisticated devices they are 
not. Sparkover voltage is determined by dielectric composition, density, and 
electrode geometry. Sparkover voltage is also dependent on voltage waveshape. 
If the voltage wave is increasing rapidly, the sparkover voltage will be higher than 
it is on  a slowly rising wave. Commercially available spark gaps frequently 
contain minute amounts of tritium or other radioactive elements to  reduce the 
dependence of sparkover voltage on voltage waveshape. 
The advantages of  spark gaps are as follows: 
They are simple and reliable. 
They have very low-voltage drop during the conducting state. When 
the gap is carrying maximum current, the voltage across the gap is 
typically I0 to 20 V. If more current tries t o  flow, the arc channel 
increases in diameter and holds the same arc-drop. 4 low arc-drop 
indicates relatively low power absorption during the conducting 
phase. 
They have large power-handling capability. Gas-filled gaps have the 
highest peak current-handling capabilities of any transient protection 
device, and almost any gap can handle the maximum surge currents 
induced by  lightning. 
They have high impedance and low capacitance. The low-shunt 
capacity and leakage current characteristics of gas-filled spark gaps 
minimize insertion problems for operating frequencies below 1 GHz. 
They provide bilateral operation, having the same characteristics on 
either polarity. 
The disadvantages of spark gaps include the following: 
They have relatively high sparkover voltage. 
Simple gaps do not extinguish follow current. This is a most 
important point to  consider if they are t o  be used on a power 
circuit. The arc must be  extinguished by removing the voltage 
(circuit breaker of  fuse) or by inserting resistance rapidly into the 
circuit b y  an additional element, such as a silicon carbide or zinc 
oxide varistor. Through suitable designing, gaps can be made 
self-extinguishing for applied voltages u p  t o  about 100 V. Such 
self-extinguishing properties require the use of the magnetic blow- 
out principle. 
They may have a large dependence of sparkover voltage on  the 
waveshape of the voltage. Specifications relating t o  the impulse ratio 
or volt-time effect should be  carefully considered. 
Since spark gaps reflect more energy than they absorb, external 
resistive components may be required to  minimize ringing. Discrete 
linear or nonlinear resistors are sometimes used t o  assist in 
extinguishing a gap. This component may serve the dual purpose of 
limiting current and dissipating power. 
15.6.2 Zener Diodes 
This category includes all single-junction semiconductor devices such as 
rectifiers, in addition t o  Zener diodes. While other semiconductor devices, such 
as PNPN devices and bipolar transistors, may have appIication as surge arrestors, 
they will not be covered here because o f  the limited pertinent data available. 
Zener diodes are basically polarized devices which exhibit an avalanche 
breakdown when the applied voltage in the reverse bias direction exceeds the 
device's specified breakdown, or Zener voltage of the device. Operated in an 
opposed series configuration, diodes can be used as effective suppression devices. 
Since Zener diodes are designed to operate in the breakdown mode, they usually 
can perform more effectively as terminal protection devices than can signal 
diodcs. While the energy-handling capabilities of Zener diodes are modest when 
compared with those of  spark gaps, they are very well adapted for protection of 
individual components o r  circuit boards. 
The advantages of Zener diodes include the following: 
They are of  small size. 
They are easily mounted. 
They have low "firing" voltage. 
They have low dynamic impedance when conducting. 
They are self-extinguishing. When applied voltage drops below the 
Zener level, they cease conduction. 
They exhibit low volt-time turnup, or impulse ratio. 
The disadvantages of Zener diodes include the following: 
They may be expensive. 
They are not bilateral. To  protect against both polarities, two diodes 
in  series b a c k - t ~ b a c k  configuration are necessary. 
Diodes have relatively high-junction capacitance; therefore, they 
may cause significant signal loss at operating frequencies above 1 
MHz. Special diode assemblies may extend the useful frequency to 
approximately 50 MHz. 
They d o  not switch state between a conducting and a nonconducting 
mode. The voltage across the diode does not switch to  a low value 
when conducting but remains at the Zener voltage. This character- 
istic accounts for their ability to cease conduction when the voltage 
falls below the Zener level, but it has a disadvantage thermally. 
During conduction, the power absorbed by the diode is the product 
of the current through the diode and the voltage across the diode. 
The power absorbed for constant current, thus, is directly propor- 
tional t o  the diode voltage. 
Partially offsetting this disadvantage, however, is the phenom- 
enon that surge energy absorbed in the diode is energy that cannot 
be reflected back into the system t o  cause trouble elsewhere. 
They provide lower energy capabilities than d o  spark gaps. Since the 
Zener action takes place across a narrow P-N junction, the mass of 
the protecting junction is small and hence cannot store much energy. 
As a result, diode networks cannot be used where extremely high 
transient current or energy is predicted. For most hardening 
applications, this is not a serious limitation, since the induced 
surge-current levels are in the I t o  100 A range at those locations 
where Zener diodes are most likely t o  be used. 
They are not available for voltage below about 5 V. 
They are not normally available for voltages above a few hundred 
volts. 
15.6.3 Forward-Conducting Diodes 
In a forwardconducting state, a diode conducts little current below about 
0.3 V for germanium and 0.6 V for silicon. They can, as a result, be placed 
directly across a low-voltage line and afford substantial protection. 
The advantages of forward-conducting diodes include the following: 
They are of small size. 
They are not costly. 
They provide protection at very low-voltage levels. 
* They have excellent surge-current ratings. 
The disadvantages of forward-conducting diodes include the following: 
They are not bilateral. For protection of both polarities, two diodes 
in parallel must be used. Some vendors supply dipolar diodes for 
protection purposes. 
Conduction may occur on  normal signals with attendant signal- 
clipping and frequency-multiplication effects. Diodes must be used 
in series t o  raise voltage levels. 
They have relatively high capacitance. 
15.6.4 Nonlinear Resistors 
This category includes nonlinear resistors (varistors) that may be character- 
ized b y  the expression 
I = K V ~  
where N a n d  K are device constants dependent on  the varistor material. 
Varistors may be constructed of silicon carbide, selenium, or metal oxide. 
This section will concentrate on the metal oxide varistor (Reference 15.1). 
The advantages of metal oxide-based nonlinear resistors include the 
following: 
They are bilateral devices. 
They are of small size. 
They are easily mounted. One common configuration is very similar 
in  appearance t o  a disk ceramic capacitor. 
They are self-extinguishing. When applied voltage drops below the 
voltage for which the device is rated, they conduct very little 
current. 
They have a n  inherently fast responsellow-impulse ratio. 
They provide high power-handling capability. The current- and 
energy-handling capability is second only t o  certain types of spark 
gaps. This device gives a higher ratio of energy absorbed t o  energy 
reflected than conventional gaps give. Morever, the energy is 
absorbed throughout the bulk of the material and is not con- 
centrated in a narrow P-N junction. 
The disadvantages of nonlinear resistors include the following: 
They have low impedance and high capacitance. The zinc oxide 
varistor is characterized by  high-shunt capacity, limiting its use to  
frequencies below 1 MHz. While it has a much higher idling current 
than have either gaps or diodes, the standby power dissipation is in 
the milliwatt region and is usually not a significant limitation. 
They are not suitable for operating voltages below 20 t o  30 V. 
Operating v o l t ~ g e  is proportional t o  material thickness. Good surge 
protection o f  low-voltage circuits would require an impractically 
thin piece of  material. 
15.6.5 Surge Protecting Connectors 
At least two lines of  activity have been pursued with the aim of  
incorporating surge protective devices directly in electrical connections. One 
approach (Reference 15.2) incorporated spark gaps between the connector pins 
and the connector shell. A high dielectric material, rutile, was used t o  stimulate 
internal flashover and t o  achieve a protective level of  about 1100 t o  1300 V with 
an impulse ratio nearly unity, even with voltage rates of  change o f  1 0  k V / p .  
This design withstood extremely large currents (100 t o  250 kA). The work on 
this device was performed at Sandia Laboratories and supported by  the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission. 
Another line o f  approach uses zinc oxide varistor material t o  hold the pins 
in a connector. This work is being done by General Electric Company for the 
U.S. Army Harry Diamond Laboratories. Neither of these protective connector 
designs is yet  available commercially. 
15.7 Improvement Through Transient Coordination 
Transient coordination is a concept which, when reduced t o  its simplest 
terms, implies that targets relative to transients will be assigned both t o  those 
that design electronic equipment ("black boxes") and those that design wiring to 
interconnect those black boxes. The task that is t o  be assigned the designers of 
black boxes is t o  produce equipment that will be able to  withstand transients on 
all of the input and output  wiring. The targets that form a part of the task will 
be specifications describing the type of transients that the equipment must 
withstand and to which it will be subjected as part of an acceptance or proof 
test. The task that is t o  be assigned t o  the groups designing interconnecting 
wiring is that no external threat, such as lightning or switching of inductive 
devices, shall produce on the wiring transients larger than those which the black 
box was designed t o  withstand. The target numbers to  which the wiring designer 
must work will be maximum amplitudes of  current, voltage, and surge energy. 
The assignment of such tasks implies that there must be a referee who 
assigns the appropriate target numbers and oversees the work t o  ensure that both 
parties fulfill the tasks assigned. This referee may be  called the system integrator. 
The transient coordinator philosophy is illustrated in Figure 15.8. The aims of 
transient coordination would be the following: 
1 .  Insure that the actual transient level produced by lightning (or any 
other source of  transient) will be less than that associated with the 
transient control level number assigned to the cable designer. The 
cable designer's job would be t o  analyze the electromagnetic threat 
that lightning would present and t o  use whatever techniques of 
circuit routing or shielding would be necessary t o  ensure that the 
actual transients produced by lightning did not exceed the values 
specified for that particular type of circuit. 
2. The transient design level controlling the type of circuit or circuit 
protection techniques used, and assigned t o  the avionics designer, 
would be higher than the transient control level by a margin 
reflecting how important it was that lightning did not in fact 
interfere with the piece of equipment under design. A margin is 
necessary because any single lightning flash might produce an actual 
transient level higher than the assigned transient control level, which 
would have been derived for a predicted average in spite of the cabIe 
designer's good intentions. Prediction of actual transient levels is an 
imperfect art. 
The job of the avionics designer wouId be to ensure that the 
vulnerability and susceptibility levels of the equipment that he is to 
supply would be higher than the assigned transient design level. The 
vulnerability level is that level of transient which, if applied to the 
input or output circuit under question, would cause the equipment 
to be permanently damaged. The susceptibility level is defined as 
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Figure 15.8 The transient coordination philosophy. 
SYSTEM INTEGRATOR 
that level of transient that would result in interference with o r  
malfunction of  the equipment. The vulnerability level by  definition, 
then, would have t o  be  a t  least as high as the susceptibility level. 
There are several ways in which the levels might be set. In the first, the 
system integrator would set the desired transient level, then set the required 
margin, which in turn would set the transient control level. Whatever the 
rationale by which the system integrator sets the transient design level, that level 
would become a part of the purchase specifications and would, presumably, not 
be subject to  variation by the vendor of the avionics. As a n  alternative, the 
avionics designer might determine b y  suitable testing the vulnerability and 
susceptibility levels of his equipment and provide a guarantee as t o  the level of 
transients that his equipment could withstand. That level would then be the 
transient design level. After the system integrator had set the desired safety 
margin, the appropriate transient control level for the cable designer would have 
been established, One approach t o  the setting of margins appears in the Space 
Shuttle Lightning Criteria Documei~t (Reference 15.3). 
The numbers that would be assigned t o  the transient design level probably 
should be expressed in terms of the maximum voltage appropriate to  a 
high-impedence circuit (open circuit voltage) or the maximum current appro- 
priate t o  a low-impedance circuit (short circuit current). In order for the 
transient coordination philosophy t o  have most impact, there should be a 
limited number of  levels. One set of  levels that has been proposed (Reference 
15.4) is shown in Table 15.1. With each level there is associated an open circuit 
voltage and a short circuit current; the two are related b y  a standard 
transient-source impedance, shown in Figure 15.9 (Reference 15.5) 
Figure 15.9 Short circuit current (ISC) resulting from a transient source with 
VOC open circuit voltage and 50n/50pHz source impedance. 
Table 15.1 PROPOSED TRANSIENT CONTROL LEVELS 
- - 
Proposed Transient Open Circuit Short Circuit 
Control Level Voltage Level Current Level 
Number (volts) (amperes) 
An alternative set of levels for which some voltages are numerically equal 
to the voltages in existing specifications is presented in Table 15.2. 
Table 15.2 ALTERNATIVE TRANSIENT CONTROL LEVELS 
Proposed Transient Open Circuit Short Circuit 
Control Level Voltage Level Current Level 
Number (volts) (amperes) 
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CHAPTER 16 
COMPONENT DAMAGE ANALYSIS 
16.1 Introduction 
The energy coupled into a system b y  lightning induces large current pulses 
into the cabling and wiring of the system and resulting voltage pulses across 
loads. Determining whether o r  not these voltages and currents cause upset or 
damage to active or passive components requires a knowledge of the failure 
thresholds of devices. These failure thresholds were investigated extensively 
during studies of nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) effects o n  electronic 
equipment. 
Assessment of the vulnerability of a system t o  a transient environment 
leads to  the observation that failure of the system to function properly may 
result from a degradation in performance of a single active or passive component 
device when it is subjected t o  a transient voltage pulse. Systems vulnerability 
evaluation therefore requires that one know the failure thresholds for devices 
subjected to  transients. Simulation of failure resulting from transients at the 
component level can be conveniently performed in the laboratory by  means of 
high-voltage pulse generators. Information from such simulation can then be 
correlated with the original threat (EMP or lightning) b y  analytical techniques. 
Semiconductor electronic components are generally more vulnerable under pulse 
conditions than are nonsemiconductor components; therefore, most of the 
discussion of  this section will be devoted t o  semiconductors. 
16.2 Theoretical Models 
The number of 'semiconductor devices that have been experimentally 
tested (mostly diodes and transistors) is only a small sample of the total number 
of devices available. However, the scope of the experimental results has been 
extended by development of theoretical models which relate significant changes 
in the properties of a semiconductor PN junction t o  high temperatures generated 
in the junction region during application of  a high-voltage pulse. Theoretical 
models based on thermal analysis of the junction region yield a mathematical 
relation between junction temperature and power dissipation in the junction 
region. This re!ation can be used t o  define a constant characterizing the 
operation in a given time domain of each device. 
16.3 Empirical Models 
In addition t o  the theoretical correlations just described, the experimental 
data have been used in the development of empirical relations which are 
obtained from two models of semiconductor junction devices--the junction 
capacitance model and the thermal resistance model. These models provide a 
framework from which the power failure threshold of  an untested device can be 
estimated from the quantities listed in a data sheet description prepared by 
manufacturers for a diode or a transistor. 
16.4 Limitations 
Certain limits to  the accuracy and application of the theoretical and 
empirical models exist and must be noted in estimating component device 
vulnerability. The models have been verified only for diodes and bipolar 
transistors. Other devices, such as FETS and unijunction transistors, have been 
tested in insufficient numbers for conclusions t o  be drawn as to  their 
conformance with the model. Also, the results and models which are presented 
apply strictly only t o  an isolated device--that is, not t o  a device in a circuit. In 
the case of a multiple-terminal device, they apply only t o  the two terminals 
connected for test, with any other terminals open. 
The assumptions made about junction heating and transfer of heat in the 
derivation o f  the models limit their applicability t o  the region of pulse durations 
of approximately 0.1 t o  20 ps. For longer times appreciable heat transfer may 
take place away from the junction area during the pulse input. For short pulses 
the power levels are so high (1 t o  1 0  kW) that very large currents flow; 
consequently, the joule heating in the bulk material is appreciable. The 
transition behavior between these three regions of pulse duration (regions that 
will be more preciseIy described later in this section) is not well defined and may 
vary from one device type to  another. Examination of available data indicates 
the transition region generally occurs between 100 ns and 1 MS. 
Still another limitation is fundamental t o  the work summarized in this 
section: it applies only to  junctjon burnout. Other modes of device failure, such 
as metallization burnout and internal arcing, are not treated. Based on  the results 
obtained in studies of  junction burnout, it would seem that other effects, such 
as metallization burnout, occur at higher power input levels than those input 
levels sufficient to damage the junction. 
16.5 Failure Mechanisms--Semiconductors 
The two principal breakdown modes for semiconductor PN junctions are 
the following: 
I .  Surface damage around the junction as a result of arcing 
2. Internal damage to the junction region as a result of  elevated 
temperatures. 
Surfuce damage refers to  the establishment of a high-leakage path around the 
junction which effectively eliminates any junction action. The junction itself is 
not necessarily destroyed, since, if it were possible t o  etch the conducting 
material away from the surface, the device might be able t o  return t o  its normal 
operating state. This is not practical, of course, in an operational semiconductor. 
It is equally likely that the formation of any surface leakage path would be the 
result of  excessive heat formation in the bulk of the material, and this would 
typically be an irreversible phenomenon. It is very difficult t o  predict 
theoretically the conditions which will lead to surface damage because they 
depend upon many variables, such as the geometrical design and the details of 
the crystal structure of the surface. The theoretical prediction of surface arcing 
under pulse conditions is not practical (Reference 16.1). It should be cautioned 
that surface damage, in the general case, may occur in devices at power levels 
which are orders of magnitude below those sustainable by devices in which bulk 
damage occurs (Reference 16.2). 
Bulk damage, which results in a permanent change in the characteristic 
electrical parameters of the junction, indicates some physical change in the 
structure of the semiconductor crystal in the region of the junction. The most 
significant change is melting of the junction as a result of high temperatures. 
Other types of change may involve the impurity concentrations, the formation 
of alloys of the crystal materials, or a large increase in the number of lattice 
imperfections, either crystal dislocations or point defects. 
The simplest structure to analyze is a diode. Consider Figure 16.1. In this 
diode a current is assumed to flow as a result of some outside stimulus and, in 
doing so, t o  produce a voltage across the diode. This voltage may be the forward 
bias voltage (0.5 to 1.5 V), or it may be the reverse breakdown voltage if the 
outside stimulus has biased the diode in the reverse direction. Assume that I is a 
square wave and that V is not a function of time, as it might be if V depended 
upon the junction temperature. The instantaneous power dissipated in the diode 
is then also a square pulse of magnitude 
and the total energy produced is 
I 
Assume that the power level is sufficient that the device fails at the end of the 
pulse. Both experimental and theoretical analyses indicate that the power (or 
energy) required to cause failure depends on pulse width: the narrower the 
pulse, the greater the power required to cause failure. Over a broad range of times, 
typically between 0.1 ps and 100 ps, the power required to cause failure is 
inversely proportional to the square root of time. For very short pulse durations 
the power required to cause failure is inversely proportional to the first power of 
time, and for very long pulse durations the power required to cause failure is a 
constant threat. These relations may be expressed by the following equations: 
P = Constant t > 100 ps (16.5) 
where To generally lies between 10 ns and 1 ps. 
Figure 16.2 (Reference 16.3) shows an example for a 10 W diode. The most 
Figure 16.1 Voltage and current through a diode junction. 
(a) Forward bias case 
(b) Reverse bias case, Vg > VBD 
important region is the center region, where 
Junctions are less susceptible t o  burnout when operated with forward bias: 
first, because the power produced by  a given current is lower when flowing 
through the low forward bias voltage than when developed across the higher 
reverse bias breakdown voltage, VBD, and, second, because the current is more 
uniformly distributed across the junction in the forward direction. Accordingly, 
it requires more power in the forward direction to cause failure. An example is 
shown in Figure 16.3 (Reference 16.4). The 2N2222 transistor is a 0.5 W NPN 
silicon high-speed switch. 
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Figure 16.2 Expected time dependence of pulse power failure: threshold for an 
example I0 W diode. 
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Figure 16.3 Experimental data points for failure of the base-emitter: junction 
of  a 2N-2222 transistor for forward and reverse polarity voltage pulses. 
16.6 Damage Constants 
From curves, such as those of Figure 16.3, the value of a damage constant, 
K (or C), can be determined and tabulated for a range of devices. The 
appropriate threshold damage curve can then be reproduced as desired from a 
single damage characterization number, the damage constant K. It is convenient 
to  express K in kW . psM, since the value of K in these units then becomes 
numerically equal t o  the power necessary for failure, dissipated by a square pulse 
of 1 ps duration. If this point is located on  a log-log graph (Figure 16.2 or  Figure 
16.31, then a curve of slope, -1/2, drawn through this point reconstructs the 
curve fit to the data for a particular device, and the power for failure at other 
pulse durations can be read directly from such a graph. Ideally, the K factor 
should be known for both the forward bias and the reverse bias conditions. Gen- 
erally, only the K factor for the reverse bias condition is known. This limitation 
gives conservative answers, since K for the reverse bias condition is almost always 
lower than is K for the forward bias condition. 
The magnitude of  the damage constant depends upon the type of junction 
under consideration: broadly speaking, it is larger for large junctions and smaller 
for small junctions. Figures 16.4 and 16.5 (Reference 16.5) show the range of 
the damage constant for typical diodes and transistors. 
16.6.1 Experimental Determination of K Factor 
Experimentally the K factor is determined by  injecting power pulses into 
the semiconductor junction, starting at low levels and increasing the levels until 
either failure or significant degradation of the junction occurs. Devices would 
normally be pulsed in both the forward and reverse directions. 
The K factors and breakdown voltages for a number of semiconductors are 
given in Table 16.1 and 16.2 (Reference 16.6). In the case of transistors, the K 
factor listed generally refers t o  the base-emitter junction, since this is generally 
the junction most susceptible t o  burnout. In all the cases the K factor refers to  
the reverse bias direction. 
16.6.2 K Factor as Determined from Junction Area 
If the K factor is not measured, it may be estimated by one or more of 
three methods. The most accurate of the indirect methods involves a knowledge 
of the area of  the junction. If the area is known, the K factor may be estimated 
from the following relations: 
Diodes - K = 0.56 A 
Transistors - K = 0.47 A 
K in kW psM 
For transistors, the junction area t o  be used is that of the base-emitter region. 
This is generally the weaker junction (lower breakdown voltage), and it is that 
for which the experimental average value for K(A) was obtained. 
This method is of  course limited by the availability of information on 
junction area, but  where such information is available, the method yields damage 
Rectifier Diodes 
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Figure 16.4 Range of  pulse power damage constants for representative diodes. 
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Figure 16.5 Range of  pulse power damage constants for representative 
transistors. 
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constants accurate t o  within a factor of two. For planar devices, the junction 
area can often be measured directly on the silicon chip. 
16.6.3 K Factor as Determined from Junction Capacitance 
The next most reliable method of  detertiiining the damage constant is 
from a knowledge o f  the capacitance (Cj) and breakdown voltage (VBD) of the 
junction. For three different categories of devices, the relations are 
Category 1 - insufficient data 
Category 2 - K = 4.97 x 1 oJ Cj VBD 0.57 
Category 3 - K = 1.66 x l o 4  Cj VBD 0.992 
The different categories are 
Category 1 - Germanium diodes and germanium transistors 
Category 2 - Silicon diodes, all silicon transistor structures except planar 
and mesa 
Category 3 - Silicon planar and mesa transistors 
If the junction is a transistor base-emitter junction, the capacitance used should 
be taken at  a reverse bias of approximately 1 V. If it is a collector-base junction 
or a diode junction, the value should be taken at  the reverse bias of 
approximately 5 t o  1 0  V. 
16.6.4 K Factor as Determined from Thermal Resistance 
A third, but the least reliable, way of estimating the damage constant is 
from a knowledge of the thermal resistance of the junction, either the thermal 
resistance from junction t o  case (Bjc) or from junction t o  ambient (Bja). The 
empirical expressions for each category for each of the thermal resistances are 
Category 1 - insufficient data for an accurate curve fit 
Category 2 - K = 707 Bjc (Bjc > 10.0) (16.12) 
K z 4 . 1 1  x lo4  Oja (16.13) 
Category 3 - K = 707 8jc (Bjc > 10.0) (16.14) 
K = 2.74 x 10' Oja '2.55 (16.15) 
Normally Bjc and Bja are not given in the transistor data sheets but,  rather, must 
be calculated from the maximum operating junction temperature, (Tj[max]), 
the total power dissipation (Pd), case temperature (T,), and ambient temper- 
ature (Tamb). 
Generally, a t  least one of these thermal resistances may be determined from the 
manufacturer's data sheet. 
The accuracy of the damage constant as determined from either the 
junction capacitance or the junction thermal resistance is somewhat limited. 
Table 16.3 (Reference 16.8) gives some estimate of the accuracy within which 
the damage constant can be calculated. 
16.6.5 Oscillatory Waveforms 
Equation 16.6 is based on the assumption that the applied voltage, 
current, and power waves are rectangular in shape. While actual transients are 
very seldom rectangular, it is possible t o  derive equivalent rectangular pulses for 
more common types of transients. One such type of transient typically 
encountered is the damped oscillatory wave. Based on  multiple pulse studies by  
Wunsch and others (References 16.9 and 16. lo), it can be assumed that device 
damage wilI occur, if a t  all, during the first half cycle of a damped sine wave. 
Therefore, the lower amplitude cycles may be neglected. Two cases may be 
considered, one in which one of  the half cycles of  the transient does not exceed 
the reverse breakdown voltage of the junction, Figure 16.6 (Reference 16.1 I), 
and one in which the reverse breakdown voltage is exceeded, Figure 16.7 
(Reference 16.12). In either case, one of the half cycles will bias the junction in 
a forward direction. Treating first the case in which the reverse breakdown 
voltage is not exceeded (Figure 16.6), the rectangular wave of the same peak 
amplitude, V,, and producing the same probability of damage as the sine wave, 
has a duration rP 
where 
of the sine wave. If the transient does exceed the reverse breakdown voltage, the 
duration of the equivalent transient depends upon the fraction of the time that 
the oscillatory transient does exceed the reverse breakdown voltage. The 
duration of the equivalent rectangular wave is given by the expression 
I ("e) )' 
Tp = Ts 
. cos - I  (+) 
This expression is shown plotted in Figures 16.8 (Reference 16.13) and 16.9 
(Reference 16.1 4). For oscillatory transients whose initial amplitude consider- 
ably exceeds the reverse breakdown voltage of the junction, Equation 16.19 
Figrtre 16.6 Device waveforms for Vg < VBD, 
(a) Generator voltage 
(b) Diode voltage 
(c) Junction current 
(d) Junction power 
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Figure 16.7 Device waveforms for Vg > VBD. 
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Figure 16.8 Plot of 7 17 versus Vo/VBD. P s 
approaches a limiting value of 0.2, and thus becomes identical with the forward 
bias case, Equation 16.1 8. 
A limited amount of data relating voltage and current durations to  the 
breakdown of integrated circuits is available. Figures 16.10 (Reference 16.15), 
16.1 1 (Reference 16.16), and 16.12 (Reference 16.1 7) show the results of 
measurements on SN55 107 line receivers, SN55 109 line drivers, and CD4050 AE 
hex buffers. 
VO /VBD 
Figure 16.9 Plot of r P 17 s versus Vo/VBD for values of V,/VBD less than 2. 
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Figure 16.1 0 Damage thresholds of SN 55  107 line receivers. 
16.7 Failure Mechanisms--Capacitors 
Capacitors fail by a mechanism different from that of semiconductors. The 
mechanism of capacitor failure depends upon the type of dielectric. Capacitors 
with solid dielectrics--paper, Mylar, or ceramics--will, when subjected t o  
nonrepetitive transients, either fail by  puncture of the dielectric o r  not fail at all. 
Typically, a capacitor can withstand short-duration transient voltages several 
times greater than the d c  rating of the insulation. The pulse-breakdown rating of 
the dielectric, however, is not a constant ratio t o  the dc voltage rating, nor is it 
normally part of any manufacturer's specification. Accordingly, it is safest to  
consider that such a capacitor is in danger of  failure if the pulse voltage exceeds 
the dc rating of the capacitor. 
Electrolytic capacitors, on the other hand, d o  not experience abrupt 
failure when exposed t o  short-duration transients. If the voltage across the 
capacitor exceeds the voltage used t o  form the dielectric film, the dielectric film 
begins to  conduct. After the pulse has disappeared, the dielectric returns to 
nearly its normal state. During the transient period the dielectric film can carry 
substantial transient current without permanent or catastrophic degradation. 
Transients, however, may lead to increased leakage currents. An example of data 
that is available relates t o  a series of tests made on tantalum eIectrolytic 
capacitors of  value 0.47 pF, 0.047 pF, and 0.0047 pF with a dc voltage rating of 
350 V (Reference 16.18). The data indicate that failure (defined as a substantial 
increase in the leakage current a t  voltages o f  less than 3 5 0  V) can generally be 
associated with the time during which internal conduction occurs. For  these 
components, conduction was initiated at 3 to 4 times the voltage rating. Leakage 
current increased continuously with time of conduction, from initial values o f  a 
few nanoamperes through milliamperes. The value of the capacitance determines 
how quickly the voltage across the capacitor reaches the breakdown voltage 
range, 9 0  to 1 4 0  V, which then relates to the time of conduction and the extent 
of damage. Figure 16.13 (Reference 16.1 9) shows the data for the nine 0.0047 
pF capacitors tested. For  a particular pulse duration of 5 fils, an increase in 
leakage current is expected; for pulse voltages of 1 0 0  to 150  V and for pulses of 
150  to 900 V, an increase in leakage current to  milliamperes is possible. It is 
cautioned that this behavior may not be readily extended to capacitors of  
different materials o r  construction. The capacitor data remains insufficient t o  
draw general conclusions as to  system ilr~plications at this time. 
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16.8 Failure Mechanisms--0 ther Components 
A limited amount of pulse test data is available for various nonsemicon- 
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Figure 16.12 Damage thresholds of CD 4050 AE hex buffers. 
ductor electronic circuit components. These data were mostly obtained by 
testing with a square-wave pulse input of 1 t o  1 0  ps duration and up  t o  1 kV 
peak. As would be expected, not all such components are invulnerable t o  pulses 
of this shape. The test results for several kinds of components are presented in 
Table 16.4 (Reference 16.20). The test conditions consisted of an 8 ps, 1 kV 
pulse applied 1 0  times t o  each device. In the case of multiterminal components, 
several pairs of  terminals were tested in this manner. 
16.9 Examples of Use of Damage Constants 
Some examples of how the preceding material may be used to determine 
whether or not a given transient will cause damage t o  semiconductors follow. 
The first circuit chosen for analysis (Figure 16.14) (Reference 16.2 1) is a 
simple remote-controlled relay. Across the terminals of the relay coil there is a 
diode which would be  exposed t o  the same transients as those to  which the coil 
is exposed. The analysis approach that will be taken is first t o  calculate the 
current level that would cause the diode t o  fail and then t o  see whether or not 
Pulse Height (V) 
Figure 16.13 Representation of pulse test data for Sprague 0.0047 pF tantalum 
electrolytic capacitors. 
r 1 RELAY 
Figure 16.14 Simple remote-controlled relay. 
the transient voltage source could supply that current. It will be assumed that 
the oscillatory pulse is a transient of 1 MHz frequency or 1 ps period. At this 
frequency the inductive reactance of the relay coil would be sufficiently large 
that the relay could be neglected. The current required to cause failure at time, 
t,  would be 
~ t - %  Pf = -  IF = - (16.20) 
VBD VBD 
For a 1N540 diode, the reverse breakdown voltage, VBD, is 400 V and the 
damage constant, K, is 0.93 (See Table 16.1). If a 200 ns pulse is used to 
approximate at 1 MHz damped sine wave, the failure current for the diode 
would be 
I ~ = 5 . 2  A 
Assume now that the impedance of the source from which the voltage transient 
generated is 10 52. The voltage required to produce a current of 5.2 A through 
the diode would be 
- R V~ransient - 'BD + '~ransient Source 
Therefore, a 452 V pulse, 200 ns wide or a 1 MHz damped sine wave having a 
peak amplitude of 452 V would cause the diode to fail. 
The second circuit chosen for analysis is the simple phase-splitter amplifier 
shown in Figure 16.1 5 (Reference 16.22). The first step in determining the input 
current required for damage is to simplify the circuit. Again assume that the 
voltage source producing the transient is a damped sine wave of 1 MHz 
frequency. At such a frequency the reactances of capacitors C1 and C2 will be so 
small that they may be neglected. Lkewise the 12 V power supply line can be 
considered to  be at ac ground potential. The resultant circuit after simplification 
is shown in Figure 16.16 (Reference 16.23). The circuit can be further simplified 
by determining the equivalent resistances for the base and for collector circuits. 
The base-emitter junction and the base-collector junction can also be replaced by 
their diode equivalents to represent operation in the breakdown regions. This 
simplified circuit is shown in Figure 16.17 (Reference 16.24). Also shown in 
Figure 16.1 7 are the breakdown voltages and damage constants for the 2N706B. 
Note that for this transistor a damage constant for the collector-base junction is 
available, though not listed in Table 16.2. 
The circuit is now simplified to the point where it lends itself easily to 
hand analysis. The next step is to determine which junction will fail and what 
the failure mode is. The passive components are generally able to withstand 
higher energies for short-duration pulses than can transistors. Therefore, the 
transistor is the element to consider for damage. Failure is also assumed to occur 
in the reverse biased direction. 
Using the Wunsch damage model (P = Kt-%), a calculation is made to see 
whether the emitter-base junction or the collector-base junction would fail first. 
I I 
I L - - - - -  
Figure 16.15 Phase-splitter circuit. 
Figure 16.1 6 Simplified phase-splitter circuit. 
This calculation shows that the emitter-base junction is the more susceptible. 
The current required to fail the emitter-base junction would be 
IjF = !h = 3.4 A 
V BD 
The voltage from the base to ground is 
Figure 16.1 7 Further simplification of phase-splitter circuit. 
The current through the collector-base junction is 
The power dissipated in the collector-base junction is 
which is below its failure-threshold power. 
The total current into the circuit is then 
'Transient = ' j ~  + 'CB + k E = 9 . 4  A 
R~~ I 
and the  IT^^^^^^^^ voltage required to cause failure is 
Therefore (assuming a 100 S1 source impedance) a 2.5 kV pulse, 200 ns 
wide, will cause the transistor to fail. 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA 
I N8 1 
I N82A 
I N9 1 
IN128 
IN191 
IN198 
IN248A 
l N249 
IN2490 
IN250 
IN2506 
IN251 
IN253 
IN254 
IN260 
,003 
.0007 
-0055 
.005 
.005 
.024 
40. 
40. 
40. 
40. 
80. 
.03 
86. 
3.5 
,0027 
10. 
5 .  
100. 
40. 
90. 
80. 
50. 
100. 
100. 
200. 
200. 
40. 
95. 
190. 
30. 
SP 
DX 
CM 
CM 
S P 
S P 
S f J  
SP 
SP 
S P 
SP, DE 
S P 
DX 
SP 
CM 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Device Number 
IN270 
IN276 
l N277 
1N295, A 
IN320 
IN332 
1 N333 
IN335 
IN337 
l N338 
I N34 1 
IN342 
IN346 
l N429 
1 N457 
1 N458 
l N459 
I N459A 
I N46 1 
l N462 
l N466 
IN467 
IN468 
I N470 
IN474A 
I N482A 
Reference 
CM 
CM 
DX 
S P 
S P 
SP 
S P 
S P 
S P 
DE 
SP 
S P 
S P 
DX 
DX 
S P 
DX 
DX 
S P 
S P 
S P  
S P 
SP 
SP 
CM 
DX 
K 
.022 
.0055 
.027 
.005 
1.2 
3.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
18.3 
3.5 
1.5 
1.5 
.6 
.12 
.5 
.59 
.96 
.24 
.05 
.78 
.78 
.78 
.78 
.219 
.96 
"BD 
100. 
100. 
125. 
40. 
500. 
400. 
400. 
300. 
200. 
100. 
400. 
400. 
200. 
6.2 
70. 
150. 
200. 
200. 
35. 
80. 
3.5 
4.1 
4.9 
7.1 
5.8 
36. 
- - 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
- 
Device Number 
lN483, A 
IN483, B 
IN484A 
IN4849 
1 N485 
IN486, B 
lN487, Z 
l N488 
l N536 
l N537 
lN538, M 
l N539 
IN540 
l N547 
I N560 
IN561 
l N562 
IN619 
IN622 
l N625 
I N625A 
I N643 
I N643A 
1 N645 
l N646 
-- - -- 
K 
.3 
.3 
.45 
.3 
.3 
.29 
.3 
.3  
1 .  
.51 
1. 
1. 
.93 
12.1 
.625 
.625 
1.8 
.36 
.347 
,164 
.045 
.44 
.1 
2.8 
2.29 
- - - 
v~~ 
70. 
80. 
130. 
130. 
180. 
225. 
300. 
380. 
50. 
100. 
200. 
300. 
400. 
600. 
800. 
1000. 
800. 
10. 
150. 
30. 
20. 
200. 
200. 
225. 
300. 
- 
Reference 
SP 
S P 
DX 
SP 
CM 
SP 
SP 
SP 
DE 
DX 
S P 
S P 
DX 
DX 
CM 
CM 
S P 
SP 
CM 
CM 
CM 
S P 
DX 
S P 
DX 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Device Number 
l N647 
1 N648 
IN649 
1 N658 
I N660 
I N66 1 
l N662 
l N663 
l N676 
l N689 
IN691 
IN692 
IN702, A 
I N 703A 
IN704, A 
IN705, A 
IN706 
IN709, A 
IN710 
IN71 1A 
IN712 
IN714A 
IN715A 
IN718A 
lN719A 
IN721, A 
K 
2.8 
2.8 
2.9 
.92 
-44 
.41 
-29 
.44 
.27 
1.1 
.418 
.5 
1. 
1. 
1. 
.91 
,288 
.78 
.78 
2.1 
.78 
.78 
.78 
.1 
.1 
.35 
"BD 
400. 
500. 
600. 
120. 
100. 
200. 
100. 
100. 
100. 
600. 
80. 
100. 
2.6 
3.5 
4.1 
4.8 
5.8 
6.2 
6.8 
7.5 
8.2 
10. 
11. 
15. 
16. 
20. 
Reference 
S P 
SP 
DX 
DX 
S P 
DX 
SP 
S P 
SP 
S P 
S P 
S P 
SP, OX 
SP 
S P 
S P 
CM 
S P 
S P 
DX 
SP 
S P 
S P 
S P 
SP 
S P 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Device Number 
IN 725A 
1 N729 
1N746, A 
IN747, A 
I N748A 
IN749 
I N750A 
lN751, A 
1N752, A 
lN753, A 
lN754, A 
lN755, A 
1N756, A 
lN757, A 
1N758, A 
lN759, A 
IN761 
IN762 
IN763 
lN763-2 
I N766A 
IN767 
1 N 769A 
IN769-3 
IN816, W 
IN817 
K 
.349 
.06 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
3. 
1.8 
1.8 
1.8 
2. 
1.5 
.46 
"B 0 
30. 
43. 
3.3 
3.6 
3.9 
4.3 
4.7 
5.1 
5.6 
6.2 
6.8 
7.5 
8.2 
9.1 
10. 
12. 
4.9 
5.8 
7.1 
7.0 
12.8 
15.8 
23.5 
26. 
26. 
200. 
Reference 
CM 
S P 
S P 
S P 
SP 
S P 
S P 
SP 
SP 
SP, DX 
S P 
S P 
SP 
S P 
SP 
SP 
S P 
SP 
SP 
DX 
SP 
SP 
S P 
DX 
DX 
SP 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
- - - -  - 
IN1 126A 
IN1 184 
IN1199, A 
IN 1200 
IN1201 
IN1202 
IN1204A 
IN1206 
IN1217 
IN12228 
IN1317A 
IN1319A 
INi342A 
IN1348A 
IN 1367 
14. 
31.5 
15. 
62.32 
62.32 
21. 
46.106 
62.32 
5.8 
2.563 
.19 
.19 
38.4 
1.827 
34. 
500. 
100. 
SO. 
100. 
150. 
200. 
400. 
600. 
400. 
19. 
28. 
100. 
200. 
47. 
SP 
C M  
S P 
C M  
C M  
S P 
C M  
C M  
S P 
CM 
S P 
SP 
DE 
CM 
SP 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
i 
Device Number 
IN1583 
IN1585 
IN1614 
IN1615 
IN1693 
IN1695 
IN1731 
IN1733A 
I N 1 770A 
IN 1773A 
IN 1780A 
IN1783 
IN1818RA 
1N1823C, A 
IN1828C 
IN1834 
IN1835A 
IN1836C 
IN1904 
IN1909 
1 N2037 
IN2154 
IN2158 
IN2164 
l N2483 
IN2610 
K 
11.391 
3.5 
.38 
.666 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
11.3 
14.2 
1.9 
1.9 
21.3 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
33.8 
4.3 
4.3 
28. 
6.8 
.05 
20. 
21.5 
2.3 
2. i 
2.6 
"BD 
200. 
400. 
200. 
480. 
200. 
400. 
1500. 
3000. 
9.1 
12. 
24. 
33. 
16. 
27. 
43. 
75. 
82. 
91. 
100. 
200. 
12.8 
50. 
400. 
9.4 
400. 
100 
Reference 
C  M 
D E 
S P 
C M  
S P 
S P 
C M  
DE 
D E 
S P 
S P 
D E 
S P 
S P 
SP 
C M  
S P 
S P 
SP 
SP 
S P 
S P 
CM 
S P 
SP 
SP 
- 
- 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Reference 
S P 
S P 
SP 
SP 
S P 
S P 
CM 
CM 
CM 
S P 
CM 
S P 
S P 
SP 
SP 
DX 
CM 
SP 
S P 
S P 
S P 
SP 
SP 
SP 
S P 
SP 
V~~ 
200. 
400. 
600. 
400. 
150. 
200. 
10. 
20. 
30. 
33. 
39. 
160. 
200. 
400. 
600. 
1. 
.74 
6.8 
12. 
15. 
20. 
22. 
24. 
25. 
27. 
30. 
Device Number 
IN261 1 
IN2613 
IN2615 
IN2789 
IN2795 
IN2796 
IN 2808 
IN2818 
IN28238 
l N2824 
IN2826B 
IN2844B 
IN28468 
IN2862 
1 N 2864 
I N2929A 
IN2930 
1 N2970B 
IN29768 
IN29790 
lN2984, B 
1N2985, 0, RB 
IN29860 
IN29870 
1 N2988B 
l N2989B 
K 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
40. 
40. 
40. 
249. 
249. 
249. 
156. 
249. 
15. 
15. 
2.8 
2.8 
.073 
,196 
15.0 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Device Number 
IN2991B 
lN2995, B 
I N 2997B 
IN3001B 
IN3008B 
lN3015B 
IN3016B 
IN301 78 
IN3019B 
IN30228 
IN30248 
IN30258 
IN30268 
IN30278 
lN3028, B 
I N3029B 
IN3030B 
IN3031B 
IN30338 
IN3035B 
IN30378 
IN3040B 
IN3041, B 
IN3051 B 
IN3064 
I N 3070 
K 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
15. 
33.84 
19.5 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
.02 
.365 
"BD 
36. 
47. 
51. 
68. 
120. 
200. 
6.8 
7.5 
9.1 
12. 
13. 
16. 
18. 
20. 
22. 
24. 
27. 
30. 
36. 
43. 
51. 
68. 
75. 
200. 
75. 
200. 
Reference 
S P 
SP 
S P 
SP 
S P 
CM 
DE 
S P 
SP 
SP 
S P 
S P 
SP 
S P 
SP 
SP 
S P 
SP 
SP 
SP 
S P 
SP 
SP 
SP 
SP 
CM 
-- 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Device Number 
IN3157 
IN3189 
IN3190 
l N3560 
IN3561 
IN3582A 
I N3600 
IN3821 
IN3828A 
IN3893 
1 N3976 
l N424 1 
l N4245 
IN4249 
IN4312 
IN4370A 
IN4816 
IN4817 
IN4820 
IN4823 
l N4989 
AM2 
04330 
FD300 
S G22 
SLDIOEC 
- 
"BD 
P-P 
8 -4 
200. 
600. 
.475 
,475 
11.7 
50. 
3.3 
6.2 
400. 
200. 
6. 
200. 
1000. 
150. 
2.4 
50. 
100. 
400. 
' OOV 
200. 
50. 
125. 
10,000. 
K 
-625 
10. 
4.1 
.038 
.038 
.35 
.18 
1.947 
1.95 
6.41 
132. 
33.84 
2.4 
2.4 
. I16 
.625 
6.8 
6.8 
10. 
.208 
14.33 
1.4 
.001 
.18 
.23 
f 
Reference 
CM 
S P 
CM 
CM 
CM 
SP 
S P 
CM 
CM 
CM 
CM 
CM 
S P 
SP 
CM 
CM 
DE 
D E 
D E 
CM 
CM 
S P 
SP 
SP 
SP 
CM 
d 
Table 16.1 DIODE DAMAGE DATA (CONCLUDED) 
SP - SAP-I Computer Listing from SAP-I Conlputer Code ilfut~ual (un- 
published), U.S. Air Force Weapons Laboratory, 1972. 
DX - Experimental data from DASA (Defense Atomic Support Agency) 
Handbook (See Reference 16.3) 
DE - Estimated data from DASA Handbook (See Reference 16.3) 
CM - Computed data (Reference 16.7) 
Device Number 
SV1035 
SV2092 
SV2183 
TM7 
TM21 
TM27 
TM84 
TM 124 
UT 242 
K 
1.71 
2.6 
2.6 
20. 
18. 
20. 
11. 
11. 
2.6 
v~~ 
26. 
70. 
200. 
200. 
800. 
1200. 
200. 
Reference 
CM 
S P 
S P 
S P 
S P 
SP 
S P 
S P 
SP 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA 
3evice 
Number 
2N43, A 
2N117 
2N118 
2N 128 
2N158 
2N176 
2N189 
2N  190 
2N243 
2N244 
2N263 
2N264 
2N274 
2N279A 
2 N 297A 
2N329,A 
2N332 
2N333 
2N335, A 
2N336 
2N337 
2N338 
2N339 
2N34 1 
K 
.28 
.15 
.15 
.017 
.499 
.46 
.17 
.58 
.05 
.05 
-38 
.36 
.0076 
.047 
.499 
.21 
.45 
.32 
.55 
.55 
.12 
.12 
2. 
1. 
BV 
E 6 0  
5. 
1.  
1. 
10. 
30. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
.5 
40. 
20. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
(4 .-2N335A) 
BV 
CBO 
45. 
45. 
45. 
10. 
60. 
40. 
25. 
25. 
60. 
60. 
45. 
45. 
35. 
45. 
60. 
50. 
45. 
45. 
45. 
BV 
CEO 
----. 
30. 
45. 
45. 
4.5 
60. 
30. 
25. 
25. 
60. 
60. 
30. 
30. 
40. 
30. 
40. 
30. 
30. 
30. 
45. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
1. 
Reference 
Source 
SP 
SP 
SP 
SP 
CM 
CM 
SP 
OX 
S P 
S P 
S P 
SP 
CM 
CM 
CM 
SP 
S P 
S P 
SP 
30. 
30. 
30. 
55. 
85. 
45. 
45. 
45. 
55. 
125. 
S P 
S P 
SP 
SP 
SP 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
BV 
C BO 
60. 
40. 
40. 
20. 
80. 
45. 
60. 
100. 
TOO. 
-- 
- - 
-- 
-- 
60. 
60. 
120. 
25. 
25. 
40. 
60. 
60. 
75. 
25. 
60. 
80. 
BV 
CEO 
60. 
20. 
30. 
15. 
60. 
30. 
60. 
100. 
100. 
50.(A-C) 
200. (A-C ) 
300.(A-C) 
800.(A-C) 
40. 
40. 
80. 
25. 
20. 
15. 
40. 
40. 
32. 
20. 
40. 
60. 
- 
Device 
Number 
2N551 
2N576A 
2N587 
2N595 
2N618 
2N652A 
2N656 
2N657 
2N657A 
2N682 
2N685 
2N687 
2N690 
2N696 
2N697 
2N699 
2 N 703 
2N7G6,B 
2 N 708 
2N717 
2N718 
2N718A 
2N726 
2N730 
2 N 736 
Reference 
Source 
S P 
DX 
S P 
C M  
DX 
C M  
DX 
DX 
DX 
C M  
DX 
DX 
C M  
C M  
SP 
DX 
SP 
DX 
DX 
SP 
S P 
S P 
CM 
CM 
DX 
J 
K 
1.6 
.023 
.14 
,012 
.88 
.I18 
.2 
-66 
1.07 
.33 
1.4 
11.7 
3.1 
1 .O 
.2 
.25 
.08 
-0075 
.03 
.13 
.13 
.35 
.021 
,165 
. 1  
BV 
E BO 
6. 
15. 
40. 
40. 
30. 
8. 
8. 
8. 
- - 
-- 
-- 
-- 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
3. 
(5.-2N706B 
5. 
5. 
5. 
7. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
-- 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
Device 
Number 
2N 1602 
2N1613 
2N1615 
2N 1642 
2N1700 
2N1701 
2N1711 
2N1722 
2N1751 
2N 1753 
2N1772A 
2N1776A 
2N 177A 
2N1871A 
2N 1890 
2N 1893 
2N1916W 
2N2015 
2N2035 
2N2060 
2N2102 
2N2156 
2N2218A 
2N2219 
2N2219A 
K 
.40 
.27 
.553 
.13 
4.134 
4.5 
.36 
54.5 
1.05 
.039 
.651 
1.584 
C-G C-A 
2.0 .46 
1.1 
.27 
.4 
2.22 
26.462 
3.633 
.21 
.77 
.471 
.264 
.3 
.264 
BV 
E BO 
-- 
7. 
8. 
30. 
6. 
6. 
7. 
10. 
2.5 
.5 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
7. 
7. 
-- 
10. 
10. 
7. 
7. 
25. 
6. 
5 .  
6. 
BV 
C BO 
-- 
75. 
100. 
30. 
60. 
60. 
75. 
175. 
80. 
30. 
- - 
-- 
-- 
- - 
100. 
120. 
- - 
100. 
80. 
100. 
120. 
45. 
75. 
60. 
75. 
B V 
CE 0 
200. 
50. 
100. 
6. 
40. 
40. 
50. 
80. 
80. 
18. 
100. 
300. 
400. 
60. 
60. 
80. 
400. 
50. 
60. 
60. 
65. 
30. 
40. 
30. 
40. 
Reference 
Source 
DX 
SP 
C M  
DX 
C M  
SP 
S P 
DE 
C M  
C M  
C M  
C M  
DX 
C M  
S P 
DX 
C M  
C M  
C M  
S P 
SP 
C M  
C M  
SP 
C M  
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
BV 
CEO 
30. 
40. 
60. 
45. 
100. 
15. 
-- 
30. 
15. 
80. 
60. 
100. 
-- 
20. 
15. 
12. 
60. 
40. 
40. 
60. 
40.(60.-A) 
60. 
10. 
20. 
20. 
I 
Device 
Number 
2N2222 
2N2222A 
2N2223,A 
2N2270 
2N2346 
2N2369A 
2N2417 
2N2432 
2N2481 
2N2509 
2N2516 
2N2563 
2N2646 
2N2708 
2N2857 
2N2894,A 
BV 
E BO 
5. 
6. 
7. 
7. 
- - 
4.5 
30 .* 
15. 
5. 
7. 
8. 
20. 
30.* 
3. 
2.5 
4. 
(4.5-2N2894A) 
Reference 
Source 
DX 
S P 
S P 
S P 
DX 
SP 
C M  
C M  
C M  
CM 
CM 
S P 
S P 
C M  
C M  
S P 
C M  
C M  
DX 
C M  
DX 
DX 
S P 
CM 
CM 
K 
.1 
.1  
.21 
.5 
3.2 
.03 
.549 
. I89 
.099 
.I26 
.209 
.55 
.72 
.018 
.018 
.03 
BV 
C BO 
60. 
75. 
100. 
60. 
-- 
40. 
35.* 
30. 
40. 
125. 
80. 
100. 
35. * 
35. 
30. 
12. 
60. 
60. 
60. 
60. 
60. 
60. 
15. 
40. 
25. 
2N2904A 
2N2905 
2N2906 
2N2906A 
2N2907,A 
2N2920 
2 N 2996 
2N3014 
2N3050 
.221 
.22 1 
.044 
.221 
. 1  
.04 
.01 
.02 
.O 1 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
5. 
6. 
. 3  
5. 
5. 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONT.) 
# 
Device 
Number 
2P.13053 
2N3054 
2N3055 
2N3118 
2N3217 
2N3235 
2N3240 
2N3251 
2N3308 
2N3384 
2N3436 
2N3440 
2N3585 
2N3708 
2N3777 
2N3785 
2N3819 
2N3823 
2N3902 
2N3907 
2N4037 
LN75497 
LN75638 
Mi517331 
T1482 
K 
.72 1 
3.633 
20.084 
.53 
.I26 
20. 
1.5 
.I43 
.12 
.094 
.488 
1.75 
5.278 
.507 
2. 
.012 
.22 
.228 
43.35 
.I65 
.045 
1.9 
2.3 
.1 
.21 
BV 
E BO 
5. 
7. 
7. 
4. 
15. 
7. 
8. 
5. 
3. 
-- 
- - 
7. 
6. 
6. 
8. 
.5 
25. 
30. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
5. 
Reference 
Source 
CM 
CM 
CM 
SP 
CM 
S P 
S P 
CM 
SP 
CM 
CM 
S P 
CM 
CM 
S P 
SP 
CM 
CM 
C M  
C M  
CM 
DX 
D X  
DX 
S P 
BV 
CBO 
60. 
90. 
100. 
85. 
15. 
65. 
160. 
50. 
30. 
30.t 
5O.t 
300. 
440. 
30. 
100. 
50. 
25 .t 
30.t 
400. 
60. 
60. 
20. 
BV 
CE 0 
40. 
60. 
70. 
60. 
10. 
55. 
160. 
40. 
25. 
-- 
- - 
250. 
300. 
30. 
100. 
12. 
- - 
- - 
400. 
45. 
40. 
20. 
Table 16.2 TRANSISTOR DAMAGE DATA (CONCLUDED) 
SP - SAP-I Computer Listing from SAP-I Co~np~trer  Code Illar~ual (un- 
published), U.S. Air Force Weapons Laboratory, 1972. 
DX - Experimental data from DASA (Defense Atomic Support Agency) 
Hondbook (See Reference 16.3) 
DE - Estimated data from DASA Handbook (See Reference 16.3) 
CM - Computed data (Reference 16.7) 
Table 16.3 ACCURACY OF K FACTOR AS DETERMINED 
BY INDIRECT METHODS (CATEGORY 2 SEMICONDUCTORS) 
Kamb = K as determined from 0 .  J a 
'case 
= K as determined from 0 .  
J C  
Kcj = K as determined from junction capacitance 
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CHAPTER 17 
TEST TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATION OF INDIRECT EFFECTS 
17.1 Introduction 
There are as yet few official standard tests or even generally recognized 
test techniques for evaluation of how well electrical and electronic equipment 
withstands the indirect effects of lightning. The purpose of this section is to 
discuss some of the existing test techniques, to discuss some of the philosophy 
behind some of the existing or evolving standards, and to  suggest possible 
avenues of improvement in test techniques. 
The lightning current to which an aircraft may be exposed cannot be 
predicted beforehand except in statistical terms. Aircraft are thus designed to 
some type of model lightning flash--one which duplicates the essential 
characteristics of lightning, even though the chances of any particular lightning 
current actually having all those characteristics is vanishingly small. A design 
model that has strongly influenced test techniques is the severe composite 
lightning model developed for the Space Shuttle Program (Reference 17.1). This 
model, with some revisions, seems to  be emerging as a standard for aircraft 
design, testing, and certification. The model, as incorporated in present test 
practice (Reference 17.2), is shown as Figure 1.36. 
As regards indirect effects, only the first and possibly the second return 
stroke are likely to be of consequence. The wave fronts of the initial return 
stroke and the restrike are not specified in Figure 17.1 (Reference 17.2), since 
they are not significant for the evaluation of direct effects. In theSpaceShzcttle 
Program Lightning Protection Criteria Document and in the earlier MIL 
specification Bonding, Electrical and Lightning Protection for Aerospace 
Systems (Reference 17.3), the current is taken to rise linearly to crest in 2 ps. 
Dividing the peak amplitude of 200 000 A by a front time of 2 ps yields an 
average rate of change of 100 kA/ps, a figure frequently quoted with respect to 
indirect effects. 
Ideally, for proof tests to determine indirect effects, a simulated lightning 
current having this waveshape (or at least the waveshape of the initial stroke 
would be circulated through the aircraft and the electronic equipment observed 
to insure that no  harmful effects would be caused by the current. In practice this 
is not done, since available surge generators do not have the stored energy 
required to circulate this amount of current through the inductance that would 
be associated with a complete aircraft. Compromises with perfection have to be 
made, and these take the following three forms. 
Tests may be made on a complete aircraft, during which tests 
currents of high amplitude are circulated through the aircraft and 
the effects noted. In such tests the waveshape of the current may 
differ radically from the waveshapes of actual lightning currents. 
Tests of this nature might be called proof tests and are discussed in 
Section 17.3.1. 
Tests may be made on a complete aircraft, during which tests 
currents of  low amplitude but correct waveshape are circulated 
thlough the aircraft. Such tests are sometimes called frutzsietlt 
ut2u!ysis testr and are discussed in Section 17.3.2. 
Tests may be made upon individual pieces of  electronic equipment 
o r  upon interconnected electronic subsystems. During such tests it is 
assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that the waveshapes of the current 
or voltage surges injected into the pieces of equipment or subsystems 
are representative of those produced by natural lightning. Some of 
the aspects of such tests are discussed in Section 17.5. 
17.2 Waveform Definitions 
Before discussing test techniques in detail or discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of  different types o f  tests, it would be well to discuss general types 
of waveforms and the terms used t o  describe these waveforms. 
Waveforms of either voltage or current tend t o  fall into one of  the 
categories shown in Figure 17.1. The waveforms shown in Figure 17.1 are 
described in two ways: in terms of the natural type of waveform produced (1) 
by physically reali~able test circuits and (2) by  their triangular approximation. 
When any test waveform is described in terms of its triangular approximations, it 
must be understood that there is no intent that an actual test be made with 
triangular waveforms, since such waveforms can never be produced with 
physically realizable hardware. Any test that is to  be done should be performed 
with natural waveforms, of which a specified triangular wave is only a 
convenient approximation. 
Perhaps the most common waveform encountered during indirect effects 
testing is the damped oscillatory waveform of Figure 17.l(a). The major 
characteristics of importance for such a waveform are the peak amplitude, A, 
and the period, T ,  or alternatively, the frequency, f. Since an oscillatory 
waveform may be either a basically cosinusoidal waveform (one starting at the 
peak amplitude A) or a sinusoidal waveform (one starting at  zero), the initial 
time t o  crest, t 1, should generally be specified in addition to  the period, or 
natural, frequency. In addition, specifications may be required as t o  the 
decrement of  the wave, or the time required for the oscillations t o  damp out t o  a 
negligible amplitude. 
The second most commonly encountered waveform is the exponential 
wave of Figure 17.l(b). This waveform describes the characteristics of a 
capacitor discharging through a resistor. The most common specifications relate 
to the peak amplitude, A, the time to crest, t i ,  and the duration of  the tail, or 
decay, t2. The front time is described most commonly in terms of its triangular 
approximation, t',, the time required for a tangent line through the major 
portion of  the leading edge t o  intercept the projection of the peak amplitude. 
Surge generators frequently have enough inherent inductance that the leading 
edge is fairly linear over a reasonable length of time, in which case the best fit 
tangent line may be drawn by inspection. To  cover those situations in which the 
Figure 17.1 Description of waveforms. 
(a) Damped oscillatory wave 
(b) Exponential wave 
(c) Exponential wave with backswing 
(d) Generalized triangular wave 
tangent line is not obvious by inspection, specifications frequently require that 
the straight line defining the front be that passing through the 10% and 90% 
points. Sometimes specifications require that the straight line be drawn through 
the 30% and 9Wo points. The duration of the tail, t2, is most frequently defined 
as the time required for the wave to decay to one-half its initial amplitude. Some 
alternate specifications may define the tail in terms of the e-folding time, the 
time required for the wave to decay to l/e, or approximately 37% of its initial 
amplitude. 
With some types of test circuits the characteristic wave produced is that of 
an exponential wave with a relatively small backswing, as shown in Figure 
17.l(c). Technically, such a wave is a damped oscillatory wave with a high 
degree of damping. Specifications made with regard to the peak amplitude of 
such a wave, A , ,  and to the time to crest, t, or t ' l ,  will be the same as those for 
the exponential wave. Specifications relating to the decay time may refer to 
either the time required for the wave to decay to  one-half (or alternatively 37%) 
of its initial amplitude or the time required for the wave to decay to zero, t j .  
Specifications which relate to an exponential wave with backswing frequently 
require that the maximum amplitude of the backswing, A2, be less than some 
specified fraction of the initial amplitude. The duration of the backswing is 
frequently unspecified. In summary, then, the characteristics required to specify 
the generalized triangular wave of Figure 17.l(d) are the peak amplitude, A, the 
time to crest, t l ,  and a measure of the duration of the wave. This latter may be 
either the time required to decay to half value, t2, or the time required to decay 
to zero, t j .  If t l  is small with respect to  either t2 or t j ,  t2 may be assumed to be 
equal to one-half of t3. 
1 7.3 Tests on Complete Vehicles 
Tests on complete vehicles may be intended either as full-scale proof tests 
of the aircraft and all its internal electrical and electronic systems, or they may 
be transient analysis tests to determine only how the wiring responds to the 
electromagnetic fields produced by the simulated lightning current. 
17.3.1 Proof Tests Techniques and Waveforms 
Proof tests on a complete vehicle are intended primarily to identify system 
incompatibility problems--systems which may operate properly by themselves 
but which may fail when the complete vehicle is subjected to lightning currents. 
For example, redundant systems may provide no redundancy when they are 
simultaneously affected by the same induced voltages. Typical test setups are 
shown in Figure 17.2 (Reference 17.4). 
In a test of this nature a high-power surge generator is placed adjacent to 
the aircraft; current is passed into one extremity of the aircraft and returned to 
the surge generator through an external wire or wires--preferably wires 
sufficiently well insulated that the test current is confined to the test circuit and 
does not enter the ground network of the facility where the tests are made. 
CURRENT GENERATOR 
TEST VEHICLE 
GROUND RETURN WIRES 
CONNECTION INSULATED FROM GROUND 
WHERE INDUCED VOLTAGE 
MEASUREMENTS ARE MADE 
GROUND WHEELS ON RETURN WIRES 
CONNECTION ELECTRICAL INSULATION INSULATED FROM GROUND 
Figure 17.2 Typical setups for  complete vehicle tests. 
(a) Vehicle under test grounded 
(b) Low side of current generator grounded 
There should be a ground on the system. If the low side of the surge generator 
can be insulated from ground, it is generally preferable that the vehicle under 
test be grounded as shown in Figure 17.2(a). If this is not possible, the test 
vehicle must be insulated from ground and the ground made at the low side of 
the surge generator, as shown in Figure 17.2(b). 
Since present surge generators are not sufficiently powerful to  circulate 
the full-design lightning current through the aircraft, it is accepted practice to  
perform the proof test with two or more damped oscillatory currents having as 
waveforms one which provides the fast rate of rise characteristic of a natural 
lightning stroke wave front and the other a long-duration period characteristic of 
natural lightning-stroke duration. The two different components are necessary, 
since the mechanism of  coupling electron~agnetic fields into the interior of a 
vehicle is different a t  different frequencies. The high-frequency waveform is 
intended primarily for evaluation of aperture effects and has a minimum 
amplitude of 10 k A  and a fundamental frequency of 100 kHz. The low- 
frequency waveform is primarily for evaluation of diffusion effects and has a 
minimum amplitude of 2 0  kA and a fundamental frequency of 2 kHz. As a 
result of the inductance of the test circuit, the waveforms are typically of a 
sinusoidal nature, and no independent definition of  the front time, t l ,  need be 
made. 
During the tests the responses of the electrical equipment should be 
measured. Since neither of the test current waves is of the full amplitude 
associated with lightning, the test results must be extrapolated to  the full 
lightning-threat level, 200  kA. For the high-frequency test current wave, the 
average rate of rise of the first quarter cycle of the test waveform should be 
determined by  measurement or calculation and the test results extrapolated to 
100 kA/ps. Measurements made with the low-frequency current wave must be 
extrapolated from the measured peak amplitude of the current wave to the 200 
kA level. 
The use of these oscillatory currents is one of the necessary compromises 
with perfection previously mentioned. These waves are used for proof tests 
simply because test facilities capable of subjecting a complete aircraft t o  a 
full-threat lightning current do not exist. For purposes of simulation the 
oscillatory waves have both merits and drawbacks. These are summarized below. 
The fast oscillatory wave has the following merits: 
Over a narrow band of frequencies it simulates one important aspect 
of indirect effects--the aperture coupling of electromagnetic fields. 
High amplitude is available from relatively low-energy-surge gener- 
ators, since little energy is lost in waveshaping resistance. 
It can be nearly a full-threat-level test because of the higher 
frequency coupling effects. 
The fast oscillatory wave has the following drawbacks: 
It overemphasizes (and deliberately so) one of  the component 
frequencies of lightning currents. 
It underemphasizes low-frequency coupling effects, particularly the 
effects of vehicle resistance and the diffusion penetration of 
magnetic fields. 
It is fundamentally different in waveshape from the waveshapes of 
natural lightning currents. 
I t  is potentially damaging to avionic equipment. In this respect, 
however, it must be remembered that if avionic equipment can be 
damaged b y  a simulated lightning proof test, it can also be damaged 
by an actual lightning flash. 
Bulky and  expensive test equipment is required t o  make the test. 
Some of the drawbacks of  the fast oscillatory test wave are offset by its 
companion, the slow oscillatory wave. The slow oscillatory wave has the 
following merits: 
It simulates over a narrow band of frequencies one important aspect 
of  indirect effects--the resistive coupling of electromagnetic fields. 
High amplitude is available from relatively low-energy-surge gener- 
ators, since little energy is lost in waveshaping resistance. 
It can approach a full-threat-level test of lower frequency resistive 
coupling effects, at least for lightning strokes of low t o  average 
amplitude. 
The slow oscillatory wave has drawbacks parallel t o  those of the 
high-frequency test wave: 
It overemphasizes (and deliberately so) one of the component 
frequencies of lightning currents. 
It may not correctly simulate diffusion penetration of magnetic 
fields. One can take refuge, however, in the observation that 
imperfect simulation is better than no simulation. 
It does not constitute a full-threat-level test for the higher amplitude 
lightning flashes. Data obtained at  low amplitudes require extra- 
polation to give effects that would be present at full lightning- 
current amplitude. 
It is fundamentally different in waveshape from the waveshapes of 
natural lightning currents. 
It is potentially damaging t o  avionic equipment. The observation 
made previously about the high-frequency test waveform applies 
equally well t o  the same drawback in the low-frequency test. 
It too  requires bulky test equipment. 
17.3.2 Transient Analysis Tests 
A major virtue of the fast oscillatory test wave is that it can simulate fairly 
well one of the important aspects of natural lightning--the electromagnetic 
effect, associated with the initial rate of change of lightning current. Because of 
the emphasis that is placed on rate of change, it is often believed that only rate 
of change of current is important. Likewise, it is often believed that a 
nondamaging test for indirect effects analysis can be made b y  applying a current 
that initially rises at the full-threat-level rate, 100 kA/ps, but not allowing that 
current to  flow for very long or not allowing it to  increase to  a high amplitude. 
Such concepts are fallacious. 
Consider Figure 17.3 (Reference 17.5) in which two different current 
waves are applied to  an equivalent circuit of the type shown in Figure 17.3(a). 
One current rises at the rate of 100  kA/,us t o  a value of 1 0  kA, with t l  equal to 
0.1 ps, and the second rises at  the rate of 100 k A / w  t o  a value of 100 kA, with 
t 1 equal to 1 ps. The responses of the circuit, shown in Figure 17.4 (Reference 
17.6), are fundamentally different. 
The most nearly correct method of making a nondestructive test of 
indirect effects is to  keep the basic waveshape the same, reducing only the 
amplitudes. Such scaling is shown in Figure 17.5 (Reference 17.7). Frequently, 
concern is expressed about the fact that reducing amplitude but keeping front 
50  1 
. I  ,us 1 ,us 
Figure 17.3 Why duration of rate of rise is as important as rate of rise. 
(a) Circuit analyzed 
(b) Current waveshapes 
time the same reduces the rate of  change of current. The initial rate of change is 
indeed reduced, but it is reduced in exactly the same ratio as  that of the peak 
amplitude. 
Such considerations of  scaling have led t o  the development and use o f  the 
transient analysis technique in which currents of  waveshape similar to  those 
produced b y  natural lightning, but  of lower amplitude, are circulated through 
the aircraft. During such a test many measurements would be made of the 
transients induced on  the wiring of the aircraft. These measurements, when 
scaled up  t o  full-threat level, provide a measure of the transients t o  which 
lightning would subject the individual pieces of electronic equipment. An 
assessment of whether or not such transients might present a hazard t o  the 
equipment might involve additional tests on the individual pieces of equipment. 
Some of the considerations in such tests are given in Section 17.5. 
Figure 17.4 Responses of circuit. 
(a) Response to a 10 k A  current 
(b) Response to  a I00 k A  current 
The techniques of making transient analysis tests have been described in 
other literature (References 17.8, 17.9, and 17.10) and will not be discussed 
here. A summary of their advantages and disadvantages follows. 
The transient analysis type of test has, among others, the following 
advantages: 
The tests may be made with current surges of waveshape nearly 
representative of those of natural lightning. 
The waveshapes have the correct ratio of high- and low-frequency 
components. 
The test correctly simulates frequency-dependent resistance and 
diffusion-coupled electromagnetic effects. 
The test is nondamaging to avionic equipment if it is made at low 
current levels. 
Relatively small and inexpensive equipment is required to make the 
tests. 
The transient analysis type of test has, among others, the following 
drawbacks: 
Because a considerable amount of energy is lost in resistive circuit 
elements, a given size test generator produces less current than it 
would if it were used to produce damped oscillatory current waves. 
Data obtained at  low amplitudes must be extrapolated to full-threat 
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Figure 17.5 Considerations regarding amplitude scaling. 
(a) Correct scaling 
(b) Incorrect scaling 
level. Such extrapolation requires an assumption of linearity--that 
is, 10 A produces 10 times the response of  1 A. While such linearity 
can usually be relied upon, there are some nonlinear effects involved 
in the indirect effects o f  lightning. 
It  is not a proof test and hence has no pass or fail criteria. 
17.4 Tests on External Electrical Hardware 
The test techniques described so far have dealt with determining how the 
wiring and equipment within the aircraft respond to the passage of lightning 
current through the aircraft. There are, however, some types of equipment 
containing electrical hardware, or containing wiring that connects to  electrical 
hardware, that are frequently mounted on  the exterior of the aircraft. Some of 
these are likely to  be struck by the lightning flash. A pitot boom containing a 
deicing heater and the electrical wiring to supply power t o  that heater is an 
excellent example. An externally mounted navigation light is another example. 
Tests are frequently required t o  determine what voltages and currents might be 
induced on the electrical wiring by  a lightning stroke to  such hardware. These 
tests are needed because the currents and voltages may be conducted to other 
electrical systems in the vehicle. The basic principle by  which one of such tests is 
made is shown in Figure 17.6 (Reference 17.1 1). The test object should be 
mounted on a shielded test chamber so that access to  the electrical connectors of 
the object can be obtained in an area relatively free from the electromagnetic 
fields produced b y  the surge generator. The test object should be mounted to 
the shielded enclosure in a manner similar t o  the way in which it is mounted on 
the aircraft, since normal bonding impedances may contribute to  the voltages 
induced on circuits. If the shielded enclosure is large enough, the measurement 
oscilloscope may be contained within it. If not, a suitably shielded instrument 
cable may be used to transfer the induced voltage signal from the shielded 
enclosure t o  the oscilloscope. Measurements of the voltage induced on  the 
electrical circuits within the test objects should be made on both a line-ground 
and a line-line mode. Since the direct contact of  the lightning flash with the test 
object frequently produces quite high voltages, dividers or attenuators external 
to  the oscilloscope may be needed. If used, these should be checked t o  ensure 
that the signals displayed o n  the  oscilloscope are not the result of either spurious 
pickup on  the attenuator or overload effects in the amplifiers used in the 
oscilloscope. 
The appropriate waveforms of the surge currents to  be injected into the 
test object depend on where the object will be located on the aircraft and 
whether or not it will be likely t o  intercept the initial lightning current stroke or 
whether it is likely only t o  intercept a stroke blown back along the surface of 
the vehicle by the swept-stroke mechanism. The literature on test requirements 
discusses in considerable detail the waveforms appropriate t o  the different zones 
on the aircraft, and for any such test the reader is referred t o  that literature 
(Reference 17.1 2). 
17.5 Tests on Internal Equipment 
The second major category of tests involves tests t o  determine how the 
avionic equipment within the aircraft responds t o  the transients induced on the 
wiring by the flow of lightning current. Equipment for and specifications 
relating t o  these tests are in an embryonic state of development at  the present 
time. In the following sections we will attempt to discuss some of the available 
test techniques, the goals they are intended to accomplish, and some of the 
factors to which attention must b e  given during the conduct of such tests. 
1 7.5.1 Waveforms and Amplitudes 
Tests and measurements have shown that the transient voltages and 
currents to which avionic equipment is subjected are most commonly of a 
damped oscillatory nature. Voltages are almost always of this nature and 
currents usually are as well, although the currents flowing on the shields of 
shielded conductors have more of a tendency to be of a unidirectional nature 
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Figure 17.6 Typical electrical hardware indirect effects, test and measurement 
circuit. 
like that of the external lightning current than d o  the  induced voltages. 
Some examples of transients found in aircraft during transient analysis 
tests are shown in Figure 17.7 (Reference 17.1 3). Whether the measurement is 
of an open circuit voltage or of a short circuit current is indicated in this figure. 
Figure 17.7 Some examples of lightning-induced transients found in aircraft. 
Information relating to amplitude and to the conditions under which the 
transient was measured has deliberateIy been omitted, since the intent of the 
figure is merely to illustrate the broad diversity of waveforms that might be 
encountered. 
The question of what waveforms to  specify for transients used during tests 
related to indirect effects is another subject for which there are as yet only 
evolving standards. Some of those standards, or evolving standards, that have 
been used outside as well as inside the aircraft community are summarized in 
Tables 17.1 (Reference 17.14) and 17.2 (Reference 17.1 5). Specifications 
relating waveforms that are basically unidirectional will be discussed first. 
TABLE 17.1 SPECIFICATIONS RELATING TO 
UNIDIRECTIONAL TRANSIENTS 
Peak Crest Decay Amplitude of 
Amplitude Time Time Backswing 
A1 T1 T2  A2 
Space Shuttle - Component 1 
10 A 2 Ps 100 ps 
50 V 2 1 s  100 ps 
Space Shuttle - Component 2 
5 A 300 ps 600 ps 
0.5 V 300 ps 600 ps 
Standard ANSI Test Waves 
(depends on 4 Ps 10 ps 
application) 1.2 ps 50 ps to half value 
Fisher and Martzloff 
(depends on 5 I.ls not specified 
application) 0.25 p 5 Ps 
not specified 
A2 < 0.5 A1 
The waveforms of longest standing are the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) waves relating to  lightning effects on high-voltage apparatus 
(Reference 1 7.1 6). These call for current waves of 4 ps t o  crest and 10  ps t o  half 
value, and voltage waves of 1.2 ps t o  crest and 50  ps t o  half amplitude. Although 
other waveforms are specified for other purposes, these are the most common 
waveforms. 
TABLE 17.2 SPECIFICATIONS RELATING TO 
OSCILLATORY TRANSIENTS 
Peak Damping 
Amplitude Period Frequency Definition 
Space Shuttle - Component 1 
10 A 8~ 125 kHz 
5 0  V 8~ 125 kHz 
Space Shuttle - Component 2 
5 A 1200 /.IS 833 Hz 
ANSI SWC Test 
N A N A N A  
2.5-3.0 kV 0.67-1 /.ti 1 .O-1.5 MHz 
Martzloff and Howell 
N A  N A  N A 
0.8 kV 10 ps I 0 0  kHz 
A2 > 0.25 A ]  
on fifth cycle 
A2 > 0.25 A, 
on  fifth cycle 
A;! >0.25 A 1  
on fifth cycle 
A2 > 0.25 A 1  
on fifth cycle 
Envelope decay 
to 50% in no 
less than 6 ps  
Some of the older American literature refers t o  a voltage wave having a 
time to crest of 1.5 /.ti and a decay time to half amplitude of 4 0  ps. For all 
practical purposes, this is the same as the 1.2 x 50  ps waveshape, the 1.2 x 5 0  ps 
wave representing a fusion of slightly different American and European 
standards. The 1.2 x 5 0  ps figure is often viewed as representing the waveshape 
of the lightning current. This view, however, is incorrect; it represents the 
voltage produced at high-voltage equipment, such as transformers, by the effects 
of a lightning stroke at  some remote point. The 4 x 10 current wave 
represents the lightning-related current passing through a lightning arrester after 
it has been caused to spark over internally by a voltage surge of different 
waveshape. Both the voltage and current waveshapes represent transients that 
may be produced by basically simple laboratory test equipment. They do  not 
necessarily represent the shape of the current or voltage transients produced by 
natural lightning. 
At one stage in the development of the Space Shuttle Criteria Document, 
there was an allowance made for two basically unidirectional transient test 
waves. While those test waves had some deficiencies and have been largely 
superseded, discussion of them is still appropriate, since that discussion will 
illustrate some of the problems inherent in waveform specifications. 
The first of these specifications dealt with a transient rising to crest in 2 ps 
and decaying to zero in 100 ps. The intent of this test wave was to dupIicate in 
some manner the effects produced by magnetic flux leaking through apertures. 
The waveform had its basis in the ANSI test waves. These waveforms permitted a 
backswing, a feature characteristic of transformer-coupled surges. The backswing 
amplitude was required to be less than 25% of the initial amplitude, but the 
duration of the backswing was left uncontrolled. The test waveform was not 
intended to be interpreted as requiring a backswing. An overdamped wave was 
perfectly satisfactory. If an overdamped waveform was used, there would be no 
clearly defined time to zero. In such cases the decay time was intended to be 
taken as one-half the indicated value (50 ps instead of 100 ps) and measured to 
the time at which the wave had decayed to 50% of its initial amplitude. The 
waveform was thus similar to the standard ANSI test waveform derived for tests 
on high-voltage apparatus. The front time of 2 ps reflected the 2 ps front time of 
the basic lightning design current. The transients themselves were specified as 
having amplitudes of 50  V open circuit and 10  A short circuit. 
The second specification related to a long-duration transient representing 
the effects produced by magnetic flux diffusing through the walls of cavities. 
Such flux would have rise and decay times much longer than those of the 
lightning current. The specification called for a short circuit current of 5 A and 
an open circuit voltage of 0.5 V, both taking 300 ps to reach crest and another 
300 ps for decay to zero. The specification of  equal times to crest and from crest 
back to zero is incompatible with the response of real physical elements. In 
practice, any waveform with a rise time of 300 pi would have a decay time 
longer than 600 ,us. 
One common deficiency of the above specifications was that both the 
short circuit current and open circuit voltage had the same waveshape. In 
practice the open circuit voltage would be of a duration shorter than that of the 
short circuit current. 
In the original paper in which the concept of transient control levels was 
first presented (Reference 17.17), Fisher and Martzloff proposed a test wave 
that was primarily unidirectional. The open circuit voltage was characterized by 
a fast rise t o  crest and then a decay to  zero in 5 ps, or greater. To allow for 
transformer coupling of the transient, a backswing was allowed after the 
transient had decayed to zero. The character of the backswing was not 
specified--only that its amplitude should be less than 50% of the initial 
amplitude. 
The rationale behind this waveform concept included the following several 
aspects. 
It should be in some measure proportional to the derivative of the 
magnetic field produced by a lightning current. 
The duration of the transient should be long enough that possible 
failures of semiconductors would not be strongly affected by the 
waveshape of the transient, since, with transients of duration shorter 
than about a microsecond, the failure levels of semiconductors are 
strongly affected by waveshape. 
The duration of the transient should be roughly comparable to the 
duration of clock cycles in digital equipment. 
The transient should include a rapidly changing phase to excite 
inductively coupled circuit elements. 
The transient should be one that could be produced by and coupled 
to equipment by relatively simple test equipment. 
Directly associated with the open circuit voltage transient was a short 
circuit current transient. The short circuit current was that current which would 
flow from a source the internal impedance of which could be represented as 50 
pH in parallel by 50 S2. The test waves taken together as a set were thus more 
consistent than were those relating to the Space Shuttle. Amplitudes of neither 
current nor voltage were specified, since the test levels would be part of transient 
control level specification. 
The most common type of transient encountered would be oscillatory. 
Some existing specifications relating to osciIlatory transients are summarized in 
Table 17.2. The first two shown deal with the Space Shuttle and were essentially 
oscillatory versions of the unidirectional transients shown in Table 17.1 As 
presented at that time there was no specification on the initial front time; 
however, the maximum front time would be governed by the oscillatory 
frequency. The decrement of the transient was defined by requiring that the 
amplitude of the fifth half-cycle be more than 25% of the amplitude of the 
initial amplitude. 
The low-frequency component 2 was ultimately dropped from further 
consideration, since there was little evidence from transient analysis tests of such 
low-frequency oscillations being excited by diffusion-coupled magnetic flux. 
A specification of somewhat longer standing is the ANSI (SWC) Surge 
Withstand Capability Test (Reference 17.18). This test was derived from 
considerations of the transients found on control equipment in high-voltage 
substations. The specification makes no reference to short circuit currents. The 
open circuit voltages are specified as being between 2.5 and 3 kV, with the 
oscillatory frequency being from 1.0 to  1.5 MHz. Decrement is specified by 
requiring that the envelope decay t o  50% in no less than 6 ,us. 
The test was intended for simulation of the transients found in 
high-voltage electrical substations and to which equipment in such substations 
might be exposed. The voltage range specified is reasonable for such apparatus 
510 
but may be high for most electronic equipment, particularly for equipment 
located in shielded locations. The waveshape, while not unreasonable, is 
sometimes difficult t o  inject into circuits by transformer coupling. This test does 
not treat in any way the short circuit current that would flow on a shorted 
conductor connected t o  a low-impedance load or flow upon the shield of a 
cable. The specification that the envelope decay to 50% in no less than 6 ps 
implies a lower loss test circuit than may be found in practice. The 
recommended test generator circuit is somewhat uncontrolled, using an 
untriggered spark gap firing virtually at random at the crest of an ac charging 
voltage, though the waveform itself does not imply any particular generator test 
circuit. The specification does call for a 150 R source impedance. The question 
of source impedance deserves serious consideration and 150 52 may not be the 
optimum value. 
This test (and waveform) is one of the few that have been formally 
approved by an industry standardizing group. 
Martzloff and Howell (Reference 17.19) proposed a test wave with a 
frequency of 100 kHz and a voltage range of 0 to 8 kV. The wave was intended 
for the duplication of transients found in residential circuits on 120 V ac lines. 
The damping was specified such that the ratio of successive half-cycles should be 
greater than 0.6. This also may be somewhat high, particularly if the transient is 
t o  be coupled into equipment through transformers. No specification was made 
about the magnitude or waveshape of the short circuit current. Martzloff and 
Howell show a test circuit capable of injecting the transient onto 120 V ac lines 
where, since the output impedance of the circuit is basically 150 R resistive, the 
shape of the short circuit current would be about the same as that of the open 
circuit voltage. 
This waveform and this test circuit have been widely accepted in some 
fields. One example is their use in relation to ground fault interrupters 
(Reference 17.20). 
In answer to response from readers and users of the original Fisher and 
Martzloff paper (Reference 17.21) on the transient control level philosophy, 
Crouch, Fisher, and Martzloff have proposed a test wave somewhat different 
from the original one (Reference 17.22). The revised voltage wave, shown in 
Figure 17.8, emphasizes the oscillatory nature of the wave, rather than 
deemphasizing it, as did the original test wave. The front time was raised to 0.5 
ps, the course of the wave after crest being defined in terms of its oscillatory 
frequency of 100 kHz and the decrement specified by requiring that the ratio of 
successive half-cycles be greater than 0.6. The voltage wave thus becomes nearly 
identical with that proposed by Martzloff and Howell. 
The proposed waveshape should be viewed in relationship to its com- 
panion short circuit current. The current, similar to that from natural transient 
sources, is essentially the integral of the voltage. 
17.5.2 Equipnlent for Direct Injection of Transients 
Surge generators capable of producing the types of transients described 
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Figure 17.8 Revised proposals for TCL test waves. 
(a) Open circuit voltage 
(b) Short circuit current 
here generally e n ~ p l o y  capacitors that are discharged into a wave-shaping circuit. 
That circuit would be resistive if unidirectioi~al transients are to  be produced, 
and inductive if oscillatory transients are to be produced. Some representative 
examples of circuits are shown in Figure 17.9 (Reference 17.13). The switching 
gap may be either triggered or untriggered depending on the degree of 
sophistication desired. Components should be chosen and laid out in such a way 
as t o  minimize undesired residual inductance. Circuit voltages are typically high 
enough to be hazardous; therefore, appropriate safety precsutions should be 
taken in both their construction and their use. Figure 17.10 (Reference 17.24) 
shows an exanlple of  the types of transients that are produced by  the revised 
TCL test circuit shown in Figure 17.9(b). 
One way in which the generators may be used is to connect the output 
directly t o  the terminals of  the device under test. When generators are used in 
such a manner, one may determine the level of transient that causes a device to 
fail or,  alternatively, determine that a given transient does not cause the device 
to fail. The test may be applied in a common mode, as it is in Figure 17.1 1(a) 
(Reference 17.3,5), or in a differential mode, as it is in Figure 17.11(b). 
Depending on the nature of the circuits under test, it may be appropriate to  
couple the transient into the terminals of the device through coupling capacitors. 
Direct injection of transients into the terminals of a device has the 
drawback that the device becomes connected in a manner different from its 
normal connections. As a result, it may not be possible to  check the device to  
see whether the transient interferes with the normal operation of the device. One 
way the operation of the device may be checked is t o  discharge the test 
generator into shields placed over interconnecting cables, if there are such 
shieids, or into the cases housing electronic equipment. In either case, the 
generator would be used to generate a short circuit current, and that current, 
C1 = Mica type 
L1 3 turns no 9 wire on 2% in. diameter form 
IMR 50pH 
dc OUTPUT 
CHARGING 
VOLTAGE 0.25pF 
(b) > - r T A b 
* LOW INDUCTANCE 
**LOW INDUCTANCE & N O N  POLARIZED 
FRONT TIME = 3R2C 2 
TAIL TIME = 0.7 R1 (C, + C2) 
. - ~  
-"--J--= v w 
Figure 17.9 Representative transient generator circuits. 
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Figu~e 17.1 0 Output characteristics of TCL generator shown in Figure 17.9(b). 
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flowing through whatever transfer impedances might be present, would induce 
transients upon the internal circuitry. Presumably one would have previously 
determined in some manner what would be an appropriate amount of  current t o  
inject into the shields. 
Direct injection of  current is an appropriate test technique if the system 
w d e r  test will be exposed to a severe electromagnetic field threat, since any 
successful system will almost certainly be fitted with shields on the intercon- 
necting wires. 
1 7.5.3 Equipment for Transformer Injection of Transients 
Another powerful test technique by  which transients may be injected into 
the electrical wiring interconnecting different pieces of electronic equipment is 
through the use of  a pulse-injection transformer and a suitable pulse generator. 
The elements of such a system are shown in Figure 17.1 2. Current that is passed 
from the pulse generator through a primary winding on  a magnetic core sets u p  a 
TERMINALS OF 
ISOLATING REACTORS SYSTEM UNDER TEST 
- 0 
TO OTHER CrYYYI 1 o--- 
EQUIPMENT ----+ 
0 
I /I 
TEST 
(0 )  GENERATOR REFERENCE GROUND 
TERMINALS OF 
SYSTEM UNDER TEST 
TEST 
GENERATOR 
Figure 17. I 1  Direct injection of transients. 
(a) Common mode 
(b) Differential mode 
magnetic field in that core. If the core is placed around a cabIe interconnecting 
two pieces of electronic equipment, the magnetic field contained in that core 
induces current o r  voltage in the interconnecting wiring in a manner very similar 
t o  that produced b y  magnetic flux from an external lightning source. This type 
of  equipment has been used for NEMP effects testing on the B-1 (Reference 
17.26) and has also been specified for use in the Space Shuttle Lightning Criteria 
Document (Reference 17.27), though only in principle, not in detail. An 
example of the type of  test waves that may be produced by a transformer 
pulse-injection circuit is shown in Figures 17.13 and 17.14 (Reference 17.28). 
The inclusion of more complex waveshaping elements in the pulse generator 
(shown dotted in Figure 17.1 2) would allow other waveshapes t o  be produced. 
Some considerations regarding the capabilities of such transient injection 
follow. First, it should be remembered that the circuit under test is primarily 
exposed t o  the  changing electromagnetic field confined in the core of the pulse 
injection transformer. If the circuit under test is a high-impedance circuit, the 
natural effect of that changing magnetic field is t o  induce an open circuit 
voltage, the magnitude and duration of  which will depend upon the amplitude 
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Figure 1 7.12 Transformer pulse injection. 
and rate of change of the magnetic field in the core but which will not be 
significantly affected by  the length of the circuit under test. If the circuit is of 
low impedance, however, the magnetic field wlll induce a circulating current in 
the circuit. The shape of this current will be of a duration longer than that of the 
open circuit voltage, and will be nearly the same as the duration of the current 
produced b y  the pulse gerlerator in the primary of the transformer. The 
magnitude of this current will depend upon the impedance of the circuit under 
test, and t h ~ s  impedance will in turn depend upon the height of the circuit above 
a ground plane and upon the diameter of the circuit or bundle of wires in which 
current is injected, since these latter parameters affect the self-inductance of the 
circuit. A complete specification of the test circuit must deal both with the 
maxlmum open circuit voltage that may be produced and with the maximum 
short circuit current that may be produced. The inductance of  the circuit under 
test is almost directly proportional to the length o f  the circuit, but proportional 
only to  the logarithm of the diameter of the circuit or its height above the 
ground plane. In  the absence of any other specifications, it is suggested that the 
pulse generator and core be  such that the specified short c i~cu i t  current may be 
induced on a conductor 3 m long (about 10 ft) and having a diameter of  0.41 crn 
and spaced 5 cm above a ground plane. Such a conductor may be provided by 
the sh~eld of RG-58 coaxial cable. Furthermore, it is proposed that the open 
circuit voltage be measured when the pulse generator is set at the ainplitude 
producing the specified short circuit current. Specifications have yet t o  be 
Figure 17.13 Oscillatory current injected. 
(a) ISC 
(b) EOC 
(c) EOC (different time base) 
developed as t o  what this open circuit voltage should be in terms of  the 
corresponding short circuit current, although suggestions are given by Fisher and 
Martzloff and by Howell and Martzloff (Reference 17.29). If the open circuit 
voltage is too  high, there are two alternatives: ( 1 )  to  modify the pulse generator 
so as t o  reduce the rise time of the current pulse in the primary of the 
transformer, or (2) to  use a Zener diode or other clipping device on an auxiliary 
winding on the transformer core. After the required short circuit current was 
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HORIZONTAL - 1 ps/div. 
VERTICAL - 20 V/div. 
HORIZONTAL - 0.2 ps/div. 
Figure 17.14 Unidirectional current injected 
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shown to be developed on the standard conductor (Figure 17.12), that standard 
conductor would be replaced by the actual cable into which transients were to 
be injected. The actual current induced in the cable could be monitored by the 
current-viewing transformer. Recording it as well should probably be one of the 
requirements of the test plan. The actual current, of course, may be lower than 
the standard short circuit current if the actual cable is terminated in impedances 
higher than zero. Conversely, if the actual cable under test is provided with an 
overall shield and that shield is connected to the ground structure at both ends 
and if it has a diameter larger than 0.41 cm, the actual short circuit current may 
be larger than the standard or specified current. 
Whether or not it is appropriate to measure the voltage actually induced 
on the individual circuits would depend upon the characteristic of those circuits. 
Connection of a voltage probe would certainly be more likely to disturb the 
circuit and cause spurious response than would the insertion of a current-viewing 
transformer. 
During the demonstration tests in which the waves shown in Figures 17.13 
and 17.14 were measured, the conductor was a 15-foot section of RG-58 coaxial 
cable lying directly on a metal-covered floor. One end of the shield of this cable 
was connected to the floor, and the other end could be left either open circuited 
or shorted to the floor. Measurements were made only of the open circuit 
voltage or the short circuit current on the shield of the cable. Measurements 
were not made of either the current or the voltage induced on the signal 
conductor within the shield. The short circuit current is seen to rise t o  crest in 
about 1 ps and to oscillate at a frequency of 123 kHz. The peak current 
obtained with this configuration was about 23 A. 
If the conducter was left open at one end, the magnetic field that was then 
produced in the core of the transformer induced an open circuit voltage of about 
210 V. The voltage rose to crest in about 0.2 ps and oscillated at a frequency of 
91 kHz. The frequency was different because the inductance seen by the 
capacitor in the pulse generator was different, depending on whether or not 
there was a short circuit on the secondary of the transformer. The higher 
frequency oscillations on the front of the open circuit voltage were caused by 
the stray inductance and capacitance of the conductor under test. 
Significant points to observe here are that the open circuit voltage will 
invariably rise to crest faster than does the short circuit current and that the 
open circuit voltage will typically oscillate at a lower frequency than does the 
short circuit current. When the conductor under test is shorted, the inductance 
seen by the pulse generator is lower than it is when the secondary is open. This 
difference in oscillatory frequencies should be either recognized and allowed for 
in test specifications or corrected by adjusting the capacitance of the pulse 
generator used to  excite the transformer. 
When a unidirectional current was injected into the transformer (Figure 
17.14), the short circuit current rose to a crest of about 5.5 A in about 0.5 p. 
The rise time was greater and the amplitude less because of the damping resistor 
that was required to be in series with the primary winding. The open circuit 
voltage again rose to crest more rapidly than did the short circuit current. If an 
equal number of turns are used on the primary and secondary windings, there 
will be less current in the secondary winding than in the primary. With the 
transformer core used, the secondary current was about 65% of the primary 
current. The factors that affect the performance of puke-injection transformers 
are discussed in more detail in paragraph 17.5.4. 
As an alternative to transformer coupling, it is possible t o  discharge the 
pulse generator into a wire run parallel to the cable interconnecting the two 
pieces of equipment. This technique is less efficient in coupling low-frequency 
energy into the cable under test than is the transformer technique, but it may be 
more effective in coupling high-frequency energy. 
17.5.4 Equipment for Generation of Electric and Magnetic Fields 
The test equipment described so far has been aimed at the injection of 
current or voltage pulses into the terminals of electronic equipment. There is 
sometimes a need for subjecting an entire piece of electronic equipment t o  an 
engulfing electric or magnetic field, principally to check for magnetic field 
leakage of a cabinet. Sometimes these effects are checked with a wire-wrap 
technique in which a coil of wire is wrapped around the item to be tested and 
the coil then excited from a pulse generator. The type of magnetic field so 
produced is perhaps not the best that may be  derived for indirect effects testing. 
In the study of  nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) effects, use is often made 
of strip line simulators in which a pulse generator is matched t o  a large, open 
transmission line. In such simulators attention is given t o  ensuring that there is a 
suitable transition from the small geometry of the pulse generator to  the large 
geometry of the test chamber, with the intent of producing plane wave fields in 
the working chamber. The pulse generators and working chambers are also 
carefully matched t o  each other to  allow the production of electromagnetic 
fields having very fast fronts. 
For testing the electromagnetic effects resulting from lightning, the 
physical design of such chambers can frequently be simplified. The rise times 
involved are not as fast as those in NEMP studies, and the requirement of plane 
wave propagation in the test chamber is not as important. A test chamber 
suitable for many types of  equipment might be like that shown in F ~ g u r e  17.15. 
It would basically consist of  a Helmholtr. coil of rectangular cross section about 
1 m3 in volume. Such a coil, when excited by the pulse generator sketched, 
would produce in its working volume a magnetic field of approximately 1000 
A/m or an electric field intensity of about 30 kV/m. Magnetic fields of this 
nature might frequently be encountered in typical equipment bays of an aircraft 
unless these bays were deliberately built t o  provide electromagnetic shielding. 
The impedance (E field intensity/H field intensity) would be lower than that of 
free space or lower than the impedance of  an NEMP strip line simulator. This 
would be appropriate, since the electromagnetic field impedance inside an 
aircraft equipment bay would also be lower than the impedance of free space. 
The duration of the pulses produced by  such a simulator with the generator and 
load resistor constants shown would be about 100 ps. The front times would be 
determined by  the inductance of  the chamber and the values of any waveshaping 
elements, L and C, employed in the pulse generator. Longer duration magnetic 
fields, typical of  those that might be found in an aircraft equipment bay, might 
be produced by short circuiting the 20 R termination resistor shown in the 
figure and, possibly, increasing the value of the capacitance and inductance of 
the pulse generator. 
17.6 Design Notes for Transformer Pulse-I~~jection Equipment 
This section will discuss some of the detailed considerations in the design 
of  equipment suitable for pulse-injection equipment. The pulse generator and 
transformers described should not be viewed as representing the only designs 
that might be suitable o r  even the best that are suitable. They are intended only 
to  provide a starting point for those who wish to  initiate a test program at 
minimum cost. 
17.6.1 Pulse Generator 
A simple single-polarity current injection-pulse generator could be made as 
Figure 17.15 Possible test chamber for evaluating electric and magnetic field 
effects. 
shown in Figure 17.16 (Reference 17.30). This pulse generator is basically the 
one used to produce the waveforms shown in Figures 17.13 and 17.14. The 
energy storage element is capacitor C, which is charged through D 2  to a voltage 
determined by  the ratings of  transformer T2 and the setting of the variable 
autotransformer T I .  Charging of the capacitor would take place o n  the positive 
half-cycle (b) o f  the supply voltage. During this time the discharge switch, R Y I ,  
a relay with mercury-wetted contacts, would be unenergized and resting on 
contact b. During the negative half-cycle (a) RYl will be energized through 
diode D l  and closed t o  position a, thus discharging the capacitor during the 
half-cycle when there is no voltage being applied through diode D2. Because of 
mechanical inertia, the switch armature does not necessarily operate in phase 
with the ac drive signal, and, consequently, during a portion of the positive 
charging half-cycle, the contact may remain closed t o  point a. In order to 
prevent excessive power drain from the transformer or excessive power 
dissipation in R3, the series resistor R 2  is used to limit the charging current 
drawn from the transformer. 
The capacitor would be discharged into a single-turn primary on  a 
transformer core. If a unidirectional pulse were desired, switch S3 would be 
open and resistor R2  inserted in the discharge circuit to  provide damping. If S3 
were closed, the capacitor would oscillate through the inductance of the 
transformer. A parts list for the pulse generator is shown in Table 17.3. 
Higher voltages could be  obtained by increasing the ratings of T2,  D2, and 
C1. If the charging voltage were appreciably higher, the mercury-wetted contact 
relay RYI used for switching the charged capacitor into the transformer would 
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have to  be replaced by a different device, either a higher voltage relay or some 
type of discharge tube. 
TABLE 17.3 PARTS LIST - SINGLE-POLARITY PULSE GENERATOR 
T3 - 
F - 
RYl - 
Yellow (power on) 
Red (pulse on) 
0.1 pF, 600V 
IN4003 ( 1  A, 200 V) 
IN4007 (1 A, 1000 V) 
6800 R, 1 W 
15KR,1 W 
27 R, 2 W 
SPST (power and relay on) 
SPST (pulse on) 
SPST (unidirectional or oscillatory) 
Variable autotransformer (1 20 V, 2 A) 
120/350 V, 4 0  mA 
(Any of a variety of plate transformers is satisfactory. 
Half or all of a center-tapped secondary may be used). 
Ferroxcube 1F53C5 U-core (2 required) 
120V, I A 
Mercury-wetted contact relay 
Clare HG 1002 or 
Potter and Brumfield JML 1200-8 1 
RYI MUST CLOSE TO CONTACT (a) ON 
HALF-CYCLE (a) OF THE SUPPLY VOLTAGE. 
CONTACT (b) SHOULD BE THE REST OR 
UNENERGIZED POSITION 
Gnd 
4 J I CONDUCTOR 
UNDER TEST 
Figure 1 7.16 Single-polarity current injection-pulse generator. 
17.6.2 Current-Injection Transformers 
Some of the parameters affecting circuit response are shown in Figure 
17.1 7 (Reference 17.31). These include the capacitance of the storage capacitor; 
the inductance of the lead connecting the storage capacitor to the transformer; 
the primary, secondary, and leakage inductances of the transformer; and the 
inductance and resistance of the conductor under test. 
The characteristics of the pulse transformer are among the most important 
properties. These parameters relate to the primary and secondary inductances, 
the flux in the transformer core, and the proportion of flux produced by current 
C  = S T O R A G E  C A P A C I T O R  
L p  = I N D U C T A N C E  OF P U L S E  G E N E R A T O R  A N D  
C O N N E C T I N G  L E A D  (0.77pH/ft  FOR 5 0 0  
C O A X I A L  C A B L E )  
L I = P R I M A R Y  I N D U C T A N C E  OF T R A N S F O R M E R  
L 2  = S E C O N D A R Y  I N D U C T A N C E  O F  T R A N S F O R M E R  
Ls  = I N D U C T A N C E  OF L E A D  U N D E R  T E S T  
R s  = R E S I S T A N C E  O F  L E A D  U N D E R  T E S T  
#, = F L U X  D U E  TO C U R R E N T  I N  P R I M A R Y  
# , = F L U X  D U E  TO C U R R E N T  I N  S E C O N D A R Y  
) , = L E A K A G E  F L U X ,  FLUX O R I G I N A T I N G  I N  
P R I M A R Y ,  B U T  N O T  L I N K I N G  S E C O N D A R Y  
Figure 17.1 7 Parameters determining circuit response. 
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in the primary that links the secondary winding. The difference in these two 
fluxes is the leakage flux, and it is the leakage flux that prevents the secondary 
current from being as large as the primary current. 
For a given transformer, the primary and secondary inductances may 
either be measured on an inductance bridge or be calculated by discharging a 
known capacitor through the winding and observing the frequency of oscillation. 
Mutual inductance, which is related to  the degree of coupling between windings, 
can be determined by connecting the primary and secondary windings in series, 
first in series so that the two magnetic fields set up are in the same direction 
(series aiding) and then so the magnetic fields are in opposite directions (series 
bucking). 
Knowing the primary, secondary, and mutual inductances, one can 
produce an equivalent circuit of an injection transformer. One such circuit is the 
Pi circuit of Figure 17.18(b) (Reference 17.32). If the number of turns on  the 
primary winding is equal to the number on the secondary winding (the usual 
case), the circuit reduces to that of Figure 17.1 8(c). 
The amount of open circuit voltage or short circuit current that can be 
transformed by a given transformer depends upon the magnetization curve of 
the core. A typical curve for a core without any air gap in the magnetic path is 
shown in Figure 17.19(a) (Reference 17.33). The operation of the core depends 
on the type of pulse t o  be produced. The most difficult operation involves a 
train of pulses, all of the same polarity. If the core is initially demagnetized, the 
first pulse will follow path a on the magnetization curve, whereas successive 
pulses will follow curve b. Since the amount of open circuit voltage that may be 
produced depends upon the change in magnetic field, operation along curve b 
cannot support as high a voltage as would be expected if one considers only path 
a, nor one lasting for as long a period of time. If alternate positive and negative 
pulses are applied, then operation along paths c and d will occur, and a much 
higher output voltage may be produced. If the first pulse carries the magnetic 
field along path a and then lets it relax to point 1, the second pulse will carry the 
magneti~ation along path c and let it relax to point 2. The third pulse would 
then carry it along path d and let it relax back to  point I again. 
If there is an air gap in the magnetic path, the B-H curve is flattened out 
and the remnant magnetic flux in the core becomes very small. In such a case, 
the core can support a series of pulses all of the same polarity and amplitude, 
since operation along path e is virtually the same as that along path f. 
The B-H curve of a typical ferrite core suitable for a current injection 
transformer is shown in Figure 17.20 (Reference 17.34). The core dimensions 
are shown in the figure. The core was a ferrite U-core with a removable end 
yoke. Tf the end yoke butts closely against the pole pieces of the U-core, the 
core shows a clearly defined B-H loop. The initial magnetic path, corresponding 
to curve a of Figure 17.1 9(a), is identified as the zeru-milgap. With gaps of 1.8 
or 3.3 mils (.0018 or .0033 inches) on the two-pole faces, the curve flattens out, 
or becomes less steep. ln each case the core begins to saturate when the magnetic 
field reaches 1.8 x 10-5 W, corresponding to  about 3500 gauss (lines per square 
centimeter). 
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A M P E R E - T U R N S  ' 
Figure 17,20 Saturation characteristics of ferrite current injection transformer. 
The primary or secondary inductance is defined as the slope of the B-H 
curve: 
The inductance is proportional to the square of the number of turns in the 
winding. For the three curves the inductance would be as indicated. 
In the absence of a controlled gap in the magnetic path, the inductance of 
a winding depends largely on the amount of pressure exerted on the pole piece, 
since with more pressure any small residual gap is reduced. When the B-H curve 
shown in Figure 17.20 was obtained by exciting the core with 60 Hz ac, the 
magnetic forces involved held the poles closely together. The result is that the 
inductance that would be calculated from the zero-mil gap curve in Figure 
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17.30 would be higher than one that would be encountered if the core were 
excited by  a short-duration pulse, one lasting only a few microseconds. With 
short pulses the magnetic field may be high and may exert a significant pressure 
on the pole pieces, but the inertia of the pole piece prevents the poles from 
moving together and reducing the residual air gap. 
The transformers are not constrained t o  be operated with only one turn on 
CONDUCTOR UNDER 
TEST 
Figure 17.21 Effect of more turns on secondary. 
Less short circuit current 
- More open circuit voltage 
- A decrease in the frequency of the natural 
oscillatory mode of the cable under test 
CONDUCTOR UNDER 
TEST 
\ 
Figure 17.22 Effect of more turns on primary. 
-- More short circuit current 
- Less open circuit voltage 
- A decrease in the frequency of the natural 
oscillatory mode of the pulse generator 
- A longer rise time of the current pulse 
each winding or, for that matter, with the same number of turns on the two 
windings. Figures 17.2 1 and 1 7.22 (Reference 17.35) give quaIitatively some of 
the ways in which turns on one winding or the other affect the results if the 
number of  turns on the two windings are not equal. For instance, if the wire 
under test is looped through the core several times, a given excitation on the 
transformer will produce less short circuit current, more open circuit voltage, 
and a decrease in the frequency of the natural oscillatory mode of the cable 
under test. If there are more turns on the primary, there will be more short 
circuit current, less open circuit voltage, and a decrease in the frequency of the 
natural oscillatory mode of the pulse generator. There will also be a longer rise 
time of  the current and voltage pulses. 
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SR-52 CALCULATIONS - CONDUCTOR (CONCLUDED) 
TITLE Canductor Temperatwe Rise and ElorpiIan PAGELOF, SR-52 
PROGRAMMER J. A. Plum= DATE 25 October I976 
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User Instructions 4~ 
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TITLE Qoundiq n~ubc Ternpcrat~~c  ire md Elo~ation PAGELOF 
DATE I6 March 1976 
SR-52 
PROGRAMMER I. A .  numcr 
SR-52 CALCULATIONS - TUBE (CONCLUDED) 
TITLE Groundimg Tube Tcrnpcratun Riw and Elongallon P A G E  'OF- SR-52 
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APPENDIX 3 
PROGRAM MA GFLD 
Table A3.1 LISTING OF PROGRAM MAGFLD 
................................................................... 
MAGFLD 10/L6/76 
I lo HEM 
I20 HEX 
130 ;(EM 
140 2Ehl 
150 REM 
lo0  dEH 
I I0 E M  
l a0 rci!4 
I90 HE!4 
200 QEM 
210 HEM 
220 REU 
230 REM 
232 REhl 
234 HEM 
236 HEM 
23b HC'4 
239 AEM 
FA FlSHCd GENERAL ELECTRIC COUPAIIY ENVIllONUENTAL 
ELECTRO AGNETICS UNIT BLDG 9-209 PITTSFIEL9,MA 0120 l 
PHONE (41 3 1-494-4380 02 DIAL COYhl 8-236-4370 
THIS PRoGHAM CALCULATES THE MAGNETIC FIELD INTERIIAL O R  FXrERNAL 
TO A GR'jJP OF CURRENT CARRYING CONDUCTORS. ALL COIIDUCTORS 
AnE ASSJMED LONG EIIOUGH THAT END EFFECTS AdE NESLIGIBLE 
IT ALSO CALCULATES THE DISTPIBUTIOII OF CURRENT AMONG TH; 
CONDUCTORS. THE COliWCTORS AHE ALL ASSU'!ED TI1 BE E7UIDISTAKT FRI 
THE RETdRN PATH. T3E DISTANCE TO TO ME RETURN PATH IS ASSUME7 
METCR. THE PROGRAM DOES IlIlT CALCULATE ANY PRoXI).IITY EFFECTS. 
DATA 1 5  STORED IN A FILE ;IHIC'I IS SIVE:I THC WAh(E DATFIL 
THE FIR,T RECOdO OF THE FILE SHOULD GIVE %E TOTAL N U M B ~ R  OF CONDUCTORS 
SllCCESSlVE dECORDS OF THIS FILE SHOUL9 SlVE THE LOCATIOII OAND 
SIZE OF THE COll9UCToRS. THEY SHOULD sf IN THE FOR).! wrollnUCToR 
NUUbER" ( 1 3i20UGl P I I  1 ,  " X  3rXQDINATE1' ( I t (  '!ETERS). "Y COOP71:.IAE" 
(IN I~IETILHSI A N O  "CO:iDUCTo? DIA!!ETER8' (1i.l 'IFTERS) . 
240 RE!A A SAMPLc DATA FILE I S  S~lo~l i l  UEL0,r. 
241 RE14 THIS FILE DFSCRI:>ES FOUR COII~UCTII\?S EACH f l .O l  :IETEHS QIAUFTER. 
242 KEsi AHHAJJGEI' AT-THZ CORiJEPS OF A S O U A ~ E ' I  MITER O Y  A 517E AIJn 
243 HEY CEIITEHE I AT X=Y=O. 
244 HEY 
242 R E U  
240 REM 10W> 4 
247 REM 101,  1 ,  .5..5..01 
Z4J {?EM 102: 2,.5,-.5,.9l 
232 HE% 103"s 3,- .5,--5,  -01 
234 HE61 104'; 4, .5,-.5,.01 
236 ifEl.( 
25d REM 
260 dEM THE LENC'TH OF THE CONDUCTORS IS NOT ENTERET). THEY ARE ASSUME9 m 
202 REX BE flF 1,rFI;IITE LEVCTH. 
270 2EM 
2dO REM THE PHIKRAU I S  PilESENTLY I)IhlENSIoNEO Fo2 A YAXIYUM oF 
290 HEM 50 ClIIII)JCTOt4S 
300 REM 
310 ttE84 THE IlUTi-UT IS S0;lMALIZED TO A TOTAL CUddiliT OF ONE AMPERE 
320 dE!A FLOtrING TIIRIIUGH THE OlcoiiP OF CONDUCTORS. 
345 FILES DATFIL 
3>0 DIY h~(50,50),V(i0,1~,1(50,11.~l50,4).N(50,50) 
360 DIM J(SD) ,K(50)  
303 HEAD# I .(I I 
370 rlAr H E A D  #1.D(I.il,4) 
300 YAT V=ZEd(I.II , I  ) 
390 FOR 1-1 TI) . I 
400 LET V(1.I ) = I  
Table A3.1 LISTING OF PROGRAM MAGFLD (CONT.) 
-- ---- --- .- ------------- - ----------------- - ......................... 
YAT I=ZEH(lil . I  I 
:.!AT N=ZER(NI .:I1 
PHIHT"COi.IDU,'TO;Iil,"X COORI)IIIATE"."Y CO!I;I?INA'TF"."DIA7EER-KflERSn 
I #### - F . # # # - A A -  
HAT PhINT '3 
~ h l ! < T  
LET P2=6 .20d ld  
LET E2=2.71,.28 
LET g l = 3 0 0  
FllH I = I  T o  :I 
FOR J = I  T o  ,.I 
I F  I = J  TriEN 383 
LET n2=SOd((D(I,21-~(J,21)*2 + ( O ( I , 3 ) - D ( J , 3 ) ) ^ 2 1  
LFr M(I,J)=I.OG(RI/HZJ 
GOT!) 590 
LET C ( I , J ) = : . O C ; ( R I * Z / D ( I , 4 ) )  
IdEXT J 
NEXT I 
- . ~  
,(AT N=IIIV(Y) 
MAr 1=1t*v 
LET I l*O 
FOd I =  ITOiIl 
LET I l = I ( I . I ) + I I  
NEXT I 
FOR I = i  TO ..I 
L r r  J( I ) = I  ( I ,  I ) / I  
IlEXT I 
PBI.1T 'rCOIID~CTOR" 
PHI!JT 
FObi I = l  TO . I  
PdINT USING 455.1 
IiEXT I 
PHii4T 
I 
. "FUACTIONAL 
PdlliT 
PHIIIT"TI1E i I  HST CiiARACTEe OF A.4Y YEYEOAX! I :IPUT DATA I S  A CO?iTROL" 
?dIliT"Ci(ARA<'TEbi. iidEW Ail INPUT OUESTIO!d ASKS FOR 'COIITl)OL',FI:TEil" 
Pd1NT"I (O. .E)  I F  YllU NISti TO CollTINUE 4'iIiil  THAT TYPE OF CALCUL-" 
PlcI!lT"ATIoii AND EWTER O (ZERO) I F  YOU :.iISi To G o  ON TO THE" 
Pi(INT"i4EXT iYPE [IF CALCULAi'I0;I" 
?HINT 
HE'A THIS STi.r(TS CALCiJLATION OF FIELD AT A OEFINED POINT 
Pd1:IT"DO YO.J wAKT A POIIJT UY POIIIT CALCULATIOII OF THE FIELO?" 
Pr(IriTnYES=I i4o=O" 4 
I ~ l P i i i  Al 
I F  AI=0 T H E  1022 
PBINl 
 EM TYIS STiUTS CALCULATIIlil OF THE FIELD AT A &TINED POINT 
PRINT X Y Y-X 3-Y H-T!)T AYGLF-OFG" 
Table A3.1 LISTING OF PROGRAM MACFLD (CONT.) 
930 PRINT 
940 REM X I  A N D  Y I  ARE C(N)RDINATES OF POINT PI 
950 PRINTUCONTROL, X I  .Yl"i 
960 INPUT O,XI,YI 
962 PRINT 
970 IF  0-0 THE,, I020 
980 GOSUB 1048 
990 PHINT USING 1021 , X I  , Y I  ,B2,B3,D4.B5 
I O N  PHINT 
l 01 0 GOT0 950 
HEY THIS EiIDS ME CALCULATIoll rtF THE FIELD AT A DEFINED POINT 
I #. ###*-*- #.###"*"- #. ###**** #. *##**** #.###*-*- ####. # #  
REM THIS STARTS CALCULATION OF THE FIELD AT A SERIES OF POINTS 
PRINT"D0 YOU rlANT A CALCULATION OF THE FIELD AT A SERIES OF POINTS" 
PR1NT"COVErING A N  AREA? YES=( .No=O~~f 
INPUT (I 
IF  0=0 THE11 1280 
PRINTrthHAT ARE START,SToP AND INCREMENT VALUES FOR X " I  
INPUT S1 ,S i ,S3  
Pt4INTndHAT AGE START,STOP AND INCREMENT VALUES FOR Y " f  
INPUT 54, SJ, 56 
PRINT 
D U T M T  , ,,*... 
PRINTU X Y Y-X H-Y H-TOT AHGLE-DEG" 
FOR X I  =S I TO S2 STEP 5 3  
FOR Y I =S4 TO S5 STEP S6 
GOSUB 1049 
PRINT USING 1021 ,XI,Yl,B2,B3,84.B5 
NEXT YI 
NEXT X I  
REM THIS ENDS THE CALCULATION OF FIELD AT A SERIES OF POINTS 
PdINT 
PRINT 
GOT0 1280 
HEM THIS STARTS THE SUBROUTINE FOR CALCULATION OF FIELD AT A POINT 
LET B2=O 
LET B3=0 
1060 FOR 
1070 REM 
1080 REM 
I090 REM 
1100 LET 
1110 LET 
1120 LET 
1 130 LET 
1135 HEM 
1 137 REM 
1140 LET 
1150 LET 
1 160 LET 
i3=~-COMPONENT BETWEEN POINT I AND POINT I 
DITTO FOR Y3 
R3= TOTAL DISTANCE BETWEEN POINT I A N D  POINT I 
X3=XI-D(I.2) 
Y3=YI-D(I.3) 
R3=SORIX3*X3+Y3*Y3 
BI=J( I ) / (P2*R3)  
C2=INCHEMEKTAL,COMPONENT IN X DIRECTION 
C3=INCREMENTAL' COMPONENT IN Y DIRECTION 
C2-B I *Y3/R3 
Table A3.1 LISTING OF PROGRAM MAGFLD (CONT.) 
MAGFLD I 0/2 67 76 
1170 LET B3=83+i3 
l ldO NEXT I 
l I90  REM B2= X COMPONENT OF TOTAL FIELD 
1200 HEM B3=Y COMPIINENT OF TOTAL FIELD 
REM 84- TOIAL FIELD 
HEM B5=ANGLE [IF TOTAL FIELD 
LET 84=SQR182*!32+B3*83 ) 
dEM THE FOLLIINING STATEMENTS 
I F  B2<>0 THEN 1240 
I F  B3<0 THtN 1236 
LET B5=90 
LET ~ 5 = - 9 0  
GOT0 1260 
LET B5=ATN 1 B3/B2 I 
LET 85=85*>7.29583 
BEM IF B2>U ANGLE I S  
HEW IF B2<J AND 8 3 ~ 0  
REU IF BZeO AND 83>0 
IF 82>0 THtN 1260 
I F  8 3 ~ 0  THkN 1258 
GUARD AGAINST DIVISION BY ZERO IF; LINE 1240 
IN FIRST OR FOURW QUADRANTS AND LINE 
THE ANGLE I S  IN THE THIRD QUADRANT 
THE ANGLE I S  IN THE SECOND OUADRANT 
LET B5=180+85 
GOT0 1260 
LET 855-183+85 
RETURN 
HEM THIS ENDS THE SUBROUTINE FOR CALCULATION IIF THE FIELD AT A POINT 
PRINTnDO Y l l U  IIANT THE FLUX INTEGRATED OVER A PATH BETNEEN" 
PRINTnTIIO POINTS. YES- l NO-O"I 
INPUT A2 
I F  A2-0 THtN 1400 
PRINT 
HEM X4 AND Y4 ARE THE CtUlRDINATES (IF PI 
REM X5 AND Y5 ARE THE COUIRDINAES [IF P2 
PRINT"CONT~0LX-PI .Y-PI ,X-P2.Y-Pa") 
INPUT O.X4.Y4,X5.Y5 
I F  0-1 THEh 1470 
PRINT 
PRINTnDO YOU dANT TO GO BACK AND DO MORE POINT BY POINT CALCULATIONS" 
PRINT1'(ENTER 21 ,  DO YORE CALCULATIONS OF FLUX OVER AN AREA (ENTER I ) "  
PRINT"0R SiOP (ENTER 0 )  
INPUT A2 
I F  A212 THEN 090 
I F  A2-I THEN 1330 
I F  A2-0 THEN 1720 
REY THIS SrARTS CALCULATION OF FLUX OVER A N  AREA 
LET X5rX5-Xl - - - . . - . . - . .
LET Y6=Y5-Y4 
LET R6= SOR(X6+X6+Y6*Y6) 
REY 01 I S  'THE ANGLE BETWEEN THE LINE JOINING PI AND P2 
REY AND THE X AXIS. SIL(OIl=Y6/R6 
Table A3.1 LISTING OF PROGRAM MAGFLD (CONCLUDED) 
1230 liE1.I All0 COS(01 )=X6/d6 
1240 RE.4 THIS SiAI1TS T!IE 1:iTEGHATIflN OVER THE AREA BETWEEN PI Alin P2 
1342 LET 0 3 ~ 5 0  
1545 LET 04=R6/1:3 
1320 FOh J=O TO 03 
1260 LET O2=J/O3 
1370 LET X I  =X4+\)2*X6 
1330 LET Y I =Y4+ 12*Y6 
I390 OOSUB 1049 
1600 HEM D l  AND D2 A2E THE COYPONEYTS OF H-X ANr) il-Y NORMAL TO THE 
1010 dEH LIkE JOIIIING PI AEln P2 
1020 LET DI=-B2<Y6/R6 
1630 LET D2=B3* .6/R6 
LET K(J)=DI+D2 
INEXT J 
L t i  87=0 
f O R  J=0 TO 03-1 
LET B7=(K(J)+K(J+I 
NEXT J 
LET B7=2E-/*P2*B7 
1690 PttII.IT"TOTAL FLDX="~B~I"IVEBERS" 
1700 PI~INT 
171 0 GOT0 1360 
1720 END 
I 
0 1 0 ONE OF FOUR CONDUCTORS. EACH CARRYING 0.25 A 
I 
I 
Figure A3.1 Pattern of field around the conductors described in lines 246 to 
254 of Table A3.1. 
Table A3.2 SAMPLE OUTPUT FROM PROGRAM MAGFLD 
MAGFLD 09127EDT 10/26/76 
CONDUCTOR X COORDINATE Y CIHIRDINATE D I  AMETER-METERS 
CONDUCTOR r-HACTI ONAL CURRENT 
THE F IRST  CHARACTER OF ANY KEYBOARD INPUT DATA I S  A CONTROL 
CHAHACTER. nHEN AN INPUT QUESTION ASKS FOR 'CONTR0L8,ENTER 
I (ONE) I F  YOU WISH TO CONTINUE N ITH  THAT TYPE OF CALCUL- 
ATION AND ENTER 0 (ZERO) I F  YOU d I S H  To GO [IN TO THE 
NEXT TYPE OF CALCULATION 
0 0  YOU NANT A POINT BY POINT CALCULATION OF THE F IELD?  
YES=l NO=Ol l 
X f H-X H-Y H-TOT ANGLE-DEC 
Do YOJ #(ANT A CALCIILATION OF THE F IELD AT A SEHIES OF POINTS 
COVEhING AN A R M ?  YES=l.NIl=O? I 
dHAT ARE STAdT SLOP AND IhCREh'ENT VALUES F o Q  X7 0 1.2 4 
M A T  ARE START:STOP AND IilCHEYENT VALUES FOR Y? 0:1.2::4 
H-X 
. I 4 9 E - W  
.370E-01 
.124E+00 
. l l Y E + 0 0  
H-Y 
-. 186E-08 
. I4I)E-Ob 
. I PEE-06 
.649E-09 
Tf iE  FLJX I lTEG2ATFD 
YES=I iiO=O? ! 
DO YOU iiAiuT TO 3 0  bACK AX3 L)o 9 0 B E  POIIVT fry POI:IT CALCULATIOPiS 
( E i T c d  2 1 ,  30 S!I*E CALCULAT1OI:S OF FLi lX OVE? A!l AREA (E?ITEl! I I 
0.2 STOP (EIITER :) 
7 i) 
INDEX 
Access doors, effects on  magnetic 
field, 327 
sparking at ,  159-164 
Action integral, 82,  188, 190  
Airworthiness regulations, 105-1 13,  150 
Aluminum foil, as diverter strip, 222 
as protective coating, 246 
shielding effectiveness, 241, 243, 244 
Anodizing, effects on conductivity, 
163, 166 
effccts on couplings, 168 
Aperture coupling - Electric fields 
cquations, 343-344 
shape factor, 34  1 
Apcrturc coupling Magnetic fields 
dipole approximations, 329-332, 
335 
cquations, 333-334, 336-337 
equivalcncc of aperture shapes, 340 
examples, 342-343 
patterns of field intensity. 333 
reflecting surfaces, 337,  338 
shape factor, 332 
Arcing (See sparking) 
Attachment of flash (See attacl~ment 
zones), as influenced by diverter 
strips (See diverter strips) 
initial attachment, 48,  49,  5 3  
on  nonmetallic surfaces, 207-209 
to fuel tanks (Scc ,fuel tanks) 
to radomes (Scc radomes) 
Attaclnncnt zones, 50-53, 105-108, 
132-1 34 
defined, 5 1 ,  106 
dcter~ninctl by scalc models, 106 
field experience, 107, 109 
ligl~tning environment in, 1 10-1 1 1 
swcpt-stroke Lone, 50-53, 106, 107, 
108, 109 
Avoitlancc, of  storms, 59 ,  65-71 
of strikes, 69-70 
I%ontling, jumpers, 204 
rnagnctic force cffccts, 201-203 
of access doors, 163, 164 
of composites, 240 
o f  fuel caps, 160 
o f  hinges, 205 
o f  pipe couplings, 169, 170 
o n  fuel dump pipes, 135 
via fasteners, 165 
Boys camera, 8 , 9 ,  149 
Breakdown, attachment point tests, 
211-213 
of air, 7 ,  174 
of  canopies, 8 8  
of  electrical insulation, 9 1, 9 3  
of  fiberglass, 87 ,  2 16 
of spark gaps (See protective devices) 
Canopies, puncture of ,  8 8  
scorching of ,  9 0  
strcamcrs inside, 8 8  
Capacitance, aircraft, 40 
sphere, 39 
Channcl of  lightning, initial develop- 
ment ,  5-9 
pressure of, 8 3  
return stroke, 9-14 
temperature of ,  8 3  
Charge, delivered by stroke com- 
ponents, 16, 19, 25, 27 
in leader, 7, 41 
on  aircraft, 40,  41 
produccd by engines, 48-49 
to burn through metals, 136, 143, 
152 
Circulating currents, 304, 306, 307, 
31 1, 
Coatings, 224, 245-250 
('omposite materials, boron, 230-233 
dielectric coatings for, 248-249 
electrical modcls of, 231, 232 
cncrgy absorption, 229 
cxamplcs ofdamage,  234, 235, 237 
extent of damage, 236 ,268 ,  239 
graphite, 232, 237-238 
invisible damage, 233, 235 
joints, 240 
n ~ c c l ~ a n i s n ~  of failure, 87-89 ,230 ,233  
protective coatings, 245-247 
shielding properties, 24 1-245 
temperature rise, 230 
Conductivity, at  access doors, 163-164 
at joints, 165-167, 240 
of composites, 229-230, 233-238 
of metals, 190, 303 
through couplings and interfaces, 
171-172 
Connectors, grounding of ,  3 9 4 , 4 0 0 , 4 0 4  
transfer characteristics, 394, 399 
Continuing current, 18 
effects of, 78,  136-154, 186-188 
Corona, 3 ,  4 , 4 4 , 4 9  
Coulomb ignition thresholds, 140-143, 
150, 152 
Covers, access (See access doors) 
effects of internal fields, 325 
sparking at, 163 
Current distribution, 280,283,  287, 291 
in ~nternal  conductors, 160-171 
time conqtant of redigtribution, 
305-308 
Damage Direct effects, from shock 
waves, 85,  86 
to con~posites, 88, 84,  230-240 
to  fiberglass, 83, 87 ,92 ,  206-213 
to  metal surfaces, 78, 136-154 
to radomes, 83, 85,  87  
to structures, 79-86, 199-201, 
206-213 
Damage - Indirect effects, 98 
constants, 453,455-462,465-492 
examples of, 92, 99-101 
to capacitors, 463-464 
to semiconductors, 45 1-462,465-492 
Dart leader, 18 
Design to minimize indirect cffects, cir- 
cuit design, 438-440 
in fuel systems, 172-179 
location of equipment, 429-430 
location of wiring, 430-433 
premises for design, 429 
protective devices, 441-446 
shielding, 176-179, 433-437 
transient coordination, 446-448 
Diffusion (See pulse penetration) 
Direct effects, defined, 76, 77 
o n  fuel systems (See fuel systems and 
fuel tanks) 
on composites (See composites) 
on metallic surfaces (See metallic 
surfaces, fuel systems) 
magnetic force, 78-79, 8 1  
melting and burnthrough, 78, 8 0  
pitting, 79 
resistance heating, 82  
Diverters, application of ,  2 13-220 
electromagnetic interference from, 
223 
foil, 222-223 
inductance of ,  222 
internal, 22 1 
metallic coatings, 224 
on composite materials, 247 
on  wing tips, 132, 156 
required size, 220 
segmented, 225-226 
solid bar, 220-221 
tests on, 2 18-2 19 
thermal elongation, 194, 195 
types of, 220-228 
woven wire, 224 
Dwell time (See swept strokes) 
Eddy currents, 299, 303, 309 
Electric field, as influenced by air- 
craft, 37, 39  
at aircraft surface, 38-41 
at surface of a sphere, 40 
coupling through apertures, 341- 
342 
effects on circuits, 353-357 
external intensity, 353 
on interior of cylinders, 298-302 
on interior of shield, 369 
Electron density, 48 
Elljptical conductors, current distri- 
bution, 274-276 
internal magnetic field, 288, 289, 
309-320 
tangential field intensity, 274-276, 
287 
Engincs, lightning cffects on, 75, 96,  
97 .98  
Explosion, in fuelvent systems, 127- 
132 
in fuel tanks, 115-1 16, 162 
of conductors, 82,  84,  188-193 
of radomes, 8 3  
Fasteners, effects on magnetic fields, 
325 
needed to carry lightning currents, 
166 
Flame arresters, configurations, 124, 
125 
location of, 125, 126, 133 
Flame sprayed aluminum, on com- 
posites, 247 
shielding properties of, 243, 244 
Flame suppression, 124-126 
Flammability, limits of jet fuels and 
gasolne, 1 15-1 20 
Flash blindness, 7 1, 75 
Flash, lightning, charge formation, 2 
components of, 1 ,  2, 18 
direction of, 1 8  
influence of aircraft, 37 
influence of ground, 15 
polarity, 18, 19 
statistics (See statistics, lightning) 
types of ,  1, 19 
F-8 aircraft, 41  3-425 
F-89 aircraft, 407-41 3 
Filler caps, protection of ,  159-163 
sparking at, 92-95, 159-163 
Fuel quantity probes, 156-158, 160, 
175-179 
Fuel lines, bonding of, 134, 135 
Fuel systems, 89-91 
protection of, 115-180 
wing tip tanks, 93, 95,  153-159, 
162 
Fuel tanks, attachment zones related 
to,  132-134, 153-156 
diverters on (See diverters) 
hot spots from arcs, 136 
inerting of. 120 
integral fuel tanks (See integral 
fuel tanks) 
nonmetallic, 154-1 59 
objects within, 157-158 
puncture of, 154-159 
required skin thickness, 136, 154 
streamers in, 156 
titanium vs aluminum, 140 
trailing edge, 153-154 
wing tip, 93, 95, 155-159 
General aviation aircraft, strike to, 92 
Hinges, 203-205 
Ignition of fuel, effect of  altitude, 117, 
119 
effect of temperature, 116-120 
energy required, 9 0  
flame retardant foams, 9 1 
flammability of fuel, 11 5-1 20 
from vents, 91, 121-134 
fuel probes, 9 0  
hot spots, 136-153 
resulting from filler caps, 139-162, 
190 
sources of ignition, 120-179 
Indirect effects, defined, 76, 77 ,99-  
101 
examples of, 92,  98, 100 
Induced voltages, on external loops, 
294, 297 
on fuel probe wiring, 177 
on  internal loops in circular cylin- 
ders, 293. 296, 298 
on  internal loops in elliptical cylin- 
ders, 3 11-3 14 
Inductance, of  bond straps, 135, 164, 
170 
of diverter strips, 2 14 
in ground conductors, 403-404 
mutual, calculation of, 280, 401- 
402 
self, calculation of ,  280, 307, 323- 
324 
transfer (See transfer inductance) 
Interaction, of aircraft with the lightning 
channel, 42-43, 49-50, 85-86, 
140, 144-149,254-259 
Interception of  lightning, altitude, 57-58 
in clear air, 1, 59-60 
flight conditions, 59 
as influenced by temperature, 58,  
63-64 
as influenced by time of year, 6 3  
as influenced by weather, 59-64 
warning symptoms, 65-7 1 
Ionization, at aircraft extremities, 
38-46 
of  engine exhaust, 47-49 
of  leader, 6 
Jointh, g~~idcl i t ies  for design, 166-167 
in pipes and couplings, 168-173 
on  skins, spars, rib\, 165-1 67 
Laplace's equation, 276, 278 
I.attice diagrams, 258 
Leader, as  influenced 1)y aircraft, 37-38 
charge o n ,  7 , 9  
dcvcloptitcnt of, 5-6, 8 
dialiietcr of ,  7 
electric field s t rc~~pt l t ,  7 
propagation of ,  38, 12-43  
resistance of, 9 
step-, 5-9 
velocity of, 9 
protection from te~nperaturc rise in, 
188-193 
Models, for attachment point studies, 
52-53, I 0 8  
for determining estcrnal current 
density, 285-286 
of liglitning flaslies, 31-33, 110 
Nonmetallic materials (See carlopies, 
composites, fiberglass) 
Orbiter (See Space Skiirtle) 
MAGFLD, coniptlter prograni, 280 
Magnetic fields -- euternal, cleliientary 
concepts, 269-280 
esamples of, 277, 285, 291 
intlucncc of radius of  curvature, 271 
methods of determining, 274, 284 
Magnetic fields internal, apcrture- 
coupled, 261-262, 329-344 
diffusion-coupled, 293-326 
esperiment and nicasurcment. 3 14- 
320, 41 3-425 
in cavities, 310-326 
pulsc pcnctration titlie constant, 
298-303 
redistribution time constant, 305 
Magnetic fields, mcasurcrnent o f ,  420- 
4 26 
Magnetic field zones, 341-344, 359 
Magnetic forces, a t  joints, 200 
be taeen  conductors. 196 
esamples, 8 1, 197 
o n  bond straps, 201-203 
o n  riletal surfaces, 195-203 
Magnetos, 75 
Metals, properties of, 150-152 
Metallic surfaces, holes burned in, 
136-140, 187 
magnetic force effects, 195-203 
pitting of, 79, 138 
protection from holes, 141, 149- 
153, 186-188 
P-sta tic (See precipilatiotr static) 
Precipitation static, 42-43 
a7 influrnced by btatic dischargers, 
45 
frequency spectrum, 45 
Properties of metals (See rndals,  
properties on  
Propellers, 96-97 
Protcctive devices fur wiring, forward 
conducting diodes, 444 
nonlinear resistors, 442 
varistors, 442 
Zener diodes, 443 
Radar returns, 65,  6 8  
Radomcs, 87 ,  89 ,  207-217, 225-228 
attachment point tests, 208-2 1 2  
da~iiage to,  83 ,  87 ,  208 
Rain gradient, 6 6  
Reflections, of apertures, 338 
of pressure waves in fuel vent sys- 
tems, 118-1 29 
o f  traveling waves, 254-260 
resulting from protective de- 
vices, 44 1 
Requirements, airworthiness related 
to liglitning, 11  1-1 1 3  
Resistance, 261, 264-266 
of bond straps, 164 
of composites (See conductivity o f  
composites) 
of hinges, 205 
of metals (See metals, properties o n  
Resistivity, influence of, on pulse pene- 
tration time, 298-302 
on  redistribution tirne, 308 
on temperature rise, 188-190, 193, 
230-231 
Resistivity of  typical metals, 303 
Restrike, 18 
Return stroke, current, 1 1 
development of, 9-14 
resistance, 12 
surge impedance, 1 4  
velocity of  propagation, 10 
voltage gradient, 12 
St. Elmo's fire, 4 ,  44, 69 
Segmented diverter strip (See diverters) 
Shielded conductors, braided shields, 
effects of grounding, 355, 362- 
368, 385-393, 437 
effects of load impedancc, 362-369, 
387, 390-393 
multiple shields, 385-393 
response to current, 363-368 
transfer admittance, 380-381 
transfer inductance, 368-379 
Shielded conductors, solid shields, 298- 
303 ,382  
Shielded conductors, spiral shields, 
381-382 
Shock wave, 83,  86  
Single point grounding, 765 
Skin depth, 775 
Space Shuttle, 33, 34, 258, 344, 356, 
507 ,508  
Sparking, a t  access doors, 163-164 
at couplings, 168-173 
at fuel filler caps, 161-162 
at joints, 165-168 
voltage required for, 170, 173, 175 
Static discharge, 37,  45, 46 
forewarning by precipitation static, 
45-46 
Statistics - Aircraft, frequency of, 
strikes to, 71-72 
Statistics - Characteristics of  lightning, 
amplitude of return stroke, 21 
charge in continuing current, 14 
charge per flash, 25 
duration, 23  
frequency of occurrence, 27-3 1 
front time, 15-16, 21 
interval between strokes, 24 
rate of rise, 22 
return strokes per flash, 24 
tail time, 15-17, 23  
Statistics, strikes to aircraft, altitude, 58  
flight condition, 59 
frequency of occurrence, 71-72 
temperature, 6 4  
time of year, 6 3  
weather, 60 ,  6 4  
Stoichiometric mixture, 123 
Streamers, discharge, 5 
from helmets, 88 
near fuel vents, 132-1 36 
on nonmetallic surfaces, 207-2 13 
Swept strokes, as affected by environ- 
ment, 110 
dwell time, 143-147 
influence of air velocity, 146-147 
influence of coatings, 232, 140, 147 
mechanism, 49 
on rivets, 166-167 
ways to reduce dwell time, 153 
zones, 106-107 
Synoptic meteorological conditions, 59 
Tests, of diverters, 2 18-2 19 
to observe sparking, 17 1 
to verify protection, 1 10-1 f 3, 180- 
181,446-450, 495-529 
Test equipment, electric and magnetic 
fields, 5 19 
surge withstand capability (SWC), 
508, 513 ,515  
transformer injection of transient, 
514-529 
transient control level, 447, 448, 
509-5 14 
Tests for indirect effects, full-scale on 
complete vehicles, 499-501 
transient analysis tests o n  complete 
vehicles, 499-504 
transient control level, 446-450 
waveform definitions, 505-5 11 
Tests for direct effects, airworthiness 
certification, 11 1-1 13  
diverter placement, 2 13-2 19 
fiberglass structures, 207-2 19 
fuel system protection, 180-181 
full-scale attachment, 207-212 
swept-stroke, 146-147 
Thermal expansion, 194-195 
Thunderstorms, cells, 2-5, 58, 65-68 
frequency of occurrence, 27 
Time lag curve, 209, 2 10, 2 1 1 
Transients, analysis technique, 4 13-426, 
501-504 
control levels, 446-450,5 1 1 
specifications, 507-5 11 
tests, 5 11-529 
Triboelectric charging, 43 
Triggering of  lightning, by  an aircraft, 
3 7 , 4 7  
by Apollo 12, 48 
by electromagnetic radiation, 49 
by jet engine exhaust, 47-49 
Turbulence, 64, 66  
Varistors (See protective devices for 
wiring) 
Vcnt outlets (See also ignition of fuel, 
fuel systems), Atlantic Research 
study, 123 
effects of air flow, 121, 126-1 27 
effects of turbulence, 129 
explosive ignitions, 127 
location of, 132-1 3 3  
Lockheed -- LTRl study, 126 
velocity of flame propagation, 123, 
I25 
velocity of flames, 127, 130-131 
Wire fabric, cffects of coatings, 246 
mechanism of operation, 234, 246 
Wiring, aid to calculation of  current and 
voltage, 357-359 
current induced upon, 351 -352 
influence of location, 179,430-433 
in fuel tanks, 172,  179 
response to electric fields, 35 3-357 
response to magnetic fields, 349-353 
transmission line effects, 351-353 
voltages induced upon, 349-350 
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